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29 - Sun 4 Apr 2021 LESSON 3637 Buddha-Sasana - The Shape of the Lay Community- Celebrate a Cruelty-Free Vegunaury Easter ALL APRIL DUCK FOOLS -அனைத்து ஏப்ரல் வாத்து முட்டாள்கள்
Filed under: General, Vinaya Pitaka, Sutta Pitaka, Abhidhamma Pitaka, Tipiṭaka KUSHINARA NIBBANA BHUMI PAGODA
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 29 - Sun  4 Apr 2021 LESSON 3637 Buddha-Sasana  - The Shape of the Lay Community- Celebrate a Cruelty-Free Vegunaury Easter ALL APRIL DUCK  FOOLS  -அனைத்து ஏப்ரல்
வாத்து முட்டாள்கள்
Friends

The Shape of the Lay Community
There
is less to say about the lay community from the perspective of early
Buddhist scripture than about the monastic, since the Buddha did not
organize the laity. Rather the lay community is shaped by the presence
of the two overlapping Sanghas in their midst, the Noble Ones and the
monastics, who root their lives entirely in the soil of the Sasana. The
Third Gem has a distinct advantage over Gem One and Gem Two: an
immediate and living presence. It ennobles the community to have monks,
nuns and particularly Noble Ones in its midst.
The
Noble Ones in particular are the most qualified teachers, the adepts,
the most admirable friends who impart the Dharma both verbally and
bodily, through explanation and by example. What they explain is very
deep, very sophisticated and very difficult to grasp without equally
deep practice. Sangha members individually gain reputations for their
teaching or humanitarian work, for their inspiring meditation practice
or for their scrupulous observance of monastic discipline.
Relatively
few in the general population will have the time, energy or inclination
to enter the Dharma deeply, what with fields to plow, goods to bargain
for and children to raise. Indeed the understanding of the typical lay
Buddhist has generally been very limited or erroneous. This is much the
same with science: Relatively few people develop deep scientific
knowledge: Armchair scientists wonder how rocket ships avoid bumping
into all the orbits out there and why it is cold at the North Pole, the
place closest to the sun. It has generally been the case that the laity
is also much more concerned than monastics with the more excessive
devotional practices. The Buddha, for instance, before his death when
asked by Ananda what to do with his body, replied that it was no concern
for the monks,
“For
there are, wise Khattiyas, Brahmins and householders who are devoted to
the Tathagata: they will render care of the funeral.”48
Nonetheless,
the member of the Buddhist community benefits from living in a culture
of Awakening. The Buddha stated that the Dharma is not held in a tight
fist; there is nothing esoteric in the teachings; they are open to all.
As the laity opens its heart to the Third Gem and rubs shoulders with
individual adepts, the teachings flow freely to them. The lay Buddhist
benefits as adepts clarify and correct her views upon request, or
pro-actively when greed, hate or delusion arise in her heart. Noble Ones
are great to have around. If the lay devotee should find the time,
energy and aspiration to go deeply, to begin to ascend the stem that
reaches toward Awakening, there are kind and friendly helping hands
available to explain the meaning of the Buddha’s life and Awakening in
detail and to clarify step by step the highly sophisticated teachings to
lead the instructling toward and up the Path toward Awakening. With
work the lay devotee can become quite adept herself and will likely, at
that point, avail herself of the ever-present opportunity to join the
Sangha in order to pursue the Path more fully, with the full and
enthusiastic support of her generous neighbors.
Most
immediately, the lay Buddhist witnesses in the Sangha constant
breathing examples of what it is to live a Buddhist life. Its members
are walking science experiments, demonstrating with every word and
gesture what happens when one lets go, when one renounces everything
that common sense says is necessary for felicity, for fun, for
fulfillment: the empirical result is that either one quits the Sangha or
one ends up being among the most joyfully contented people in the
village. The Noble Ones serve as a reality check for folk people as they
make life’s decisions, and a subversively and radically civilizing
influence on the whole community.
The
wholesome practice of veneration extends particularly easily to the
living Gem and dovetails with the project of satisfying their material
needs, which becomes an expression of both veneration and generosity.
The needs of the monastics are modest but constant. This puts the devout
layperson right at the center of the wholesome practice of generosity,
which becomes the lifeblood of the Buddhist community as it gives rise
to an economy of gifts grown from monastic roots. Through their support
of the Sangha as well as the rest of the Buddhist community, lay
Buddhists develop the joyful feeling of doing their share for the
Sasana, of participating fully in bringing the civilizing influence of
the Noble Ones into the community and in upholding the Sasana to
preserve Buddhism in its pristine purity for future generations.
The
relationship between the Sangha and lay community is one of
complementary roles in partnership. The Sangha upholds the teachings,
spins off Noble Ones and thereby serves the community. The Noble Ones
are the soil that carries not only the nourishment of water and mineral
but ensures that the entire practice, roots, leaves, stem and blossom,
will not be carried away by the wind in the years to come. The community
supports the Sangha’s material needs. Generosity on both sides binds
the two together. It is important to recognize that there is little here
in the way of hierarchy. What authority the Sangha holds arises from
its own attainments, teachings and conduct. The Sangha has no coercive
power beyond the layperson’s willingness to accept advice or admonition
or to view the monastic as a role model. The laity actually has more
direct coercive power: Dissatisfaction with the Monastic Sangha can turn
into withdrawal of support, a constant external check on the purity of
the institutional Sangha.
Because
generosity is such a joyful experience, monastery/community centers49
can be very happy places in which to practice fundamental Buddhist
values, along with selfless veneration. Monastery/community centers
encourage community involvement, demand no sophisticated knowledge of
Dharma and provide a wholesome environment into which to bring the kids.
They also open into an opportunity to rub shoulders with Noble Ones, to
benefit from their wisdom and advice and to begin to learn and practice
the Path to Awakening.
Conclusions
A
culture of Awakening is one that offers the optimal support and
encouragement to those who aspire to Awakening and that secures the
optimal benefit from the Dharma for future happiness and virtue of those
of more modest aspiration. It represents an oasis of sanity in a world
otherwise perpetually spinning crazily out of kilter, out of control.
The Buddha-Sasana provides the infrastructure for a culture of
Awakening. I have described that infrastructure in these first three
chapters, grounding it in the Buddha’s Dhamma-Vinaya and highlighting
the organic functionality of its various interrelated elements in
supporting its purpose. I will maintain in the remainder of this book
that the flower of the Sasana has remained surprisingly faithful to the
form described here, from the time the Buddha first breathed life into
it, through its hundred-generation long history, and up to the present
day.
In
brief, the Buddha-Sasana works in three ways. First, the Refuges
establish Buddha, Dharma and Sangha as primary sources of wisdom and
inspiration. This inclines us all toward Dharma even as we may also
individually come under the many often unwholesome influences alive in
any culture. Second, the community provides opportunities for optimal
practice for those of highest aspiration. As a result, Noble Ones walk
among us and we are all ennobled by their inspiration. Third, the
presence of an adept community of Noble Ones, trainees and scholars
ensures the preservation and propagation of an authentic Dhamma.
What
I have provided so far is a synchronic account of the Buddha-Sasana. I
intend in the remaining chapters to look at the dynamics of the Buddha-
Sasana: its historical evolution, its social and demographic variation,
its modern manifestations, and how Buddhism has proven so resilient yet
so darn tolerant of cultural influences.
DISPENSION OF BUDDHA (BUDDHA SASANA)
The truth of Life
To
bring true happiness, one must control ones mind, not physicality if
you can control and discipline your mind you will find the way to
understand truth and all wisdom and virtues will come to you naturally.
DISPENSION OF BUDDHA (BUDDHA SASANA)
To
bring true happiness, one must control ones mind, not physicality if
you can control and discipline your mind you will find the way to
understand truth an…
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Bunny Easter GIF - Bunny Easter HappyEaster GIFsIm Vegan Openied GIF - ImVegan Openied PalmOilFree GIFsHappy Easter Snoopy GIF - Easter Happyeaster Eastersunday GIFsNevhada Veg Sticker - Nevhada Veg Vegan StickersAnimal Lover Easter GIF - AnimalLover Easter VeganEaster GIFs


https://www.peta.org/features/celebrate-cruelty-free-easter/




Why You Should Celebrate a Cruelty-Free Easter

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As
Christians remember Christ’s crucifixion as the final sacrifice and
celebrate His victory over death in the resurrection, let us resolve to
emulate His compassion in their own lives by showing mercy to animals.
There’s no better place to begin than the dinner table. As we break
bread, let’s break ties with some of the most violent and ungodly places
on Earth—farms and slaughterhouses.

iStock_000006516808_locke_rd© iStock.com/locke_rd

Before
they become Sunday’s centerpiece, animals on farms are denied
everything that God designed them to want and do. They never breathe
fresh air, nurture their young, play with other animals, or do anything
to live out the biblical concept that “God’s mercy is over all His
creatures.”

Piglet on spring green grass on a farm© iStock.com/Byrdyak

For example, pigs
spend their entire lives in filthy concrete pens, and cruelty is
rampant, as witnessed by PETA investigators. PETA’s investigation of
Belcross Farm, a pig-breeding facility in North Carolina, resulted in
the first-ever felony indictments for cruelty to animals by farm workers
in the U.S. PETA’s recent undercover investigation at Seaboard Farms,
Inc. has resulted in the filing of felony cruelty-to-animals charges
against a former manager at the facility.

Hen with Chicks© iStock.com/xalanx

Easter is also no celebration for hens on egg farms,
who suffer constant confinement to tiny, filthy wire cages. Male chicks
are killed—often through suffocation—since they don’t produce eggs, and
female chicks have their beaks painfully seared off to keep them from
pecking one another. Cows on dairy farms
are kept continually impregnated, and their calves are snatched away
just after birth so that their mothers’ milk can be consumed by humans.

Calf and Mother CowIMG_0167 | Razvan Antonescu | CC BY 2.0

At
the end of their short, miserable lives, these animals are crammed into
trucks, with little protection from the elements, to suffer the
ultimate terror of the slaughterhouse, where workers hang them upside-down and slit their throats.

What You Can Do

Supermarkets and chain restaurants
are becoming more vegan-friendly every day. Since being vegan is easier
than ever, there’s simply no reason for any animals to end up on our
plates. Order your free vegan starter kit below, and check out our guide to eating vegan.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVQojho7Hws
The ULTIMATE Vegan EASTER Food Guide 2021
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Have you got your Easter sorted yet? Vegans are honestly spoilt for choice this year. Did you know them all?
Being
vegan during Easter has progressed incredibly well over the last few
years, with many retailers stepping up their vegan friendly options each
year.
There are a handful of new vegan Easter food items available this year, are you aware of all of these?
What are you planning to purchase this year for your Easter celebrations? Please let me know in the comment section below!
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As
always, I would love to hear your feedback in the comments below and be
sure to chuck us a subscribe if you want to stay up-to-date with more
great content!
Disclosure:
We use affiliate links to monetize our content. We may receive a
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http://voiceofsikkim.com/2010/01/30/sikkim-to-suggest-amalgamation-of-evm-data-into-master-evm/comment-page-1/

EVM: Parakesarivarma Chola’s intellectual property right


EVM
or secret balloting while ensuring the public nature of the elections
is as old as Parakesarivarma Chola, who, about 1000 years ago wrote the
procedure in an inscription on stone. This is also known as kudavolai
stone inscription. (kudam means ‘pot’ as ballot box; olai means
‘palm-leaf’ as ballot).


This was the basis for
the Constitution of India which has the basic feature of democratic
republic. The inscription was also discussed in the Constituent
Assembly.

http://164.100.47.132/lssnew/constituent/vol4p8.pdf


T.
Prakasam, Member of the Constituent Assembly, 23rd JULY 1947 stated:
Adult suffrage is not a new thing. as imagined by some of our friends,
handed down to us by Great Britain. Adult suffrage you will find
inscribed on the stone walls of a temple in the village of Uttaramerur
twenty miles from Conjeeveram, the whole structure of democracy of those
days just a thousand years ago,-many of us imagine that it is Great
Britain that has given us the democratic process of election; that is
not so. You will find ‘on the stone walls of that temple written in the
Tamil language an inscription to the effect that there was democratic
election carried on then on the basis of adult suffrage a thousand years
ago. There was adult suffrage as stated there. There were no wooden
boxes which could be used as ballot boxes, but cadjan leaves were used
as ballot papers and pots as ballot boxes. That is the way in which they
carried on the administration of the country, even in the villages; and
it is the misfortune of this country that we have fallen on evil days
and came under the rule of different kings.


Cholas had an advanced system democratic republic for local-self governance of villages.


I am attaching
photographs of the rule books of the 1000-year old stone inscription; I
request Govt. of India through Chief Election Commissioner of India to
seek an international patent for the stunning and stable election
process for a democratic republic. (Actual date of the inscription is:
mudalam parantakanin padinankavatu aandu padinaram naal, that is, the
16th day of the fourteenth year of Parantaka Chola king).


The kudam ‘pot’ used is the electronic machine part of EVM. I challenge anyone to tamper with an ancient pot from Chola days.


The terracotta and palm-leaves are non-tamperable and are, respectively,
authentic ballot boxes and authentic ballots which can be preserved for
thousands of years in the vaults of the Election Commission.


Uttaramerur Inscription: Recording the Mode of Election to Village Assemblies in the Tenth Century A.D.


The text of the inscription is in V. Venkayya, Annual Report on Epigraphy, 1904


King

Parakesarivarman, who conquered Madurai.


Date


On the sixteenth day of the fourteenth year.


Royal Order


Whereas
a royal letter of His Majesty, our lord, the glorious  Viranarayana, the
illustrious Parantakadeva, the prosperous Parkesarivarman, was received
and was shown to us,


The Village


We, the members of the assembly of Uttaramerur-caturvedi-mangalam in its own subdivision of Kaliyurkottam,


Officer Present


Karanjai Kondaya-Kramavitta bhattan alias Somasiperuman of Srivanganagar in Purangarambainadu, a district of the Chola country,


Settlement


Sitting with us and
convening the committee in accordance with the royal command, made a
settlement as follows according tothe terms of the royal letter for
choosing once every year from this year forward members for the “Annual
Committee”, “Garden Committee”, and “Tank Committee”:


Wards


There shall be thirty wards;


Qualifications


In these thirty wards,
those that live in each ward shall assemble and shall choose for
“pot-tickets” ( Kudav Olai) anyone possessing the following
qualifications:


 
(a) He must own more than a quarter veli of tax-paying land;


(b) He must live in a house built on his own site;


(c) His age must be below 70 and above 35;


(d) He must know the  Mantrabrahmana, i.e., he must know it by teaching others;

(e)
Even if one owns only one-eighth  veli of land, he should have his name
written on the pot-ticket to be put into the pot, in case he has learnt
one Veda and one of the four bhasyas by explaining it to others.

 
Among those possessing the foregoing qualifications:


 
(f) Only such as are well conversant with business and are virtuous shall be taken and,


(g)
One who possesses honest earnings, whose mind is pure and who has not
been on any of the committees for the last three years shall also be
chosen.


 
Disqualifications


 
(a)  One who has
been on any of the committees but has not submitted his accounts, and
all his relations, specified below, shall not have their names written
on the pot-tickets and put into the pot;


(b) The sons of the younger and elder sisters of his mother,


(c) The sons of his paternal aunt and maternal uncle,


(d) The uterine brother of his mother,


(e) The uterine brother of his father,


(f) His uterine brother,


(g) His father-in-law,


(h) The uterine brother of his wife,


(i) The husband of his uterine sister,

(j) The sons of his uterine sister,


(k) The son-in-law who has married his daughter,


(l) His father,


(m) His son;


(n) One against whom incest ( agamyagamana) or the first four of the five great sins are recorded,


(o) All his relations above specified shall not have their names written on the pot-tickets and put into the pot;


(p) One who is foolhardy;


(q) One who has stolen the property of another;


(r) One who has taken forbidden dishes (?) of any kind and who has become pure by performing expiation;


(s) One who has committed sins and has become pure by performing expiatory ceremonies;


(t) One who is guilty of incest and has become pure by performing expiatory ceremonies.


(u)
All these thus specified shall not to the end of their lives have their
names written on the pot-ticket to be put into the pot for any of the
committees.


Mode of Election


Excluding all these,
thus specified, names shall be written for pot-tickets in the thirty
wards and each of the wards in these twelve streets of Uttaramerur shall
prepare a separate covering ticket for each of the thirty wards bundled
separately. These packets shall be put into a pot. When the pot-tickets
have to be drawn, a full meeting of the Great Assembly, including the
young and old members, shall be convened. All the temple priests
(Numbimar) who happen to be in the village on that day, shall, without
any exception whatever, be caused to be seated in the inner hall, where
the great assembly meets.


In the midst of the
temple priests one of them, who happens to be the eldest, shall stand up
and lift that pot looking upwards so as to be seen by all people. One
ward, i.e., the packet representing it, shall be taken out by any young
boy standing close, who does not know what is inside, and shall be
transferred to another empty pot and shaken. From this pot one ticket
shall be drawn by the young boy and made over to the arbitrator
(madhyastha). While taking charge of the ticket thus given to him, the
arbitrator shall receive it on the palm of his hand with the five
fingers open. He shall read out the name in the ticket thus received.
The ticket read by him shall also be read out by all the priests present
in the inner hall. The name thus read out shall be put down (and
accepted). Similarly one man shall be chosen for each of the thirty
wards.

Constitution of the Committee


Of the thirty men thus
chosen, those who had previously been on the Garden committee and on the
Tank committee, those who are advanced in learning, and those who are
advanced in age shall be chosen for the
Annual Committee. Of the rest, twelve shall be taken for the Garden
committee and the remaining six shall form the Tank committee. These
last two committees shall be chosen by showing the Karai.


Duration of the Committees


The great men of these
three committees thus chosen for them shall hold office for full three
hundred and sixty days and then retire.


Removal of Persons Found Guilty

When one who is on the
committee is found guilty of any offence, he shall be removed at once:
for appointing the committees after these have retired, the members of
the Committee “for Supervision of Justice” in
the twelve streets of Uttaramerur shall convene an assembly kuri with
the help of the Arbitrator. The committees shall be appointed by drawing
pot-tickets according to this order of settlement.


Pancavara and Gold Committees


For the Pancavara
committee and the Gold committee, names shall be written for pot-tickets
in the thirty wards. Thirty packets with covering tickets shall be
deposited in a pot and thirty pot-tickets shall be
drawn as previously described. From these thirty tickets chosen,
twenty-four shall be for the Gold committee and the remaining six for
the Pancavara committee. When drawing pot-tickets for these two
committees next year, the wards which have been already represented
during the year in question on these committees shall be excluded and
the reduction made from the remaining wards by drawing theKarai. One who
has ridden on an ass and one who has committed forgery shall not hav
his name written on the pot-ticket to be put into the pot.


Qualification of the Accountant


Any Arbitrator who
possesses honest earnings shall write the accounts of the village. No
accountant shall be appointed to that office again before he submits his
accounts for the period during which he was in
office to the great men of the big committee and is declared to have
been honest. The accounts which one has been writing, he shall submit
himself and no other accountant shall he chosen to close his accounts.

King’s Order


Thus, from this year
onwards, as long as the moon and the sun endure, committees shall always
be appointed by pot-tickets alone. To this effect was the royal letter
received and shown to us graciously issued
by Lord of Gods, the emperor, one who is fond of learned men, the
wrestler with elephants, the crest jewel of heroes, whose acts i.e.,
gifts, resemble those of the celestial tree, the glorious
Parakesarivarman.


Officer Present


At the royal command,
Karanjai Kondaya Kramavitta bhattan alias Somasiperuman of Srivanganagar
in Purangarambai-nadu, a district of the Chola country, sat with us and
thus caused this settlement to be made.


Villager’s Decision


We, the members of the
assembly of Uttaramerur Caturvedimangalam, made this settlement for the
prosperity of our village in order that wicked men
may perish and the rest may prosper.

The Scribe


At the order of the
great men, sitting in the assembly, I, the Arbitrator Kadadippottan
Sivakkuri Rajamallamangalapriyan, thus wrote this settlement.

http://www.vasucv.com/tirukkovil/uttara-inscriptions_files/image002.jpg


 http://www.vasucv.com/tirukkovil/uttara-inscriptions_files/image003.jpg


Full reading is at http://www.vasucv.com/tirukkovil/uttara-inscriptions.htm


S. Kalyanaraman, Director Sarasvati Research Centre


Kalyan97@gmail.com 15 Feb. 2010


http://www.scribd.com/doc/26863214/EVM-parakesarivarmachola

Intellectual property?

There
are two types of EVMs. One with date-time stamp (introduced for 2009
polls by ECI) and another WITHOUT such stamping feature. According to
ECI website, the processor chip is imported from Japan.


In reality, the
microchips are delivered by Microchip USA and Renesas Japan local agents
to ECIL and BEL from Microchip, USA and Renesas, Japan as masked
microchips (to ECIL) or One time programmable read only memory (OTP-ROM)
microchips (to BEL).


