After all, 
who in
one’s right mind would yet allow the use of absolutely
 antiquated,
completely out-dated, easily hack-able and highly
 tamper-able “high
school technology” based, obsolete EVMs (electronic
voting machines) in
national elections, even now — in 2016?

More
than 80 democracies
in the world have simply done away with them,
 dumping them in the trash,
or simply declared the usage of this
 simplistic voting system
susceptible to fraud, and hence declaring the
 same as illegal — as the
Supreme Courts of Germany and Holland indeed 
have done. Even Japan, from
where EVMs originated, has long abandoned 
its rogue babies, and is
using paper ballot system since then. All the
  advanced democracies in
the West, except the most dull-headed ones, have 
reverted to a voter
verifiable system or the ballot paper. In Canada,
even at the ,most
basic school level, ballot paper voting is in use.

Over a billion cuckoos cackle, cry and crap in India.

It 
is a nation where intelligence rules in closed quarters, idiocy in the
 open. Just like the open toilets under the benign gaze of Mother
 Nature — there are more cell phones than toilets in India, a survey
reports. Oh! the average Indian retorts — and, then, goes on to do
“business” as usual, sitting on the haunches, as sorry-assed as
before — or sorts.
We are an indifferent,
intelligently inclined idiocy — oops! democracy, We make gods out of
mud, then, prostrating before them, we remain, as before, a dud. And,
some times, in the name of our fancied little god and his glory, my
motherland’s favorite sons also kill each other, with the deep ingrained
vigor of all our bestial ancestry, and like a whiff of wind are
gone — dead.

Lest it becomes confusing, let’s say it
as it is — we Indians, like every other human being, are truly one
really, really queer kin of apes. In some fields, ahead of others and
beyond compare; in other areas, we are as silly and supercilious as a
bull-hounded mare. In a nutshell, Indians, at least in the loftier
mystical and evolved spiritual circles “get” some things well — like
higher metaphysics — while failing miserably, simplistically, in simple,
elementary physics.

After all,
who in one’s right mind would yet allow the use of absolutely
antiquated, completely out-dated, easily hack-able and highly
tamper-able “high school technology” based, obsolete EVMs (electronic
voting machines) in national elections, even now — in 2014?

More
than 80 democracies in the world have simply done away with them,
dumping them in the trash, or simply declared the usage of this
simplistic voting system susceptible to fraud, and hence declaring the
same as illegal — as the Supreme Courts of Germany and Holland indeed
have done. Even Japan, from where EVMs originated, has long abandoned
its rogue babies, and is using paper ballot system since then. All the
advanced democracies in the West, except the most dull-headed ones, have
reverted to a voter verifiable system or the ballot paper. In Canada,
even at the ,most basic school level, ballot paper voting is in use.

Last
 year, the Supreme Court of India, having been convinced of an 
undeniable, edible possibility of EVMs getting tampered with and that
 easily hacked — even from afar — had ordered the imbecilic Election
 Commission and the indolent Government of India to provide about 1600
crore (1600, 0000000) rupees — convert this into your respective
currency! — for manufacturing these VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trail) voting machines; which show a verifiable paper receipt to the
voter.

This is the Fundamental Right of a citizen of
 India, as per the laws laid down by the Constitution. However, recent 
newspaper reports tell us that only 20, 000 such voting machines have
 been provided for the entire country in this, 2014 election! India has
 29 states now — with Telagana being the latest. In most of them,
depending upon their size etc., either about 400 VVPAT machines are 
being deployed, or some such similar ridiculous number — more or
 less — has been made available in the length and breadth of the country.
 It’s an asinine, bland, cruel, demeaning joke we 1.25 billion joker s
have been “blessed” with by the powers that be.

All “patriotic” hackers of our motherland are going to make hay in May!

As
to how EVMs can be hacked into, tampered with, and results favorably
manipulated via software interference and other means — from near and
from far, far away — this can easily be found by anybody by just going
to Google etc. and filling “EVM HACKING, TAMPERING” or
something to this effect in the Search. And lo, behold! a plethora of
information will just overwhelm your overly chilled-out, lesser
employed, un-billed brains.

