Though
a recent report,[114] dtd. Nov. 19 2017, claims, quoting unidentified
official sources, that the IT Department has now slapped criminal
charges under the new anti-black money Act and launched fresh assessment
of stashed offshore income against over half-a-dozen Indian entities in
the (Panama Papers) list, yet the identities of those presumably
charged remain undisclosed.

So, this report, authentic or not,
makes hardly any impact on the overall picture of lack of governmental
actions in this regard.
Demonetisation to Fight ’Terrorism’

It’s hardly any wonder that the government would claim remarkable success even on this front.

Unsurprisingly, this is almost solely based on the claim that
demonetisation has hit the terrorists by depriving them of the funds to
carry out their nefarious activities and very thin, if at all any,
actual evidence.

The headline115of a news report carried by the
India Today on the occasion of the first anniversary of demonetisation
is a typical illustration:
Arun Jaitley calls demonetisation a success, says terrorists hit by fund shortage
Rather interestingly, the actual report does not at all touch upon the issue of “terrorism”.

The then Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, had also made similar
claims soon after demonetisation. Here is an analytical note[116]
tearing apart his arguments and listing out the string of actual
instances of numerous terrorist attacks committed in the immediate wake
of the move: Demonetisation’s Strike on Terrorism is another Blatant Lie
by the Government.

Now, a communication,[117] apparently mass emailed, by the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) has claimed:
Stone-pelting incidents in Kashmir came down by 75% from the previous
year as one of the multi-dimensional benefits of DEMONETISATION!

As if stone pelting in Kashmir Valley was supposed to continue for eternity but for the demonetisation.

In any case, here is a very different account [118] offered by none other than India’s Chief of the Army Staff:
Stone pelting in Kashmir has come down “to some extent” said Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat today (Nov. 10 2017).
The army chief said that combined efforts of the Indian Army, BSF, CRPF, and the J&K Police has helped.
“Solution to this can’t be achieved overnight. Government, intelligence
agencies, state administration all are making efforts. Will be
successful if things go in this direction, can say this with belief,” he
added.

No mention of demonetisation, just none!

And, at any rate, stone-pelting cannot be counted under the category of terrorism.

Furthermore, P Chidambaram, a senior Congress leader and former Union Finance and Home Minister, has recently testified: [119]
“As of November 10, the number of infiltrations, the number of
militants neutralised, the number of civilians killed and the number of
jawans martyred, all are larger than the numbers for the corresponding
period in 2016.”

And, this public testimony, by no Tom, Dick or Harry, remains uncontradicted.
Subsequently Added Objectives

Formalisation of Informal Sectors and Less-Cash Economy

The proponents of demonetisation have (now) given a new spin [emphasis
added] (as almost 99 per cent of the Rs 15.44 lakh crore of the
demonetised currency returned to government’s coffers). They portray the
return of the notes as a success. They claim that those with black
money were forced to deposit their illegal hoards in the banks and they
can now be caught by the tax department and made to pay additional
taxes. This, the argument goes, would expand the tax base. Further, they
argue that the idle black money is now in the banks and that would lead
to efficiency because the cash-to-GDP ratio would decline. They believe
there is a formalisation of the informal economy and that the economy
is moving towards a less cash economy. These are the long-term benefits
even if there was short-term pain [emphasis added].[120]

It’s on
November 27 2016, eighteen days after the launch of demonetisation, the
PM had made his first public appeal [121] to the nation through his
monthly radio programme Mann ki Baat, the youth of India in particular,
to take a pledge to become part of a çashless society for a corruption
less, black money-free India.

This was done against the backdrop
of common people’s dire struggle to cope up with the severe cash crunch,
badly affecting their daily lives, triggered by demonetisation.

From that point onward, moving towards a cashless economy was, by and
by, added [122] as another virtuous goal of demonetisation.

The
cashless would, however, in view of its sheer absurdity as highlighted
by the critics of demonetisation, be, after a rather short while,
modified [123, 124] to less-cash.

This does not, however,
necessarily rule out, or for that matter rule in, the possibility that
this goal had already been in the minds of those launching
demonetisation.[125, 125a, 126]

One may, here, like to recall the
full front-paged ads [127] in leading newspapers that the leading
e-wallet company Paytm came up with, on the very morning following the
announcement, congratulating PM Modi.

