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12/29/16
B. Iriyāpatha Pabba-
Filed under: Vinaya Pitaka, Sutta Pitaka, Abhidhamma Pitaka, Tipiṭaka
Posted by: @ 6:19 pm



B. Iriyāpatha Pabba

Puna
ca·paraṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu gacchanto vā ‘gacchāmī’ ti pajānāti, ṭhito
vā ‘ṭhitomhī’ ti pajānāti, nisinno vā ‘nisinnomhī’ ti pajānāti, sayāno
vā ‘sayānomhī’ ti pajānāti. Yathā yathā vā pan·assa kāyo paṇihito hoti,
tathā tathā naṃ pajānāti. 

B. Section on postures

Furthermore,
bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, while walking, understands: ‘I am walking’, or
while standing he understands: ‘I am standing’, or while sitting he
understands: ‘I am sitting’, or while lying down he understands: ‘I am
lying down’. Or else, in whichever position his kāya is disposed, he
understands it accordingly. 

Iti ajjhattaṃ vā kāye kāyānupassī
viharati, bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhatta-bahiddhā vā
kāye kāyānupassī viharati; samudaya-dhamm·ānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati,
vaya-dhamm·ānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati, samudaya-vaya-dhamm·ānupassī
vā kāyasmiṃ viharati; ‘atthi kāyo’ ti vā pan·assa sati paccupaṭṭhitā
hoti, yāvadeva ñāṇa·mattāya paṭissati·mattāya,{1} a·nissito ca viharati,
na ca kiñci loke upādiyati. Evam·pi kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu kāye
kāyānupassī viharati. 



Thus he dwells observing kāya in kāya
internally, or he dwells observing kāya in kāya externally, or he dwells
observing kāya in kāya internally and externally; he dwells observing
the samudaya of phenomena in kāya, or he dwells observing the passing
away of phenomena in kāya, or he dwells observing the samudaya and
passing away of phenomena in kāya; or else, [realizing:] “this is kāya!”
sati is present in him, just to the extent of mere ñāṇa and mere
paṭissati, he dwells detached, and does not cling to anything in the
world. Thus, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu dwells observing kāya in kāya. 

மேலும்,பிக்குக்களுக்களே,ஒரு
பிக்கு, நடந்து செல்லும் பொழுது, ‘நான் நடந்து செல்கிறேன்’,என அவர்
அறிந்துகொள்கிறார்.அல்லது நின்று கொண்டிருக்கிற பொழுது, ‘நான் நின்று
கொண்டிருக்கிகிறேன்’, என அவர் அறிந்துகொள்கிறார்:அல்லது உட்கார்ந்திருக்கிற
பொழுது, ‘நான் உட்கார்ந்திருக்கிறேன்’, என அவர் அறிந்துகொள்கிறார்: அல்லது
படுத்திருத்திருக்கிற பொழுது, ‘நான் படுத்திருத்திருக்கிறேன்’,என அவர்
அறிந்துகொள்கிறார்: தவிர அவர் kāya உடல்அமர்வுநிலை எதுவாக தீர்வு
செய்கிறாரோ அதன்படிபுரிந்து கொள்கிறார்.

இவ்வாறு அவர் kāya in kāya
உடல்/காயத்தை காயதுக்குள் கண்காணி வாசம் செய்கிரார், அல்லது காயத்தை
காயதுக்கு வெளியே கண்காணி வாசம் செய்கிரார், அல்லது காயத்தை காயதுக்கு
உள்ளே மற்றும் வெளியே கண்காணி வாசம் செய்கிரார்;புலன்களால் உணரத்தக்க
எழுச்சி கண்காணி வாசம் செய்கிரார், மற்றும் புலன்களால் உணரத்தக்கதை
கடந்துசெல்லுவதை கண்காணித்து வாசம் செய்கிரார்; இல்லாவிடில்
எச்சரிக்கையாயிருக்கிற உணர் உடனிருக்கிறதை,சும்மா வெறும் ஓர்அளவு ஞானம்
மற்றும் ஓர்அளவு paṭissati என எண்ணி பற்றறு வாசம் செய்கிரார்.
C. Sampajāna Pabba

