REVERT TO PAPER BALLOTS
(NO To Elections)
machines that could be used by up to a quarter of the US electorate on
Election Day next year can be hacked.
Politico-Social Transformation Movement
Despite the fact that
‘It took EC 4 years to admit that EVMs could be hacked’
if any one suggests them to revert back to Paper Ballots the EC
questions “What is the Proof you have to say that the EVMs are fraud?”
in a typical chitpavan brahminical way.
The Bene Israel claim that Chitpavans are also of Jewish origin.
A 15 year old female student of Jyotiba Phule
called Mukta Salve from the Mang community, another untouchable caste,
wrote in an essay in 1855 that during Peshwa rule untouchables were
often murdered using oil containing toxic red lead
and then buried in the foundations of mansions of upper castes.She
further wrote that Passing the Talimkhana (local gymnasium) by a Mahar
or Mang often resulted in the person’s head being cut off and played
with. Those resisting any sanctions could be trampled under an elephant
on the grounds of the Peshwa’s palace.
Many Mahars enlisted in the armies of the British East India Company and served the British in their war against the Peshwas. On 1 January 1818 in the Battle of Koregaon
between forces of the East India Company and the Peshwa, Mahars
soldiers formed the biggest contingent of the Company force. The British
won the battle and this effectively ended Peshwa rule.
After the fall of the Maratha Empire in 1818, the Chitpavans lost their
political dominance to the British. The British would not subsidize the
Chitpavans on the same scale that their caste-fellow, the Peshwas, had
done in the past. Pay and power was now significantly reduced.
Some of the prominent figures in the Hindu reform movements of the 19th and 20th centuries came from the Chitpavan Brahmin community. These included Dhondo Keshav Karve, Justice Mahadev Govind Ranade, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Gopal Ganesh Agarkar, Vinoba Bhave.
Some of the strongest resistance to change came from the very same
community. The vanguard and the old guard clashed many times. D. K.
Karve was ostracised. Even Tilak offered penance for breaking caste or
religious rules. One was for taking tea at Poona Christian mission in
1892 and the second was going to England in 1919.
The Chitpavan community includes two major politicians in the Gandhian tradition: Gopal Krishna Gokhale,
whom Gandhi acknowledged as a preceptor, and Vinoba Bhave, one of his
outstanding disciples. Gandhi describes Bhave as the “jewel of his
disciples”, and recognised Gokhale as his political guru. However,
strong opposition to Gandhi came from the Chitpavan community. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the founder of the Hindu nationalist political ideology Hindutva,
was a Chitpavan Brahmin and several other Chitpavans were among the
first to embrace it because they thought it was a logical extension of
the legacy of the Peshwas and caste-fellow Tilak.
These Chitpavans felt out of place with the Indian social reform
movement of Phule and the mass politics of Gandhi. Large numbers of the
community looked to Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha and finally the RSS. , drew their inspiration from fringe groups in this reactionary trend
After Gandhi’s assassination by Nathuram Godse, a Chitpawan, Brahmins in Maharashtra, became targets of violence, mostly by members from the Maratha
caste. The motivating factor for the violence was not love for Gandhi
on the part of the rioters but the denigration and humiliation that the Marathas were subjected to due to their caste status.
In the Patwardhan princely states such as Sangli, the Marathas were joined by the Jains and the Lingayats
in the attacks against the Brahmins. Here, specifically, advanced
factories owned by the Chitpawans were destroyed. This event led to the
hasty integration of the Patwardhan states into the Bombay Province by
March 1948 - a move that was opposed by other Brahmins as they feared
the Maratha predominance in the integrated province. During early 20th century, the ruler of Kolhapur state, Shahu had collaborated with the British against the Indian freedom struggle - a struggle that was identified with Chitpavans like Bal Gangadhar Tilak.
He was also instrumental in shaping anti-brahmin attitude in the
non-brahmin communities during that period. This led to great violence
against Brahmins in Kolhapur.
Proof No. 1
CJI Sathasivam committed a grave error of judgement by ordering that
the fraud EVMs have to be replaced in a phased manner where the question
of replacement in itself is a clear proof that the EVMs could be
tampered. Otherwise why they should be replaced.
The Ex CEC Sampath suggested for replacement in a phased manner as it cost Rs 1600 crore at that point of time.
the Murderer of democratic institutions & Master of diluting
institutiond (Modi) says it costs more than Rs 9000 crore, hence
continue with EVMs.