However,
the only solace for us naive fools is that quite a few unscrupulous
politicians and every other most “honorable” political party worthy of
its “salt”, would surely be playing this comic-tragic game of hacking
into and hijacking the votes of a billion people! Thus, one who
outsmarts the other such fine folks, armed with their hacking forks in
this merry-go-around, will win.

The
rest — this or that “tsunami” or wave in favor of one or the other, poll
forecasts and the “newbie”, the over enthused, seeming game changers in
the making — well, they may well fall flat on their dumb faces, if not
on their smart asses.

That the Supreme Court of India
too, while passing the order of putting new VVAT voting machines in use
in a “phased manner”, has unwittingly shirked its duty. In fact, it
committed a grave error of judgment. Perhaps dealt a fatal blow to
Indian democracy. It should have ordered, as a caution, that till the
time this newer set of about 1300ooo voting machines is manufactured in
full and so deployed throughout India, ballot paper system would be
brought in. No such precautionary measure was decreed by the apex court.
Well,
crib all you want. But don’t cry, my dear countrymen. After all, the
same model of EVMs is yet very much in use in South Africa, Bangla Desh,
Bhutan, Nepal, Nigeria, Venezuela etc. These poor folks of the said
“non-techy” countries — millions of them — too cannot figure out as to
what the hell had, yet is happening, in their dear short-circuited
“developed” democracies. Nor will you.

Don’t worry, be happy! You are not alone “out there”.

Oh,
by the way, the somewhat notorious lawyer who had brought in this
case — of the present lot of EVMs being tamper-able and hack-able — and,
who, had successfully fought it so, forcing the Supreme Court to order
the installation of a fail-safe voting mechanism (of Voter Verifiable
Paper Audit machines replacing the susceptible earlier Electronic Voting
Machines) to ensure a free and fair electoral process in India — well,
this oh-so-very honorable fellow too has fallen silent, like a demure
maiden. This most vociferous gentleman had openly declared on social
websites, especially Twitter, that in case VVPAT machines do not get
installed in time for 2014 elections, then, there would be a
“constitutional crisis” — putting it out there like an Indian
“pehalwan”, a la WWW wrestler, that he would challenge the same in the
apex court. He had most emphatically underlined he would ensure that
either the new fail-safe voting machines or the old time-tested paper
ballot system will be put in use during this general election in India.
However, recently, when asked specifically on Twitter about this
matter — as to what this lovely man is doing or is going to do about
this impending doomsday electoral scenario — there was a deafening
silence from his side. May be owing to the fact that since the Supreme
Court judgement late last year, this self-righteous rightist has joined
the ultra-rightist political bandwagon.

The latter has
been projected by pollsters to overwhelmingly sweep these
elections — as a direct result of the doings of the monstrous public
relations firm hired from the land of the let-it-be, oops! free. This
US firm is the same that was used fruitfully by President Bush and
Hillary Clinton for their respective political campaigns. It has — let
there be no doubt about it — successfully projected its client as the
potential winner and the next numero uno in Indian politics.

What
the majority of the Indians have missed in fine print is that the
outgoing Chief Minister of the state of Rajasthan, in the last year
elections, had officially filed a complaint with the election commission
that the EVMs used in his state were pre-programmed and tampered
with — and that the same had come from the state of which this presently
hyped-up future Prime Minister of India, is the current Chief Minister.
Now, the lawyer who had gone to the dogs to awaken India and the rest
of the world about the mischief and malfeasance possible with the old
model of EVMs — and had in fact written a book on this subject — is in a
wink-wink deep-throat “smadhi”. A silence that speaks truths we dumb
billion idiots on this part of slippery earth cannot fathom. Perhaps
it’s a precursor of the things to come.

Let us hope
the jolly good hackers of this-that party screw-up each other’s
devilish, outright evil plans. In a dog eat dog political crap pit we
hapless billion creatures have to walk through every election, maybe
this time the ape sitting by the side — the wide-eyed hopeful citizen of
India — at least gets a tiny part of the apple pie this messy hacking
cat fight will leave behind, on the side lanes. Perhaps these little
crumbs will be enough for us to stay afloat. though not gloat.