The following is the status of the patent pending according to the World Intellectual Property Organization website:


EVM India, BEL’s application of 2002 for patent.
http://www.sumobrain.com/patents/wipo/Electronic-voting-machine-evm/WO2002084607.html

FriendsPatent Searching and Data


Title:
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Document Type and Number:
WIPO Patent Application WO/2002/084607
Kind Code:
A1
Abstract:
The
ballot unit (BU) which contains sixteen candidate buttons and indicator
lamps for each candidate button is interconnected to control unit (CU)
through a five-meter-length twenty-five core flat jacketed cable. The
control unit (CU), initially set for a particular number of contesting
candidates, activates the ballot unit (BU). The voting continues until
all the voters cast their votes. On completion of voting, operating the
close button (28) closes the control unit (CU), machine power switched
off, and control unit (CU) is packed into carrying case and taken into
the counting centers for the counting of votes. The result of the
election is displayed on the display screen (12) upon pressing of a
result button (29, 30) in the control unit (CU). The recorded votes cast
against each candidate are displayed sequentially in the display screen
(12) with a buzzer beep sound. The voting data is retained in the
memory even if power is switched off. The machine can be used for
conducting simultaneous elections using the auxiliary control unit (ACU)
along with the main control unit (CU). The entire machine is operated
by a 7.5V battery and allows the selection of a maximum of sixty-four
contesting candidates. Compartments are provided in the machine
constructed according to the invention with interlocking and thread
sealing features, the machine thus being tamper proof, error free and
easy to operate. The voting data recorded once are retained in the
memory until it is erased by operating a clear button (31). The entire
machine is constructed in injection moulded plastic for mass manufacture
and fabricated of light weight. The machine is convenient to use and
portable.
Inventors:
RAJAGOPALAN JAGANNATHAN (IN)
Application Number:
PCT/IN2002/000043
Publication Date:
October 24, 2002
Filing Date:
March 13, 2002
Export Citation:
Click for automatic bibliography generation Help
Assignee:
BHARAT ELECTRONICS LTD (IN)
RAJAGOPALAN JAGANNATHAN (IN)
International Classes:
G07C13/00; (IPC1-7): G07C13/00; G06F19/00
Foreign References:
US4649264A 1987-03-10
US5758325A 1998-05-26
Attorney, Agent or Firm:
Alamelu, Vaidyanathan (3rd Block 3rd Stage, Basaveshwaranaga, Bangalore 9 Karnataka, IN)
Download PDF:
View/Download PDF PDF Help
Claims:
CLAIMS
1.
An Apparatus for conducting elections for Parliament, State Assembly,
Municipal and other local bodies on the majority voting scheme as per
constitution of India on secret ballot and one voteronevote principle
comprising. a) A control unit having an OTP Micro controller (One time
programmable) to collect, record and store, count and display, a non
volatile data memory being interfaced serially to the Microcontroller,
the said memory stores the data during voting process, the various
control signals are generated through the shift register, a power
monitoring circuit to generate the reset to the Microcontroller, a seven
segment drivedecoder to generate display data, a ballot unit interface
along with the necessary connector, all being housed in a housing, the
top portion of the control unit being divided in to four sections i. e.,
(i) A display section consisting of two lamps ON to indicate that the
machine is ready for use and BUSY to indicate that the voter can record
his vote, and the display panelsone of 2 digits and the other of four
digits to display the no of candidates, total number of votes polled,
individual votes for each candidate and the errors, if any, (ii)
Candidate set section divided into two parts, one having”Candidate Set
Button”to set the number of contesting candidates, the other part for
carrying the power pack, two doors, one to cover the candidate set
button individually and the other which covers the entire section, (iii)
Result section divided into two parts, one having the close button to
close the polling operations, the other part divided into three sub
sections wherein result I and Result II buttons and clear buttons are
housed, the result buttons are used to display the results and clear
button is used to clear the previous voting records, two separate doors,
one to lock the result button sub sections and another to cover the
entire section and (iv) Ballot section wherein”ballot button”to permit
the voter to cast a vote and total buttons to show the total number of
votes polled are housed, and (b) a ballot unit having a base which
encloses a printed circuit board and a cover thereof, a connector box
for inter connecting cables to the control unit, sixteen push button
voting switches (one switch for each contesting candidates), an
indicator lamp which glows when the voter is permitted to vote, a slide
switch to indicate the ballot unit number.
2.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein multilevel thread sealing
provision is made to protect against any possible tampering.
3.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the control unit and ballot
unit are made by injection moulded plastic parts, fastenerless heat
sealing assembly technique, which provides consistent quality for mass
production at economical cost.
4.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein said base comprises of
rectangular moulded base providing locating latches, guides for
inserting PCB, self tapping bosses to fix PCB, heat sealing pipes to
seal door II & III, cutout for accommodating rear door and pips with
depression for fixing serial number plate.
5.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including cover, rectangular moulded
part contains compartments for ballot, total, close, result I, result
II, cand. set and clear buttons, a cavity to accommodate doors II, door
III & door IV, a compartment for power pack, windows for ON, Serial
number, Votes and busy indication, protrusion to hold the rear door,
counter bore to fix cover to base at the four locations with selftapping
screws.
6. Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, wherein said door I is a moulded cover including
cutouts to reach result keys form cover, latches to open from inside,
lugs for thread sealing to the cover.
7.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein said door II is a cover
hinged to base and enclosing the close, results and clear button, Slots
for latching to base, and slant surface with hole to thread seal to the
base.
8. Apparatus as
claimed in claim 1 including door III comprising moulded panel hinged to
base enclosing cand. set switch, power pack compartments, slot for
latching to base, and slant surface with hole to thread seal to the
base.
9. Apparatus as
claimed in claim 1 including door IV, comprising moulded cover hinged to
the main cover and enclosing cand. set swich and lugs for thread
sealing to the cover.
10.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein a panel enclosing the out
going connector compartment, rotates and opens out for interconnection,
latch and thread sealing lugs on both sides. 1I.
11. Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including spacers for sandwich mounting of PCB between base and cover.
12.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including the construction of
recessed switch knob to ensure deliberate pressing by voter to record
the votes.
13.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein said base is a rectangular
moulded panel with self tapping holes to fix PCB, provision for fixing
stand, compartment for connector interconnecting and sealing pipes to
fix serial number plate.
14.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein said base is a rectangular
moulded panel with self tapping holes to fix PCB, provision for fixing
stand, Compartment for connector interconnecting and sealing pipes to
fix serial number plate.
15.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1 including cover, rectangular moulded
panel with oblong cutouts to operate switch knob to register the vote,
stepped slot to fit cover ballot sheet, slots to hold right and left
flops at extreme corners and pips for fixing hinges at the bottom side.
16.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1 including PCB cover, rectangular panel
enclosing the PCB and provided ing holes for inserting sixteen sets of
switch and close knobs.
17.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including cover ballot sheet,
transparent cover for inserting paper containing name, serial number and
election symbol of contesting candidates, fixed to cover with round
latch for easy rotation.
18.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including switch knob and closing
knob constructed in that form to operate one at a time in the oblong
opening, the construction of movement of one knob brings other knob into
position.
19.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including flap right and left enclosing
latch of main cover and provided with thread sealing slots to cover and
base to protect against possible tampering by the voters.
20.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including door connector box, moulded
cover enclosing rear compartment to protect cascading connector and
cable.
21. Apparatus as
defined in claim 1, including the signal integrity established between
Microcontroller, Data memory and ballot unit so that these three will
work in unified manner.
22.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including the construction of Battery
pack in moulded case with polarised plug, which is unique and fool
proof that different battery cannot be used along with Low battery
indication means to facilitate replacement of battery at any stage of
polling process and the process can be continued without any loss of
voting data.
23.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including the powering scheme of ballot
units from the control unit, which gives a unique nature of signal
integrity (Scanning process) for the machine, high current drivers used
to drive the ballot unit to cater to the twentymeter distance between
the polling officer and voting compartment and the slide switch setting
in ballot unit makes it unique and cannot be interchanged during poll.
24.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including the method MicroController
(OTP) used to store the firmware, which cannot be changed or modified
once fused, the non volatile data memory (EEPROM) is tightly coupled to
the microcontroller through unique protocol to store the data during the
voting process, and every time the microcontroller checks the check sum
of the data memory (EEPROM) to establish link to proceed with the
voting process, in case of mismatch the machine displays Er message,
which eliminates the tampering the micro controller of EEPROM by
replacement of external components.
25.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including the scheme of data memory
written in encrypted form and has been split into two banks and the
ballot counting is stored in both banks, at every instance of a change
in the data memory, the data is stored in two different ways and both
are verified to check the correctness of the operation and the data can
be decrypted only by the firmware in the micro controller, hence it is
not possible to corrupt firmware of data by any known means.
26.
Apparatus as claimed defined in claim 1, including the implementation
of effective redundancy scheme with two independent nonvolatile memory
devices (EEPROM) to store the data, effectively four banks are used to
store data and at every operation all the four banks are checked and
atleast two banks should contain the correct data as per the firmware’s
expectations and if data are not found in atleast any of the two banks
then a fatal error is declared and the whole unit is unusable at this
state.
27. Apparatus as
defined in claim 1, including the printing of stored data memory
through a printer interface module at any number of times in the life of
the machine unless deliberately erased by operating the clear button.
This emulates the manual ballot paper method as per the constitutional
requirements.
28.
Apparatus as defined in claim 1, including the unidirectional
operational sequence of Machine in which a) Contesting candidate setting
cannot be changed unless the result is seen once, b) Votes cannot be
cast on the machine unless it is in the cleared condition (Previous
voting data erased), c) Votes cannot be added to the machine once it is
closed (by pressing the close button), d) Result cannot be seen unless
the machine is closed, e) The machine cannot be cleared unless the
result is seen at least once and the clearing operation requires the
ballot unit inter connection, which eliminates accidental erasing.
29.
Apparatus as defined in claim 1 including the regulation of voting in
which the machine accepts maximum of 5 votes per minute and this feature
discourages rigging and both capturing.
Description:
This
Invention relates to an Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) PREAMBLE The
prior art is known as manual ballot paper voting method in which every
voter is provided with a ballot paper containing serial number, names of
the contesting candidates, their election symbol and space to record
votes. The recording of vote is done by putting’X mark using rubber
stamp in the space provided against the candidate in the ballot paper.
After recording vote, the voters deposit the ballot paper in a sealed
metallic box (Ballot box). On completion of voting, the ballot papers
are taken to the counting centers. The seals of ballot box is opened in
the presence of candidates/agents and the votes are counted manually by
identifying’X’stamp mark against the candidate. The candidate who
secured highest number of votes is declared winner as per the
constitution of India.
The shortcomings of the prior art (manual ballot paper voting method) are 1. Involves printing of huge volume of ballot paper.
2. Storage and distribution of ballot paper requires large manpower and security.
3. Accounting and issue of ballot paper is a tedious work and error prone.
4. Manual counting of votes requires large manpower, time and prone to human error.
5. Re-counting is time consuming and costly.
6. Segregation of invalid votes is cumbersome and leads to disputes lfights, among candidates.
7. Manual voting is prone to mal-practices, booth capturing-not tamper proof.
Due
to the ever increasing population and frequency of elections, there is a
definite need to bring out improvement over manual ballot paper voting
method, which is 1. Fool proof, trouble free and cost effective.
2. To conduct election, paper less and count the votes automatically, so that the result can be declared immediately.
3. To eliminate the invalid votes so that the dispute of segregation of invalid votes eliminated.
4.
Reduce the overall election expenditure, to the government (The
election expenditure is increasing due to the frequent elections).
5.
Reduce drastically the volume of Ballot paper printing from the current
requirement of more then 70 million papers for manual voting for one
general election (Papers less system) The Electronic Voting Machine
(EVM) of the present invention is provided with all the \ above needed
improvements over the manual ballot paper voting method which are
explained in the succeeding paragraphs.
Summary of the invention.
The
present invention relates to an Electronic Voting Machine (EVM)
consisting of Control Unit (CU) and Ballot Unit (BU) for conduct of
elections in place of conventional manual ballot paper voting method.
The invention totally replaces the existing manual
method
by the use of apparatus constructed in accordance to the invention and
operational requirements as per the constitution of India for fool
proof, error free and cost saving way to conduct elections for electing
members of state assembly, parliament and other municipal bodies based
on majority voting scheme. The apparatus of the invention is convenient,
simple to operate and portable. Another important feature of this
machine is the facia construction of the control unit and ballot unit,
which is as per the constitutional requirement of India. Use of this
machine eliminates invalid voters, cumbersome procedure and disputes in
segregation of invalid votes as in manual ballot voting scheme. By the
use of EVM, the labour can be minimized at poling centers as well as
counting centers. The feature of the machine are illustrated below.
The
Electronic voting machine of the present invention consists of two
units, i. e. a balloting unit which the voter operates to exercise
his/her franchise and a control unit which controls the polling process.
It is operated by the Presiding Officer or the First Polling Officer.
The
Control Unit (CU) constructed in accordance with a invention is built
around a Micro - Controller [One time Programmable (OTIR)]. The control
unit is divided into four sections, i. e. a. display section, b.
candidate set section, c. result section and d. ballot section. The said
sections, are provided with seven control buttons namely cand. set,
ballot, close, result I, result B, total and clear buttons. Light
emitting diode (LED) indicates ON and BUSY condition of the machine. Six
digits of seven segment LED is
provided
for the display of result and error messages. Operation of cand. set
switch sets the number of contesting candidate in control unit. Ballot
switch operation energizes the ballot unit, receives and records one
vote in control unit. Close button operation ends the voting process,
The machine records the total number of votes polled and votes against
each contesting candidate during the polling. On the operation of Result
switch, the vote recorded against every contesting candidate is
displayed sequentially. Clear operation erases all previous voting data
stored in the machine. Print of recorded voting data is obtained through
a printer interface unit.
The
Ballot Unit (BU) constructed in accordance with the invention has
sixteen (16) push button voting switches and indicator lamps. The voting
buttons are provided in a recessed oblong cutout in the cover so that
the buttons are deliberately pressed by the voters for recording of
votes and not by accidental pressing. The top cover has a transparent
cover for inserting ballot paper to display the names of contesting
candidates, their serial number and election symbol. This cover can be
sealed inside the panel by thread seal to protect the ballot paper
against any tampering. Green LED lamp is provided for indicating the
energized condition of the machine to the Voter. Five meter flat cable
provides interconnection to the control unit to receive the signal.
Slide Switch is used to indicate the ballot unit number, which is set
depending on the number of contesting candidates. The rear compartment
receives the interconnecting cable of the cascading ballot unit when the
machine is used for more than sixteen contesting candidates.
The
machine is constructed using injection moulded plastic parts, which
provides consistent quality, high volume output for mass production.
Fastnerless assembly of plastic components used in the construction of
machine to achieve consistent quality and cost effective product. The
voting machine designed with injection moulded carrying cases for
movement/transportation to any location for usage. The machine
constructed to operate with 7.5V battery power source. It can be
deployed in places where no electrical power is available. Machine
construction with multilevel interlocking panels/section makes it fool
proof, easy to use by common man.
Other
features and advantages of the machine will be apparent from the
following description, the accompanying drawings and the appended
claims.
BRIEF
DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS: Fig. 1 shows the perspective view of
control unit to control the polling process, which is constructed in
accordance with the invention.
Fig. 2 is a fragmentary perspective view showing hinging arrangement of Door I & Door II to the Base of the control unit.
Fig. 3 is a fragmentary perspective view of showing the rear door of the control unit.
Fig 4 is a fragmentary perspective view of the control unit base showing the assembly of Printed Circuit Board (PCB).
Fig
5 is a perspective view of the control unit in fully assembled
conditions showing four sections, of the control unit namely A) Display
section B) candidate section, C) Result section D). Ballot section.
Fig 6 is an exploded view of control unit showing parts constructed in accordance with the invention.
Fig 7 shows view of switch knob and closing knob of Ballot Unit constructed in accordance with the invention.
Fig 8 is a fragmentary perspective view illustrating the arrangements of hinge, flap right, cover LED red.
Fig. 9 is a perspective view of Ballot unit, which is constructed in accordance with the invention.
Fig. 10 is a perspective view of internal construction of ballot unit.
Fig.
ll is a fragmentary perspective view illustrating door connector box
with cable clamp, lockingpin with flaps and rubber stand Fig. 12 is an
exploded view of balloting unit constructed in accordance with the
invention.
Fig. 13. is a diagram of Auxiliary Control Unit (ACU) constructed in accordance with the invention.
Fig. 14 is a schematic block diagram of Control Unit constructed in accordance with the invention.
Fig. 15 is a schematic block diagram of Ballot Unit constructed in accordance with the invention.
Fig. 16 is the connectivity scheme EVM for single poll mode.
Fig. 17 is the connectivity scheme of EVM for dual poll mode.
Fig. 18 is the state transition diagram of Electronic Voting Machine constructed in accordance with the invention.
DESCRIPTION
OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT : Referring the drawing of the Control Unit
illustrated in Fig. l includes an aesthetically designed plastic molded
base 2 which enclosed Printed Circuit Board 35 (PCB) shown in Fig. 4
and cover 1 consists of four sections Display Section, Candidate
Section, Result Section and Ballot Section as shown in fig. 5. a)
Display Section consists of two lamps ON, Busy, and two display panels,
one of 2 digits and other of 4 digits. (Fig. 5) b) The Candidate Section
(fig. 5) has a cover, which opens from, left to right. On opening its
cover by pressing the latch on the left-hand side, two compartments are
seen. The left compartment is for the battery 34 rated 7.5V, 2Ah. In the
right compartment, a Candid button is located. The Candidate Set
Section is closed and sealed by Door I as shown in (fig. 1). c) The
cover of the Result Section has an elliptical aperture on the left hand
side through which the close button is seen. The left portion of the
Result Section
houses
a black close button. The right portion contains an inner compartment
with its own door. The door of the inner compartment has two elliptical
apertures through which buttons marked Resuft I and Resuft H is seen.
The inner door can be opened by inserting the thumb and a finger through
the two apertures above the Result I and Result II’buttons’and then
pressing the inner latches simultaneously slightly inwards. On opening
the door of the inner compartment by inserting forefinger and thumb
through the holes which are marked Result I and Result H and pressing
the latches and pulling the cover up, there are two frames around the
two apertures for fixing green paper seals. The inner compartment has
three sub-sections with two yellow buttons marked Result I and Result Il
and a white Aearbutton. d) In the ballot section, there are two
buttons-a Grey Total button 32 (fig. 6) and a large blue ballot button
as indicated in fig. 5.
The
cover 1 (fig. 5) defines four sections namely a. Display section, b.
Candidate section, c. Result section and d. Ballot Section.
The
base 2 (fig. 6) has provision to mount printed circuit board 35 (PCB)
using self tapping screws 37. It has also a compartment with rear door 3
(fig. 6) This rear door is hinged in the bottom and opens swinging
downwards, when the latch in the middle is pressed downwards. This has a
provision for thread sealing. The rear door when opened will reveal a
socket on the left hand side for plugging the interconnecting cable from
the
ballot unit and a toggle switch 36 in the middle for switching the EVM ON or OFF (Fig. 3).
The
door I 4 (fig. 5) is a protection cover for result section. Door I when
opened reveal knob (Result I) 29; Knob (Result II)30 ; and knob (clear)
31 (fig. 6) & has provision for thread sealing. The insert 16 (Fig.
5) is used for the thread sealing of the result section.
Two elliptical cutouts are provided in the door 4 to access Result I, Result II and Clear - buttons.
The
door II referred by reference numeral S (fig. 5) is the top cover of
the result section having an elliptical cutout for the knob (close) 28
{fig. 6). The elliptical cutout is sealed by plate-paper seal 26 (fig.
5) and green paper seal. The door in indicated by reference numeral 6
(fig. 5) is a protection cover for candidate set section with provision
for thread sealing. The door in when opened will reveal battery
compartment and candidate compartment. The candidate set compartment is
accessed by opening door IV (cand. set) 7 (fig. 5) by removing thread
sealing. The knob (cand. set) 27 (fig. 6) can then be operated.
The hinge 8 (fig. 4) shows the hinging action of the door It 5 & door in 6 with the cover.
The
plexy glass display 12 (fig. 6) is a red acrylic sheet to view the
digits of 7-segment display mounted on the Printed Circuit Board (PCB).
There are 2 digits for serial number and 4 digits for number of votes.
There are seven knob bases 11 (fig. 6) used for the seven different
knobs such as knob 27 (cand. set). Knob 28 (close), knob 29 (result I),
knob 30 (result 1I), knob 31 (clear), knob 32 (total) and knob 13
(Ballot) (Fig. 6). The
knob (ballot) 13 (fig. 6) is a dark blue colour plastic button to register vote. Cover 38 is provided for the green LED.
The
bush short 14 (fig. 6) and bush long 15 (fig. 6) are assembled after
mounting the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) on to the base of the control
unit. The pin (door IV) 22 and hinge (door IV) 23 (Fig. 5) are required
to assemble door IV onto the cover of the control unit. At first hinge
and door IV are assembled by using pin (door IV) and then the door IV
assembly is fixed to the cover by heat sealing as shown in fig. 6.
The
washer 24 (fig. 6) are used along with five knobs namely knob (cand.
set). Knob (close), knob (result I), knob (result II) and knob (clear)
It gives cushioning effect to the knobs. It is made out of foam. The
washer 25 (fig. 6) are used to fix display Printed Circuit Board (PCB)
rigidly on to the base of the control unit. After mounting the display
board on the base, washer is placed and then fixed by screws. Rubber cap
33 (Fig. 6) is fixed to cover screw head.
Referring
to the drawings, the ballot unit illustrated in fig. 10 includes a
rectangular plastic moulded base 39, which encloses PCB cover & PCB
(not shown). It also encloses door connector box 64 (fig. 11) for
interconnecting cable. The base has got a rubber stand 40 as shown in
fig. 7. The cover 42 (fig. 10) defines cover ballot sheet 62 for
inserting the ballot paper of the sixteen contestants, cover (ready
Light Emitting Diode (LED) 44 (fig. 10) & Light Emitting Diode (LED)
cover 45 (fig. 10). It protects ballot paper. The cover 42 & base
39 of the ballot unit are assembled with two numbers of
plastic
hinges 46 (fig. 8) and the cover ballot sheet is assembled with locking
pins 47 and 48 (fig. 11). The hinges are assembled to the base and
cover by heat sealing process.
The
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) cover 49 (fig. 12) is a rectangular plastic
moulded part, dark Grey in colour having provision for sixteen closing
knobs 50 (fig. 7), sixteen switch knobs 51 (fig. 7). This protects
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) 63 (Fig. 12) from tampering.
It
is fixed to the base by screws. The closing knob 50 (fig. 7) used for
blocking the switch knob 51. In order to access the switch knob 51 one
has to open the closing knob.
This is used during polling depending on the number of contestants in fray.
Locking pin 52 (fig. 12) used for closing & opening the cover and base of the ballot unit.
Flap
right 53 (fig. 11) and flap left 54 (fig. 11) are used for covering
locking pin 52 after latching the cover to base. Bracket 55 (fig. 10)
used for clamping the interconnecting cable at two places after crimping
the 25 core flat cable to the 25-pin dip header, which is soldered to
the Printed Circuit Board (PCB). Support LED 56 (fig. 12) is a plastic
moulded part in which ready LED assembly is mounted in order to avoid
damage during operation and transportation of the Ballot Unit.
Rubber Stand 40 (Fig. 7) supports the ballot unit while placing on table during operation.
It is a plastic moulded part having provision for fixing serrated rubber stand 41 (fig. 7).
Rubber
foot 57 (Fig 11) prevents sliding of the ballot unit from the table
while the unit is in operation. Clamp cable 58 (fig. 11) clamps the
interconnecting cable of the cascading
Ballot
unit (incase of more than sixteen contesting candidates), 25 contact
sub connector) inside the connector box compartment of the ballot unit.
Interconnecting
cable 59 (Fig. 9) is a sheathed 25 core flat cable, one end of which is
permanently attached to the Ballot unit. The other end is with 25
contact D-sub connector with hood for connecting it to the control unit.
Ready lamp 60 (Fig. 9) is on the top left side of the Ballot unit. This
lamp glow when the presiding officer presses the’Ballot button3 on the
control unit enable the voter to record his vote. It goes off when the
voter has recorded his vote.
Slide
switch 61 window (Fig 10) is on the top right side of the Ballot unit.
The slide switch inside the Ballot unit is used to set the Ballot Unit
for 1-16, 17-32, 33-48 or 48-64 positions in cascading configurations.
Sixteen candidates button 51 (Fig. 7) provide convenient access for the
voter to record his/her vote by pressing the candidate’s button against
the name and symbol of the candidate of his 1 her choice. When the
button is pressed the lamp on the left side of that button glows and
voters choice is recorded.
Provision
for insertion of ballot paper 43 (fig. 12) is provided on the top cover
of ballot unit. The ballot paper contains serial number, names and
symbols of the contesting candidates. A transparent polycarbonate sheet
62 covers the ballot sheet 43 (Fig. 12) to protect the said ballot
paper.
Referring
to the diagram 13, Auxiliary control unit is constructed by means of
cover 65, base 66, Printed Circuit Board (PCB) 67, inter-connecting
cable 68 to connect to the main
control
unit. The PCB is held by self-tapping screws 69, cover and base is held
by screws 70, ballot knob 71 is inserted into the packet in the cover
and knob base 72 is fitted from inside. Partition box 73 is used to
control light dispersion on indicator. Rear door 74 provides access to
connect Ballot Unit and Cable Clamp 75 is used to Clamp the Cable.
Referring
to the diagram 14 which shows the block level details of hardware
construction of control unit built around a Micro-controller (One Time
Programmable). The non- volatile data memory is interfaced serially to
the Micro controller. All the required control signals are generated
through the shift register. In order to have an orderly power up and
power down sequence, power monitoring circuit (DS1231) is used. To
protect EEPROMs during power up and power down, the low voltage detector
in the power monitor is used. Additionally, the reset signal also
inhibits the write operation under low voltage condition. A
seven-segment drive-decoder is used to generate display data. In order
to reduce the hardware complexity, these displays are driven in a
multiplexed mode using an 8-digit, high current display driver.
Minimum
numbers of components have been used to construct the machine to keep
cost and power consumption at optimum. Industrial grade and surface
mount technology have been used to achieve high reliability. The total
hardware has been populated in only three PCBs with minimum number of
interconnections to provide high field reliability and serviceability.
Signal integrity is established between Micro-controller, Data memory
and
ballot unit so that these three will work in unified manner. Without connecting the ballot unit the voting is not possible.
The
battery is packaged in moulded case with polarized plug, which is
unique and fool proof that different battery can not be used. Low
battery indication is provided in the machine to facilitate replacement
of battery at any stage of polling process and the process can be
continued. The ballot units are powered from the control unit, which
gives a unique nature of signal integrity (Scanning process) for the
machine. High current drivers are used to drive the ballot unit to cater
to the twenty-meter distance between the polling officer and voting
compartment. The slide switch setting in ballot unit makes it unique and
cannot be interchanged during poll.
Micro-controller
(One Time Programmable) is used to store the firmware, which cannot be
changed or modified once fused. The non-volatile data memory (EEPROM) is
tightly coupled to the micro-controller through unique protocol to
store the data during the voting process. Every time the
micro-controller checks the check sum of the data memory (EEPROM) to
confirm data integrity, otherwise the machine displays Er, which
eliminates the tampering the micro-controller or EEPROM by replacement
of external components.
The
data memory is written in encrypted form and has been split into two
banks and the ballot counting is stored in both banks. 2 Nos. are used
for redundancy and hence voting data is stored at 4 locations. At every
instance of a change in the data memory, the data
stored
in 4 locations are verified to check the correctness of the operation.
The data can be decrypted only by the firmware in the micro-controller.
Hence it is not possible to corrupt the firmware or data by any known
means.
To
have effective redundancy, two independent non-volatile memory devices
(EEPROM) are used. Effectively four banks are used to store data and at
every operation all the four banks are checked and at-least two banks
should contain the correct data as per the firmware’s expectations. If
data are not found in at-least any of the two banks then a fatal error
is declared and the whole unit is unusable at this state.
The
stored data can be read and printed through a printer interface module
at any number of times in the life of the machine unless deliberately
erased by operating the clear button. This emulates the manual ballot
paper method as per the constitutional requirements.
Figure 15 shows switch and LED matrix interfaced to Control unit.
Figure 16 shows the connectivity details of electronic voting machine for single poll mode.
Figure
17 shows the connectivity details of electronic voting machine for dual
poll mode where in the EVM is deployed for parliament and assembly
elections simultaneously.
Figure
18 shows the state transition diagram of voting process. It also gives
the different state of the machine and change over from one state to
other. The state transition has
been done to prevent mal-practices and to strictly follow the procedure of voting as per the constitutional requirements.
OPERATION
: Before the Electronic Voting Machine is sent to the Polling Stations,
the Ballot Unit has to be prepared by the Officer-in-charge as given
below: a) Inserting the Ballot paper, b) Masking the Candidate’s
buttons, which are not required to be used, c) Setting the Slide Switch
at the appropriate position, i. e. 1,2,3, or 4 as the case may be
according to the number of such units which are to be used depending
upon the number of candidates and the sequence in which, they are to be
used and d) Sealing the unit.
After
taldng out the Ballot Unit from the carrying case, the top cover of the
unit may be opened carefully by pressing simultaneously, towards the
right, the latches at the top and bottom on the right edge of the unit
(fig. 11), and swinging the cover up. (fig. 13).
OPENING
OF BALLOT PAPER SCREEN Open the Ballot Paper Screen, which is a
transparent acrylic sheet, hinged to the top cover on the extreme left
side. The release latches of the screen are inside the top cover (Fig.
9). By pressing the latches simultaneously, first slightly towards right
and then pushing them downwards, the Ballot Paper Screen will become
free for opening on the
upper side of the said top cover. While opening the screen care should be taken to ensure that it is not damaged.
FIXING
OF BALLOT PAPER Place the Ballot Paper in the space provided for the
purpose on the upper side of the top cover. Align the Ballot paper
properly so that each candidate’s name and his symbol are in line with
the corresponding Candidate’s lamp and button. After ensuring this
alignment, close and press fit the Ballot Paper Screen to secure the
Ballot Paper firmly underneath that screen.
After
the Ballot Paper has been firmly fixed and the Ballot Paper Screen has
been pressed fit on the upper side of the Top Cover, the screen is to be
sealed on the inner side of the Top Cover. This is to be done by
passing the thread through the two holes on the screen specially
provided for the purpose and by putting the thread seal on the
prescribed address tag showing the particulars of the election with the
seal of the Returning Officer.
MASKING
OF CANDIDATES’BUTTONS If the number of Candidates on the ballot paper
is less than 16, the white masking tabs should be moved onto the
Candidates’buttons not required to be used.
SETTING
OF SLIDE SWITCH Inside the Ballot Unit on the top right side, there is a
Slide Switch, which has four positions 1, 2,3 and 4. If only one Ballot
Unit is to be used, set this Switch to the position marked ‘1′. If two
ballot Units are to be used, set this Switch to the position marked ‘1′
in the Ballot Unit in which the names of the Candidates at Sl. Nos. 1 to
16 appear, and in the second Ballot Unit set this Switch to the
position marked’2′. If three Ballot Units are to be used, the Slide
Switch will be set to the position marked’1′in the first Ballot Unit in
which the names of candidates at Sl. Nos. 1 to 16 appear, to the
position marked’2′in the second Ballot Unit in which the names of
contesting candidates at Sl. Nos. 17 to 32 appear, and to the position
marked’3′in the third Ballot Unit. Likewise, if the 4* Ballot Unit is
also to be used if the number of contesting candidates exceeds 48, then
the Slide Switch will be sent to the position marked’4′in the last
Ballot Unit.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4
SEALING
OF BALLOT UNIT Close the Ballot Unit by bringing the top cover back to
its original position. Pass two threads, one through the three holes at
the top and the other through the three holes at the bottom provided for
the purpose and seal each thread with Returning Officer’s seal.
CONTROL
UNIT The Control Unit is to be prepared by the Returning Officer by- a)
Installing the Power Pack. b) Setting the number of contesting
candidates and c) Sealing the Candidate Set Section POWER PACK
INSTALLATION Open the cover of the Candidate Set Section by pressing
slightly inward the latch provided on the left side. Install the Power
Pack specially supplied by mating the socket of the Power Pack to the
plug. Ensure that Power Pack is pressed tight.
SETTING
THE NUMBER OF CONTESTING CANDIDATES After connecting the Power Pack,
open the compartment at the bottom of the Control Unit as explained
above, and proceed as follows for setting the Number of contesting
candidates :
a)
Connect the Ballot Unit to the Control Unit by plugging the connector
of the Interconnecting Cable in the socket in that compartment. As the
connector and the plug are multi-pin connectors, it will need some
practice to plug them properly.
The
EVM will work only when this connection is made properly. b) After
plugging the connector properly, push the’Power’switch to’ON’position.
It
will give a beep sound and the”ON”lamp on the Display Section of the
Control Unit will glow GREEN. c) After the’ON’lamp glows GREEN, press
the’Cand Set’button in the Candidate Set Section. There upon the 2 digit
Display Panel in the Display Section will now flash the letters’Cd’. d)
When the letters’Cd’start flashing on the Display Panels on the Control
Unit, press the Candidate’s button against the last contesting
candidate in Ballot Unit.
For example, if there are 9 contesting candidates, press the 9i candidate’s button.
On
that button being pressed, the Display Panels will stop flashing the
letters ‘Cd’. Instead, the full panel will start displaying the
following information sequentially-
This
way the machine is set for 9 contesting candidates. e) Switch OFF the
EVM by pushing the”Power”switch downwards to OFF position and disconnect
the Interconnecting cable from the control unit. For this purpose, the
spring type clips on both sides of the connector hood should be pressed
inward simultaneously and then the connector pulled out. Then close the
door of the compartment at the bottom of the Control Unit.
SEALING
THE CANDIDATE SET SECTION Close the flap which houses the Cand Set
button and pass a thread through the two holes provided on the left side
and seal with the seal of the Returning Officer. Then close the
candidate set section and do the thread seal. While sealing take care
that direct flame does not come in contact with the Control Unit and
molten wax does not fall on any part of the Control Unit.
Put
back the Ballot Unit and the Control Unit in their respective carrying
cases. They are ready for transportation to the Polling Station.
On
the day of Election, the presiding Office shall make the following
preparations: The Ballot Unit sill be checked to see if the Ballot Paper
is properly fixed in ballot display panel under the ballot paper screen
and that the two seals are intact.
In
the Control Unit, the presiding officer will check if the Candidate Set
Section is intact and then connect the Ballot Unit to the Control Unit
by plugging the connector of the
interconnecting
cable, put the’Power’switch to’ON’position and then close the bottom
compartment. Then open the’Result’Section in the Control Unit and press
the’Clear’ button to set all counts to’ZERO’. On completion of the
clearing process, the display panel will start displaying that all
counts are set to’ZERO’sequentially (i. e. one by one, the display panel
will show the total number of candidates, total votes polled and number
of votes for each candidate). If need be the presiding officer will
conduct a”MOCK POLL”in the presence of some polling agents & others.
During
the actual poll, the’Result Section’should be sealed, using special
security paper serially numbered. This paper seal has to be firmly fixed
in the inner cover frame of the Result Section. Here is also a
provision for making a thread seal on the left side of the inner door.
After this, the outer cover of the Result Section has to be pressed for
closing this section.
PROCEDURE
DURING POLL The Poll shall commence at the hour fixed for such
commencement. After all procedural requirements relating to
identification of voter, application of indelible ink on his/her
forefinger and obtaining his/her signature/thumb impression in the
Register of Voters have been completed with regard to the first voter,
the voter concerned has to be allowed for recording his vote. For that
purpose, press the’Ballot’button on Ballot Section of the Control Unit
which would make the Ballot Unit ready for recording of the vote by that
voter as has been explained herein above. Repeat that procedure every
time the next voter
is
to be allowed to record his vote. It should be ensured that only one
voter goes inside the voting compartment to vote. Special care should be
taken to ensure that a voter goes in that compartment in the same order
in which his Name is entered in the’Register of Voters.’Also ensure
that the Ballot button is pressed only when the earlier voter has come
out of the voting compartment. At any time, if the total number of votes
polled has to be ascertained,’Total’button should be pressed. The
Display panel will then show the total number of votes polled by that
time. Please remember that the’Total’button is to be pressed only when
the’Busy’lamp is OFF.
After
the close of the poll, the close button will be pressed. When this
button is pressed the display panel will show the total number of
candidates and the total number of votes polled during the day.
On
the day of counting, after making the necessary checks, the Result
button I in the Control Unit pressed to start the Result computation
process. On completion of the result computation process, the total
number of candidates, the total number of votes and the total number of
votes for each candidate will be displayed in the’Display Panel’
sequentially.
While
the form of apparatus herein described constitutes a preferred
embodiment of the invention, it is to be understood that the invention
is not limited to this precise form of apparatus, and that changes may
be made therein without departing from the scope and sprit of the
invention as defined in the appended claims.
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1. WO2002084607 - ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)











