INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  E-FILING REGISTRATION
	First time users of Supreme Court E-filing have to register him/her through the “Sign Up” option.
	Through “e-FILING” only Advocate-on Record and petitioners-in-person can file cases in the Supreme Court of India.
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	After successful login the “Disclaimer screen” appears on the screen.
	Clicking of “I agree” button on Disclaimer allows the user to proceed further, while “I decline” button sends the control back to the Login screen.
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	INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  AVAILING ORDER / DOCUMENTS
	Note dated 25-06-07 of Ld. Registrar regarding providing of certified copy of order through post and charges thereof. Whenever any person /party concerned sends application by post or through e-mail for issuance of certified copy of order/document etc. first of all charges are calculated as the details given below
	1. Folio(per page)  2. Certification charges  3. Urgency charges 4. Postal charges(minimum)by Regd. Post 5. Third party	Rs.1/- Rs.10/- Rs.5/- Rs.22/- Rs.5/-
	After the calculation of amount according to the number of pages of particular order plus other charges as mentioned above, the party concerned is informed by post or e-mail(if e-mail id is mentioned in his application)to send the charges by the way of “Money Order” in favour of Assistant Registrar(Copying). On receipt of amount, Court fee is purchased and affixed at the application and certified copy of order, as requested, is dispatched by Regd. Post only at the address mentioned in the application.

 

Note:- Petitions filed through E-MAIL are not entertained. For Electronic filing of
case in Supreme Court. Use E-Filing facility only. Payment of Fee for E-Filed
case are accepted only through Credit Cards and Debit Cards of the following
banks mentioned below:

Andhra Bank	Axis Bank Limited	Barclays Bank Plc	Canara Bank
City Union Bank Ltd.	Corporation Bank	Deutsche Bank AG	GE Money Financial Services Ltd.
HDFC Bank Ltd.	ICICI Bank Ltd. Also for Mastercard debit cards (Only on ICICI PG)	Indian Overseas Bank	Kotak Bank-Virtual card
Standard Chartered Bank	State Bank of India	Syndicate Bank	The Federal Bank Ltd.
The Karur Vysys Bank Ltd.

To save Universal Adult Franchise,tests to claim legitimacy, Paper Ballots absolutely  do. The voter can
visually confirm that his/her selection has been registered, the voting
happens in secret, and the counting happens in front of his/her
representative’s eyes.

Paper ballots claim legitimacy by passing the three tests of a free and fair election, which EVMs don’t

The recent Assembly elections — the last major polling exercise before
the 2019 Lok Sabha polls — were not devoid of Electronic Voting Machine
(EVM) malfunctions. Though the discourse at present makes no distinction
between a ‘malfunction’ (which suggests a technical defect) and
‘tampering’ (manipulation aimed at fraud), there were several reports of
misbehaving EVMs. Alarmingly, in Madhya Pradesh alone, the number of
votes polled did not match the number of votes counted in 204 out of the
230 constituencies. The Election Commission’s (EC) explanation is that
the votes counted is the actual number of votes polled — a circular
logic that precludes cross-verification.

The reason a nation chooses to be a democracy is that it gives moral
legitimacy to the government. The fount of this legitimacy is the
people’s will. The people’s will is expressed through the vote,
anonymously (the principle of secret ballot). Not only must this vote be
recorded correctly and counted correctly, it must also be seen to be
recorded correctly and counted correctly. The recording and counting
process must be accessible to, and verifiable by, the public. So
transparency, verifiability, and secrecy are the three pillars of a free
and fair election.

A discrepancy of even one vote between votes polled and votes counted is
unacceptable. This is not an unreasonably high standard but one
followed by democracies worldwide. It might therefore be helpful to
briefly look beyond the question that has hijacked the EVM debate — of
how easy or tough it is to hack these machines — and consider the first
principles of a free and fair election.

EVMs, however, fail on all three, as established by a definitive
judgment of the German constitutional court in 2009. The court’s ruling
forced the country to scrap EVMs and return to paper ballot. Other
technologically advanced nations such as the Netherlands and Ireland
have also abandoned EVMs.