But, to be sure, the goal
of moving towards a cashless, or rather less-cash, economy did figure
nowhere in the November 8 speech.[127a]

Its subsequent addition,
whatever be the driver(s), strongly suggests an admission, even if only
indirect, of the failure of meeting the originally announced goals. (So
is, arguably, Jaitley’s branding [128, 129] of demonetisation, on the
eve of its first anniversary, as ethical and moral decision.

Similarly, the goal of formalising the informal sectors of the Indian economy would also be added while on the go.

And, it gained considerable traction with a World Bank report, reported
widely by Indian media in early June, strongly championing [130] the
cause of demonetisation as a driver for formalising the informal
economy.

The twin objectives of moving towards a less-cash economy and formalisation of informal economy are fairly interlinked.

A formal economy provides a better ecosystem for the emergence of a
less-cash economy and, conversely, a less-cash economy provides a nudge
towards formalisation.

Before we proceed to examine the success
or otherwise in meeting these two goals, it is necessary to briefly look
into their essential rationale and desirability.

Manmohan Singh, in a recent interview,[131] in his characteristic soft tone has put it this way:
We are a nation of small and medium enterprises. There are certain
characteristics inherent in these small and medium businesses. They tend
to be less organised, more informal and use cash as the primary mode of
transaction. The underlying economic policy objective in our country
should be to find ways to help these small businesses become larger
which will then help us reap the efficiencies of scale economies. But we
need to be able to achieve these objectives without any disruption to
these small enterprises in their current form. Objectives such as a less
cash or digital economy are laudable pursuits. But we also need to get
our economic priorities right. It is unclear that these goals of
cashless economy will indeed help small enterprises become larger and
achieve scale efficiencies. That should be our priority. These small and
medium enterprises are the backbone of India’s economy and labour
markets.

He has further added:
In India, we refer to an
informal economy as one that is not officially registered, is outside
the tax net but plays an important role in the economic value chain. I
do not think India is unique among emerging economies in its share of
the informal economy. Given our size of the overall economy, the
absolute size of the informal economy seems very large. The value
created by the informal sector will be captured in the form of income,
wealth or consumption effects. Hence, we must be cautious about sweeping
generalisations about the informal economy and passing moral judgments
about the entire sector.
Having said all this, it is very important
for a nation such as ours to build strong state capacity to lift our
standards of governance. This is possible only when we increase our
share of tax revenues. If formalisation of the informal sector means
widening of the tax base, it should be welcomed. But the means is as
important as the ends.
(Never mind the irony of Manmohan Singh mouthing the need to protect small and medium enterprises.)

Prior to that, Raghuram Rajan had put it [132]rather crisply:
“One has to be careful on separating intent from cost,” Rajan said.
“Intent is to reduce the extent of non-compliance with taxation, which
in the long run would be good in terms of generating more revenue. The
problem is at what cost?” Rajan asked.

Here is a more hardline view:[133]
The informal sector, however, is not an aberration in our growth
process. It is an integral part of the process of transition from a
traditional economy to a modern economy. While it may not pay taxes and
is largely dependent on cash, it plays an important role in providing
jobs to millions of first-time workers and to millions of others who are
moving out of agriculture to the non-agricultural sector. It provides
the first exposure to many of these illiterate and low-skilled workers
to the new economy. At the same time, it is also the biggest agency
which does the painful task of re-skilling the majority of these
workers—much more than any government scheme. Any attempt to reduce the
role of the informal sector is only going to make the transition arduous
and difficult for the economy.
But in the rhetoric of ‘everybody is
a thief’, the real casualty are the informal enterprises. Attempts at
forcing informal enterprises to become formal may kill the golden goose
which has been taking care of the transitional pains of the economy by
providing jobs. It has also acted as a sponge, creating incomes and
demand when the agricultural sector was in stress. The short-term
benefit of formalisation of the economy is at the cost of long-term loss
of the crucial agency of the informal sector. The net benefits to the
economy through income generation, employment creation and re-skilling
of labour by the informal sector far outweighs any short-term benefits
of tax collection through a process of forced formalisation.
The
need of the hour is to protect and nurture the informal sector and
handhold it to become formal in the process of growth rather than
through surgical strikes a la demonetisation.