Publication Number

WO/2002/084607

Publication Date

24.10.2002

International Application No.

PCT/IN2002/000043

International Filing Date

13.03.2002

Chapter 2 Demand Filed

18.09.2002

IPC



G07C 13/00


2006.01
Applicants


  • BHARAT ELECTRONICS LIMITED
    [IN]/[IN]image.png
    (AllExceptUS)
  • RAJAGOPALAN, Jagannathan
    [IN]/[IN] (UsOnly)


Inventors


  • RAJAGOPALAN, Jagannathan


Agents


  • ALAMELU, Vaidyanathan
    image.png


Priority Data


319/MAS/01 17.04.2001 IN

Publication Language

English (EN)

Filing Language

English (EN)

Designated States





Title

(EN) ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
(FR) MACHINE DE VOTE ELECTRONIQUE (EVM)





Abstract

(EN)
The
ballot unit (BU) which contains sixteen candidate buttons and indicator
lamps for each candidate button is interconnected to control unit (CU)
through a five-meter-length twenty-five core flat jacketed cable. The
control unit (CU), initially set for a particular number of contesting
candidates, activates the ballot unit (BU). The voting continues until
all the voters cast their votes. On completion of voting, operating the
close button (28) closes the control unit (CU), machine power switched
off, and control unit (CU) is packed into carrying case and taken into
the counting centers for the counting of votes. The result of the
election is displayed on the display screen (12) upon pressing of a
result button (29, 30) in the control unit (CU). The recorded votes cast
against each candidate are displayed sequentially in the display screen
(12) with a buzzer beep sound. The voting data is retained in the
memory even if power is switched off. The machine can be used for
conducting simultaneous elections using the auxiliary control unit (ACU)
along with the main control unit (CU). The entire machine is operated
by a 7.5V battery and allows the selection of a maximum of sixty-four
contesting candidates. Compartments are provided in the machine
constructed according to the invention with interlocking and thread
sealing features, the machine thus being tamper proof, error free and
easy to operate. The voting data recorded once are retained in the
memory until it is erased by operating a clear button (31). The entire
machine is constructed in injection moulded plastic for mass manufacture
and fabricated of light weight. The machine is convenient to use and
portable.
(FR)
L’unité
de vote (BU) qui renferme seize boutons correspondant à seize candidats
et lampes indicatrices pour chaque bouton, est interconnectée à une
unité de commande (CU) par l’intermédiaire d’un câble gainé plat de cinq
mètres de longueur, vingt cinq fils. L’unité de commande (CU),
initialement réglée pour un nombre déterminé de candidats disputant les
sièges, active l’unité de vote (BU). Le vote continue jusqu’à ce que
tous les votants déposent leurs votes. Une fois le vote terminé, l’unité
de commande (CU) est fermée par actionnement du bouton de fermeture
(28), la machine est mise hors circuit et l’unité de commande (CU) est
emballée dans une valise de transport et amenée dans les centres de
comptage des votes. Le résultat du scrutin est affiché sur l’écran (12)
après avoir appuyé sur le bouton des résultats (29, 30) dans l’unité de
commande (CU). Les votes enregistrés pour chaque candidat sont affichés
séquentiellement sur l’écran (12) avec signal sonore bip. Les données du
scrutin sont maintenues en mémoire, même si le courant est interrompu.
La machine peut être utilisée pour traiter des scrutins simultanés au
moyen de l’unité de commande auxiliaire (ACU), conjointement avec
l’unité de commande principale (CU). L’ensemble de la machine fonctionne
au moyen d’une batterie 7,5 V et permet de sélectionner un maximum de
soixante quatre candidats disputant le scrutin. Des compartiments sont
prévus dans la machine, laquelle comporte, selon l’invention, des moyens
de verrouillage et de scellage, ce qui rend la machine impossible à
falsifier, exempte d’erreurs et facile à faire fonctionner. Les données
du scrutin, une fois enregistrées, sont retenues en mémoire jusqu’à ce
qu’elles soient effacées par actionnement d’un bouton de libération
(31). Toute la machine est construite en matière plastique par moulage
par injection, en production série, et est d’un poids léger. Par
ailleurs, la machine est d’un emploi pratique et est portable.