If we take the first two criteria, EVMs are neither transparent nor
verifiable. Neither can the voter see her vote being recorded, nor can
it be verified later whether the vote was recorded correctly. What is
verifiable is the total number of votes cast, not the choice expressed
in each vote. An electronic display of the voter’s selection may not be
the same as the vote stored electronically in the machine’s memory. This
gap was why the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) was
introduced.

But VVPATs solve only one-half of the EVMs’
transparency/verifiability problem: the voting part. The counting part
remains an opaque operation. If anyone suspects a counting error, there
is no recourse, for an electronic recount is, by definition, absurd.
Some believe the VVPATs can solve this problem too, through statistics.

At present, the EC’s VVPAT auditing is restricted to one randomly chosen polling booth per constituency. In a recent essay, K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty,
a former IAS officer, demonstrates that this sample size will fail to
detect faulty EVMs 98-99% of the time. He also shows that VVPATs can be
an effective deterrent to fraud only on the condition that the detection
of even one faulty EVM in a constituency must entail the VVPAT
hand-counting of all the EVMs in that constituency. Without this
proviso, VVPATs would merely provide the sheen of integrity without its
substance.

The third criterion is secrecy. Here too, EVMs disappoint. With the
paper ballot, the EC could mix ballot papers from different booths
before counting, so that voting preferences could not be connected to a
given locality. But with EVMs, we are back to booth-wise counting, which
allows one to discern voting patterns and renders marginalised
communities vulnerable to pressure. Totaliser machines can remedy this,
but the EC has shown no intent to adopt them.

So, on all three
counts — transparency, verifiability and secrecy — EVMs are flawed.
VVPATs are not the answer either, given the sheer magnitude of the
logistical challenges. The recent track record of EVMs indicates that
the number of malfunctions in a national election will be high. For that
very reason, the EC is unlikely to adopt a policy of hand-counting all
EVMs in constituencies where faulty machines are reported, as this might
entail hand-counting on a scale that defeats the very purpose of EVMs.
And yet, this is a principle without which the use of VVPATs is
meaningless.

Unjustified suspicions

Despite these issues,
EVMs continue to enjoy the confidence of the EC, which insists that
Indian EVMs, unlike the Western ones, are tamper-proof. But this is a
matter of trust. Even if the software has been burnt into the microchip,
neither the EC nor the voter knows for sure what software is running in
a particular EVM. One has to simply trust the manufacturer and the EC.
But as the German court observed, the precondition of this trust is the
verifiability of election events, whereas in the case of EVMs, “the
calculation of the election result is based on a calculation act which
cannot be examined from outside”.

While it is true that the results come quicker and the process is
cheaper with EVMs as compared to paper ballot, both these considerations
are undeniably secondary to the integrity of the election. Another
argument made in favour of the EVM is that it eliminates malpractices
such as booth-capturing and ballot-box stuffing. In the age of the
smartphone, however, the opportunity costs of ballot-box-stuffing and
the risk of exposure are prohibitively high. In contrast, tampering with
code could accomplish rigging on a scale unimaginable for
booth-capturers. Moreover, it is nearly impossible to detect
EVM-tampering. As a result, suspicions of tampering in the tallying of
votes — as opposed to malfunction in registering the votes, which alone
is detectable — are destined to remain in the realm of speculation. The
absence of proven fraud might save the EVM for now, but its survival
comes at a dangerous cost — the corrosion of people’s faith in the
electoral process.

Yet there doesn’t have to be incontrovertible
evidence of EVM-tampering for a nation to return to paper ballot.
Suspicion is enough, and there is enough of it already. As the German
court put it, “The democratic legitimacy of the election demands that
the election events be controllable so that… unjustified suspicion can
be refuted.” The phrase “unjustified suspicion” is pertinent. The EC
has always maintained that suspicions against EVMs are unjustified.
Clearly, the solution is not to dismiss EVM-sceptics as ignorant
technophobes. Rather, the EC is obliged to provide the people of India a
polling process capable of refuting unjustified suspicion, as this is a
basic requirement for democratic legitimacy, not an optional accessory.