The software and its source is kept secret in the eyes of the voters.
present CJI must dissolve the Central Government and go for fresh polls
with Ballot Papers to save Universal Adult Franchise, democracy,
liberty, equality and freedom as enshrined in our Marvellous Modern
Constitution for the welfare, happiness and peace for all societies.
Despite the fact that
‘It took EC 4 years to admit that EVMs could be hacked’
if any one suggests them to revert back to Paper Ballots the EC
questions “What is the Proof you have to say that the EVMs are fraud?”
in a typical brahminical way.
Security Analysis of India’s Electronic Voting Machines
Don’t stand on prestige, dump EVMs, save democracy
Election Commission concedes manipulation of EVMs
Don’t stand on prestige, dump EVMs: Naidu
EVM debate rages on, lets get rid of it.
‘EVMs illegally being used for a decade’
Linked on USA Today 23 Feb.
Electronic voting machines used for US elections between 2002 and
2014 would have been extremely easy to hack, according to reports.
The AVS WinVote machines were used during three presidential
campaigns in the state of Virginia and would receive an “F-minus” for
security, with many using “abcde” or “admin” as passwords.
Jeremy Epstein, of non-profit organization SRI International, who
served on the Virginia state legislative commission and has been
investigating the machines for some time, is relieved that they have now
“The vulnerabilities were so severe, and so trivial to exploit, that
anyone with even a modicum of training could have succeeded”, he explained.
“They didn’t need to be in the polling place — within a few hundred
feet (e.g., in the parking lot) is easy, and within a half mile with a
rudimentary antenna built using a Pringles can. Further, there are no
logs or other records that would indicate if such a thing ever happened,
so if an election was hacked any time in the past, we will never know”.
In an interview with the Guardian,
Epstein also explained that his conversations with Brit Williams, the
original certifier of the voting machines, had been equally concerning.
“I said, ‘How did you do a penetration test?’ and he said, ‘I don’t know how to do something like that’”.
The Virginia Technology Agency today published a report condemning
the WinVote machines, which have also been used for elections in
Mississippi and Pennsylvania. It found that the machines ran a version
of the Windows operating system that had not been updated since 2004,
leaving them susceptible to relatively simple malware and hacking
The news comes at a time when the UK is preparing for its own vote,
with the general election scheduled for next month. Although electronic
voting, or e-voting will not be available this year, it is reported to
be in place for the 2020 election.
Published under license from ITProPortal.com, a Net Communities Ltd Publication. All rights reserved.
anyone this is a surprise to hasn’t been paying attention. http://blackboxvoting.org/ has said this since 2004 and it is not exclusive to this one type of voting machine. It is trivial to exploit any of them.
Once I figured out that non-US citizens and people illegally here
(even worse) can vote, I have lost all hope on the election process.
Even a worse opinion of the politicians that continue to argue that no
real form of ID is required. Once you figure this out, you start to see
it’s hacked before even getting to the voting machines.
It is WAY past time for Congress to establish a non-partisan
standards committee for electronic voting machines, composed of experts
from all relevant technology components. This committee would create
mandatory security standards that ALL electronic voting machine
manufacturers must meet before their products can be used in any
election where Federal office holders are elected.
And while they are at it, they might start working on hack-proof standards to allow Internet voting.
This is the 21st century. It’s time we started acting like it.
Proof No 17
What do you need to rig an election? A basic knowledge of
electronics and $30 worth of RadioShack gear, professional hacker Roger
Johnston reveals. The good news: we can stop it.
Vulnerability Assessment Team at Argonne National Lab
A simple non-cyber attack on an electronic voting machine
Roger Johnston is the head of the Vulnerability Assessment Team
at Argonne National Laboratory. Not long ago, he and his colleagues
launched security attacks on electronic voting machines to demonstrate
the startling ease with which one can steal votes. Even more startling:
Versions of those machines will appear in polling places all over
America on Tuesday. The touchscreen Diebold Accuvote-TSX will be used by
more than 26 million voters in 20 states; the push-button Sequoia AVC
Voting Machine will be used by almost 9 million voters in four states, Harper’s magazine reported recently
(subscription required). Here, Johnston reveals how he hacked the
machines–and why anyone, from a high-school kid to an 80-year-old
grandmother, could do the same.–Ed
The Vulnerability Assessment Team at Argonne
National Laboratory looks at a wide variety of security devices– locks,
seals, tags, access control, biometrics, cargo security, nuclear
safeguards–to try to find vulnerabilities and locate potential fixes.