Also published as






Report


generated on: 14.02.2010

http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/iasr?IA=IN2002000043&LANGUAGE=EN&ID=0&VOL=0&DOC=0&WO=02/084607&WEEK=null&TYPE=&DOC_TYPE=IASR&PAGE=1
Intl. Application status report
http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/wads.jsp?IA=IN2002000043&LANGUAGE=EN&ID=09006361800979b0&VOL=17&DOC=006533&WO=02/084607&WEEK=43/2002&TYPE=A1&DOC_TYPE=PAMPH&PAGE=1

Drawings
 
Figure 18 shows the state transition diagram of voting process. It also gives the different state of the machine and change over from one state to other.

http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/wads.jsp?IA=IN2002000043&LANGUAGE=EN&ID=09006361800979b0&VOL=17&DOC=006533&WO=02/084607&WEEK=43/2002&TYPE=A1&DOC_TYPE=PAMPH&PAGE=1
Figure 18
Title:
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Abstract:
The
ballot unit (BU) which contains sixteen candidate buttons and indicator
lamps for each candidate button is interconnected to control unit (CU)
through a five-meter-length twenty-five core flat jacketed cable. The
control unit (CU), initially set for a particular number of contesting
candidates, activates the ballot unit (BU). The voting continues until
all the voters cast their votes. On completion of voting, operating the
close button (28) closes the control unit (CU), machine power switched
off, and control unit (CU) is packed into carrying case and taken into
the counting centers for the counting of votes. The result of the
election is displayed on the display screen (12) upon pressing of a
result button (29, 30) in the control unit (CU). The recorded votes cast
against each candidate are displayed sequentially in the display screen
(12) with a buzzer beep sound. The voting data is retained in the
memory even if power is switched off. The machine can be used for
conducting simultaneous elections using the auxiliary control unit (ACU)
along with the main control unit (CU). The entire machine is operated
by a 7.5V battery and allows the selection of a maximum of sixty-four
contesting candidates. Compartments are provided in the machine
constructed according to the invention with interlocking and thread
sealing features, the machine thus being tamper proof, error free and
easy to operate. The voting data recorded once are retained in the
memory until it is erased by operating a clear button (31). The entire
machine is constructed in injection moulded plastic for mass manufacture
and fabricated of light weight. The machine is convenient to use and
portable.
Inventors:
Rajagopalan, Jagannathan (353 11th Cross, 14th Main J.P. Nagar, II Phas, Bangalore 8 Karnataka, 560 07, IN)
Publication Date:
October 24, 2002
Filing Date:
March 13, 2002
Export Citation:
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Assignee:
BHARAT ELECTRONICS LIMITED (At Trade Center, 116/2 Race Course Roa, Bangalore 1 Karnataka, 560 00, IN)
Rajagopalan, Jagannathan (353 11th Cross, 14th Main J.P. Nagar, II Phas, Bangalore 8 Karnataka, 560 07, IN)
International Classes:
G07C13/00
Attorney, Agent or Firm:
Alamelu, Vaidyanathan (451 2nd Cross, 3rd Block 3rd Stage, Basaveshwaranaga, Bangalore 9 Karnataka, 560 07, IN)
Claims:
CLAIMS
1.
An
Apparatus for conducting elections for Parliament, State Assembly,
Municipal and other local bodies on the majority voting scheme as per
constitution of India on   secret ballot and one voteronevote principle
comprising. a) A control unit having an OTP Micro controller (One time
programmable) to collect, record and store, count and display, a non
volatile data memory being interfaced serially to the Microcontroller,
the said memory stores the data during voting process, the various
control signals are generated through the shift register, a power
monitoring circuit to generate the reset to the Microcontroller, a seven
segment drivedecoder to generate display data, a ballot unit interface
along with the necessary connector, all being housed in a housing, the
top portion of the control unit being divided in to four sections i. e.,
(i) A display section consisting of two lamps ON to indicate that the
machine is ready for use and BUSY to indicate that the voter can record
his vote, and the display panelsone of 2 digits and the other of four
digits to display the   no of candidates, total number of votes polled,
individual votes for each candidate and the errors, if any, (ii)
Candidate set section divided into two parts, one having”Candidate Set
Button”to set the number of contesting candidates, the other part for
carrying the power pack, two doors, one to cover the candidate set
button individually and the other which covers the entire section, (iii)
Result section divided into two parts, one having the close button to
close the polling operations, the other part divided into three sub
sections wherein result I and Result II buttons and clear buttons are
housed, the result buttons are used to display the results and clear
button is used to clear the previous voting records, two separate doors,
one to lock the result button sub sections and another to cover the
entire section and (iv) Ballot section wherein”ballot button”to permit
the voter to cast a vote and total buttons to show the total number of
votes polled are housed, and (b) a ballot unit having a base which
encloses a printed circuit board and a cover thereof, a connector box
for inter connecting cables to the control unit, sixteen push button
voting switches (one switch for each contesting candidates), an
indicator lamp which glows when the voter is permitted to vote, a slide
switch to indicate the ballot unit number.
 
2.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein multilevel thread sealing provision is made to protect against any possible tampering.
 
3.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, wherein the control unit and ballot unit are
made by injection moulded plastic parts, fastenerless heat sealing
assembly technique, which provides consistent quality for mass
production at economical cost.
 
4.
Apparatus as claimed in
claim 1, wherein said base comprises of rectangular moulded base
providing locating latches, guides for inserting PCB, self tapping
bosses to fix PCB, heat sealing pipes to seal door II & III, cutout
for accommodating rear door and pips with depression for fixing serial
number plate.
 
5.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including
cover, rectangular moulded part contains   compartments for ballot,
total, close, result I, result II, cand. set and clear buttons, a cavity
to accommodate doors II, door III & door IV, a compartment for
power pack, windows for ON, Serial number, Votes and busy indication,
protrusion to hold the rear door, counter bore to fix cover to base at
the four locations with selftapping screws.
 
6.
Apparatus as
claimed in claim 1, wherein said door I is a moulded cover including
cutouts to reach result keys form cover, latches to open from inside,
lugs for thread   sealing to the cover.
 
7.
Apparatus as
claimed in claim 1, wherein said door II is a cover hinged to base and
enclosing the close, results and clear button, Slots for latching to
base, and slant surface with hole to thread seal to the base.
 
8.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1 including door III comprising moulded panel
hinged to base enclosing cand. set switch, power pack compartments, slot
for latching to base, and slant surface with hole to thread seal to the
base.
 
9.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1 including door IV,
comprising moulded cover hinged to the main cover and enclosing cand.
set swich and lugs for thread sealing to the cover.
 
10.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, wherein a panel enclosing the out going
connector compartment, rotates and opens out for interconnection, latch
and thread sealing lugs on both sides. 1I.
 
11.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including spacers for sandwich mounting of PCB between base and cover.
 
12.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, including the construction of recessed switch
knob to ensure deliberate pressing by voter to record the votes.
 
13.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, wherein said base is a rectangular moulded panel
with self tapping holes to fix PCB, provision for fixing stand,
compartment for connector interconnecting and sealing pipes to fix
serial number plate.
 
14.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1,
wherein said base is a rectangular moulded panel with self tapping holes
to fix PCB, provision for fixing stand, Compartment for connector
interconnecting and sealing pipes to fix serial number plate.
 
15.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1 including cover, rectangular moulded panel with
oblong cutouts to operate switch knob to register the vote, stepped slot
to fit cover ballot sheet, slots to hold right and left flops at
extreme corners and pips for fixing hinges at the bottom side.
 
16.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1 including PCB cover, rectangular panel enclosing
the PCB and provided ing holes for inserting sixteen sets of switch and
close knobs.
 
17.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1, including
cover ballot sheet, transparent cover for inserting paper containing
name, serial number and election symbol of contesting candidates, fixed
to cover with round latch for easy rotation.
 
18.
Apparatus as
claimed in claim 1, including switch knob and closing knob constructed
in that form to operate one at a time in the oblong opening, the
construction of movement of one knob brings other knob into position.
 
19.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, including flap right and left enclosing latch of
main cover and provided with thread sealing slots to cover and base to
protect against possible tampering by the voters.
 
20.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, including door connector box, moulded cover
enclosing rear compartment to protect cascading connector and cable.
 
21.
Apparatus
as defined in claim 1, including the signal integrity established
between   Microcontroller, Data memory and ballot unit so that these
three will work in unified manner.
 
22.
Apparatus as claimed
in claim 1, including the construction of Battery pack in moulded case
with polarised plug, which is unique and fool proof that different
battery cannot be used along with Low battery indication means to
facilitate replacement of battery at any stage of polling process and
the process can be continued without any loss of voting data.
 
23.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, including the powering scheme of ballot units
from the control unit, which gives a unique nature of signal integrity
(Scanning process) for the machine, high current drivers used to drive
the ballot unit to cater to the twentymeter distance between the polling
officer and voting compartment and the slide switch setting in ballot
unit makes it unique and cannot be interchanged during poll.
 
24.
Apparatus
as claimed in claim 1, including the method MicroController (OTP) used
to store the firmware, which cannot be changed or modified once fused,
the non volatile data memory (EEPROM) is tightly coupled to the
microcontroller through unique protocol to store the data during the
voting process, and every time the microcontroller checks the check sum
of the data memory (EEPROM) to establish link to proceed with the voting
process, in case of mismatch the machine displays Er message, which
eliminates the tampering the micro controller of EEPROM by replacement
of external components.
 
25.
Apparatus as claimed in claim 1,
including the scheme of data memory written in encrypted form and has
been split into two banks and the ballot counting is stored in both
banks, at every instance of a change in the data memory, the data is
stored in two different ways and both are verified to check the
correctness of the operation and the data can be decrypted only by the
firmware in the micro controller, hence it is not possible to corrupt
firmware of data by any known means.
 
26.
Apparatus as claimed
defined in claim 1, including the implementation of effective  
redundancy scheme with two independent nonvolatile memory devices
(EEPROM) to store the data, effectively four banks are used to store
data and at every operation all the four banks are checked and atleast
two banks should contain the correct data as per the firmware’s
expectations and if data are not found in atleast any of the two banks
then a fatal error is declared and the whole unit is unusable at this
state.
 
27.
Apparatus as defined in claim 1, including the
printing of stored data memory through a printer interface module at any
number of times in the life of the machine unless deliberately erased
by operating the clear button. This emulates the manual ballot paper
method as per the constitutional requirements.
 
28.
Apparatus
as defined in claim 1, including the unidirectional operational sequence
of Machine in which a) Contesting candidate setting cannot be changed
unless the   result is seen once, b) Votes cannot be cast on the machine
unless it is in the cleared condition (Previous voting data erased), c)
Votes cannot be added to the machine once it is closed (by pressing the
close button), d) Result cannot be seen unless the machine is closed,
e) The machine cannot be cleared unless the result is seen at least once
and the clearing operation requires the ballot unit inter connection,
which eliminates accidental erasing.
 
29.
Apparatus as defined
in claim 1 including the regulation of voting in which the machine
accepts maximum of 5 votes per minute and this feature discourages
rigging and both capturing.
Description:
This Invention relates to
an Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) PREAMBLE The prior art is known as
manual ballot paper voting method in which every voter is provided with a
ballot paper containing serial number, names of the contesting
candidates, their election symbol and space to record votes. The
recording of vote is done by putting’X mark using rubber stamp in the
space provided against the candidate in the ballot paper. After
recording vote, the voters deposit the ballot paper in a sealed metallic
box (Ballot box). On completion of voting, the ballot papers are taken
to the counting centers. The seals of ballot box is opened in the
presence of candidates/agents and the votes are counted manually by
identifying’X’stamp mark against the candidate. The candidate who
secured highest number of votes is declared winner as per the
constitution of India.
The shortcomings of the prior art (manual ballot paper voting method) are 1. Involves printing of huge volume of ballot paper.

2. Storage and distribution of ballot paper requires large manpower and security.

3. Accounting and issue of ballot paper is a tedious work and error prone.

4. Manual counting of votes requires large manpower, time and prone to human error.

5. Re-counting is time consuming and costly.

6. Segregation of invalid votes is cumbersome and leads to disputes lfights, among candidates.

7. Manual voting is prone to mal-practices, booth capturing-not tamper proof.

Due
to the ever increasing population and frequency of elections, there is a
definite need to bring out improvement over manual ballot paper voting
method, which is 1. Fool proof, trouble free and cost effective.

2. To conduct election, paper less and count the votes automatically, so that the result can be declared immediately.

3. To eliminate the invalid votes so that the dispute of segregation of invalid votes eliminated.

4.
Reduce the overall election expenditure, to the government (The
election expenditure is increasing due to the frequent elections).

5.
Reduce drastically the volume of Ballot paper printing from the current
requirement of more then 70 million papers for manual voting for one
general election (Papers less system) The Electronic Voting Machine
(EVM) of the present invention is provided with all the \ above needed
improvements over the manual ballot paper voting method which are
explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

Summary of the invention.

The
present invention relates to an Electronic Voting Machine (EVM)
consisting of Control Unit (CU) and Ballot Unit (BU) for conduct of
elections in place of conventional manual ballot paper voting method.
The invention totally replaces the existing manual

method by the
use of apparatus constructed in accordance to the invention and
operational requirements as per the constitution of India for fool
proof, error free and cost saving way to conduct elections for electing
members of state assembly, parliament and other municipal bodies based
on majority voting scheme. The apparatus of the invention is convenient,
simple to operate and portable. Another important feature of this
machine is the facia construction of the control unit and ballot unit,
which is as per the constitutional requirement of India. Use of this
machine eliminates invalid voters, cumbersome procedure and disputes in
segregation of invalid votes as in manual ballot voting scheme. By the
use of EVM, the labour can be minimized at poling centers as well as
counting centers. The feature of the machine are illustrated below.

The
Electronic voting machine of the present invention consists of two
units, i. e. a balloting unit which the voter operates to exercise
his/her franchise and a control unit which controls the polling process.
It is operated by the Presiding Officer or the First Polling Officer.

The
Control Unit (CU) constructed in accordance with a invention is built
around a Micro - Controller [One time Programmable (OTIR)]. The control
unit is divided into four sections, i. e. a. display section, b.
candidate set section, c. result section and d. ballot section. The said
sections, are provided with seven control buttons namely cand. set,
ballot, close, result I, result B, total and clear buttons. Light
emitting diode (LED) indicates ON and BUSY condition of the machine. Six
digits of seven segment LED is

provided for the display of
result and error messages. Operation of cand. set switch sets the number
of contesting candidate in control unit. Ballot switch operation
energizes the ballot unit, receives and records one vote in control
unit. Close button operation ends the voting process, The machine
records the total number of votes polled and votes against each
contesting candidate during the polling. On the operation of Result
switch, the vote recorded against every contesting candidate is
displayed sequentially. Clear operation erases all previous voting data
stored in the machine. Print of recorded voting data is obtained through
a printer interface unit.

The Ballot Unit (BU) constructed in
accordance with the invention has sixteen (16) push button voting
switches and indicator lamps. The voting buttons are provided in a
recessed oblong cutout in the cover so that the buttons are deliberately
pressed by the voters for recording of votes and not by accidental
pressing. The top cover has a transparent cover for inserting ballot
paper to display the names of contesting candidates, their serial number
and election symbol. This cover can be sealed inside the panel by
thread seal to protect the ballot paper against any tampering. Green LED
lamp is provided for indicating the energized condition of the machine
to the Voter. Five meter flat cable provides interconnection to the
control unit to receive the signal. Slide Switch is used to indicate the
ballot unit number, which is set depending on the number of contesting
candidates. The rear compartment receives the interconnecting cable of
the cascading ballot unit when the machine is used for more than sixteen
contesting candidates.

The machine is constructed using
injection moulded plastic parts, which provides consistent quality, high
volume output for mass production. Fastnerless assembly of plastic
components used in the construction of machine to achieve consistent
quality and cost effective product. The voting machine designed with
injection moulded carrying cases for movement/transportation to any
location for usage. The machine constructed to operate with 7.5V battery
power source. It can be deployed in places where no electrical power is
available. Machine construction with multilevel interlocking
panels/section makes it fool proof, easy to use by common man.

Other
features and advantages of the machine will be apparent from the
following description, the accompanying drawings and the appended
claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS: Fig. 1 shows the
perspective view of control unit to control the polling process, which
is constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig. 2 is a fragmentary perspective view showing hinging arrangement of Door I & Door II to the Base of the control unit.

Fig. 3 is a fragmentary perspective view of showing the rear door of the control unit.

Fig 4 is a fragmentary perspective view of the control unit base showing the assembly of Printed Circuit Board (PCB).

Fig
5 is a perspective view of the control unit in fully assembled
conditions showing four sections, of the control unit namely A) Display
section B) candidate section, C) Result section D). Ballot section.

Fig 6 is an exploded view of control unit showing parts constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig 7 shows view of switch knob and closing knob of Ballot Unit constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig 8 is a fragmentary perspective view illustrating the arrangements of hinge, flap right, cover LED red.

Fig. 9 is a perspective view of Ballot unit, which is constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig. 10 is a perspective view of internal construction of ballot unit.

Fig.
ll is a fragmentary perspective view illustrating door connector box
with cable clamp, lockingpin with flaps and rubber stand Fig. 12 is an
exploded view of balloting unit constructed in accordance with the
invention.

Fig. 13. is a diagram of Auxiliary Control Unit (ACU) constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig. 14 is a schematic block diagram of Control Unit constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig. 15 is a schematic block diagram of Ballot Unit constructed in accordance with the invention.

Fig. 16 is the connectivity scheme EVM for single poll mode.

Fig. 17 is the connectivity scheme of EVM for dual poll mode.

Fig. 18 is the state transition diagram of Electronic Voting Machine constructed in accordance with the invention.

DESCRIPTION
OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT : Referring the drawing of the Control Unit
illustrated in Fig. l includes an aesthetically designed plastic molded
base 2 which enclosed Printed Circuit Board 35 (PCB) shown in Fig. 4
and cover 1 consists of four sections Display Section, Candidate
Section, Result Section and Ballot Section as shown in fig. 5. a)
Display Section consists of two lamps ON, Busy, and two display panels,
one of 2 digits and other of 4 digits. (Fig. 5) b) The Candidate Section
(fig. 5) has a cover, which opens from, left to right. On opening its
cover by pressing the latch on the left-hand side, two compartments are
seen. The left compartment is for the battery 34 rated 7.5V, 2Ah. In the
right compartment, a Candid button is located. The Candidate Set
Section is closed and sealed by Door I as shown in (fig. 1). c) The
cover of the Result Section has an elliptical aperture on the left hand
side through which the close button is seen. The left portion of the
Result Section

houses a black close button. The right portion
contains an inner compartment with its own door. The door of the inner
compartment has two elliptical apertures through which buttons marked
Resuft I and Resuft H is seen. The inner door can be opened by inserting
the thumb and a finger through the two apertures above the Result I and
Result II’buttons’and then pressing the inner latches simultaneously
slightly inwards. On opening the door of the inner compartment by
inserting forefinger and thumb through the holes which are marked Result
I and Result H and pressing the latches and pulling the cover up, there
are two frames around the two apertures for fixing green paper seals.
The inner compartment has three sub-sections with two yellow buttons
marked Result I and Result Il and a white Aearbutton. d) In the ballot
section, there are two buttons-a Grey Total button 32 (fig. 6) and a
large blue ballot button as indicated in fig. 5.

The cover 1
(fig. 5) defines four sections namely a. Display section, b. Candidate
section, c. Result section and d. Ballot Section.

The base 2
(fig. 6) has provision to mount printed circuit board 35 (PCB) using
self tapping screws 37. It has also a compartment with rear door 3 (fig.
6) This rear door is hinged in the bottom and opens swinging downwards,
when the latch in the middle is pressed downwards. This has a provision
for thread sealing. The rear door when opened will reveal a socket on
the left hand side for plugging the interconnecting cable from the

ballot unit and a toggle switch 36 in the middle for switching the EVM ON or OFF (Fig. 3).

The
door I 4 (fig. 5) is a protection cover for result section. Door I when
opened reveal knob (Result I) 29; Knob (Result II)30 ; and knob (clear)
31 (fig. 6) & has provision for thread sealing. The insert 16 (Fig.
5) is used for the thread sealing of the result section.

Two elliptical cutouts are provided in the door 4 to access Result I, Result II and Clear - buttons.

The
door II referred by reference numeral S (fig. 5) is the top cover of
the result section having an elliptical cutout for the knob (close) 28
{fig. 6). The elliptical cutout is sealed by plate-paper seal 26 (fig.
5) and green paper seal. The door in indicated by reference numeral 6
(fig. 5) is a protection cover for candidate set section with provision
for thread sealing. The door in when opened will reveal battery
compartment and candidate compartment. The candidate set compartment is
accessed by opening door IV (cand. set) 7 (fig. 5) by removing thread
sealing. The knob (cand. set) 27 (fig. 6) can then be operated.

The hinge 8 (fig. 4) shows the hinging action of the door It 5 & door in 6 with the cover.

The
plexy glass display 12 (fig. 6) is a red acrylic sheet to view the
digits of 7-segment display mounted on the Printed Circuit Board (PCB).
There are 2 digits for serial number and 4 digits for number of votes.
There are seven knob bases 11 (fig. 6) used for the seven different
knobs such as knob 27 (cand. set). Knob 28 (close), knob 29 (result I),
knob 30 (result 1I), knob 31 (clear), knob 32 (total) and knob 13
(Ballot) (Fig. 6). The

knob (ballot) 13 (fig. 6) is a dark blue colour plastic button to register vote. Cover 38 is provided for the green LED.

The
bush short 14 (fig. 6) and bush long 15 (fig. 6) are assembled after
mounting the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) on to the base of the control
unit. The pin (door IV) 22 and hinge (door IV) 23 (Fig. 5) are required
to assemble door IV onto the cover of the control unit. At first hinge
and door IV are assembled by using pin (door IV) and then the door IV
assembly is fixed to the cover by heat sealing as shown in fig. 6.

The
washer 24 (fig. 6) are used along with five knobs namely knob (cand.
set). Knob (close), knob (result I), knob (result II) and knob (clear)
It gives cushioning effect to the knobs. It is made out of foam. The
washer 25 (fig. 6) are used to fix display Printed Circuit Board (PCB)
rigidly on to the base of the control unit. After mounting the display
board on the base, washer is placed and then fixed by screws. Rubber cap
33 (Fig. 6) is fixed to cover screw head.

