Please render exact translation in your mother tongue to this Google Translation as a lesson of this University
http://www.constitution.org/
Nostradamus! — Rightly Predicted the Outcome of the May 2014 General Elections in Indool’s Paradise. Hacke hay in May!
The trend continued and still continues in all the elections just in favour of Murderer of democratic institutions (Modi)
Part XXI
Temporary, transitional and special provisions.
ARTICLE
(1) Notwithstanding the
repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to
the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein
until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent
authority.
The trend continued and still continues in all the elections just in favour of Murderer of democratic institutions (Modi)
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/2019-general-elections-to-have-paper-trail-electronic-voting-machines-nasim-zaidi-cec/articleshow/51106327.cms
2019 general elections to have paper-trail electronic voting machines: Nasim Zaidi, CEC
NEW
DELHI: Polling for 2019 general elections will be conducted through
paper trail-based electronic voting machines to “enhance transparency”.
We
have reached a stage where people are demanding hundred per cent
deployment of paper audit trail machines to enhance transparency.
We have preserved secrecy (in this system) too. By 2019, the whole country will be covered by (such) machines,” Mr Zaidi said
Once
the votes are cast, the VVPAT-linked EVM immediately takes a printout,
which is preserved for later use to tally in case of a dispute in the
final result. Mr Zaidi, speaking on the theme of “Leveraging Technology
for Transparent and Credible Elections”, stressed that secrecy of voting
will be zealously preserved even in this system.
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=137341
Press Information Bureau
Government of India
Election Commission
04-March-2016 15:55 IST
Schedule for the General Elections to the Legislative Assemblies of Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry.
The terms of the Legislative Assemblies of Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu,
West Bengal and Puducherry are normally due to expire as follows:
Tamil Nadu 22.05.2016
West Bengal 29.05.2016
Kerala 31.05.2016
Puducherry 02.06.2016
Assam 05.06.2016
As
per the established practice, the Election Commission holds the General
Elections to the Legislative Assemblies of the States whose terms
expire around the same time, together.
By virtue of its powers,
duties and functions under Article 324 read with Article 172(1) of the
Constitution of India and Section 15 of Representation of the People
Act, 1951, the Commission is required to hold elections to constitute
the new Legislative Assemblies in the States of Assam, Kerala, Tamil
Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry before expiry of their present
terms………..
……
The total number of Assembly Constituencies in the States of
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry and seats reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, as determined by the Delimitation Commission
under the Delimitation Act, 2002, are as under: -
State |
Total |
Reserved |
Reserved |
Kerala |
140 |
14 |
02 |
Tamil Nadu |
234 |
44 |
02 |
West Bengal |
294 |
68 |
16 |
Puducherry |
30 |
05 |
– |
Assam* |
126 |
08 |
16 |
(*In Assam, territorial
determination of Assembly Constituencies is as per Delimitation of
Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1976)
(6)
VVPAT (
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail)
VVPAT will be used in all the five poll
going states as per the details in the table below:
States |
No. of ACs with VVPAT deployment |
Assam |
10 |
Kerala |
12 |
Tamil Nadu |
17 |
West Bengal |
22 |
Puducherry |
3 |
(3)
Polling
Stations and Special Facilitation
The
number of Polling Stations in the poll going States as on the date of final
publication of electoral rolls are as follows:
States |
No. of Polling Stations |
No. of Polling Stations |
% Increase |
Assam |
23,813 |
24,888 |
4.5 |
Kerala |
20,758 |
21,498 |
3.5 |
Tamil Nadu |
54,016 |
65,616 |
21.5 |
West Bengal |
51,919 |
77,247 |
48.7 |
Puducherry |
815 |
913 |
12 |
VVPATs will be used in just 14,066 out of 1,90,162
(13.5%) polling stations across the 5 poll-bound states/UT and the List of Assembly
Constituencies in each State where VVPAT will be used in the forthcoming
elections is placed at “Annexure VI”.
86.5 % voters in all the above states are deprived of paper audit trail machines used to enhance transparency. No preservation of secrecy.