Puna
ca·paraṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu abhikkante paṭikkante sampajānakārī hoti,
ālokite vilokite sampajānakārī hoti, samiñjite pasārite sampajānakārī
hoti, saṅghāṭi-patta-cīvara-dhāraṇe sampajānakārī hoti, asite pīte
khāyite sāyite sampajānakārī hoti, uccāra-passāva-kamme sampajānakārī
hoti, gate ṭhite nisinne sutte jāgarite bhāsite tuṇhībhāve sampajānakārī
hoti. 



http://www.ambedkar.org/gifimages/voteforBSP.gif

http://www.ambedkar.org/gifimages/voteforBSP.gif





Page 1 of 2

Privacy Issues in an Electronic Voting Machine

Arthur M. Keller

UC Santa Cruz, Baskin

School of Engineering

Santa Cruz, CA 95066

+1(831)459-1485

ark@soe.ucsc.edu

David Mertz

Gnosis Software, Inc.

99 2nd Street

Turners Falls, MA 01376

+1(413)863-4552

mertz@gnosis.cx

Joseph Lorenzo Hall

UC Berkeley, SIMS

102 South Hall

Berkeley, CA 94720

+1(510)642-1464

joehall@berkeley.edu

Arnold Urken

Stevens Inst. of Technology,

Political Science

Hoboken, NJ 07030

+1(201) 216-5394

aurken@stevens.edu

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we describe the Open Voting Consortium’s voting

system and discuss the privacy issues inherent in this system. By

extension, many of the privacy issues in this paper also apply to

other electronic voting machines, such as DREs (Direct

Recording Electronic voting machines). The privacy issues

illustrate why careful and thorough design is required to ensure

voter privacy and ballot secrecy.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: K.4.1 [Computers and

Society]: Public Policy Issues — privacy.

General Terms: Design, Human Factors, Legal Aspects.

Keywords: Electronic voting, open source, privacy design.

1. INTRODUCTION

The requirements for secrecy in elections depend upon the

values and goals of the political culture where voting takes place.

Gradations of partial and complete privacy can be found in

different cultural settings. Most modern polities institutionalize

the ideal of complete privacy by relying on anonymous balloting.

The use of secret balloting in elections — where a ballot’s

contents are disconnected from the identity of the voter — can be

traced back to the earliest use of ballots themselves in 6th Century

B.C.E. Athens, Greece. The public policy rationales for instituting

anonymous balloting typically aim to minimize bribery and

intimidation of the voter [1]. Secret ballots, although not always

required, have been in use in America since colonial times.

Today, almost one hundred years after most states in the U.S.

passed laws to require anonymous balloting, a strong sense of

voter privacy has emerged as a third rationale.

These cultural values and practices contribute to the sets of

user requirements that define the expectations of voters in

computer-mediated elections and determine alternative sets of

specifications that can be considered in developing open source

software systems for elections [7]. The Open Voting Consortium

(OVC) has developed a model election system that aims as one of

its goals to meet these requirements. This paper describes how the

OVC model ensures ballot privacy.

The OVC has developed the model for an electronic voting

system largely in response to the reliability, usability, security,

trustworthiness, and accessibility concerns of other voting

systems. Privacy was kept in mind throughout the process of

designing this system. Section 2 of this paper discusses the

requirements for a secret ballot in more detail and how secrecy

could be compromised in some systems. Section 3 describes how

the OVC handles the privacy concerns. While this paper focuses

mostly on privacy issues for US-based elections, and how they are

addressed in the OVC system, many of the issues raised are

applicable elsewhere.

2. SECRET BALLOT REQUIREMENTS

The public policy goals of secret balloting — to protect the

privacy of the elector and minimize undue intimidation and

influence — are supported by federal election laws and

regulations. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 [5] codifies this

as “anonymity” and “independence” of all voters, “privacy” and

“confidentiality” of ballots and requires that the Federal Election

Commission create standards that “[preserve] the privacy of the

voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.”