Yet another [134] of broadly the same genre:
In public discussion, ‘formalisation of the informal’ emerged as a new
rationale for Demonetisation 2016 after the event. Demonetisation and
then digitalisation of monetary transactions would compel, it was
argued, the informal sector to be henceforth more tax compliant. It was
also argued that the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST)
would only strengthen this process. It is indeed well-known that in
large sections of the informal sector—real estate, retail and wholesale
trade, and professional services—payment of taxes is often not the norm.
Demonetisation and digitalisation may drag these economic agents into
the formal sector and lead to greater tax compliance. However, the
fundamental problem with the ‘formalisation of the informal’ argument is
that the much larger informal sector that ekes out its livelihood on
the margins does not avoid paying taxes, it just earns too little to
fall into the tax bracket. Formalisation of production by the tiny
enterprises in industry, road-side service establishments, and by small-
and medium-sized farmers would not lead to a gain to society. It would,
in fact, put an additional burden on these producers who are already
struggling by earning low incomes.

The foregoing, if nothing
else, at least clearly demonstrates that the view put across by the said
World Bank report, also very much shared and propagated by the
proponents of the incumbent regime, is by no stretch an uncontested one.

In fact, there is a large body of opinions, arguably no less informed
than that of the World Bank, which strongly holds that coerced
formalisation of India’s informal economy, which is estimated to employ
90% of India’s workforce,[135, 136] poses the very palpable and serious
danger of proving traumatic for the sector and would, in that event,
trigger large scale misery and, maybe, even social unrest.
Notwithstanding the lure of better tax compliance and resultant enhanced
tax revenue going to the government coffers.

But then, it could
very well be that the real aim is just that: Destroy the micro, small
and medium enterprises to clear the field for indigenous and global
corporates.125a

Apart from that, analysts after analysts have
shown that there obtains no definite correlationship between the
cash-to-GDP ratio and either corruption or development.

A most
recent example [137] is: Demonetisation Has Failed to Tackle Black Money
by Karan Thapar. And, also noteworthy: [138] Economic Rationale of
‘Demonetisation: Scrutiny of the Government’s Claims’ by Vineet Kohli
and R Ramakumar.

Here are two insightful short excerpts from the Karan Thapar’s article:
I. The country with the highest cash to GDP ratio is Japan with a
figure of 19.40%. It also happens to be one of the least corrupt. Almost
at the bottom is Nigeria, with a cash to GDP ratio of 1.55%. It’s one
of the world’s most corrupt.
According to the same ranking,
Singapore, Switzerland, Hong Kong and the whole of the Eurozone have
cash to GDP ratios significantly above India’s. They’re also
significantly less corrupt. On the other hand, Argentina, Colombia,
South Africa and Brazil have cash to GDP ratios that are around half or
less India’s but they’re perceived to be as corrupt.
The truth is
the cash to GDP ratio is not a test of corruption or corruptibility
because how much cash you hold doesn’t make or tempt you to be corrupt.
II. The total value of digital transactions according to the NPCI in
November 2016 was [Rs.] 94 lakh crore. They reached a high point of 149
lakh crore in March 2017 and then fell to 107 lakh crore in July 2017.
In August, they were almost the same at 109 lakh crore. However, in
September, they rose to 124 lakh crore but collapsed in October to 99
lakh crore. The October figure is accurate only until the 29th of that
month.
Much the same is true of the volume of digital transactions.
They were 671.49 million in November 2016, rising to 957.50 million in
December, before falling to 862.38 million in July and, thereafter,
remaining stable. In October they were 863.9 million.
So, the NPCI
data shows that in value terms, digital transactions in October 2017
were almost exactly what they were in November last year [emphasis
added]. In volume terms, however, they increased by nearly 42% between
November and December but, thereafter, declined significantly and
flattened out.
More importantly, the NCPI data includes all debit
and credit card usage as well as pre-paid instruments and NEFT. It also
includes Bhim and UPI, e-wallets and Paytm.

The second one,
obviously, deals with the level of success in bringing about
digitisation of Indian economy, regardless of its merit or otherwise,
via demonetisation.[139, 140]

As regards formalisation of informal sectors, it is necessary to note here, right or wrong, the GST is the tool to effect it.

Demonetisation is at the utmost, a rather superfluous, auxiliary measure.