Hence no “Leveraging Technology for Transparent and Credible Elections”, which
stressed that secrecy of voting will be zealously preserved even in this
system.
Over a billion cuckoos cackle, cry and crap in India.
It
is
a nation where intelligence rules in closed quarters, idiocy in
the
open. Just like the open toilets under the benign gaze of
Mother
Nature — there are more cell phones than toilets in India, a
survey
reports. Oh! the average Indian retorts — and, then, goes on to
do
“business” as usual, sitting on the haunches, as sorry-assed
as
before — or sorts.
We are an indifferent,
intelligently inclined
idiocy — oops! democracy, We make gods out of
mud, then, prostrating
before them, we remain, as before, a dud. And,
some times, in the name
of our fancied little god and his glory, my
motherland’s favorite sons
also kill each other, with the deep ingrained
vigor of all our bestial
ancestry, and like a whiff of wind are
gone — dead.
Lest it
becomes confusing, let’s say it
as it is — we Indians, like every other
human being, are truly one
really, really queer kin of apes. In some
fields, ahead of others and
beyond compare; in other areas, we are as
silly and supercilious as a
bull-hounded mare. In a nutshell, Indians,
at least in the loftier
mystical and evolved spiritual circles “get”
some things well — like
higher metaphysics — while failing miserably,
simplistically, in simple,
elementary physics.
After all,
who in
one’s right mind would yet allow the use of absolutely
antiquated,
completely out-dated, easily hack-able and highly
tamper-able “high
school technology” based, obsolete EVMs (electronic
voting machines) in
national elections, even now — in 2014?
More
than 80 democracies
in the world have simply done away with them,
dumping them in the trash,
or simply declared the usage of this
simplistic voting system
susceptible to fraud, and hence declaring the
same as illegal — as the
Supreme Courts of Germany and Holland indeed
have done. Even Japan, from
where EVMs originated, has long abandoned
its rogue babies, and is
using paper ballot system since then. All the
advanced democracies in
the West, except the most dull-headed ones, have
reverted to a voter
verifiable system or the ballot paper. In Canada,
even at the ,most
basic school level, ballot paper voting is in use.
Last
year, the
Supreme Court of India, having been convinced of an
undeniable, edible
possibility of EVMs getting tampered with and that
easily hacked — even
from afar — had ordered the imbecilic Election
Commission and the
indolent Government of India to provide about 1600
crore (1600, 0000000)
rupees — convert this into your respective
currency! — for
manufacturing these VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trail) voting
machines; which show a verifiable paper receipt to the
voter.
This is
the Fundamental Right of a citizen of
India, as per the laws laid down
by the Constitution. However, recent
newspaper reports tell us that only
20, 000 such voting machines have
been provided for the entire country
in this, 2014 election! India has
29 states now — with Telagana being
the latest. In most of them,
depending upon their size etc., either
about 400 VVPAT machines are
being deployed, or some such similar
ridiculous number — more or
less — has been made available in the length
and breadth of the country.
It’s an asinine, bland, cruel, demeaning
joke we 1.25 billion jokers
have been “blessed” with by the powers that
be.
All “patriotic” hackers of our motherland are going to make hay in May!
As
to
how EVMs can be hacked into, tampered with, and results
favorably
manipulated via software interference and other means — from
near and
from far, far away — this can easily be found by anybody by
just going
to Google etc. and filling “EVM HACKING, TAMPERING”
or
something to this effect in the Search. And lo, behold! a plethora
of
information will just overwhelm your overly chilled-out,
lesser
employed, un-billed brains.
However,
the only solace for
us naive fools is that quite a few unscrupulous
politicians and every
other most “honorable” political party worthy of
its “salt”, would
surely be playing this comic-tragic game of hacking
into and hijacking
the votes of a billion people! Thus, one who
outsmarts the other such
fine folks, armed with their hacking forks in
this merry-go-around, will
win.
The
rest — this or that “tsunami” or wave in favor of one
or the other, poll
forecasts and the “newbie”, the over enthused,
seeming game changers in
the making — well, they may well fall flat on
their dumb faces, if not
on their smart asses.