Jaga Chand (@JagaChand) | Twitter

Murderer of democratic institutions (Modi)
-doesnt-know-bsp-is-a-movement … “We alone can challenge and defeat
the casteist, communal and pro-capitalist BJP! Get ready!” Behanji’s
clarion call to BSP workers to liberate the country from the clutches of
fascist rule.

“We
alone can challenge and defeat the casteist, communal and
pro-capitalist BJP (Brashtachar Jiyadha Psychopaths (Private) Limited!

Maha
Mayawati’s clarion call to the Sarvajan Samaj i.e., Cadres of all
societies in general and BSP Cadres in particular to liberate the
country from the clutches of fascist rule.

[3:44 PM, 3/16/2019] Jagadeesan Chandrashekar: Your 20 mins can decide the next Prime Minister of India . In 20 mins you can
help 3 Crore Muslim and 4 Crore Dalit Unregistered Voters get Registered

What to do in 20 mins ?

1. Watch  Missing Voters App video : 8 mins

Click  https://youtu.be/kQqs8JyAAak to watch
Speech by Missing Voter App Founder
Syed Khalid Saifullah at 3rd National Leadership Summit 2019, India Islamic Cultural Centre, New Delhi

2. Copy this message and paste in  all your groups - 2 mins

3. Click on https://tinyurl.com/ybg4nhtn and install Missing Voter App. Click Apply Voter Id and apply 5 Voter Id’s. - 10 mins

What you will learn from Video? :

1. Introduction : Various Community Projects done by Us.
1. Muslimfreedomfighters.com
2. NRC CJP App
3. Hate Hatao App

2. Problem : Estimated 3 Crore Muslim and 4 Crore Dalit Voters Missing from the electoral lists..

3.
The Gujarat Assembly Elections Analysis, Shocking revelations. Huge
proportion of  Muslim voters  missing in 16 Assembly Constituencies of
Gujarat where BJP won with margin less than 3000 Votes.

4. How Votes go Missing?
- Political Conspiracy - Form 7
- Helplessness of Poor Muslims / Dalits
- Negligence of the Literate ( We belong to this category)

5. Methodology :  How we data mine electoral rolls and identify Missing Muslim Voter Households.
- EPW Article

4. Demo of Missing Voter App : How to locate Missing Voter Households and How to apply new Voter Id in 2 mins.

5. Karnataka Success Story : - - Estimated 18 Lakh Muslim Voters missing in Karnataka
 - 12,000 Volunteers  registered.
- 12 Lakh new Voters were enrolled in 3 weeks.

6. Enrollment and Tracking process at the back office explained.

7. Achievements till date :
- Data mining of 800 Assembly Constituencies,
- Identified 1.6 Crore Missing Voter Households about 40 lakh are Muslims.
- 9000 plus Volunteers registered in App. 
- 25K New Voter Ids applied through App.