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has issued a set of

Voting System Standards (VSS) [4] that serve as a model of

functional requirements that elections systems must meet before

they can be certified for use in an election. The FEC VSS state

explicitly:

“To facilitate casting a ballot, all systems shall: […] Protect the

secrecy of the vote such that the system cannot reveal any

information about how a particular voter voted, except as

otherwise required by individual State law;” ([4] at § 2.4.3.1(b).)

This high level requirement of not exposing any information

about how an individual voted is required of all voting systems

before certification.

It is not sufficient for electronic voting systems to merely

anonymize the voting process from the perspective of the voting

machine. Each time a ballot is cast, the voting system adds an

entry to one or more software or firmware logs with a timestamp

and an indication that a ballot was cast. If the timestamp log is

combined with the contents of the ballot, this information

becomes much more sensitive. For example, it can be combined

with information about the order of votes cast collected at the

polling place with surveillance equipment — from cell phone

cameras to security cameras common at public schools — to

compromise the confidentiality of the ballot. As described below,

system information collected by the voting system should be kept

separated from the content of cast ballots and only used in

conjunction by authorized, informed elections officials.

Rebecca Mercuri proposed that Direct Recording Electronic

(DRE) voting machines have a paper audit trail maintained under

glass, so the voter does not have the opportunity to touch it or

change it. [6] Some vendors are proposing that paper from a spool

be shown to the voter, and a cutter releases the paper audit trail

piece to drop into a box for safekeeping. [2] A challenge is to

make sure that all of the paper audit trail is readable by the voter,

doesn’t curl away out of view, and yet the paper audit trails from

previous voters is obscured from view. However, the paper audit

trail can fall in a more-or-less chronologically ordered pile. The

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for

personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are

not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that

copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy

otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists,

requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.

WPES’04, October 28, 2004, Washington, DC, USA.

Copyright 2004 ACM 1-58113-968-3/04/0010…$5.00.


Page 2 of 2

problem of reconciling the paper audit trail with the electronic

ballot image is difficult to do in an automated manner if the paper

audit trail cannot be sheetfed. Another approach is to keep the

paper audit trail on a continuous spool. [7] While this approach

has the potential to be more easily scanned in an automated

fashion for recounts, privacy is compromised by maintaining the

chronological order.

In the longer version of this paper, we discuss in more detail these

issues. We discuss that problem that the voter’s secret identity

must be disclosed to poll workers and yet not be discernable from

the ballot. Covert channels can be used to transfer identity of the

voter to the ballot. A critical example is when the machine that

prepares for the voter an authorizing token also contains the voter

registration data, which might be passed to the electronic voting

machine through that authorizing token.

3. SECURITY, PRIVACY, RELIABILITY

In the full version of this paper, we discuss a variety of issues and

their solutions in security, privacy, and reliability for the voting

system designed by the Open Voting Consortium and described

more fully there.

Some of these issues are the following.

The Advantage of Free and Open Source Software. When

the system is a black box, where the source code is maintained as

a trade secret, we must trust the official testers. A frequent

criticism of free and open source software is that, while the code

is available for inspection, no coordinated inspection is actually

conducted. [3] The absence of Non-Disclosure Agreements and

restrictive intellectual property agreements encourages the large

body of open source developers to inspect the code.

Randomization of Ballot-IDs. Under the OVC design

ballots carry ballot-IDs to enable auditing of official paper ballots

against unofficial electronic ballot images. Ballot IDs are easily

remembered and can be a vehicle for disclosing the vote.

Privacy Issues with Barcodes. The Open Voting

Consortium system design uses a barcode to automate the

scanning and tallying of paper ballots. Such barcodes raise several

possibilities for introducing covert channels.

Privacy in the Voting Token. The token given to the voter

to enable her to use the electronic voting machine might contain

information that could compromise anonymity. Analysis of the

software and the poll worker interface for encoding the voter

token can show the type of information that can be encoded.