Referring to the
drawings, the ballot unit illustrated in fig. 10 includes a rectangular
plastic moulded base 39, which encloses PCB cover & PCB (not shown).
It also encloses door connector box 64 (fig. 11) for interconnecting
cable. The base has got a rubber stand 40 as shown in fig. 7. The cover
42 (fig. 10) defines cover ballot sheet 62 for inserting the ballot
paper of the sixteen contestants, cover (ready Light Emitting Diode
(LED) 44 (fig. 10) & Light Emitting Diode (LED) cover 45 (fig. 10).
It protects ballot paper. The cover 42 & base 39 of the ballot unit
are assembled with two numbers of

plastic hinges 46 (fig. 8) and
the cover ballot sheet is assembled with locking pins 47 and 48 (fig.
11). The hinges are assembled to the base and cover by heat sealing
process.

The Printed Circuit Board (PCB) cover 49 (fig. 12) is a
rectangular plastic moulded part, dark Grey in colour having provision
for sixteen closing knobs 50 (fig. 7), sixteen switch knobs 51 (fig. 7).
This protects Printed Circuit Board (PCB) 63 (Fig. 12) from tampering.

It
is fixed to the base by screws. The closing knob 50 (fig. 7) used for
blocking the switch knob 51. In order to access the switch knob 51 one
has to open the closing knob.

This is used during polling depending on the number of contestants in fray.

Locking pin 52 (fig. 12) used for closing & opening the cover and base of the ballot unit.

Flap
right 53 (fig. 11) and flap left 54 (fig. 11) are used for covering
locking pin 52 after latching the cover to base. Bracket 55 (fig. 10)
used for clamping the interconnecting cable at two places after crimping
the 25 core flat cable to the 25-pin dip header, which is soldered to
the Printed Circuit Board (PCB). Support LED 56 (fig. 12) is a plastic
moulded part in which ready LED assembly is mounted in order to avoid
damage during operation and transportation of the Ballot Unit.

Rubber Stand 40 (Fig. 7) supports the ballot unit while placing on table during operation.

It is a plastic moulded part having provision for fixing serrated rubber stand 41 (fig. 7).

Rubber
foot 57 (Fig 11) prevents sliding of the ballot unit from the table
while the unit is in operation. Clamp cable 58 (fig. 11) clamps the
interconnecting cable of the cascading

Ballot unit (incase of
more than sixteen contesting candidates), 25 contact sub connector)
inside the connector box compartment of the ballot unit.

Interconnecting
cable 59 (Fig. 9) is a sheathed 25 core flat cable, one end of which is
permanently attached to the Ballot unit. The other end is with 25
contact D-sub connector with hood for connecting it to the control unit.
Ready lamp 60 (Fig. 9) is on the top left side of the Ballot unit. This
lamp glow when the presiding officer presses the’Ballot button3 on the
control unit enable the voter to record his vote. It goes off when the
voter has recorded his vote.

Slide switch 61 window (Fig 10) is
on the top right side of the Ballot unit. The slide switch inside the
Ballot unit is used to set the Ballot Unit for 1-16, 17-32, 33-48 or
48-64 positions in cascading configurations. Sixteen candidates button
51 (Fig. 7) provide convenient access for the voter to record his/her
vote by pressing the candidate’s button against the name and symbol of
the candidate of his 1 her choice. When the button is pressed the lamp
on the left side of that button glows and voters choice is recorded.

Provision
for insertion of ballot paper 43 (fig. 12) is provided on the top cover
of ballot unit. The ballot paper contains serial number, names and
symbols of the contesting candidates. A transparent polycarbonate sheet
62 covers the ballot sheet 43 (Fig. 12) to protect the said ballot
paper.

Referring to the diagram 13, Auxiliary control unit is
constructed by means of cover 65, base 66, Printed Circuit Board (PCB)
67, inter-connecting cable 68 to connect to the main

control
unit. The PCB is held by self-tapping screws 69, cover and base is held
by screws 70, ballot knob 71 is inserted into the packet in the cover
and knob base 72 is fitted from inside. Partition box 73 is used to
control light dispersion on indicator. Rear door 74 provides access to
connect Ballot Unit and Cable Clamp 75 is used to Clamp the Cable.

Referring
to the diagram 14 which shows the block level details of hardware
construction of control unit built around a Micro-controller (One Time
Programmable). The non- volatile data memory is interfaced serially to
the Micro controller. All the required control signals are generated
through the shift register. In order to have an orderly power up and
power down sequence, power monitoring circuit (DS1231) is used. To
protect EEPROMs during power up and power down, the low voltage detector
in the power monitor is used. Additionally, the reset signal also
inhibits the write operation under low voltage condition. A
seven-segment drive-decoder is used to generate display data. In order
to reduce the hardware complexity, these displays are driven in a
multiplexed mode using an 8-digit, high current display driver.

Minimum
numbers of components have been used to construct the machine to keep
cost and power consumption at optimum. Industrial grade and surface
mount technology have been used to achieve high reliability. The total
hardware has been populated in only three PCBs with minimum number of
interconnections to provide high field reliability and serviceability.
Signal integrity is established between Micro-controller, Data memory
and

ballot unit so that these three will work in unified manner. Without connecting the ballot unit the voting is not possible.

The
battery is packaged in moulded case with polarized plug, which is
unique and fool proof that different battery can not be used. Low
battery indication is provided in the machine to facilitate replacement
of battery at any stage of polling process and the process can be
continued. The ballot units are powered from the control unit, which
gives a unique nature of signal integrity (Scanning process) for the
machine. High current drivers are used to drive the ballot unit to cater
to the twenty-meter distance between the polling officer and voting
compartment. The slide switch setting in ballot unit makes it unique and
cannot be interchanged during poll.

Micro-controller (One Time
Programmable) is used to store the firmware, which cannot be changed or
modified once fused. The non-volatile data memory (EEPROM) is tightly
coupled to the micro-controller through unique protocol to store the
data during the voting process. Every time the micro-controller checks
the check sum of the data memory (EEPROM) to confirm data integrity,
otherwise the machine displays Er, which eliminates the tampering the
micro-controller or EEPROM by replacement of external components.

The
data memory is written in encrypted form and has been split into two
banks and the ballot counting is stored in both banks. 2 Nos. are used
for redundancy and hence voting data is stored at 4 locations. At every
instance of a change in the data memory, the data

stored in 4
locations are verified to check the correctness of the operation. The
data can be decrypted only by the firmware in the micro-controller.
Hence it is not possible to corrupt the firmware or data by any known
means.

To have effective redundancy, two independent non-volatile
memory devices (EEPROM) are used. Effectively four banks are used to
store data and at every operation all the four banks are checked and
at-least two banks should contain the correct data as per the firmware’s
expectations. If data are not found in at-least any of the two banks
then a fatal error is declared and the whole unit is unusable at this
state.

The stored data can be read and printed through a printer
interface module at any number of times in the life of the machine
unless deliberately erased by operating the clear button. This emulates
the manual ballot paper method as per the constitutional requirements.

Figure 15 shows switch and LED matrix interfaced to Control unit.

Figure 16 shows the connectivity details of electronic voting machine for single poll mode.

Figure
17 shows the connectivity details of electronic voting machine for dual
poll mode where in the EVM is deployed for parliament and assembly
elections simultaneously.

Figure 18 shows the state transition
diagram of voting process. It also gives the different state of the
machine and change over from one state to other. The state transition
has

been done to prevent mal-practices and to strictly follow the procedure of voting as per the constitutional requirements.

OPERATION
: Before the Electronic Voting Machine is sent to the Polling Stations,
the Ballot Unit has to be prepared by the Officer-in-charge as given
below: a) Inserting the Ballot paper, b) Masking the Candidate’s
buttons, which are not required to be used, c) Setting the Slide Switch
at the appropriate position, i. e. 1,2,3, or 4 as the case may be
according to the number of such units which are to be used depending
upon the number of candidates and the sequence in which, they are to be
used and d) Sealing the unit.

After taldng out the Ballot Unit
from the carrying case, the top cover of the unit may be opened
carefully by pressing simultaneously, towards the right, the latches at
the top and bottom on the right edge of the unit (fig. 11), and swinging
the cover up. (fig. 13).

OPENING OF BALLOT PAPER SCREEN Open the
Ballot Paper Screen, which is a transparent acrylic sheet, hinged to
the top cover on the extreme left side. The release latches of the
screen are inside the top cover (Fig. 9). By pressing the latches
simultaneously, first slightly towards right and then pushing them
downwards, the Ballot Paper Screen will become free for opening on the

upper side of the said top cover. While opening the screen care should be taken to ensure that it is not damaged.

FIXING
OF BALLOT PAPER Place the Ballot Paper in the space provided for the
purpose on the upper side of the top cover. Align the Ballot paper
properly so that each candidate’s name and his symbol are in line with
the corresponding Candidate’s lamp and button. After ensuring this
alignment, close and press fit the Ballot Paper Screen to secure the
Ballot Paper firmly underneath that screen.

After the Ballot
Paper has been firmly fixed and the Ballot Paper Screen has been pressed
fit on the upper side of the Top Cover, the screen is to be sealed on
the inner side of the Top Cover. This is to be done by passing the
thread through the two holes on the screen specially provided for the
purpose and by putting the thread seal on the prescribed address tag
showing the particulars of the election with the seal of the Returning
Officer.

MASKING OF CANDIDATES’BUTTONS If the number of
Candidates on the ballot paper is less than 16, the white masking tabs
should be moved onto the Candidates’buttons not required to be used.

SETTING
OF SLIDE SWITCH Inside the Ballot Unit on the top right side, there is a
Slide Switch, which has four positions 1, 2,3 and 4. If only one Ballot
Unit is to be used, set this Switch to the position marked ‘1′. If two
ballot Units are to be used, set this Switch to the position marked ‘1′
in the Ballot Unit in which the names of the Candidates at Sl. Nos. 1 to
16 appear, and in the second Ballot Unit set this Switch to the
position marked’2′. If three Ballot Units are to be used, the Slide
Switch will be set to the position marked’1′in the first Ballot Unit in
which the names of candidates at Sl. Nos. 1 to 16 appear, to the
position marked’2′in the second Ballot Unit in which the names of
contesting candidates at Sl. Nos. 17 to 32 appear, and to the position
marked’3′in the third Ballot Unit. Likewise, if the 4* Ballot Unit is
also to be used if the number of contesting candidates exceeds 48, then
the Slide Switch will be sent to the position marked’4′in the last
Ballot Unit.

Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4

SEALING
OF BALLOT UNIT Close the Ballot Unit by bringing the top cover back to
its original position. Pass two threads, one through the three holes at
the top and the other through the three holes at the bottom provided for
the purpose and seal each thread with Returning Officer’s seal.

CONTROL
UNIT The Control Unit is to be prepared by the Returning Officer by- a)
Installing the Power Pack. b) Setting the number of contesting
candidates and c) Sealing the Candidate Set Section POWER PACK 
INSTALLATION Open the cover of the Candidate Set Section by pressing
slightly inward the latch provided on the left side. Install the Power
Pack specially supplied by mating the socket of the Power Pack to the
plug. Ensure that Power Pack is pressed tight.

SETTING THE NUMBER
OF CONTESTING CANDIDATES After connecting the Power Pack, open the
compartment at the bottom of the Control Unit as explained above, and
proceed as follows for setting the Number of contesting candidates :

a)
Connect the Ballot Unit to the Control Unit by plugging the connector
of the Interconnecting Cable in the socket in that compartment. As the
connector and the plug are multi-pin connectors, it will need some
practice to plug them properly.

The EVM will work only when this
connection is made properly. b) After plugging the connector properly,
push the’Power’switch to’ON’position.

It will give a beep sound
and the”ON”lamp on the Display Section of the Control Unit will glow
GREEN. c) After the’ON’lamp glows GREEN, press the’Cand Set’button in
the Candidate Set Section. There upon the 2 digit Display Panel in the
Display Section will now flash the letters’Cd’. d) When the
letters’Cd’start flashing on the Display Panels on the Control Unit,
press the Candidate’s button against the last contesting candidate in
Ballot Unit.

For example, if there are 9 contesting candidates, press the 9i candidate’s button.

On
that button being pressed, the Display Panels will stop flashing the
letters ‘Cd’. Instead, the full panel will start displaying the
following information sequentially-

This way the machine is set
for 9 contesting candidates. e) Switch OFF the EVM by pushing
the”Power”switch downwards to OFF position and disconnect the
Interconnecting cable from the control unit. For this purpose, the
spring type clips on both sides of the connector hood should be pressed
inward simultaneously and then the connector pulled out. Then close the
door of the compartment at the bottom of the Control Unit.

SEALING
THE CANDIDATE SET SECTION Close the flap which houses the Cand Set
button and pass a thread through the two holes provided on the left side
and seal with the seal of the Returning Officer. Then close the
candidate set section and do the thread seal. While sealing take care
that direct flame does not come in contact with the Control Unit and
molten wax does not fall on any part of the Control Unit.

Put
back the Ballot Unit and the Control Unit in their respective carrying
cases. They are ready for transportation to the Polling Station.

On
the day of Election, the presiding Office shall make the following
preparations: The Ballot Unit sill be checked to see if the Ballot Paper
is properly fixed in ballot display panel under the ballot paper screen
and that the two seals are intact.

In the Control Unit, the
presiding officer will check if the Candidate Set Section is intact and
then connect the Ballot Unit to the Control Unit by plugging the
connector of the

interconnecting cable, put the’Power’switch
to’ON’position and then close the bottom compartment. Then open
the’Result’Section in the Control Unit and press the’Clear’ button to
set all counts to’ZERO’. On completion of the clearing process, the
display panel will start displaying that all counts are set
to’ZERO’sequentially (i. e. one by one, the display panel will show the
total number of candidates, total votes polled and number of votes for
each candidate). If need be the presiding officer will conduct a”MOCK
POLL”in the presence of some polling agents & others.

During
the actual poll, the’Result Section’should be sealed, using special
security paper serially numbered. This paper seal has to be firmly fixed
in the inner cover frame of the Result Section. Here is also a
provision for making a thread seal on the left side of the inner door.
After this, the outer cover of the Result Section has to be pressed for
closing this section.

PROCEDURE DURING POLL The Poll shall
commence at the hour fixed for such commencement. After all procedural
requirements relating to identification of voter, application of
indelible ink on his/her forefinger and obtaining his/her
signature/thumb impression in the Register of Voters have been completed
with regard to the first voter, the voter concerned has to be allowed
for recording his vote. For that purpose, press the’Ballot’button on
Ballot Section of the Control Unit which would make the Ballot Unit
ready for recording of the vote by that voter as has been explained
herein above. Repeat that procedure every time the next voter

is
to be allowed to record his vote. It should be ensured that only one
voter goes inside the voting compartment to vote. Special care should be
taken to ensure that a voter goes in that compartment in the same order
in which his Name is entered in the’Register of Voters.’Also ensure
that the Ballot button is pressed only when the earlier voter has come
out of the voting compartment. At any time, if the total number of votes
polled has to be ascertained,’Total’button should be pressed. The
Display panel will then show the total number of votes polled by that
time. Please remember that the’Total’button is to be pressed only when
the’Busy’lamp is OFF.

After the close of the poll, the close
button will be pressed. When this button is pressed the display panel
will show the total number of candidates and the total number of votes
polled during the day.

On the day of counting, after making the
necessary checks, the Result button I in the Control Unit pressed to
start the Result computation process. On completion of the result
computation process, the total number of candidates, the total number of
votes and the total number of votes for each candidate will be
displayed in the’Display Panel’ sequentially. 

While the form of
apparatus herein described constitutes a preferred embodiment of the
invention, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to
this precise form of apparatus, and that changes may be made therein
without departing from the scope and sprit of the invention as defined
in the appended claims.

http://www.sumobrain.com/patents/wipo/Electronic-voting-machine-evm/WO2002084607.html

 

EVM AND CYBER LAW (PPT SLIDES IN PDF FORMAT): PRESENTATION MADE IN THE INTL. CONF. HELD ON FEB. 13, 2010 IN CHENNAI

Swamy for expert panel on secure EVMs

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT , The Hindu

CHENNAI, February 13, 2010
http://beta.thehindu.com/multimedia/dynamic/00031/TH14SWAMY_31679f.jpg 
Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy during a press meet in Chennai
on Saturday. Photo: R. Ravindran

Janata Party president
Subramanian Swamy on Saturday demanded that an independent expert
committee be appointed to find out how electronic voting machines could
be safeguarded securely.
Talking to journalists after an
international conference on ‘Electronic voting machines: How
Trustworthy?,’ convened by the Centre for National Renaissance, New
Delhi, he said several countries had banned the use of EVMs. The
international consensus was that EVMs were a danger to democracy as they
were not trustworthy. The Election Commission had not demonstrated that
EVMs could never be rigged. If the Commission wanted to continue their
use, it should give a printed receipt to every voter just as people used
to get in automated teller machines after cash withdrawal. This receipt
was a requirement under the Information Technology Act of 2000, which
the Commission was “adamantly and obstinately” refusing to comply with.
He
said renowned computer experts were ready to demonstrate that EVMs
could be rigged, and stressed the need for an in-built safeguard.
Dr.
Swamy said the next date of hearing of his public interest litigation
petition on the use of EVMs in the Delhi High Court was scheduled for
February 17. He would urge the court to appoint an expert committee to
find out how EVMs could be safeguarded securely.
About 35 experts
from India, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.S. took part in the
conference. Questioning the reliability of EVMs, they said even advanced
countries were reverting to paper ballots as they felt that EVMs were
not trustworthy.
Till Jaeger, Attorney, Supreme Court, Germany, said
the German Supreme Court had said it did not matter that electronic
voting machines were efficient. Their use was a violation of the
fundamental right to information as the voter was unable to see clearly
to whom he was casting his vote and how it was being counted. It was a
constitutional principle in German law that the transparency of
elections was more important than the efficiency of conducting
elections.
Rop Gonggrijp, computer hacker specialist from the
Netherlands, said the Election Commission’s claim that it had invented
EVMs that could not be rigged was ridiculous. At no international
meeting had the Commission proved the transparency of the EVMs. He felt
there was no such thing as ‘unriggable or untamparable.’
J. Alex
Halderman, Professor of Computer Science, University of Michigan, said
that in the beginning, U.S. citizens were enamoured of the EVMs’
efficiency and modernity. Now they felt elections ‘could be stolen’ and
were demanding paper ballots.
David L. Dill, Professor of Computer
Science, Stanford University, in his letter to the Chief Election
Commissioner, had said: “Computerised voting equipment was inherently
subject to ‘programming error, equipment malfunction and malicious
tampering.’ It was time to recognise the reality that there is no basis
for public trust in paperless voting equipment.”
Charge against EC
Hariprasad,
and V.V. Rao, software engineers, said the Commission did not allow
them to complete their demonstration of the tamperability of EVMs.
Commission officials abruptly aborted their demonstration, stating that
they could not be allowed to continue as it involved the patent rights
of the Electronic Corporation of India.
The conference unanimously
resolved that in the interest of free and fair elections, the EVMs
should provide a voter verifiable paper trail, and if it was not
feasible, the Commission should return to the paper ballot system.
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article106271.ece

By Express News Service
14 Feb 2010 03:22:00 AM IST
 
Swamy for panel to check if EVMs can be tampered
CHENNAI:
In an effort to put an end to the ongoing controversy over electronic
voting machines’ (EVMs) tamperability, Janata Party president
Subramanian Swamy on Saturday said he would seek a court direction on
forming a committee to look into the issue.

Speaking to reporters
after a day-long international conference on EVMs here, Swamy said the
hearing of his public interest litigation (PIL) on use of EVMs was
scheduled to come up in Delhi High Court on February 17 where he would
press for constituting an apt committee on the issue.

Reacting to
questions on credibility of EVMs, Swamy said, “The machines can be
tampered with at any level (regional and national level) during the
polling season, and if there were no safeguards, the system itself
should be scrapped and the country revert to the ballot paper system of
voting.” Suggesting more transparency in EVMs to end controversies of
tampering, Swamy said, “Voters casting their votes in EVMs should be
given a receipt to show that the vote reached the intended candidate,
which can be stored for future reference.” Challenging the Chief
Election Commissioner Navin Chawla to prove credibility of EVMs in
international forums, Swamy said, “ While all along he is saying that
EVMs can’t be tampered with, the CEC never demonstrated the
untamperability of EVM machines publicly.” “While many countries
(including the electronically advanced nations) have banned the use of
EVMs in their elections due to its vulnerability of tampering and due to
lack of transparency in polling of votes, our CEC is propagating its
usage here without allowing them for public scrutiny,’’ Swamy added.