And, there is no hard evidence to suggest any significant formalisation
of the informal sectors of the economy over the last one year.
Shoddy Implementation

Despite the much well-orchestrated projection of a super-efficient Mody
- a Rambo Modi,[141] over the last few years, the implementation was
nothing less than shoddy making the resultant chaos even more chaotic.

It clearly spoke of lack of preparations and well thought out plans notwithstanding fabricated claims [59] to the contrary.

There were problems from the very word go.

The sizes of the new Rs. 500 and 2,000 notes, meant to replace the now
scrapped old Rs. 500 and 1,000 notes, were changed, for no apparent good
reasons.

That necessitated recalibration of the cassettes
holding the notes to be dispensed via more than 2.15 lakh ATM
machines142 spread all over India causing additional delay.[143]

Then, going against the very grain of the move to eliminate black money,
the Rs. 1,000 notes were replaced by notes of still higher denomination
- Rs. 2,000.[144]

Apparently, to hasten up the process of remonetisation.[145]

But, during the initial days, these notes, in the absence of sufficient
Rs. 500 notes in circulation, were virtually useless scraps of paper in
the hands of commoners who needed currencies to make small purchases
for day-to-day needs.[146]

And, then the RBI kept on changing the rules only too frequently.

Between Nov. 8 2016 and the following March 31st the rules were
changed/reframed no less than 21 times, excluding the notifications
issued on Nov. 8 itself.[147]

Arguably, the two most significant
of these notifications were: (i) on November 14, the RBI debarred the
District Cooperative Banks from accepting the scrapped notes [148] and
(ii) the withdrawal of facility, as had been committed by the Prime
Minister on November 8, to ordinary resident Indians to exchange SBNs at
RBI branches beyond Dec. 31 till June 30th [149] showing valid reasons
for delay.

These changes caused a lot of additional difficulties
for a large number of people and also for the District Cooperative Banks
as the RBI had refused to accept the scrapped notes received by them
since demonetisation till Nov. 14th.

All these only go to show
the sheer shoddiness of the implementation process further exacerbated
by serious inadequacies in advance planning and due diligence.

Quite interestingly, a leading and extremely vocal and voluble BJP MP,
Subramanian Swamy, even if known for being a sort of loose cannon, had
also publicly aired such a view.[150]

Nobel laureate Richard
Thaler, one of the very few eminent economists applauding the idea of
demonetisation, would also note that the rollout was deeply flawed.[151]
The Negative Outcomes Following Demonetisation

The list is rather long.

The main points are, however, summarised as under.

I. In a heavily cash-dependent economy, overnight scrapping of 86% of
all currencies threw life of a common Indian into utter turmoil.

A funny Tamil song in video format,[152] released recently, provides an effective peek into that profoundly unfunny situation.

II. More than 100 people reportedly died standing in the queues.[153]

III. An estimated 1.5 million jobs were lost in first four months of 2017.[154, 155]

IV. Disastrous effects on the MSMEs, the unorganised sector, in particular.

Here’re a few fragments of noteworthy observation.

A. The unorganized sector in India will be the worst hit by the
November demonetization of high value currency, while lots of industries
in the organized sector would be impacted by the shortage of cash
required to run business, a market analyst said on Monday. “The
unorganized sector is expected to bear higher brunt of demonetization.
Within the organized space, a lot of industries would get impacted owing
to the sucking out of daily liquidity needed to run the business,”
Centrum Wealth Research said in a report.[156]