In a nutshell, simply put, whosoever “out-hacks” the other, will win.

Then
again, we are an ancient civilization of more than 33, 0000000 gods and
goddesses — some civilized, others not so civil. Let’s hope one of
these fancied deities has a soft corner for us dumbos. Otherwise, we are
going to get screwed. A billion times over.

Therefore,
I made doubly sure I did not vote. I sat on my ass on voting day — not
that I don’t do so everyday. This voting day, I absolutely did. Not only
figuratively and metaphorically, but literally. I may have many buts in
life, but at least today I have a little sore, yet not so sorry a butt.
We are a fool’s paradise.

Long live the banana republic of India!

https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/secrecy

The secrecy of the vote is seen as one of the fundamental principles required in the conduct of democratic elections. Failure to secure the secrecy of the vote opens the possibility for voters to prove how they have voted, facilitating voter coercion and vote buying. Both of these practices undermine the free expression of the will of the voter and the possibility for election results to reflect the will of the voters.

If implemented properly, the paper-based system of voting effectively protects the secrecy of the vote. In the case of electronic counting, the same protections that currently exist for the hand counting of paper ballots should be applied. Electronic voting, however, introduces a number of additional ways secrecy can be violated. Voting machines record the choices cast on them by voters, and these votes may be recorded in the order in which they are cast with a time stamp. This means if someone knows the order in which voters cast their ballots on a voting machine or the time at which a voter cast their ballot and has access to the record of voting on the machine, they could determine the choices made by each voter.

Appropriate procedures restricting access to logged transactions on the voting machine would reduce this threat to the secrecy of the vote. In countries that have experienced authoritarian trends, these issues are likely to generate suspicions among citizens concerning breaches of ballot secrecy, and extra steps may be required to establish public confidence.

Other developments with electronic voting machines are increasing the threat to the secrecy of the vote. While the VVPAT is a vital tool in building confidence in the use of electronic voting machines and in providing an audit mechanism, it can also be implemented in such a way as to undermine the secrecy of the vote. Some VVPAT systems have a roll of paper on which the voter’s choices are printed. As the choices are printed sequentially, this can be used with the order in which voters cast their ballots on the voting machine to determine the content of each person’s vote. Access to the paper audit trail cannot be restricted in the same way as with electronic records on voting machines, since the audit trail is meant to be taken out and checked against the electronic record of the voting machine.

However, not all VVPAT systems function in this way. Some voting machine paper audit trails operate a cut-and-drop system where the printed vote is cut from the roll of paper and drops into an internal ballot box within the voting machine. This ensures that audit records are randomized in the same way as placing a paper ballot into a physical ballot box.

A potential, final challenge to the secrecy of the vote from electronic voting machines comes from the most recent developments with voting machines, whereby the machines also conduct voter identification. Most voting machines still rely on a physical process for voter identification and authentication, with polling staff checking voter names against a voter list separate from the voting machine. This means voter identification data and vote data are held in completely separate processes (the former through a manual process and the latter through an electronic process), which are never linked in any way, making it impossible to link voting data to the voter.

More recent voting machines are also fulfilling the function of voter identification and authentication. This identification can be by simply entering an ID number or passcode for the voter, or it can be through the voting machine scanning a biometric attribute of the voter and identifying them from a list of approved voters. Clearly, when the voting machine identifies the voter, it possesses both pieces of information required to break the secrecy of the vote and could retain the link between the two.

Technical solutions are readily available to ensure it is not possible to link voter data with the value of their vote. However, EMBs will need to adequately address concerns by stakeholders that this link is still maintained and that the secrecy of the vote is not violated.