Though
Swamy had sent an invitation to Navin Chawla to attend the
international conference here, he received a letter from the Election
Commissioner that he was unwell and would not be able to attend it.

http://epaper.expressbuzz.com/NE/NE/2010/02/14/index.shtml

http://epaper.expressbuzz.com/NE/NE/2010/02/14/photographs/004/14_02_2010_004_002_002.jpg
 
Can’t rule out electoral rigging, warn foreign experts
Chennai, New Indian Express, Feb. 13, 2010
 
IN
the first of its kind inter national conference on elec tronic voting
machine (EVMs) organised by th Centre For National Renais sance here on
Saturday, ex perts who participated from countries like Ger many
Netherlands, USA and Sr L a n k a m a i n t a i n e d t h a EVMs are
tamperable an that was why many advance countries have now reverte to
the old system of ballo papers in elections.
Dr Till Jaeger, Attorney
i the Supreme Court of Ger many, and who presente cases related to
bannin EVMs in the country, set th tone of the conference with his
successive persuasion on court in ordering its ban in - the country . He
narrated how - the Supreme Court finally s banned using EVMs in Gere
many’s general elections say - ing its usage was unconstitu - tional
since it limited citizens from verifying their votes.

, Besides
Jaeger, experts i from the Netherlands (Dr t Rop Gonggrijp) and the USA d
(Prof J Alex Halder man) d proved with their presentad tions that
revolved around t how these EVMs could be tampered with and affect the n
results at large.

- Several countries in the d West have already
banned g the use of EVMs in elections e and most recently, Italy and
Japan also decided against using them due to lack of transparency and
preferred to use the old  system of ballot papers in casting votes which
according to them was transparent.

In the interest of the
electoral process remaining free and fair, transparent and accountable
to the voter, the 50-odd participants unanimously resolved that the EVMs
should provide a voter verifiable paper trail, and if not feasible,
then the country should return to the paper ballot system.

The conference also decided to go for an action plan and for setting up a dedicated website to propagate the flaws in EVMs.

http://epaper.expressbuzz.com/NE/NE/2010/02/14/index.shtml

Resolution adopted by the participants at the above mentioned Conference on February 13, 2010

     
At the International Conference on EVMs, the participants consider in
detail the current international practice and law relating to the
deployment of EVMs, the evidence on and the scope for their tamper
ability and the safeguards that are necessary to ensure that the
deployment of EVMs, does not, in any manner, compromise the central
requirements of transparency and accountability to the voter, at each
and every stage of the election process.

      In the interest
of the electoral process remaining free and fair, transparent and
accountable to the voter, the participants unanimously resolved that the
EVMs should provide for an voter verifiable paper trail, and if not
feasible then we should return to the paper ballot system.    

     
The participants further resolved that, without such an auditable paper
trail, the two essential requirements, namely transparency and
accountability to the voter and the related requirement of verifiability
of the validity of the votes cast by the voters envisaged under
sections 100 and 101 of the Representation of People Act,  1951 will
stand and seriously compromised as well as infringing Sections 11 to 14
of the Information Technology Act (2000) and the Indian Evidence Act
(1872).

 Third Front’s candidate to take EVM matter to court
STAFF WRITER 20:27 HRS IST
Aurangabad,
Oct 17 (PTI) Alleging manipulation of Electronic Voting Machines
(EVMs), the Republican Left Democratic Committee (RLDC) candidate from
Latur City Assembly Constituency said today that he will take the matter
to court.

The candidate, Anna Patil alleged that the EVMs
were manipulated and the software of the machines was altered in such a
fashion that whenever any button was pressed by voters, the vote went to
the Congress candidates’ account.

The Congress candidate from Latur City Assembly Constituency is Amit Deshmukh, son of former chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh.

After
his allegations, the Returning Officer Vishambar Gawande held a
demonstration yesterday in the presence of four candidates including
Patil and BSP candidate Qayyum Khan.

He tried to explain how it
is impossible to manipulate the EVMs. Patil, not satisfied by the
demonstration, demanded to show the demonstration on the machines that
were used on the polling day, and not on blank machines.
http://www.ptinews.com/news/335856_Third-Front-s-candidate-to-take-EVM-matter-to-court
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2F0UHrBWaHM

EVM fraud in AP: video on YouTube. Thanks to Senthil Raja for the link.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2F0UHrBWaHM

EVM fraud in AP: video on YouTube. Thanks to Senthil Raja for the link.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2F0UHrBWaHM

Stop press: EVM fraud on Oct. 13, 2009: YouTube video
EVM fraud on Oct. 13, 2009: YouTube Video.

EVM fraud in AP: video on YouTube. Thanks to Senthil Raja for the link.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2F0UHrBWaHM

Kalyanaraman

EVM Tampering demonstrated in Arunachal Pradesh on Oct. 13, 2009
 
HTTP://PSENTHILRAJA.WORDPRESS.COM/2009/05/17/TAMPERING-EVMS-SOME-REFERENCES/
ON
THIS SENTHIL RAJA’S BLOG A COMMENT HAS BEEN POSTED BY AINGKU INVITING
REFERENCE TO THE URL
http://friends-of-ziro.blogspot.com/2009/10/evm-tampering.html
The
demonstrated tampering on a 1min. 18 sec video, is simple and dramatic.
The sequence in which the four candidates were listed on EC documents
were modified on the EVM polling unit. BJP-TMC candidates sequence was
switched; INC-NCP candidates sequence was switched. IntenT? Simply to
register BJP votes to TMC and vice-versa and INC Votes to NCP and
vice-versa.

Did a similar switch take place during the Lok Sabha
Elections in, say, select 100+ constituencies? If so, the EC should be
made accountable in HC/SC to stop using the EVMs in future polls, until a
proper audit trail is put in place and controls as in the case of ATMs
of Banks.

kalyanaraman

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2009
EVM Tampering
History
of sorts was created on October 13, 2009 when repolling was ordered in
two polling stations at Ziro Assembly election. This is so unexpected of
the people of Ziro who are known to be honest and peace-loving. I don’t
recall a single occasion when there was a repoll in Ziro-Hapoli
constituency. It is shameful.

A sticker, exactly similar to the
original one with the names of the candidates and the party symbols was
printed and pasted over the EVM. The orders of the BJP and TMC
candidates on the EVM was exchanged while those of the INC and NCP was
exchanged. This manipulation does not seem to benefit either the INC or
the TMC candidates who are considered the two strongest ones. Is it a
case of an attempted cheating of the electronic machine by a candidate
or just a mischief by a prankster? Whatever is the answer, it has cost
the government dearly and caused lots of hardships to the voters.
Especially this time of the year - the  entii pillo.

On the
other hand, this single incident exposes one of the hitherto overlooked
drawbacks of the much acclaimed electronic voting machine (EVM)
introduced in India recently. Possibilities of tampering the EVM has
been discussed in many  forums, but no one had anticipated this
seemingly simple one. One more agenda has been added to the training
curriculum for the polling officers in the next election.

Cheating the machine. The case of tampering the Electronic Voting Machine. See Cheating or Mischief video at the website.

Evidence

  

 
People
are now talking about the ‘brains’ of the Apatanis. Well, I like to
take that as a compliment. At the same time, I like to take that as a
challenge - the challenge to show the right direction to young people
with such ‘brains’, as they can either be used or misused.

I  dream that we use them.
http://friends-of-ziro.blogspot.com/2009/10/evm-tampering.html

 

 

ECIL Engineers Test EVMs. 8.6% defective
September 26th, 2009
SEPPA:
A first level checking of the EVMs was conducted at Seppa Election
office, by the highly skilled team of ECIL Engineers headed by S.C
Sarkar from Hydrabad.

Out of total 347 checked control unit 30
were found defective. At least 3 EVMs have been issued to the AROs of
the various circle of the district so far- one each to ARO Seijosa, ARO
Pijirang, ARO Bameng. Meanwhile a board has fixed Rs 200 per day for the
porters.

http://arunachalnews.com/ecil-engineers-test-evms.html

EVM: Incompetence or Intent?

Recap from yesterday (Sept. 16, 2009):

The serious questions being asked include:

If the polling was not even complete how could “votes polled” data be available for all but 47 of the 8071 candidates?
If
EVM’s were secure with DEO/district collectors, and elections were not
even held in many constituencies, how was the data for 8023 candidates
or all but 47 of the 8071 candidates available to the ECI on files
downloaded between these dates?
…If this is a Mistake, Why No Clarifications from the ECI?

Read on:

On
the 6th of May Anupam and Prof Nalapat asked the ECI to clarify whether
the spreadsheet that had “votes polled” for each candidate contained
test data, actual votes polled or was it a wrong file?

On 31st May, they made another formal request to the ECI specifically asking:

Can
you kindly indicate what the data in the CandidateAC downloaded from
http://eci.nic.in/candidateinfo/frmcandidate.aspx file between the 6th
and 15th is? Why is the Final votes polled data not uploaded till date
at this location? When do you plan to upload it?”

On the 7th of July 2009, they sent another, more detailed request for clarification.

The response of ECI?

Nothing…no comment at all.

This
is hardly reassuring and raises all kinds of questions. The most
important - however outrageous it may sound - being: “Were the results
of some Lok Sabha constituencies decided even before polling?”

.

As
Anupam and Prof Nalapat noted in their article in Covert, there are not
too many ways in which the information about “votes polled” in the
spreadsheet on the ECI website could have changed BEFORE the results
were actually announced.

Realistically, this could have only happened if:

1.     Someone had hacked the file.

2.     The data from various EVMs had been uploaded to the private database, and this was used to create the public file.

3.     Someone who had access to the private database had actually added the data.

In their own words (emphasis mine):

The
first possibility is serious, as it implies that the databases hosted
by the ECI are not secure and can be compromised. The second is a
violation of the ECI’s rule that no counting was to begin till 16 May.
It also constitutes a breach of security, as the EVMs were supposed to
be in safe custody in a strong room of the DEO [district election
officer]. The third would imply that the election results were being
decided by whoever had access to the private database. If the results
were to be read only from the EVMs, why was a coded spreadsheet
prepared? How could this spreadsheet have the data on “votes polled”?

Sceptics
might say that the coded data containing information on the votes
polled was test or dummy data. If so, why was this test or dummy data
prepared? What was being tested? How was  this test data generated? What
were the results of the tests? Why was the data generated after the
first three phases of polling, but before the fourth and fifth phases?
Why was the data removed when there was no intention of loading real
data into the file? Why was the dummy data coded? How do 108 winning
candidates in the dummy data match the eventual winners?

If you are still not convinced that something has gone wrong somewhere, this last bitwill probably clinch the argument:

The
various versions of the files downloaded from ECI website by
Nalapat-Saraph on 6th, 7th and 11th May and the data were merged
together along with the final results found on ECI site on June 2nd…

2.
Candidates in every constituency were ranked as 1, 2 and 3 on the basis
of the votes seen in ECI excel sheets on 6th, 7th and 11th May.
3. Then the same candidates were ranked within each constituency based on the votes recorded on June 2nd spreadsheet by ECI.

The Result?

1.     Out of 543 constituencies, we find 106 winning positions (rank 1) matched for all four dates

2.     80 candidates matched for the rank 2 and

3.     59 for the rank 3…

Basic probability theory suggests that such a coincidence is practically impossible…So what exactly was happening?

Will we ever find out? I am not hopeful.

Interestingly, buried within the avalanche of “breaking stories”, I found this snippet in the ET last week (emphasis mine):

CPM
leaders (Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury), accompanied by member
secretariat V Srinivasa Rao and a technical expert Prabir Purkayastha,
told the commission and technical experts present at the meeting that
both hardware and software should be in public domain. Further, it said
the chips manufactured by ECIL, BEL should be allowed for yearly random
third-party inspections either by NIC or IITs.

…They said these
steps were necessary to ‘restore the ‘confidence’ in EVMs as there have
been “reporting of errors in some machines and discrepancies in
results”.

On EVMs and Some Unanswered Questions

A few
weeks ago, during my last visit to Bharat, I met Anupam Saraph, Pune’s
Chief Information Commissioner. I was introduced to Anupam via a chain
triggered by Barun Mitra.

I was keen to meet him, especially as
his profile seemed to be very very intriguing.  Anupam and I met on a
rainy evening at ShivSagar restaurant (the best coffee for its price in
Pune, I think!) and it was only around 10pm that I realised we had been
talking for 3 hours!

What Anupam told me that day was
unbelievable…So I asked him to email me more information. Within two
days, Anupam sent me a bunch of links - all pointing to something that
had gone seriously wrong with either EVMs, data upload by the Election
Commission - or both (and possibly something else)

I hurriedly
glanced through some of the links but decided to write about it on the
blog only after I had gone through them in some detail.

I am glad
I did. Below is a story about EVMS and some unanswered questions…in the
words of Anupam and Prof M Nalapat. Do read and think about it. Reading
about what they uncovered made me feel very uneasy…

I am now
pretty sure that there is something that has gone wrong which we do not
know about (yet).  Most of you will not be surprised that Anupam was
hounded when he went public with his fears…and no mainstream newspaper
would touch their report or findings (sole exception: Mid-Day in
Mumbai).

If it was not for the internet, the story would have been censored and buried - never to see the light of the day.

In
view of this report, the concern raised by Vidhya on one of my previous
posts - ought to be taken seriously (Like most other readers, I too was
guilty of dismissing the concerns as mere conjecture and a bit of “sour
grapes”. I may have been very wrong). Read on:

.

From Tracking the Elections 2009 (emphasis mine):

Elections
were held in 5 phases across India. The last phase of polling was
completed on the 13th of May 2009. The counting of votes was to begin on
the 16th of May 2009.

The data of various candidates could be
obtained from the Election Commission of India’s website. In order to
track the elections and upload candidate and constituency information
onto this wiki, we accessed this website and regularly downloaded the
CandidateAC file from there. This spreadsheet had various columns
containing information of all candidates including their political
affiliations, age, address etc. There was also a column for “votes
polled” and some “coding” called “DECODE(FINALISED,’YES’,’FINALISED’,)”.

By
virtue of the Election Rules no votes polled data/exit poll was to be
available before the 16th of May 2009, least of all on the Election
Commission of India Website.

The excel spreadsheets on
candidate information for all India downloaded from the ECI website
between the 6th and 15th of May had “coded” Candidate Names, Party Names
and votes polled. Despite repeated queries the ECI has not clarified
the meaning of this data. This has resulted in widespread speculation
and raised serious questions about the the management and integrity of
the democratic process.

The serious questions being asked include:

What
was the coded data in the “votes polled” column in the versions of the
spreadsheet downloaded between the 6th and 11th of May?
Why were the spreadsheets between these dates “coded” all of a sudden?
If the polling was not even complete how could “votes polled” data be available for all but 47 of the 8071 candidates?
If
EVM’s were secure with DEO/district collectors, and elections were not
even held in many constituencies, how was the data for 8023 candidates
or all but 47 of the 8071 candidates available to the ECI on files
downloaded between these dates?

If data in these files was
test/dummy data, how does it match the winners in 108 constituencies or
106 according to another analysis?

If the the data in these
files was test/dummy data, what was it testing? Why was this test taking
place during the polling period?
What tests were these that required only some data to keep changing and others to remain unchanging?
*** To be continued ***

Rahul
Mehta in Ahmedabad, has been raising similar issues for a long time
now. Rahul is ex-IIT Delhi (Computer Science), founder of a political
party/social movement and also contested from Gandhinagar this time.

Checkout his EVM related effort here:

http://www.orkut.com/Main#Community?cmm=92705561

http://rahulmehta.com/evm1.pdf

http://satyameva-jayate.org/2009/09/16/evms-questions/

http://www.opednews.com/articles/PAPERLESS-ELECTRONIC-ELECT-by-William-J-Kellehe-090907-39.html

September 10, 2009 at 13:19:29

PAPERLESS ELECTRONIC ELECTION UPHELD BY GERMAN SUPREME COURT

By William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.

In
a ruling handed down earlier this year, Germany’s highest court, the
Federal Constitutional Court, upheld the constitutionality of recent
elections to the German legislative branch known as the Bundestag
(similar to the US Senate). An English translation of the ruling is now
available.

Two of the losing candidates sued for “a scrutiny of
the election,” in the hope of having it invalidated. They first
challenged the election in the Bundestag. After the Bundestag rejected
their claims, they appealed to the High Court.

The Controlling Law

The
Court declared the constitutional principles that it follows in cases
like this. These principles are derived from the German Constitution, or
“Basic Law.” Article 38, section one, of the Basic Law states, in part,
that “Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general,
direct, free, equal, and secret elections.” This has traditionally been
interpreted to mean that elections should be conducted in ways that are
consistent with the highest principles of democracy. Since the end of
WWII, German law has developed and articulated these principles.

The
Court stated, for example, “The public nature of elections is a
fundamental pre-condition for democratic will-formation.” Such public
elections are also a “major precondition for the well-founded trust of
citizens in the correct operation of the elections.” (Para 107 et seq)

Public
monitoring of elections is necessary “so that manipulation can be ruled
out or corrected and unjustified suspicion can be refuted.” Trust in
elections is best assured only if they are carried out “before the eyes
of the public.” (Para 108) Hence, the conduct of elections should not
require any specialized knowledge on the part of the voters.

The Complaints of the Challengers

The
complainants contended, among other things, that the use of electronic
paperless “computer-controlled voting machines” in this election
violated Germany’s Basic Law.

They argued, in effect, that to be
democratic, at best elections should consist of voters marking paper
ballots, which are then placed in boxes, counted by hand, and stored
securely in case a re-count was called for. If voting machines are
allowed, they should have a voter-verified paper audit trail to ensure
the integrity of the election, and in case a re-count is needed.

One
of the legal briefs filed in the case was by The Chaos Computer Club.
(Para 86 et seq) They vehemently opposed the use of computer-controlled
voting machines. They also argued that a voter-verified paper audit
trail was essential for an honest vote count, and for a reliable
re-count. Electronic machines do not give an actual re-count, but only
the same count repeated. Besides that, the computer-controlled machines
can be programmed prior to an election to adjust the vote and alter the
outcome in ways that are undetectable. The “fix”can be programmed into
the source code before the machines are used. During, or immediately
after, the election the votes can be changed by a remote computer, or a
nefarious insider. These suspicions are aggravated because Nedap, the
company supplying the machines, insists on its right to keep their codes
secret; hence, the entire election cannot be trusted.

Applying the Law

The
Court explained that several factors are needed to satisfy the
requirement of the “public nature” of elections. This includes that
elections be based on laws written and passed according to the Basic
Law, and supervised by public officials. Also, an election is “public in
nature” because the public is participating in it. (Para 140-144) The
Court noted that in a representative democracy, the people do not have
to be directly involved in every detail. So long as they feel they have a
satisfactory understanding of the process, and sufficient confidence in
those who conduct the elections, the requirements for a public nature
and public monitoring of elections are met.

The Court agreed that
some of the misconduct alleged by the parties might be possible in
theory. However, it also agreed with the ministry in charge of elections
that these claims are “an over-evaluation of technical security
requirements as to the voting machines.” (Para 87-88) Nothing in these
claims justified even a partial invalidation of the election. (Para
162-164) Indeed, compared to marked paper ballots put in a ballot box,
or voting by mail, the electronic machines are at least as secure, if
not more so. These conclusions were also reached by the Committee for
the Security of Elections, and their report was unanimously accepted by
the Bundestag. (Para 90-100) The Court declined to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature.

However, the Court did
agree that the voting machines used were so complex that they were “not
compatible with the principle of the public nature of elections.” Only
the manufacturer’s technicians could understand and monitor the
functioning of these machines. Hence, the public was not adequately
represented in the monitoring of the machine usage by officials from the
elections ministry. But this constitutional shortcoming was not so
severe as to require a re-run of the election. There was no evidence of
mechanical error, or of manipulation of the votes cast or counted.

Although
the Court did not specify this, it seemed to imply that if the agency
in charge of the elections had had personnel sufficiently knowledgeable
to monitor the operations of the machines, the constitutional
requirement would be satisfied. With such personnel working in the
public agency, sufficient public monitoring of the equipment could be
conducted. The voters only need to know how to vote, not how source
codes record votes.

The Court also held that a regulation made by
the ministry in charge of administering the election was
unconstitutionally vague. (Para 145 et seq) While the Court offered some
suggestions as to how the inadequate language could be tightened up,
the errors in the regulation were not so bad that the election should be
invalidated because of them.

Conclusion

After its lengthy
and minutely detailed discussion, Germany’s Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of this election. The inadequacy of the agency
regulation, and the shortcomings of the machines, were harmless errors.

This
opinion, upholding paperless electronic voting in Germany, has
far-reaching implications. The arguments and conclusions made in that
opinion can also be applied to the use of Internet voting – another
form  of paperless electronic voting. Thus, this ruling paves the way
for Internet voting in Germany.

While German law, of course, has
no precedent value in the US, it can have considerable persuasive value.
That is, the legal reasoning and conclusions of the German Supreme
Court can be a model for US courts and law-makers to emulate.

In short, this opinion may one day prove to be a milestone in the history of Internet voting in the US.

William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.