B. The above
propositions (including the one that the growth rate of the informal
sector would be even lower than overall because of the predominant use
of cash in sales and purchase in this sector, and its overwhelming
dependence on informal cash credit) are not just based on armchair
theorising, but are supported by newspaper reports and independent
surveys. In Ranchi, a survey led by Jean Drèze (Delhi School of
Economics and University of Ranchi) reports a 45% decline in earnings of
small shopkeepers/businesses; in Amritsar, Prateek Sibal (Paris
Institute of Political Studies) reports a similar figure of 46%. In
Delhi, a survey of small shopkeepers and casual labourers by Vyom Anil
(Jawaharlal Nehru University) finds a much larger drop in average income
about 60%. Another study for Delhi, by social activist Harsh Mander,
points to a 60% cut in supply of jobs to labourers, a decline in wages,
and loss in profits for small shops.
In Mumbai, Deepa Krishnan (SP
Jain Institute of Management) and Stephan Siegel (Michael G. Foster
School of Business, University of Washington) report a very significant
loss of 44% in the earnings (relative to the pre-note ban period) of the
self-employed in slum areas. Some of the surveys also indicate huge
income losses for casual workers: 50-70% in Jaipur (conducted by PUCL
Rajasthan), and 72% among domestic workers in Delhi (by Vyom Anil). A
larger survey by India Development Foundation (IDF) covering nine states
asked owners of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) whether there were
output and job losses (Chaddha et al. 2017). With regard to output loss,
61% of respondents in Telengana [sic], 94% in Andhra, and 80% in
Gujarat answered in the affirmative. For job losses, the corresponding
incidence was similar in Telengana [sic] and Gujarat, slightly lower in
Andhra, but very high in Uttar Pradesh (87.5%), which also saw
significant wage decline.
The income losses reported by these
independent surveys are large and mutually consistent. There is also no
sign of remission over the weeks since demonetisation; some newspaper
reports even suggest that the ban is biting more with the passage of
time and there are spillover effects on the formal sector. These adverse
changes have been accompanied by a 60% spike in the demand for MNREGA
(Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) work in
December 2016 (as per report of the Ministry of Rural Development),
confirming the accuracy of independent surveys, and necessitating urgent
policy action.[157]

V. The District Cooperative Banks (DCBs) got financially crippled.[158]

VI. In the latest financial quarter (April-June), the GDP has slipped
by 2.2 percentage points, from 7.9% to 5.7%, year-on-year basis.[159]

Subsequently, it is reported [160] that :
India’s trade deficit widened to its highest in 35 months in October
(2017) as merchandise exports declined for the first time in 14 months,
government data showed.
Exports during October 2017 were valued at
US $23,098.18 million as compared to $23,360.61 million during October
2016, registering a decline of 1.12%, according to data released by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry on Tuesday (Nov. 14 2017).

Imports, meanwhile, expanded at the slowest pace in 10 months, at 7.6%.
Imports during October 2017 were valued at US $37,117.01 million as
compared to US $34,495.09 million in the same period in 2016.

VII. RBI profit dwindled and instead of ballooning dividend payout to
the government, as had been initially expected (discussed above), it
actually radically shrivelled.[161]
Demonetisation was the one of
the main reasons for Reserve Bank of India’s lower-than-usual profits.
The government too received a lesser dividend from the central bank as
compared to what it received in the previous financial year. RBI
transferred a meagre Rs 30,659 crore as dividend to the government for
the year ended June 2017, which is less than half of what it gave to
government a year ago, Rs 65,880 crore to be precise [emphasis added].
While income for the year 2016-17 decreased by 23.56 per cent, the
expenditure increased by 107.84 per cent. The year ended with an overall
surplus of Rs 30,659 crore as against Rs 65,876 crore in the previous
year, representing a decline of 53.46 per cent.
The net income from
domestic sources decreased by 17.11 per cent from Rs 52,157 crore in
2015-16 to Rs 43,232 crore in 2016-17 mainly due to higher net
expenditure on interest on account of absorption of surplus liquidity in
the banking system post withdrawal of Specified Bank Notes [emphasis
added].
RBI incurred a total expenditure of Rs 7,965 crore on
printing currency notes in 2016-17 [emphasis added], [as against Rs.
16,000 crore not returned] which is more than double the Rs 3,420 crore
spent year before that. The rise in cost of printing could be attributed
to printing of new currency notes during remonetisation.
“The
upsurge in expenditure during the year was on account of change in the
production plan of printing presses due to the introduction of new
design notes in higher denominations as well as the requirement of
larger volume of notes for replacement of the demonetised currency,” RBI
said in its annual report.
Conclusion

1. To begin with,
demonetisation was a measure adopted going against the express opinion
sought and obtained from the then RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan.
No recognised economist, not even the Union Government’s Chief Economic Advisor, was known to have been taken into confidence.

And, it was, of course, no move towards bringing back illegal money
allegedly stashed in foreign banks, as had been promised by Modi, as the
Prime Ministerial aspirant.

2. It was pretty shoddily implemented.

3. It has decisively failed to mop up black money as had been initially projected and expected.

A miniscule amount of fake currencies was detected. And new fake currencies are already back.