Information Hidden in Electronic Ballot Images and

Their Files. The electronic ballot images (EBIs) are stored on the

electronic voting machine where the ballot was created. Storing

the EBIs in a database management system can record sequence

information that can be used to identify voters. Flat files can

include the date/time in the file directory, a potential privacy risk.

Reading Impaired Interface. It is important that the ballot

not record that the voter used the reading impaired interface. Nor

should the electronic voting machine maintain such information in

a way that identifies specific ballots. If a separate reading

impaired voting station is used, the ballot-ID should be generated

in a manner that does not identify the voting station used.

Printed Ballot. The secrecy of the voter’s selections is at

risk while the voter carries the paper ballot around the polling

place. We use a privacy folder — an ordinary manila folder

trimmed along the long edge so that the barcode sticks out.

Ballot Validation Station. The ballot validation station

allows visually impaired voters, or anyone, to hear through

headphones and therefore validate their paper ballots. Ballot-IDs

should not be persistently stored by the ballot validation station.

Languages. Steve Chessin identified a problem with ballots

for non-English speakers when printed in the voter’s own

language. This approach makes bilingual ballots easy to identify,

and that can compromise ballot anonymity if only a small number

of voters in a given precinct choose a particular language.

Public Vote Tallying. It is important that the ballots be

shuffled before publicly visible scanning occurs. The ballots will

naturally be ordered based on the time they were placed in the

ballot box. The sequence of voting is a potential privacy risk.

Results by Precinct. Care must be taken to ensure that

results posted by precinct do not compromise privacy and yet can

be reconciled against county totals.

Privacy in the Face of Voter Collusion. Complex cast

ballots, taken as a whole, contain potential covert channels.

4. CONCLUSION

We have discussed the privacy issues inherent the Open Voting

Consortium’s voting system that includes a PC-based open-source

voting machine with a voter-verifiable accessible paper ballot. By

extension, many of the privacy issues in this paper also apply to

other electronic voting machines, such as DREs (Direct

Recording Electronic voting machines). The privacy issues

illustrate why careful and thorough design is required for voter

privacy. Imagine how much work is required to ensure that such

systems are secure and reliable.

Further information about the Open Voting Consortium can be

found at http://www.openvotingconsortium.org. This paper is an

extended abstract; a longer version may be found at

http://www-db.stanford.edu/pub/keller.

5. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We acknowledge the work of the volunteers of the Open Voting

Consortium who contributed to the design and implementation we

describe. In particular, Alan Dechert developed much of the

design and Doug Jones provided significant insights into voting

issues. The demonstration software was largely developed by Jan

Kärrman, John-Paul Gignac, Anand Pillai, Eron Lloyd, David

Mertz, Laird Popkin, and Fred McLain. Karl Auerbach wrote an

FAQ on which the OVC system description is based. Amy Pearl

also contributed to the system description. Kurt Hyde and David

Jefferson gave valuable feedback. David Dill referred some of the

volunteers.

6. REFERENCES

[1] Albright, S. The American Ballot. American Council on Public Affairs,

Washington, D.C., 1942.

[2] Avante VOTE-TRAKKERTM EVC308-SPR,

http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/evc308spr.html.

[3] Cohen, F. Is Open Source More or Less Secure? Managing Network

Security, 2002, 7 (Jul. 2002), 17–19.

[4] Federal Election Commission. Voting System Standards. Vols. 1 & 2

(2002), http://www.fec.gov/pages/vssfinal/

[5] Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 15301 – 15545.

[6] Mercuri, R. A Better Ballot Box? IEEE Spectrum Online, October 2,

2002, http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/

publicfeature/oct02/evot.html

[7] Sequoia Voting Systems, “Sequoia Voting Systems Announces Plan to

Market Optional Voter Verifiable Paper Record Printers for Touch

Screens in 2004,” http://www.sequoiavote.com/article.php?id=54

[8] Urken, A. B. Voting in a Computer-Networked Environment. In The

Information Web: Ethical and Social Implications of Computer

Networking, Carol Gould (ed.), Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1989.

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