While challenges related to the secrecy of the vote with electronic voting machines can be resolved, it is important that electoral stakeholders are cognizant of them and take all necessary steps to ensure the secrecy of the vote when considering the use of voting machines. At the same time, observers should evaluate whether any aspect of the process might challenge this fundamental principle.

https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/legal-and-procedural-framework

Legal and Procedural Framework

The use of electronic voting and counting technologies should be defined in the legal framework. This process can take a considerable amount of time, particularly since key legal provisions are incorporated at the legislative level (i.e., in constitutions and electoral laws) as well as the regulatory level. Amendments should, at a minimum, address the following: physical and procedural aspects of voting or counting processes; testing and certification; audit mechanisms and conduct; status of audit records versus electronic records; transparency mechanisms; data security and retention; voter identification; and access to source code. The process of developing amendments should involve input from electoral stakeholders, including political parties and civil society.
In order to properly implement electronic voting or counting technologies, the use of these technologies needs to not only be in compliance with the constitutional and legal provisions relating to elections and the general conduct of public affairs, but must also be defined in the legal framework for elections. The legal framework includes the constitution, if there is one, the laws relating to elections, and the secondary legislation (such as regulations, rules and procedures often passed by electoral management bodies).

While constitutions rarely say anything specific about electronic voting or counting technologies, they may include general provisions that are relevant to the use of these technologies. Germany provides a good example of this (see Figure 11 below for more details), with the German Constitutional Court deciding in 2009 that the electronic voting machines used in Germany did not comply with general transparency requirements for the electoral process established in the constitution.

In addition to ensuring that suggested technology solutions are in compliance with the constitutional framework of a country, consideration should also be given to whether suggested solutions meet international standards, including emerging standards for the use of electronic voting and counting technologies. Election officials and lawmakers may wish to study other countries’ experiences when considering whether to adopt such technologies.
Primary and secondary legislation will inevitably need to be amended in order to accommodate the use of electronic voting and counting technologies. It is important that key legal provisions relating to the use of electronic voting or counting system are included at a legislative level so that the use of these technologies is not entirely legislated at the regulatory level. The necessary amendments to the electoral legal framework will vary depending on the technology being implemented but should cover, at a minimum, the issues listed below:

    •    Physical Aspects of the Voting or Counting Process – The use of electronic voting or counting machines will entail changes to the procedure for the setup and conduct of voting and/or counting. For example, when direct-recording electronic voting machines are used, there is no ballot box to prepare and seal. The common practice of displaying the empty physical ballot box before polling starts does have a comparable procedure for electronic voting or counting machines; a display demonstrating that no ballots have been stored is conducted for observers at the beginning of the process. Some of the procedures relating to the setup and conduct of voting and/or counting may be in the election law(s) or may be in secondary legislation, and both will need to be reviewed and amended to accommodate the setup and use of electronic voting or counting technologies.

    •    Procedural Aspects of the Voting and Counting Process – The timeline for the preparation of the voting or counting systems should be clearly outlined, as should details of how the system is to be operated, who is allowed access to it during elections, how equipment should be stored between elections and how access to equipment in storage should be regulated and reported.

    •    Testing and Certification of Technologies – Electronic voting and counting technologies clearly need to be tested before they are used. While any responsible election management body would ensure that sufficient testing of such technologies takes place before they are used for elections, it may be useful to guarantee that testing takes place and specify the kinds of testing to be conducted by including these requirements in the law or in secondary legislation. Likewise, if there is a process of formal certification of electronic voting and counting technologies, this should be included in the law as well. The law should also clearly identify the institutions with the authority to provide this certification, the timeframe for certification and the standards and requirements against which certification will take place.

    •    Audit Mechanisms – The need for audit mechanisms for electronic voting and counting technologies is an emerging international standard. In order to ensure that this standard is met, the requirement for an audit trail should be included in the law. The nature of the audit mechanisms may also be specified if relevant — for example, any requirement for a voter-verifiable audit trail often used with electronic voting machines.

    •    Conduct of Audits – Audits should be conducted in order to generate trust in the use of electronic voting or counting machines and to ensure that these technologies function correctly. Many different kinds of audits can be conducted, including audits of the results, audits of internal logs, audits of storage and access to devices, and so on. The law should clearly identify which audits are to be implemented, when such audits are to take place and the scale of the audits. In addition to requiring audits, which should be provided irrespective of whether there are any electoral challenges, the law should also identify conditions under which recounts are to take place.