App Link : https://tinyurl.com/ybg4nhtn
📞 : 9963748187
raylabs.us@gmail.com
[3:44
PM, 3/16/2019] Jagadeesan Chandrashekar: Ballot Papers is a must
instead of EVMs to decide the next PM. The BSP headed by Ms Mayawati
became eligible for PM because of her best governance of UP as CM. He
united the Sarvajan Samaj that is All Awakened Aboriginal Societies
including SC/STs/OBCs/Religious Minorities and the poor Brahmins and
Baniyas. But since she belongs to Scheduled Caste Community it is not
being tolerated by just 0.1% intolerant, violent, militant, number one
terrorists of the world, ever shooting, mob lynching, lunatic, mentally
retarded rapist foreigners from Bene Israel chitpavan brahmins of RSS
(Rowdy Rakshasa Swayam Sevaks). Therefore the fraud EVMs were tampered
by the stooges, chamchas, slaves, chelas, bootlickess, own mother’s
flesh eaters of BJP (Brashtachar Joothye Psychopaths) headed by
Murderers of the democratic institutions & Master of diluting
institutions (Modi) and gobbled the Master Key. The Ex CJI (Chief IN
Justice) Sathasivam committed a grave error of judgement by ordering
that the EVMs must be replaced in a phased manner where the question of
replacement in itself is a clear proof that the EVMs can be tampered.
The suggestion was made by the ex CEC (Chief Election Criminal) because
of the cost of Rs 1600 crore to replace the entire EVMs. Morre than 132
democracies have discorded the EVMs and use Ballot papers.   To save
Universal Adult Franchise,tests to claim legitimacy, Paper Ballots
absolutely  do. The voter can visually confirm that his/her selection
has been registered, the voting happens in secret, and the counting
happens in front of his/her representative’s eyes.
Paper ballots
claim legitimacy by passing the three tests of a free and fair election,
which EVMs don’t.   The recent Assembly elections — the last major
polling exercise before the 2019 Lok Sabha polls — were not devoid of
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) malfunctions. Though the discourse at
present makes no distinction between a ‘malfunction’ (which suggests a
technical defect) and ‘tampering’ (manipulation aimed at fraud), there
were several reports of misbehaving EVMs. Alarmingly, in Madhya Pradesh
alone, the number of votes polled did not match the number of votes
counted in 204 out of the 230 constituencies. The Election Commission’s
(EC) explanation is that the votes counted is the actual number of votes
polled — a circular logic that precludes cross-verification.
The
reason a nation chooses to be a democracy is that it gives moral
legitimacy to the government. The fount of this legitimacy is the
people’s will. The people’s will is expressed through the vote,
anonymously (the principle of secret ballot). Not only must this vote be
recorded correctly and counted correctly, it must also be seen to be
recorded correctly and counted correctly. The recording and counting
process must be accessible to, and verifiable by, the public. So
transparency, verifiability, and secrecy are the three pillars of a free
and fair election.

A discrepancy of even one vote between votes
polled and votes counted is unacceptable. This is not an unreasonably
high standard but one followed by democracies worldwide. It might
therefore be helpful to briefly look beyond the question that has
hijacked the EVM debate — of how easy or tough it is to hack these
machines — and consider the first principles of a free and fair
election.

EVMs, however, fail on all three, as established by a
definitive judgment of the German constitutional court in 2009. The
court’s ruling forced the country to scrap EVMs and return to paper
ballot. Other technologically advanced nations such as the Netherlands
and Ireland have also abandoned EVMs.

If we take the first two
criteria, EVMs are neither transparent nor verifiable. Neither can the
voter see her vote being recorded, nor can it be verified later whether
the vote was recorded correctly. What is verifiable is the total number
of votes cast, not the choice expressed in each vote. An electronic
display of the voter’s selection may not be the same as the vote stored
electronically in the machine’s memory. This gap was why the Voter
Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) was introduced.

But VVPATs
solve only one-half of the EVMs’ transparency/verifiability problem: the
voting part. The counting part remains an opaque operation. If anyone
suspects a counting error, there is no recourse, for an electronic
recount is, by definition, absurd. Some believe the VVPATs can solve
this problem too, through statistics.

At present, the EC’s VVPAT
auditing is restricted to one randomly chosen polling booth per
constituency. In a recent essay, K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty, a former IAS
officer, demonstrates that this sample size will fail to detect faulty
EVMs 98-99% of the time. He also shows that VVPATs can be an effective
deterrent to fraud only on the condition that the detection of even one
faulty EVM in a constituency must entail the VVPAT hand-counting of all
the EVMs in that constituency. Without this proviso, VVPATs would merely
provide the sheen of integrity without its substance.

The third
criterion is secrecy. Here too, EVMs disappoint. With the paper ballot,
the EC could mix ballot papers from different booths before counting, so
that voting preferences could not be connected to a given locality. But
with EVMs, we are back to booth-wise counting, which allows one to
discern voting patterns and renders marginalised communities vulnerable
to pressure. Totaliser machines can remedy this, but the EC has shown no
intent to adopt them.