No visible impact on terrorism.

4. It has, of course, opened up the possibility of identifying sizeable
amounts of earlier undeclared black money and thereby, eventually,
jacking up tax revenue.

But the actual prospect, right at this point of time, remains pretty much a big question mark.

More so, given the quantum of data/cases involved and the past track
record of the concerned departments, the IT, in particular.

Not
only that, given the already established track record [162] of the
incumbent regime, there is room for very reasonable apprehensions that
these cases may only be selectively pursued in order to blackmail,
silence and arm-twist.

5. As regards the subsequently added goals, no appreciable rise in digitisation of economy.
Formalisation of informal sector has presumably been initiated under
the impact of GST, again badly planned. No appreciable impact of
demonetisation demonstrated.

It is yet another matter that the
very desirability of forcing the pace of these two goals, under current
Indian conditions, remains a much contested issue.

6. The actions
by the regime, especially, in refraining from selecting and appointing a
Lokpal, even after three and half years, and allowing uncapped
anonymous corporate donations to political parties, that too craftily
dodging any effective parliamentary scrutiny, raise serious doubts as
regards its real intentions vis-à-vis fighting corruptions.

So,
does the lack of actions as regards various so-called papers leaked by
private parties giving out details pertaining to a large number of
Indians and Indian entities parking money in secretive foreign bank
accounts.

And, also the fact that the Gross NPAs (Non-Performing
Assets – bad unrecoverable loans, mostly lent to large corporates) of
the Public Sector Banks (PSBs), under the watch of the incumbent regime,
rose from Rs. 234,583 crore, in June 2014, to Rs. 733,[136] crore, in
June 2017.[163]A more than three-fold rise, over a period of three
years.

Even if we, for the moment, just opt to set aside the
various alleged scams,[164-167] of pretty serious nature, that have
surfaced only recently directly involving the Modi regime and the BJP
National President, on the ground that these charges yet remain to be
duly established before a court of law.

7. The impact on the economy, as a whole, at least on the short term, was decidedly negative.

The impact on the unorganised sectors, employing about 90% of the workforce, was just disastrous.

8. Day-to-day lives of ordinary Indians were severely affected.

More than a hundred reportedly lost lives.

Millions lost means of livelihood.

9. All in all, it appears to be primarily a political move, meant to
reap political dividends, with scant regard for actual economic
consequences, though packaged very much in those terms.[168]

10.
Finally, it also indicates a degree of readiness on the part of the BJP,
led by Modi-Shah duo, to tweak its traditional core constituency and,
in the process, even hurt the small and medium business - in the
interest of big money169 and also to occasionally play to the gallery of
the Indian have-nots, even if not all of them.

Sukla Sen, 25 11 2017

Notes and References:

1. Ref.: Narendra Modi takes oath as India’s 15th Prime Minister, dtd. May 26 2014, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/in…> .
2. Ref.: Everything you need to know about Lok Sabha Verdict 2014 explained in 40 charts, dtd. Jun 06 2014, at <https://scroll.in/article/666049/ev…> .
3. Ref.: How the BJP won this election, dtd. May 17 2014, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/nation…> .
4. Ref.: BJP’s 31% lowest vote share of any party to win majority, dtd. May 19 2014, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...> .
5. Ref.: BJP releases manifesto, promises to improve economy, end policy paralysis, dtd. Apr. 7 2014, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...> .
6. Ref.: Policy Paralysis, dtd. Sept. 13 2013, at <http://socialsciences.in/article/po…> .
7. Watch, e.g.: Shri Narendra Modi promises to people 15-20 lakh as BJP will bring the black money back to India at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Li…> .
8. Ref.: Boon or tragedy? Government, opposition parties battle it out on note ban anniversary, dtd. Nov. 8 2017, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...> .
9. Ref.: Opposition to observe November 8, note ban anniversary, as ’black day’, dtd. Oct. 24 2017, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/nation…> .
10. Ref.: Nov. 8 anti-black money day: Jaitley, dtd. Oct. 25 2017, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/nation…> .
11. Source: Modi’s surgical strike on black money, dtd. Nov. 8 2016, at <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com...> .
12. Ref.: Here’s The Full Text Of Modi’s Speech On The Discontinuation Of ₹500 And ₹1,000 Bank Notes, dtd. Nov. 9 2016, at <http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/1…> .
13. Ref.:
India’s cash-to-GDP ratio was over 13% before the November 2016 note
ban, which is now estimated to be at around 11% of the GDP.
(Source: Cash in use 26% less than November 8 levels, withdrawals fall for fourth week, dtd. Apr. 10 2017, at
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...> .)
14. Ref.: Ninety seven per cent of retail transactions still cash-based, says USAID report, dtd. Jan. 22 2016, at <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-pape…> .
15. Also:
About 98 percent of all consumer payments in India use cash, and the
high frequency of handling forces the monetary authority to withdraw
about 75 percent of its notes in circulation in a typical year - more
than the number of bank notes collectively produced by all countries
taken together with the exception of China.
(Source: What government plans to do with the old Rs 500, 1,000 notes, dtd. Nov. 23 2016, at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...> .)
16. Ref., e.g.: Your money’s no good: rupee note cancellation plunges India into panic, dtd. Nov. 10 2016, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2…> .
17. Ref.:
Featured are summary views, solicited by The Tribune, on the
government’s demonetisation move from nine economists of impeccable
credentials, differing ages, a spectrum of ideological persuasions, and a
variety of locations. We encounter amidst this diversity of backgrounds
a profound sameness of opinion, as reflected in unanimous denunciation
of the government’s action in sentiments and assessments such as:
“essentially political move,…insensitive,…,gratuitous,..,appalling”;
“firing cannonballs to kill mosquitoes” [emphasis added]; “arrogance and
insensitivity”; “an exercise in Manichean economics”; “authoritarian
quackery”; “heavy cost to the economy”; “frightening abandonment of
reason”; “throwing the baby out while retaining the bathwater”; and “a
cavalier or even cynical political calculation”Here’s a cross-section of
scholarly opinion.
(Source: Economists speak up on demonetisation, dtd. Dec. 5 2016, at <http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/co…> .)
18. Also: Demonetization: Winners, losers, and the utterly devastated, Dtd. Dec. 22 2016, at <http://www.atimes.com/demonetizatio…> .
19. Ref.: ’2011 Indian anti-corruption movement’ at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_…> .
20. Watch: Reality of 15 lakh promise by Narendra Modi, dtd. Feb. 12 2015, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHP…> .
It has been uploaded by a self-confessed supporter of Narendra Modi,
interspersing the original video clip (ref. note 6 above) with textual
commentaries.
21. Ref.: We’ll bring back black money in 150 days: BJP president Rajnath Singh, dtd. April 21 2014, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...> .
22. Watch: Will bring back black money in 100 days: BJP chief Rajnath Singh, dtd. April 1 2014, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZ8…> .
23. See: Timeline of black money issue and formation of Special Investigation Team, dtd. Feb. 9 2015, at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/educat…> .
24. Ref.: How Vijay Mallya flew to London via Delhi, dtd. March 11 2016, at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/…> .
25. Ref.: Sushma Swaraj, Vasundhara Raje helped me: Lalit Modi, dtd. June 17 2015, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/nation…> .
26. Ref.:
In 2014, the Central government introduced amendments to the 2013 Act
diluting the stringent provisions of social impact assessment and
consent clauses in the 2013 Act by the promulgation of the Land