InternetVoting@gmail.com

http://ssrn.com/author=1053589
PMK team tries its hand on EVMs in New Delhi
By Express News Service
28 Aug 2009 03:05:00 AM IST
CHENNAI:
The PMK team led by its president G K Mani on Thursday inspected the
electronic voting machines (EVMs) in the presence of full Commission
comprising three Election Commissioners — Navin Chawla, V S Sampath and S
Y Qureshi — in New Delhi. However, the party has requested the
Commission to provide an opportunity on September 7 to prove their
contention that the evms could be tampered with.
The team comprising
retired IAS officer MG Devasahayam, advocate K Balu, Supreme Court
advocate Dugar Rai and Pune-based IT expert Vijayendra Gupta inspected
the EVMs in the presence of a 10-member expert team of the Election
Commission.
The team was given EVMs and tools required to operate
them. PMK sources said the members were satisfied with the EC’s approach
in this regard. The EC had asked the PMK to provide technical
information about how the EVMs could be tampered with and it would be
considered seriously.
During their meeting, Navin Chawla said the PMK
would be given sufficient time to prove that the EVMs could be tampered
with and that the team could even open the spare parts of the machines.
The PMK has sought for another opportunity on September 7. PMK sources
said the party would go there with more software and hardware experts to
inspect the EVMs.
In its memorandum, the PMK team told the
Commission that “We would like to demonstrate the tamperability of the
EVM in the presence of an ‘independent committee of experts comprising
EC and party nominees’. The ECI should constitute such a committee and
provide EVMs to us for demonstration.”
In this connection, the PMK
team submitted a memorandum to the EC in which it said the ECI should
provide a few EVMs randomly picked from various polling booths in the
country by their experts team. The PMK team said, “Our team would tamper
3-4 machines and would request ECI technical committee to identify the
tampered machines.”

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/print.aspx?artid=/6GSNgFEkPM=
Voting machines: hackable, crackable, hijackable

August 19, 5:15 PM · Garry Reed - Dallas Libertarian Examiner

According
to a Raw Story write-up from August 12, 2009, a party of profs and post
grads from Cal – San Diego, Michigan, and Princeton universities hacked
into an electronic voting machine and tainted the tall. They wanted to
prove that criminals (their euphemism for Democrat or Republican Party
operatives?) could start from scratch with no source codes or inside
info, find a weakness, hack the security, and develop their own attack
software.

They proved that someone could easily break into the
machines the night before an election and install hacking software that
would alter the results on election day – all without detection.

Their educational caper cost $100,000; a pittance compared to most politicians’ political campaign purses.

And yet the brainiac “experts” keep telling us voting machines are spoof-proof.

If
you don’t believe that everything is hackable, crackable or hijackable,
vote counters included, consider just a scant handful of recent
reports:

From Fox News, August 17, 2009 – Three hackers were
indicted in an identity theft case that netted over 130 million credit
and debit card numbers, along with other account info, stolen from three
corporations, including the Dallas-based 7-Eleven convenience store
chain. This easily eclipsed the previous American Indoor Hacking
record…

From InfoWorld, July 27, 2009 – Internet hosting
company Network Solutions announced that someone dipped their illicit
software snares into the company’s digital pool and fished out half a
million of their customer’s credit card numbers.

A letter sent to
merchants who use their Ecommerce Hosting services admitted that
somebody gained “unauthorized access to credit card account numbers,
names and addresses of some of your customers.”

From Wired, July
31, 2009 - Pentagon hacker and 9/11 truther Gary McKinnon is set to be
extradited back to the U.S. from England where he faces trial for
hacking into 97 computers, including 53 Army, 26 Navy, 16 NASA, and 1
each Department of Defense and Air Force, between February 2001 and
March 2002.

He’s also accused of crashing some systems, deleting
critical files, shutting down the Army’s Military District of Washington
network of over 2,000 computers for 24 hours, and in general causing
over $700,000 in  damages.

McKinnon, whose hacker handle is
“Solo,” insists he was on a moral crusade in search of evidence of a UFO
cover-up by the military.

From LewRockwell.com, August 13, 2009 –
In an article on the libertarian website, Paul Green tells the tale of a
teenaged boy jailed for “swatting” his online-gaming adversaries.
First, he tracked down a person’s IP address. Next, he hacked his
intended victim’s internet provider for personal details. Then, spoofing
(faking) his target’s telephone number, he made an emergency call that
resulted in armed SWAT teams invading his opponent’s house.

And for local readers…

From
Dallas Business Journal, September 19, 2008 – Ready for another hacking
term? Reflashing. Dallas was a “hotbed of hackers” last year when
TracFone filed 13 lawsuites against 50-plus Dallas-area businesses and
individuals who bought the phones in bulk, reflashed them so they could
be used on other wireless networks, and resold them for a profit.

If
every kind of giga-gadget and digital widget from military mainframes
to remotely started keyless-entry security-encoded nose hair trimmers
can be hacked, is it any wonder that libertarians have long looked
askance not only at electronic voting machines but at the very concept
of voting itself? Some still check a box for the perceived “lesser of
two evils” while others pull nothing but the Libertarian lever.

But why bother when your choice of Charlie can be changed to Charlene without you ever knowing it?

The
state mandating more electronic voting machines just gives more props
to libertarians who refuse to vote at all on the principle that voting
only serves to encourage the out-of-wedlock reprobates who run for
public power.

Working within the system means getting grifted by the system.

So figure it out for yourself:

1.
It has long been proved by constant hacks and virus attacks that any
good geek with off-the-shelf gear is light years ahead of the
government-academic-corporate rocket scientist security experts,
including the colossal computer corporations who stand to make millions
by selling vulnerable voting devices to the politicos.

2. Every electronic voting machine in the nation is under the control of some government entity at some level.

3. Trust them like you trust the dope-smoking mope next door who wants to diddle your daughter.

http://www.examiner.com/x-1449-Dallas-Libertarian-Examiner~y2009m8d19-Voting-machines-hackable-crackable-hijackable

A boycott to stem ‘vote for money’

By Anbumani Ramadoss
19 Aug 2009 11:49:00 PM IST

When
the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), Pattali Makkal
Katchi (PMK) and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) announced
their boycott of the assembly by-elections in Tamil Nadu, they were
spurred by memories of the recent parliamentary elections. The elections
in Tamil Nadu witnessed the gross misuse of science — electronic voting
machines (EVMs) were manipulated and systematic rigging was resorted to
by officials showcasing blatant use of money power to the advantage of
the ruling party, handing them stupendous victory on a silver platter,
defying all principles of democracy, ethics and logic. The entire
election drama was staged with such shocking impunity and lack of
compunction that the opposition parties and the conscientious public
watched with benumbing horror. The spectacle of the democratic process
crumbled down like a pack of cards.
Elections in Tamil Nadu were held
on May 13, 2009. Till May 9, the AIADMK front was thought to be well on
its way to a winning streak. Abruptly, the situation changed —
dramatically. I surmise the cartwheel turned due to the tsunami of money
that raised its ugly head and gobbled up the gullible.
After two
corrections, when the final polling percentage of 73 per cent was
announced the day after the elections, it clearly suggested two
possibilities. Such an increase in polling meant that either people
voted in large numbers in support of the Sri Lankan issue or the
inconceivable had happened due to manipulated rigging by the ruling
party. Sadly, the latter emerged to be true. Any increase in polling
percentage over that of the previous elections has always gone against
the party in power. Defying all electoral predictions and norms, an
unprecedented 12.2 per cent increase in polling over the last elections,
in 2004, has given a resounding victory to the ruling Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (DMK), contrary to the predictions of the media, private
surveys, Intelligence Bureau reports etc, which predicted a clean sweep
for the AIADMK front.
West Bengal recorded the highest polling
percentage of 81.3 per cent, an increase of 3.3 per cent over that of
2004 and the opposition garnered 25 seats, more than it had ever managed
to garner in the long past. Kerala, with the second highest polling
percentage of 73.3 per cent registered an increase of 1.8 per cent over
the last elections, handing 15 seats out of 20 to the opposition
coalition. Tamil Nadu was the lone exception. The state recorded 73 per
cent polling and had the third highest polling percentage in the
country. The increase of 12.2 per cent over the previous elections gave
28 out of 40 seats to the ruling coalition, a clear deviation from past
trends.
What is surprising is that when the DMK front swept 40 out of
40 seats in the 2004 parliamentary elections, the polling percentage
was only 60.8 per cent. The polling percentage of all the seven
constituencies where the PMK contested this time was around 80 per cent,
that points towards massive rigging by the ruling party.
During his
press meet, the chief electoral officer of Tamil Nadu, Naresh Gupta,
mentioned that one polling booth, which had a PMK contestant, recorded
100 per cent polling. He said that nearly 725 polling booths had
recorded more than 90 per cent polling. According to political
scientists and experts, the probability of a polling booth recording a
100 per cent turnout is next to impossible. Incidentally, when some of
the polling booths had more than 80 per cent polling during the last
elections, re-polls were ordered. The logical question that arises now
is: What or who stopped the election commissioner from doing an encore
this time, announcing a re-poll in these booths?
No doubt that a
combination of various factors led to the thumping victory of the DMK
front during the current Lok Sabha elections. Money power, muscle power,
blatant misuse of government machinery, rigged EVMs and the flouting of
all Election Commission norms helped the esteemed members of the DMK
front to be ensconced comfortably in their coveted seats.
Devious
machinations by the DMK front went into the scheming of the rigging to
make the results appear genuine. The DMK front could have won all the 40
seats contested by its members on the strength of these malpractices.
Yet, to give an impression that the results were genuine, they willingly
gave 12 seats to the opposition. However, those who were not in the
good books of the DMK were all ignominiously defeated. The fate of E V K
S Elangovan, R Prabhu, K V Thangabalu, Manishankar Iyer, Vaiko and all
the PMK candidates was decided well in advance by the DMK.
The PMK
was the hardest hit in this conspiracy. It is alleged that the DMK spent
anywhere between Rs 40 to 70 crore in each of the PMK constituencies.
The highest amount was spent in the Arakkonam constituency which is
estimated to be around Rs 70 crore where the PMK candidate R Velu and
erstwhile minister of state for railways contested. R Velu, a retired
IAS officer, who has an exemplary reputation not only in Tamil Nadu but
also in the entire country, lost out to S Jagathrakshakan, currently MoS
(I& B) who is the owner of a distillery, a hotelier and the
chancellor of a deemed university (which was in the news recently for
being caught on tape demanding capitation fees for an MBBS seat).
The
clandestine operations were carried out during the dark hours of the
night, for distributing money from house to house. The upshot of these
undesirable developments was that a case was filed in the Supreme Court
against the use of EVMs by V V Rao and in the high court by the PMK.
Almost all national and regional parties including the BJP, CPI(M), CPI,
SP, RJD, BSP, TC, JDU, TDP, LJP, AIADMK, PMK, MDMK, and DMDK have come
down heavily against the use of EVMs for future elections.
The
responsibility of infusing confidence among the public and the parties
regarding the reliable use of the EVMs lies with the judiciary and the
Election Commission. In the context of the miserable failure of the EVMs
during the recent elections, it makes sense to go back to the
traditional ballot system. In fact, most of the developed countries are
going back to the traditional ballot system due to the undependability
of the EVM. The recalcitrant attitude of the Election Commission, with a
preconceived mindset in continuing with the EVM seems incomprehensible.
The election commissioner’s argument is that in India we use a
standalone EVM whereas the developed countries use a centrally linked
EVM. Ironically, according to experts the standalone EVM system is
easier to manipulate than a centrally linked EVM system.
It is
believed that the media was threatened and gagged so that free and fair
reporting was not done. I am not writing this out of a sense of
frustration because we lost, but out of a fervent desire for free and
fair elections that uphold the democratic principles of the largest
democracy in the world — at least in the future.
Among other gimmicks
employed to lure the public, the ruling DMK doled out a lot of freebies
to the general public like TVs, LPG connections, rice for one rupee,
etc. Apart from this, the DMK government took advantage of the dismal
plight of the indigent and bought votes for a ‘fee’ ranging from Rs 100
to Rs 2,000 per vote. The DMK front has created ‘history’ whipping up a
frenzy of mass scale corruption enticing the public to accept bribe for
their votes, thereby creating a new culture.
Officials manning the
polling booths were handpicked by the government in the seven
constituencies where the PMK candidates contested and were allegedly
asked to poll between 100 and 200 votes illegally, without arousing
suspicion of large-scale rigging, but effectively ensuring victory to
the ruling front. Strict instructions were given not to poll more than
200 illegal votes per booth to obliterate the suspicion of rigging,
Computing the statistics on this basis, 100 votes on an average in 1,300
polling booths per constituency will count up to 1,30,000 votes and 200
votes per polling booth is 2,60,000 votes per constituency. No wonder
PMK and other parties were hit very hard.
During the parliamentary
elections money was inundating the state like uncontrollable floods. It
has been alleged that an inspector of police was paid Rs 25,000, a sub
inspector Rs 15,000, a polling officer got Rs 10,000 and  a party booth
agent pocketed Rs 5,000, apart from Rs 100 to Rs 2,000 per vote that the
general public received. The Election Commission was in a trance of
‘Masterly Inactivity’. All complaints by the opposition fell on deaf
ears.
Innumerable complaints against election code transgressions
went unheeded. When the PMK party cadre caught persons belonging to the
opposition party distributing money red-handed, and took them to the
authorities, cases were filed against the PMK cadre rather than against
the perpetrators of malpractice. The district collectors and district
superintendents of police exhibited their allegiance to the DMK
blatantly. Even my meeting with the Big Three — the chief election
commissioner Navin Chawla, Quareshi and Sampath, turned out to be a
formal meeting without any outcome.
It is beyond doubt that the EVMs
were pre-programmed for the DMK’s victory. Numerous complaints about the
malfunctioning of the EVMs also went unheeded. It has been said that
when the voting button was pressed against the PMK symbol, the light was
blipping against the DMK candidate’s name. Amidst all this, the common
man and his rights have been conveniently forgotten. Every individual
has the right to know to which candidate his/her vote was cast, but who
cares?
While our alliance worked round the clock for door-to-door
election campaigns at all levels with senior leaders like J
Jayalalithaa, Ramadoss, Vaiko, Varadharajan of CPI(M),  Nalla Kannu
(CPI), Prakash Karat and others personally visiting villages, towns and
cities of Tamil Nadu, there was hardly any campaign in the opposite
camp, with the exception of the present deputy chief minister, M K
Stalin. Without exaggeration, I would like to disclose that during the
five weeks I campaigned for elections, I did not come across any DMK
leader or party worker campaigning in any village or town.
It was
alleged that the ruling party threatened to stop the NREGS in the
villages if the people did not vote for them. Till the time of
elections, the ruling party paid Rs 120 over the wages of Rs 80 per day
under the scheme. It was also alleged that self help groups were paid Rs
2,000 to Rs 20,000 almost throughout Tamil Nadu, depending on their
power of persuasion.
The money plundered by the sand mafia, rice
mafia, sugar mafia, liquor mafia and other unscrupulous elements was
used freely by the ruling party to systematically create a new culture
of ‘vote for money,’ whether the candidate is a competent leader or not.
In future, economically deprived candidates or political parties cannot
even think of contesting elections due to the advent of this new
culture. It is the duty of the Election Commission to restore the
confidence in the electoral system for a free and fair election and
uphold the democratic and constitutional values and principles.
Otherwise, the general public would soon lose faith and shun these types
of farcical elections.
If such a large-scale electoral scam can be
planned and executed so systematically and scientifically during the
massive parliamentary elections, a by-election is simply a walk over.
Thirumangalam was the starting point for the commencement of the new
culture of ‘vote for money,’ which has been perfected during the recent
parliamentary elections in Tamil Nadu. This made even the former CEC
Gopalaswami castigate the DMK government saying that Tamil Nadu was
worse than Bihar. The by-election may just happen to be a repetition of
this objectionable trend. Is there any necessity to waste people’s time
and money in conducting a farce? Why not announce the winner right away
and eschew all the drama?
After all, the recent parliamentary
elections do not reflect the true defeat of the PMK nor is it a true
victory for the DMK. When justice and fair practice prevail, there will
be true victory.
(The author is a former Union health minister)

http://tinyurl.com/ou5jlx

Poll panel allows petitioners to show EVM’s tamperbility

Ians

August 17th, 2009

NEW
DELHI - The Election Commission Monday met petitioners who have filed
cases in courts across the country challenging the efficacy of
electronic voting machines (EVMs) and agreed to offer machines so they
could demonstrate their claims of tamperability.

We met the
Election Commission and demanded it offer us EVMs to demonstrate that
these can be tampered with. The commission has agreed and will tell us
tomorrow (Tuesday) of the time to give this demonstration,” Hari Prasad,
managing director of Net India, a Hyderabad based software company,
told IANS after the meeting.

Two engineers of Net India are also petitioners in this case.

All
three Election Commissioners were present along with their expert
committee at the meeting with the delegation which included observers
from political parties and technical experts.

Prasad said he has
asked for 20 EVMs that he will pick randomly from different booths to
demonstrate that these can be tampered with.

The commission has reiterated several times that the machines were tamper-proof.

The
first attack against the EVMs came from Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
leader L.K. Advani. Later, other political leaders also voiced their
concerns about the reliability of the EVMs used during the April-May
Lok  Sabha polls.

Since many cases were filed on the matter in
various courts, the commission invited those who had approached the
courts and political parties to its headquarters in New Delhi to discuss
the issue.

http://blog.taragana.com/n/poll-panel-allows-petitioners-to-show-evms-tamperbility-141837/

AIADMK, SP leaders meet EC to prove EVM tampering
PTI 17 August 2009, 08:16pm IST

NEW
DELHI: A delegation comprising leader of two political parties and
technical experts today met Election Commission officials and discussed
with them the possibility of tampering of EVMs.

The delegation,
comprising leaders of AIADMK and Samajwadi Party, said the Commission
has asked them to demonstrate at a later date that the machines can be
tampered with. 

“The Election Commission wants the demonstration
be done on their EVMs and they will fix a date later,” AIADMK
spokesperson V Maithreyan told reporters after meeting the three-member
commission. 

However, Commission sources said no dates have been fixed. 

“Our
team was ready to demonstrate with a sample machine how the EVM can be
tampered. But the EC was not prepared to undergo that exercise”, he
said. 

“The EC wanted us to prove that the EVMs used by them (EC) can be tampered with,” Maithreyan said. 

“We have accepted the challenge of EC and will “prove that EVM can be tampered with,” he added. 

The
EC had earlier in a statement said that “it remains entirely satisfied
that EVMs cannot be tampered with and are fully tamper-proof.”

 

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/AIADMK-SP-leaders-meet-EC-to-prove-EVM-tampering-/articleshow/4903491.cms
Oldest PSU to develop first biometric EVM
Maneesh Chhibber Posted online: Monday , Aug 17, 2009 at 0338 hrs
New
Delhi : The country’s oldest public sector undertaking (PSU) is all set
to play a major role in ushering in a new era in the way elections are
conducted in the country. Bangalore-based ITI Limited is on the verge of
developing what could be the country’s first biometric electronic
voting machine (EVM).
With concerns over whether the EVMs that the
Election Commission of India (EC) presses into service during elections
can be hacked, the biometric EVMs could effectively end all debate about
the fairness of the electoral process. In October last, the then Chief
Election Commissioner, N Gopalaswami, had said that the EC was
considering introduction of biometric EVMs. Last week, the EC held a
meeting with Nandan Nilekani, recently-appointed chief of the UID
project, where the issue of biometric EVMs was also discussed.

The
biometric EVMs, which the ITI Ltd is developing, would identify voters
by their fingerprints, thereby putting an end to all bogus voting and
impersonation. When contacted, Lt Col A M Uniyal (retd), General Manager
(R&D), ITI Ltd, confirmed that the company was working on the new
type of EVMs. “Beyond that I can’t tell you anything,” he said.

A
source in the EC said with the Government of India having already set
up an authority to provide unique identity cards to the citizens, the
problem of a database of biometric prints of the voters would
automatically be solved.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Oldest-PSU-to-develop-first-biometric-EVM/502868

E-Voting Takes Another Hit

August 16, 2009 Mike Pearson
 
The design requirements for e-voting are high, preventing not-yet-discovered attacks.
 
A
group of computer scientists have shown how voting results, held in
electronic voting machines, can be changed using a novel hacking
technique. It’s yet another reason why we need to have a verifiable,
auditable, paper-trail for electronic voting machines.
 “This
research shows that voting machines must be secure even against attacks
that were not yet invented when the machines were designed and sold.
Preventing not-yet-discovered attacks requires an extraordinary level of
security engineering, or the use of safeguards such as voter-verified
paper ballots,” said Edward Felten, an author on the new study; Director
of the Center for Information Technology Policy; and Professor of
Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University.

 

http://mikepearsonnz.amplify.com/2009/08/16/e-voting-takes-another-hit/

 

From a statement:

To
take over the voting machine, the computer scientists found a flaw in
its software that could be exploited with return-oriented programming.
But before they could find a flaw in the software, they had to reverse
engineer the machine’s software and its hardware—without the benefit of
source code.

Essentially, return-oriented programming is a
technique that uses pieces of existing system code to exploit the
system. In this demonstration, the researchers successfully performed a
buffer-overflow.

The team of scientists involved in the study
included Shacham, as well as researchers from the University of Michigan
and Princeton University. The hacked voting system was a Sequoia AVC
Advantage electronic voting machine.

Shacham concluded that paper-based elections are the ay to go. I wouldn’t go that far, but he did:

“Based
on our understanding of security and computer technology, it looks like
paper-based elections are the way to go. Probably the best approach
would involve fast optical scanners reading paper ballots. These kinds
of paper-based systems are amenable to statistical audits, which is
something the election security research community is shifting to.”