So, on all three counts — transparency,
verifiability and secrecy — EVMs are flawed. VVPATs are not the answer
either, given the sheer magnitude of the logistical challenges. The
recent track record of EVMs indicates that the number of malfunctions in
a national election will be high. For that very reason, the EC is
unlikely to adopt a policy of hand-counting all EVMs in constituencies
where faulty machines are reported, as this might entail hand-counting
on a scale that defeats the very purpose of EVMs. And yet, this is a
principle without which the use of VVPATs is meaningless.
Unjustified suspicions

Despite
these issues, EVMs continue to enjoy the confidence of the EC, which
insists that Indian EVMs, unlike the Western ones, are tamper-proof. But
this is a matter of trust. Even if the software has been burnt into the
microchip, neither the EC nor the voter knows for sure what software is
running in a particular EVM. One has to simply trust the manufacturer
and the EC. But as the German court observed, the precondition of this
trust is the verifiability of election events, whereas in the case of
EVMs, “the calculation of the election result is based on a calculation
act which cannot be examined from outside”.

While it is true that
the results come quicker and the process is cheaper with EVMs as
compared to paper ballot, both these considerations are undeniably
secondary to the integrity of the election. Another argument made in
favour of the EVM is that it eliminates malpractices such as
booth-capturing and ballot-box stuffing. In the age of the smartphone,
however, the opportunity costs of ballot-box-stuffing and the risk of
exposure are prohibitively high. In contrast, tampering with code could
accomplish rigging on a scale unimaginable for booth-capturers.
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to detect EVM-tampering. As a result,
suspicions of tampering in the tallying of votes — as opposed to
malfunction in registering the votes, which alone is detectable — are
destined to remain in the realm of speculation. The absence of proven
fraud might save the EVM for now, but its survival comes at a dangerous
cost — the corrosion of people’s faith in the electoral process.

Yet
there doesn’t have to be incontrovertible evidence of EVM-tampering for
a nation to return to paper ballot. Suspicion is enough, and there is
enough of it already. As the German court put it, “The democratic
legitimacy of the election demands that the election events be
controllable so that… unjustified suspicion can be refuted.” The
phrase “unjustified suspicion” is pertinent. The EC has always
maintained that suspicions against EVMs are unjustified. Clearly, the
solution is not to dismiss EVM-sceptics as ignorant technophobes.
Rather, the EC is obliged to provide the people of India a polling
process capable of refuting unjustified suspicion, as this is a basic
requirement for democratic legitimacy, not an optional accessory. An
attempt is being made to E-file in the Honorable Supreme Court to go for
fresh polls with Ballot Papers. 99.9% All Aboriginal Awaked Societies
are aware of the fact that the chitpavan brahmins from Bene Israel
origin full of hatred, anger, jealousy, delusion that are defilement of
mind require mental treatment in mental asylums in Bene Israel. All
Awakened people must also attempt to E-file in Honourable Supreme Court
to conduct elections with Ballot Papers where the BJP will get only 0.1%
votes. Here is the attempt to E-file :
From Jagatheesan Chandraekharan

668, 5A Main Road, 8th Cross HAL III Stage,

Bangalore-560075

Email: buddhasaid2us@gmail.com

The Registrar,
 Supreme Court of India,
 Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110201
 011-23388922-24,23388942
 FAX 011-23381508,23381584
 e-mail :- supremecourt@nic.in

Honorable Sir,

I attempted  E-file registration without success.

This is what I am getting from

https://www.sci.gov.in/user
Home
Supreme Court of India

|| यतो धर्मस्ततो जयः ||
Further instructions have been sent to your e-mail address.
No instructions have been sent to my email address.

I wish to send a request for Ballot Papers to be used in elections.
I may be permitted to send my case to your Honorable self through supremecourt@nic.in
or as advised by your kind self.
Thanking you’
With Regards
Yours Sincerly
J Chandrasekharan