Unfortunately, there’s not much funding available in this country to
study election security. So we did this as a Saturday afternoon type of
It’s called a man-in-the-middle attack. It’s a classic attack on
security devices. You implant a microprocessor or some other electronic
device into the voting machine, and that lets you control the voting and
turn cheating on and off. We’re basically interfering with transmitting
the voter’s intent.
We used a logic analyzer. Digital communication is a series of zeros
and ones. The voltage goes higher, the voltage goes lower. A logic
analyzer collects the oscillating voltages between high and low and then
will display for you the digital data in a variety of formats. But
there all kinds of way to do it. You can use a logic analyzer, you can
use a microprocessor, you can use a computer–basically, anything that
lets you see the information that’s being exchanged and then lets you
know what to do to mimic the information.
I’ve been to high school science fairs where the kids had more
sophisticated microprocessor projects.So we listened to the
communications going on between the voter, who in the case of one
machine is pushing buttons (it’s a push-button voting machine) and in
the other is touching things on a touchscreen. Then we listened to the
communication going on between the smarts of the machine and the voter.
Let’s say I’m trying to make Jones win the election, and you might vote
for Smith. Then my microprocessor is going to tell the smarts of the
machine to vote for Jones if you try to vote for Smith. But if you’re
voting for Jones anyway, I’m not going to tamper with the
communications. Sometimes you block communications, sometimes you tamper
with information, sometimes you just look at it and let it pass on
through. That’s essentially the idea. Figure out the communications
going on, then tamper as needed, including with the information being
sent back to the voter.
We can do this because most voting machines, as far as I can tell,
are not encrypted. It’s just open standard format communication. So it’s
pretty easy to figure out information being exchanged. Anyone who does
digital electronics–a hobbyist or an electronics fan–could figure this
The device we implanted in the touchscreen machine was essentially
$10 retail. If you wanted a deluxe version where you can control it
remotely from a half a mile away, it’d cost $26 retail. It’s not big
bucks. RadioShack would have this stuff. I’ve been to high school
science fairs where the kids had more sophisticated microprocessor
projects than the ones needed to rig these machines.
Because there’s no funding for this type of security-testing, we
relied on people who buy used machines on eBay [in this case the
touchscreen Diebold Accuvote TS Electronic Voting Machine and the
push-button Sequoia AVC Advantage Voting Machine]. Both of the machines
were a little out-of-date, and we didn’t have user manuals and circuit
diagrams. But we figured things out, in the case of the push-button
machine, in under two hours. Within 2 hours we had a viable attack. The
other machine took a little longer because we didn’t fully understand
how touchscreen displays worked. So we had learning time there. But that
was just a couple days. It’s like a magic trick. You’ve got to practice
a lot. If we practiced a lot, or even better, if we got someone really
good with his hands who practiced a lot for two weeks, we’re looking at
15 seconds to 60 seconds go execute these attacks.
I want to move it to the point where grandma can’t hack elections.
We’re really not there.The attacks require physical access. This is easy
for insiders, who program the machines for an election or install them.
And we would argue it’s typically not that hard for outsiders. A lot of
voting machines are sitting around in the church basement, the
elementary school gymnasium or hallway, unattended for a week or two
before the election. Usually they have really cheap cabinet locks anyone
can pick; sometimes they don’t even have locks on them. No one signs
for the machines when they show up. No one’s responsible for watching
them. Seals on them aren’t much different from the anti-tamper packaging
found on food and over-the-counter pharmaceuticals. Think about
tampering with a food or drug product: You think that’s challenging?
It’s really not. And a lot of our election judges are little old ladies
who are retired, and God bless them, they’re what makes the elections
work, but they’re not necessarily a fabulous workforce for detecting
subtle security attacks.
Give people checking the seals a little training as to what to look
for, and now they have a chance to detect a reasonably sophisticated
attack. Do good background checks on insiders, and that insider threat
would be much less of a concern. Overall, there’s a lack of a good
security culture. We can have flawed voting machines, but if we have a
good security culture, we can still have good elections. On the other
hand, we can have fabulous machines, but if the security culture is
inadequate, it doesn’t really matter. We’ve really got to look at a
bigger picture. Our view is: It’s always going to be hard to stop James
Bond. But I want to move it to the point where grandma can’t hack
elections, and we’re really not there.
Watch the Video:
Proof No 18
Virginia election officials have decertified an electronic voting
system after determining that it was possible for even unskilled people
to surreptitiously hack into it and tamper with vote counts.