Acquisition Ordinance under Article 123 on the last day of December
2014. The provisions of the ordinance were sought to be kept alive by
repeated promulgation on April 3 and May 30 of 2015.
(Source: Cloud over Land Acquisition Act, dtd. Aug. 11 2017, at <http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/co…> .)
27. Ref.: From ‘Living Monument of UPA Failure’, Has MNREGA Become PM Modi’s Fav Tool?, dtd. Feb. 1 2017, at <http://www.news18.com/news/business…> .
28. Ref.: Yours is a ’Suit-Boot ki Sarkar, Rahul Gandhi Attacks Government in Parliament’, dtd. April 20 2015, at <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/you…> .
29. Ref.:
The cloth, made by the longstanding manufacturers Holland & Sherry
which supplies much of Savile Row, has to be specially made at a minimum
of nine metres – this is enough for Allen’s company to make two suits,
which would cost upwards of £15,000 (more for cloth with gold thread).
(Source: Narendra Modi’s style tip for world leaders: wear a suit with
your name written on it: For his recent meeting with Barack Obama,
India’s prime minister wore a suit with his name written in the
pinstripes, dtd. Jan. 26 2015, at <https://www.theguardian.com/fashion…> .)
30. Ref.: Modiji on Rs 15 lakh returning to accounts was a political ’jumla’: Amit Shah to ABP News, dtd. Feb. 5 2015, at <http://www.abplive.in/india-news/mo…> .
31. Watch: Modiji’s statement on Rs 15 lakh returning was just a
political ’jumla’ : Amit Shah to ABP News, dtd. Feb. 5 2015, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wo9…> .
32. Ref.: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delhi…> .
33. Ref.: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bihar…> .
34. Ref.:
The historic Central Hall of Parliament will host a midnight function
on June 30 to launch the sweeping tax reform of GST, reminiscent of
India’s tryst with destiny on the midnight of August 15, 1947.
(Source: Midnight Parliament central hall event to mark GST rollout, dtd. June 19 2017, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...> .)
35. Ref.: Shooting in the dark: The Bullet Train project is
economically unviable, will not lead to a transfer of technology and
serve only a minuscule proportion of rail passengers by Anil Dharker,
dtd. Sept. 23 2017, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/op…> .
36. Ref.: Bullet trains: Far too costly for India by Yogi Aggarwal, dtd. Sept. 28 2017, at <http://www.asianage.com/opinion/col…> .
37. Ref.: LIVE: Bullet train project signifies India’s progress, says Narendra Modi, dtd. Sept. 14 2017, at <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Q2…> .
38. Ref.: PIB press release: India’s rank rises to 100 in World Bank’s doing Business Report, 2018, dtd. Oct. 31 2017, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRele…> .
39. Ref.: Ease of business ranking also represents ‘ease of living life’, says PM Modi, dtd. Nov. 5 2017, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/in…> .
40. Ref.: Moody’s Upgrade Endorsement Of Reforms, Says Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, dtd. Nov. 17 2017, at <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/fin…> .
Also relevant: Modi government should not cheer Moody’s recent upgrade.
Read why by MC Govardhana Rangan and Joel Rebello, dtd. Nov. 22 2017,
at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...> .
41. Ref.: India slips 3 notches to 100 on Global Hunger Index; trails N Korea, Iraq, dtd. Oct. 15 2017, at <http://www.business-standard.com/ar…> .
42. Ref.: India falls to 108 on World Economic Forum’s gender gap index, dtd. Nov. 2 2017, at <http://www.livemint.com/Industry/uq…> .
43. Ref.:
“Therefore, ahead of the 2019 hustings, we expect Modi’s policy
initiatives to evolve around three ‘C’s — combating corruption;
completing existing policy priorities (resolving NPAs, fine-tuning GST,
completing infra projects etc; and communication to highlight how his
various initiatives are helping the common man, especially in rural
areas,” Saynal [read: Sanyal] says.
(Source: Modi May Shun Major Reforms Till 2019: Barclays’ Siddhartha Sanyal, dtd. Aug. 13 2017, at <https://www.bloombergquint.com/poli…> .)
Also relevant:
“Closer to the polls, Modi might consider deploying his political
capital more to boost BJP’s ‘[Hindu?] nationalist’ credentials rather
than its ‘reformist’ image”, argues Sanyal.
44. Ref.: Mr. Modi’s Perilous Embrace of Hindu Extremists by (The New York Times) Editorial Board, dtd. March 23 2017, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/…> .
45. Ref.: Decoded! Why Amit Shah and Modi picked Adityanath as Uttar
Pradesh Chief Minister by Aman Dwivedi, dtd. March 19 2017, at <http://www.financialexpress.com/ele…> .
46. Ref.: Government bans sale of cows for slaughter at cattle markets, restricts trade, dtd. May 26 2017, at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/…> .
47. Ref.: ’Garib hatao’: How the poor are being tricked with demonetisation, dtd. Nov. 22 2016, at <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/demo…> .
48. Source: Digging through India demonetization history — 12 Jan 1946 (Saturday) and 16 Jan 1978 (Monday) at <https://mostlyeconomics.wordpress.c...> .
49. Ref.: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raghu…> .
50. Ref.: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_…> .
51. Source: Short-term note ban costs to outweigh long-term benefits:Rajan, dtd. Sept. 4 2017, at