    •    Status of Audit Records Versus Electronic Records – In the event that the conduct of an audit determines a different result than is produced electronically by an electronic voting or counting machine, the law should specify how to deal with the situation.

    •    Transparency Mechanisms – The use of electronic voting and counting machines entails the conduct of existing electoral procedures in different ways, as well as the conduct of new stages in the electoral process (for example, the configuration of electronic voting machines). In the interest of transparency, appropriate procedures will need to be developed to ensure that political actors and observers have access to these different and new processes so that they can provide meaningful oversight of the process. These transparency measures should be clearly defined in the legal framework so that observers and party representatives understand and can utilize their access rights.

    •    Data Security and Retention – It is unlikely that existing laws and procedures adequately cover the issue of electronic data security when using electronic voting or counting machines. The way in which all electoral data is secured and stored will need to be provided for in the legal framework, as will the timeframe and procedures for deletion of the electronic data, and these provisions must be in accordance with existing data protection legislation.

    •    Voter Identification – If identification/authentication is being incorporated into the electronic voting process, then this may require legislation, whether using biometrics or making mandatory a particular form of machine-readable ID. In such cases it is essential that the secrecy of the vote be protected through de-linking the vote and the identity of the voter.

    •    Access to Source Code – It may be prudent to legislate whether source code is open source or not, in addition to legislating the mechanisms for any access by stakeholders.
Many of these issues are covered in greater detail later in this part of the guide, and the intention here is to identify the issues that are relevant for inclusion in order to properly legislate for the use of electronic voting or counting technologies.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that adapting the legal framework for the use of electronic voting or counting technologies will entail considerable amendments to laws and secondary legislation. Electoral stakeholders must be involved in the development of these legislative and regulatory amendments. Initially, political parties and observers should be consulted on the ways in which the legislation needs to be changed, especially from a transparency and oversight perspective. Once legislation is passed, the election management body will need to fully brief political parties, the media and civil society on the changes that have been made.

https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/constitutionality-of-electronic-voting-germany

The Constitutionality of Electronic Voting in Germany

After a largely successful trial period spanning from 1998 to 2005, two citizens challenged the constitutionality of electronic voting before the German Constitutional Court. Though the public generally viewed the voting system in a favorable manner throughout the trial period, the actual legality of the technology was not fully assessed in advance of implementation.

Germany piloted its first electronic voting machines, supplied by the Dutch company NEDAP, in Cologne in 1998. The trial was seen as successful, and one year later Cologne used electronic voting machines for its entire European Parliament elections. Soon other cities followed suit, and by the 2005 general election nearly 2 million German voters were using these NEDAP machines to cast votes. Reaction to the use of these electronic voting machines was generally very positive among voters, who found the machines to be easy to use, and among election administrators, who were able to reduce the number of polling stations and staff in each polling station.
However, after the 2005 election, two voters brought a case before the German Constitutional Court after unsuccessfully raising a complaint with the Committee for the Scrutiny of Elections. The case argued that the use of electronic voting machines was unconstitutional and that it was possible to hack the voting machines, thus the results of the 2005 election could not be trusted.

The German Constitutional Court upheld the first argument, concurring that the use of the NEDAP voting machines was unconstitutional. The Court noted that, under the constitution, elections are required to be public in nature and that all essential steps of an election are subject to the possibility of public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests justify an exception . . . The use of voting machines which electronically record the voters’ votes and electronically ascertain the election result only meets the constitutional requirements if the essential steps of the voting and of the ascertainment of the result can be examined reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject . . . The very wide-reaching effect of possible errors of the voting machines or of deliberate electoral fraud make special precautions necessary in order to safeguard the principle of the public nature of elections.30

Making it clear that the court’s decision did not rule out the use of voting machines in principle, it stated that:
The legislature is not prevented from using electronic voting machines in elections if the possibility of a reliable examination of correctness, which is constitutionally prescribed, is safeguarded. A complementary examination by the voter, by the electoral bodies or the general public is possible for example with electronic voting machines in which the votes are recorded in another way beside electronic storage.