The AVS WINVote,
made by Advanced Voting Solutions, passed necessary voting systems
standards and has been used in Virginia and, until recently, in
Pennsylvania and Mississippi. It used the easy-to-crack passwords of
“admin,” “abcde,” and “shoup” to lock down its Windows administrator
account, Wi-Fi network, and voting results database respectively,
according to a scathing security review published Tuesday
by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency. The agency conducted
the audit after one Virginia precinct reported that some of the devices
displayed errors that interfered with vote counting during last
The weak passwords—which are hard-coded and can’t be changed—were
only one item on a long list of critical defects uncovered by the
review. The Wi-Fi network the machines use is encrypted with wired equivalent privacy,
an algorithm so weak that it takes as little as 10 minutes for
attackers to break a network’s encryption key. The shortcomings of WEP
have been so well-known that it was banished in 2004 by the IEEE,
the world’s largest association of technical professionals. What’s
more, the WINVote runs a version of Windows XP Embedded that hasn’t
received a security patch since 2004, making it vulnerable to scores of
known exploits that completely hijack the underlying machine. Making
matters worse, the machine uses no firewall and exposes several
important Internet ports.
“Because the WINVote devices use insecure security protocols, weak
passwords, and unpatched software, the WINVote devices operate with a
high level of risk,” researchers with the Virginia Information
Technologies Agency wrote in Tuesday’s report. “The security testing by
VITA proved that the vulnerabilities on the WINVote devices can allow a
malicious party to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of
To prove their claim the machine was vulnerable to real-world hacks,
the auditors were able to use the remote desktop protocol to gain remote
access to the voting machines. They also used readily available hacking
and diagnostic software to map, access, and transfer data from default
shared network locations including C$, D$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. After
downloading the database that stores the results of each vote, the
auditors required just 10 seconds to figure out its password was “shoup”
(named after the company name that preceded Advanced Voting Solutions).
The auditors were then able to copy the database, modify its contents
to tamper with recorded votes, and copy it back to the voting machine.
It’s hard to find plain words that convey just how bad the security
of this machine is. It’s even harder to fathom so many critical defects
resided in a line of machines that has played a crucial role in the US’
democratic system for so many years. Jeremy Epstein, a security expert
specializing in e-voting, summarized the threat brilliantly in a post published Wednesday morning to the Freedom to Tinker blog. He wrote:
As one of my colleagues taught me, BLUF—Bottom Line Up
Front. If an election was held using the AVS WinVote, and it wasn’t
hacked, it was only because no one tried. The vulnerabilities were so
severe, and so trivial to exploit, that anyone with even a modicum of
training could have succeeded. They didn’t need to be in the polling
place—within a few hundred feet (e.g., in the parking lot) is easy, and
within a half mile with a rudimentary antenna built using a Pringles
can. Further, there are no logs or other records that would indicate if
such a thing ever happened, so if an election was hacked any time in the
past, we will never know.
He went on to write:
I’ve been in the security field for 30 years, and it
takes a lot to surprise me. But the VITA report really shocked me—as bad
as I thought the problems were likely to be, VITA’s five-page report
showed that they were far worse. And the WinVote system was so fragile
that it hardly took any effort. While the report does not state how much
effort went into the investigation, my estimation based on the
description is that it was less than a person week.
And finally, he wrote:
So how would someone use these vulnerabilities to change an election?
- Take your laptop to a polling place, and sit outside in the parking lot.
- Use a free sniffer to capture the traffic, and use that to figure out the WEP password (which VITA did for us).
- Connect to the voting machine over WiFi.
- If asked for a password, the administrator password is “admin” (VITA provided that).
- Download the Microsoft Access database using Windows Explorer.
- Use a free tool to extract the hardwired key (“shoup”), which VITA also did for us.
- Use Microsoft Access to add, delete, or change any of the votes in the database.
- Upload the modified copy of the Microsoft Access database back to the voting machine.
- Wait for the election results to be published.
It’s good that Virginia will no longer use this machine. Still, given
how long it took for the vulnerabilities to be identified, the report
raises serious questions about the security of electronic voting and the
certification process election officials use to determine if a given
machine can be trusted.
Story updated to change “national” to “necessary” in the second paragraph.
If it was deliberate then it wouldn’t
have been this easy to discover. The back doors would have been hidden
much better. This only comes from incompetence.
22 posts | registered Dec 9, 2014
This act of CJI and CEC helped the Murderer of
democratic institutions (Modi) remotely controlled by 1% chitpawan
brahmin Rowdy Swayam Sevaks gobble the MASTER KEY which goes against the
interest of 99% Sarvajans including SC/STs/OBCs/Minorities/poor upper castes’
liberty, fraternity and equality as enshrined in our Constitution
fathered by Babasaheb Dr BR Ambedkar.