I’d settle for verifiable paper-based audit trail.
Professor Edward Felten, a long-time observer of electronic voting systems also commented:

“This
research shows that voting machines must be secure even against attacks
that were not yet invented when the machines were designed and sold.
Preventing not-yet-discovered attacks requires an extraordinary level of
security engineering, or the use of safeguards such as voter-verified
paper ballots,” said Edward Felten, an author on the new study; Director
of the Center for Information Technology Policy; and Professor of
Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University.

In
February 2008, Felten demonstrated how he was able to access several
electronic voting systems at multiple locations in New Jersey.

http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2009/08/evoting_takes_a.html;jsessionid=ZAEAADKKKRDW3QE1GHPSKH4ATMY32JVN?cid=RSSfeed_IWK_ALL

EVM hacking: EC accountable under cyber law: IT Act 2000

I
have collated and summarised arguments demonstrating EVM hacking and
the imperative of subjecting EC to a forensic audit by an independent
agency under the directions of the Supreme Court. The splendid
contributions made by Prof. J Krishnayya, Dr. Anupam Saraph, Prof. MD
Nalapat, Sri Rajeev Srinivasan, Prof. Sohan Prabhakar Modak, Sri Senthi
Raja are gratefully acknowledged.

Freedom we have earned has to be defended resolutely. Eternal  vigilance is the price of liberty.

EC
like caesar’s wife should be above suspicion. Now, EC is tainted as it
has entered the complex cyber world,  has to justify its constitutional
status before the peoples’ court and explain fully the measures taken to
guard against cyber frauds in the wireless technology age exemplified
by a chip the size of a pencil head can transmit and receive messages
when buttoned on to a device like the EVM.

Our ancestors
of the 10th century (919 CE) seem to have conducted elections — with
secret ballots using pots — much more efficiently as recorded in the
Uttaramerur (near Kanchipuram) inscription of King Parantaka chola .
This was mentioned during the Constituent Assembly debates by T.
Prakasam (who was CM of Madras Presidency) while referring to the
democratic traditions of our nation.
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/debates.htm(Constituent
Assembly Debates) This inscription which refers to adult suffrage and
secret ballot, was cited during Constituent Assembly deliberations for
drafting the Constitution of independent Bharat. “Shri T. Prakasam
(Madras: General): The Honourable Mr. Madhava Rau said that the ballot
box and ballot paper were not known to our ancestors. I would like to
point out to him, Sir, that the ballot box and the ballet papers were
described in an inscription on the walls of a temple in the villages of
Uttaramerur, twenty miles from Conjeevaram (Kanchipuram). Every detail
is given there. The ballot box was a pot with the mouth tied and placed
on the ground with a hole made atthe bottom and the ballot paper was the
kadjan leaf and adult franchise was exercised. The election took place
not only for that village but for the whole of India. This was just a
thousand years ago. It is not known to my honourable Friend and that is
why he made such a wrong statement – a grievously wrong statement and I
want to correct it.”
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p5b.htmhttp://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol4p8.htm

http://www.thehindu.com/fr/2008/07/11/stories/2008071151250300.htm Constitution 1000 years ago

namaskaram. kalyanaraman

EC accountable under cyber law: IT Act 2000

How can an accused become a judge?

All
parties have expressed concerns about functioning of EVMs (Ghulam Nabi
Azad about Orissa polls, Advani about Lok Sabha polls, PMK/MDMK in Tamil
Nadu etc.) EC is going through a make-believe, non-transparent
exercise. How can the accused become a judge?

EC has not explained who manufactures the chips in the EVMs

The
manufactures of the CHIPs are still not revealed by the EC, and most
probably the manufacturer of the chip would be a foreign company. 
Again, this is another national security issue, where we mortgage our
credibility of our election process to a foreign company.  Ultimately we
never inspect the foreign company premises too.

There are also
reports that ECIL/BEL have outsourced the making of the EVMs to private
parties thus introducing another trojan horse. EC has to confirm the
situation.

Introduction of timer device in EVMs violates secrecy of ballot

The
latest EVMs record the time of each vote.  This violates the
fundamental principle of secret voting.  When the polling booth agent,
notes down the time a particular voter had voted, he will be able to
find which party he voted for, if he has access to EVM vote logs.  This
is a violation of constitutional rights, which can invalidate the last
loksabha election itself, since about 16% of EVMs had time details.

Use
of two types of machines — one with timer (introduced in Jan. 2009
first in Delhi Assembly polls) and another without timer device. EVMs
with timer devices are said to be about 2 lakh in number (out of a total
of  about13 lakh EVMs). Thus in 16% of the constituencies or about 80
Lok Sabha constituencies the timerdevice EVMs were used rendering them
to internet frauds because timer device makes the device non-local and
directly amenable to internet crime. There is a good possibility that
the 80 constituencies selected for manipulation were in Tamilnadu,
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, UP and Delhi. EC is accountable to provide
info. on how the timer-device EVMs were distributed and how they were
certified by manufacturers , audited by
EC, before being deployed.
Party polling agents should be allowed access to such regular system
audits to ensure transparency and accountability of EC.

The possibility of embedding wireless Feature in the Chip:

Since
the early days of electronic devices such as Read Only Memory (ROM)
chips, there have been dramatic advances including wireless
technologies.

UC SanDiego Prof writes about having been able to reverse engineer the software of
(American)
EVMs, without opening them up at all. His programming style suggest
that there have been many changes in the capability of software hackers.

The first question is how will we know, if a chip contains
wireless feature or not?  It is impossible to find the architecture of
the chip, after it is manufactured.  This wireless feature can be be
made passive, so that it gets activated only upon receiving a specific
signal in a specific frequency.

A simple analogy is that, our
mobile phone rings only if the call is intended for it..  All the GSM
waves are available to the mobile phone, but it activates only when a
particular signal (corresponding to its mobile number or set code) is
detected.  IT rejects all other waves, even though it can read those.

In
a similar case, the wireless feature will remain passive, unless
activated by the known person.  And this can be done, through satellite
from any part of the world.

Or it can be done at a distance of 200 - 300 metres outside the polling booth..  The possibility is wide here.

Failure to audit the design integrity of EVM’s and embedded software

Beep sound can NEVER be a confirmation of the vote:

The
EC claims that when a voter presses the particular party’s button,
there will be a beep sound to confirm his vote.  But in practical
perspective, a beep sound confirms only the pressing of the button, but
it does not confirm whether the vote has been delivered to the
particular party.

This is just like giving our vote to a third
person, who in turns puts in to ballot box.  We never know if that third
person puts our vote correctly or he changes it and puts a different
vote or he may not even deliver the vote itself.

So, direct and
secret voting itself is violated, which is available in the ballot
paper, where we know which party symbol we are marking, and we ourselves
ensure the voting by directly putting the paper in the ballot box
ourselves.

- Closed source proprietary design- If it is a mere
calculator and completely secure, why the secrecy about its design and
software, why not allow use of any EVM’s that confirm to a standard? We
do not restrict to using HP calculators and ban the use of any other
calculator for number crunching.

- EVM’s cannot work without
elaborate supervised pre and post-poll process involving observers,
agents and security paper seals. This is a huge risk and cost. Like a
calculator that cannot work unless scientists, teachers and examiners
certify that the calculator is secure and not fraudulent.

- There
is no verification of software on the EVM - no checksum or debug
programs to confirm identity and version of software - besides black-box
testing. What can distinguish an authentic EVM from an unauthentic one?

An
extraordinary statement was made by EC that from now on ECIL/BEL
(makers of EVMs) will be asked to certify the EVMs supplied by them. It
is amazing that such certification and audit by EC did not occur for the
13 lakhs + EVMs in use now and for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections.

Trojan Code:

Secret
Trojan code embedded right at the manufacturing stage.  This trojan can
be activated, by combination of special keys known only to secret group
of people.  This trojan need not know the candidate or his serial
number or his party symbol.  What it needs is to know the exact button,
to which the benefeciary party belongs to, so that it can either
simulate that button press, or transfer votes from other buttons to the
beneficiary party’s button code.

This point is very important,
because the Indiresan committee report claims that the candidate serial
number is not known till two weeks of commencement of election. This is a
false claim, because, candidate serial number is only for human
reference, and all the internal workings are based on machine codes.

Even
if cadidate serial number claim is to be accepted, there should be a
mechanism to feed or map the button to the serial number, and that can
be done only by humans..  who are they?

Absence of standards for EVM data storage and retrieval

-
There are no standards and procedures for data-storage, data-retrieval,
archiving, data-transfer, data-verification. In fact the BEL and ECIL
machines are not even compatible when it comes to obtaining, storing
retrieving, archiving or transferring data. What is the standard? Why
are there no third party designs? Who are the OEMs? This is like NTSC
and PAL- only the manufacturers benefit.

- There is a manual
process for reading the votes - Why is there no print-out of the votes
recorded on the machine with the machine id? Why can the entire data not
be transfered to public website instantaneously? Why must the form 17C
and form 20 be manually filled? Why can it not be printed by the EVM?

Absence of EVM audit procedures

-
There is no standard for maintaining a transaction trail and statutory
independent audit by anyone who wishes to audit an EVM or entire
constituencies. This is like allowing pass-books to be updated without
entries in registers and without payment slips or cheque-book entries in
the registers. This is like trusting the system because it runs, not
because there is a mechanism to check for points of malfunction or
misuse.

- There is no transaction slip to the voter. For the
voter, the vote is untraceable once it is cast. This is like depositing
money without a deposit slip. It is like a bank that has no pass-book
updates or ways to check that the money is still in your account.

EC gets results on 6 May 2009 before Voting is completed (last date of polling May 13)

-
Coded “results” were available on the ECI website in the versions of
the spreadsheet CandidateAC.xls downloaded between the 6th and 11th of
May. They contained “results”  for all but 47 of the 8071 candidate. If
EVM’s were secure with DEO/district collectors, and elections were not
even held in many constituencies, how was did the ECI have this data?

- Was this data not in control of the ECI? Was their site hacked? Or was data from various EVM’s uploaded in advance?

- How can the ECI distinguish between real and dummy data?

EC in violation of Supreme Court order of 19 Jan. 2009

-
The existence of the poll results data as early as May 6 (one week
before May 13 the final date of polling) contravenes the Order passed by
the Supreme Court on 19-01-2009, in writ petition ( C) No. 207 of
2004th See http://eci.nic.in/press/current/pn140409.pdf reproduced
below:

ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA

Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi – 110 001

No. ECI/PN/ 23 /2009 Dated : 14th April, 2009

PRESS NOTE

Subject : Prohibition on Publication and Dissemination of Results of Opinion

polls/Exit polls.

In pursuance of the Order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 19-01-2009,

in
writ petition ( C) No. 207 of 2004, the Election Commission issued
Guidelines, on 17th February, 09, to be followed in the matter of
publication/dissemination of results of opinion polls and exit polls in
connection with the current elections to the Lok Sabha and State
Legislative Assemblies. As per the guidelines, result of opinion/exit
polls carried out at any time, cannot be published, publicized or
disseminated in any manner, during the period starting from 48 hours
before the hour fixed for conclusion of poll in the first phase of
election and till the conclusion of poll in the last phase of election.
The period referred to in the guidelines starts from 3 PM today, the
14th April, 09 (as the hour fixed for conclusion of poll in some of the
constituencies in the first phase of election on 16.4.09 is 3 PM ), and
will continue till the conclusion of poll in the last ( the fifth) phase
of election.

(K.F.WILFRED) SECRETARY

 Use of Genesys software by EC to consolidate vote counts

Counting of votes using Genesys software

EC
has not publicized, NOR audited the flow of information after the EVMs
have been used for the polls.  There are so many places along the route
(not to mention the idea of using E-mails to collect vote totals!) where
errors can creep in.  (In fact, the Genesys programme mentioned by EC
to Anupam and Nalapat has NOT been publicised.  Has it been checked out
by the technical  group led by Indiresan?

- If this data is
generated as test/dummy data by “Genesys” software that collects and
transfers data from districts to the ECI then:
  * Why did this happen during the poll process?
  * Why did the ECI not put up notice to the effect on its website?
 
* Why did it not react to the alert to this data sent to them on the
6th of May by NIC and Dr Anupam Saraph? Why is there no response to
date? Why is there no clarification on this?
  * If the purpose of
the test is to match names with votes, why were the names coded to match
the order in which they appear on the EVM?
  * If it is just meant to tally the match, why was the data changing for at least some constituencies in this period?

Votes polled by 108 winners in 2009 Lok Sabha polls tally with May 6 spreadsheet data of EC

Nalapat’s
discovery of EC working with spreadsheets on May 6 when the final count
and results were due only on May 10. Prof. SP Modak has found that 108
constituency results match with the numbers used in the spreadsheets.
This is a serious issue requiring CBI inquiry. EC cannot be allowed to
brush this under the carpet; this is comparable to a cyber crime of
fraudulent of use of ATMs of Banks. An external agency should audit the
use of Gensys software for gathering info. On counted votes from the
state Election Commission officials.

  * Why do 108 winners tally with winners as per this data?
  * Why do the ranks of 662 candidates match the finally declared?
 
* In many cases multiple ranks in the same constituency match - this is
a highly non-random event considering each of the ‘n’ candidates in a
constituency would have ‘1/n’ chance of making it to any position and p
positions matching is a low probability chance with probability
1/(n)**p.
  * If previous years data is used to generate “dummy
data”, why are there only 108 matches? Also where does the data for
those who did not contest previously come from?
  * Why was this data “sanitized” on the 15th of May?
  * Why were the final results never uploaded onto the spreadsheet?
  * Why was the link to the spreadsheet removed on the 15th of July when the media asked the ECI questions about it?

EC has not replied to the notes sent by Anupam and Nalapat

 
* Why has the ECI not replied to the mails and minutes of the meeting
with ECI sent to them by Dr Anupam Saraph and Prof Madhav Nalapat?

- Why does the voters and votes polled data reported by the ECI in different documents on its own website differ significantly?

EC contravenes Cyberlaws in India

SC
should direct that EC be made accountable under the Information
Technology Act 2000 since EC is using a computer/computer
network/computer resource/computer system as defined in the Act.

EVMs
are computers/computer networks/computer resource/computer system under
the definitions included in The Information Technology Act, 2000 (No.
21 Of 2000)Of India

http://www.legalserviceindia.com/cyber/itact.html (For the full text of the Act)

Amendments
have also been made to the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) to recognize
electronic records and to the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (1 of 1872) and
Reserve Bank of India act 1934 (2 of 1934).

In the Reserve Bank
of India Act, 1934, in section 58, in sub-section (2), after clause (p),
the following clause shall be inserted, namely:-

“(pp) the
regulation of fund transfer through electronic means between the banks
or between the banks and other financial institutions referred to in
clause (c) of section 45-1, including the laying down of the conditions
subject to which banks and other financial institutions shall
participate in such fund transfers, the manner of such fund transfers
and the rights and obligations of the participants in such fund
transfers;”.

This is an Act to provide legal recognition for
transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and
other means of electronic communication, commonly referred to as
“electronic commerce”, which involve the use of alternatives to
paper-based methods of communication and storage of information, to
facilitate electronic filing of documents with the Government agencies
and further to amend the Indian Penal Code, the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891 and the Reserve Bank of
India Act, 1934 and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.

1 (2) It shall extend to the whole of India and, save
as otherwise provided in this Act, it applies also to any offence or
contravention thereunder committed outside India by any person.

2
) “computer” means any electronic magnetic, optical or other high-speed
data processing device or system which performs logical, arithmetic,
and memory functions by manipulations of electronic, magnetic or optical
impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage, computer
software, or communication facilities which are connected or related to
the computer in a computer system or computer network;

(j)  “computer network” means the interconnection of one or more computers through—

(i) the use of satellite, microwave, terrestrial line or other communication media; and

(ii)
terminals or a complex consisting of two or more interconnected
computers whether or not the interconnection is continuously maintained;

            (k)  “computer resource” means computer, computer system, computer network, data,computer data base or software;

(l)
“computer system” means a device or collection of devices, including
input and output support devices and excluding calculators which are not
programmable and capable of being used in conjunction with external
files, which contain computer programmes, electronic instructions, input
data and output data, that performs logic, arithmetic, data storage and
retrieval, communication control and other functions;

The act defines in Section 2 (ze) a  “secure system” means computer hardware, software, and procedure that-

(a) are reasonably secure from unauthorised access and misuse;
(b) provide a reasonable level of reliability and correct operation;
(c) are reasonably suited to performing the intended functions; and
(d) adhere to generally accepted security procedures;

Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act 2000 prescribe penalties for tampering/hacking:

65. Tampering with computer source documents.
Whoever
knowingly or intentionally conceals, destroys or alters or
intentionally or knowingly causes another to conceal, destroy or alter
any computer source code used for a computer, computer programme,
computer system or computer network, when the computer source code is
required to be kept or maintained by law for the time being in force,
shall be punishable with imprisonment up to three years, or with fine
which may extend up to two lakh rupees, or with both.

Explanation.-
For the purposes of this section, “computer source code” means the
listing of programmes, computer commands, design and layout and
programme analysis of computer resource in any form.

66. Hacking with computer system.

(1)
Whoever with the intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause
wrongful loss or damage to the public or any person destroys or deletes
or alters any information residing in a computer resource or diminishes
its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means, commits
hack:

(2) Whoever commits hacking shall be punished with
imprisonment up to three years, or with fine which may extend upto two
lakh rupees, or with both.

Procedures governing ATMs which
require printout of transaction as an audit trail for the customer
should be followed in EVM operations.

Just as an ATM produces a
receipt, EVM should produce a receipt which can be deposited in a
separate box for verification in cases of  EVM malfunction/complaints.
Secrecy of the ballot will not be vitiated. The voter is free to inform
others of how he voted; there is no law prohibiting this freedom. He
should also get a copy of the EVM receipt. Even as of now, since an EVM
can accommodate only 3000 votes, secrecy of ballot has already been
violated; it will be possible to know which ward voters voted for which
candidates.

A note on cyberlaws is provided in a separate
document. Just as a Bank is accountable for  preventing potential ATM
frauds, EC will have to be answerable to the possibility of crimes
committed on EVMs which are computing devices. RBI regulates the
operation of the ATMs of banks. Similar regulatory mechanism is needed
for EVMs operated by EC. Elections are high-stake democratic exercises.

Why EVM should be declared unconstitutional by SC

Voter
cannot be expected to be able to understand the systems audit
requirements for complex computing devices. Elections as a public
exercise should be simple and intelligible to the voter. This is the
’simplicity’ criterion on which German Supreme Court declared use of
EVMs unconstitutional.

Nontranparency of EC about vote counting

EC
is not transparent about the election counting procedure. See also the
episode about EC admitting the use of Genesys Software to maintain
spreadsheets of election results. This software had been used to keep
the count on May 6 itself even before the final counting date of May 16
in serious violation of all canons of propriety. EC has promised to
explain this issue to Anupam Saraph and Nalapat. Response from EC 
awaited.

Dangers of erroneous counting or manipulated counting or tally of votes

The possibility of changing the values at the last minute:

All
the votes are electronically stored, most probably in a flash memory.
(Similar to pen drive).  This memory should be rewritable, otherwise,
the votes cannot be entered in this memory.  The EC claims only the
controlling unit is one time writable.   But not the storage chip.

When there is a mechanism to read the total number of votes, cant there be a secret mechanism to alter the reading? 

In the case of Chidambaram episode, the EVMs seem to have been modified somewhere in the middle.

To
give an idea on how to change the values, we can refer to digital FM
radios available now, where the frequency can be either incremented or
decremented, just using two buttons.

The focus on Election Counting Machine:

EVM’s
are NOT manually counted.. rather, they are connected to a counting
machine, which reads the bulk of EVM machines.  Why can’t the counting
machine be hacked?  Since the counting machine gives a consolidated
total, it would be possible to change values through the counting
machine, since what it displays tends to be the final result.

Surely,
EC has to provide a lot of answers instead of issuing Press Notes
declaring that EVMs are tamper-proof. No one buy this declaration in
this electronic, wireless age. Else, there would have been no need for 
an IT Act 2000 as a cyberlaw of India.

EVM: no paper trail; CEC cites secrecy doctrine. Isn’t EC a creature of the citizens’ will?

Does
secrecy over-ride accountability of a functionary under the
constitution? EVM is a mystery wrapped in electronics which an ordinary
voter has reason to mistrust.

What is the objective of an
election? Counting peoples’ will. If the count is flawed, the democracy
is rendered meaningless by the EC.

Paper trail is needed to make the EC accountable and to audit the accuracy of the count by the machine.

k

EVMs are tamper-proof: Election Commission

STAFF WRITER 19:0 HRS IST

Mumbai,
Aug 13 (PTI) In the backdrop of allegations by certain political
parties that Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) could be hacked, the
Election Commission today said EVMs were and are tamper proof.

“In
the view of the Election Commission, EVMs were and are tamper proof.
Nobody has been able to demonstrate that they can be tampered with,”
Chief Election Commissioner Naveen Chawla told reporters here.

On
the demand by some parties for paper printouts of ballots, Chawla said
“we believe a paper trail would foil the essence of democracy, which is
secrecy of individual ballot, and it would be seriously compromised.”

“The
whole purpose of democracy is that individuals’ preference must be
secret and it is the whole pillar of free, fair and transparent 
election process,” he said.


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