That the Supreme
Court of India
too, while passing the order of putting new VVAT voting
machines in use
in a “phased manner”, has unwittingly shirked its duty.
In fact, it
committed a grave error of judgment. Perhaps dealt a fatal
blow to
Indian democracy. It should have ordered, as a caution, that
till the
time this newer set of about 1300ooo voting machines is
manufactured in
full and so deployed throughout India, ballot paper
system would be
brought in. No such precautionary measure was decreed by
the apex court.
Well,
crib all you want. But don’t cry, my dear
countrymen. After all, the
same model of EVMs is yet very much in use in
South Africa, Bangla Desh,
Bhutan, Nepal, Nigeria, Venezuela etc. These
poor folks of the said
“non-techy” countries — millions of them — too
cannot figure out as to
what the hell had, yet is happening, in their
dear short-circuited
“developed” democracies. Nor will you.
Don’t worry, be happy! You are not alone “out there”.
Oh,
by
the way, the somewhat notorious lawyer who had brought in
this
case — of the present lot of EVMs being tamper-able and
hack-able — and,
who, had successfully fought it so, forcing the Supreme
Court to order
the installation of a fail-safe voting mechanism (of
Voter Verifiable
Paper Audit machines replacing the susceptible earlier
Electronic Voting
Machines) to ensure a free and fair electoral process
in India — well,
this oh-so-very honorable fellow too has fallen silent,
like a demure
maiden. This most vociferous gentleman had openly
declared on social
websites, especially Twitter, that in case VVPAT
machines do not get
installed in time for 2014 elections, then, there
would be a
“constitutional crisis” — putting it out there like an
Indian
“pehalwan”, a la WWW wrestler, that he would challenge the same
in the
apex court. He had most emphatically underlined he would ensure
that
either the new fail-safe voting machines or the old time-tested
paper
ballot system will be put in use during this general election in
India.
However, recently, when asked specifically on Twitter about
this
matter — as to what this lovely man is doing or is going to do
about
this impending doomsday electoral scenario — there was a
deafening
silence from his side. May be owing to the fact that since the
Supreme
Court judgement late last year, this self-righteous rightist
has joined
the ultra-rightist political bandwagon.
The latter
has
been projected by pollsters to overwhelmingly sweep
these
elections — as a direct result of the doings of the monstrous
public
relations firm hired from the land of the let-it-be, oops! free.
This
US firm is the same that was used fruitfully by President Bush
and
Hillary Clinton for their respective political campaigns. It
has — let
there be no doubt about it — successfully projected its client
as the
potential winner and the next numero uno in Indian politics.
What
the
majority of the Indians have missed in fine print is that the
outgoing
Chief Minister of the state of Rajasthan, in the last year
elections,
had officially filed a complaint with the election commission
that the
EVMs used in his state were pre-programmed and tampered
with — and that
the same had come from the state of which this presently
hyped-up future
Prime Minister of India, is the current Chief Minister.
Now, the lawyer
who had gone to the dogs to awaken India and the rest
of the world
about the mischief and malfeasance possible with the old
model of
EVMs — and had in fact written a book on this subject — is in
a
wink-wink deep-throat “smadhi”. A silence that speaks truths we
dumb
billion idiots on this part of slippery earth cannot fathom.
Perhaps
it’s a precursor of the things to come.
Let us hope
the
jolly good hackers of this-that party screw-up each other’s
devilish,
outright evil plans. In a dog eat dog political crap pit we
hapless
billion creatures have to walk through every election, maybe
this time
the ape sitting by the side — the wide-eyed hopeful citizen
of
India — at least gets a tiny part of the apple pie this messy
hacking
cat fight will leave behind, on the side lanes. Perhaps these
little
crumbs will be enough for us to stay afloat. though not gloat.
In a nutshell, simply put, whosoever “out-hacks” the other, will win.
Then
again,
we are an ancient civilization of more than 33, 0000000 gods
and
goddesses — some civilized, others not so civil. Let’s hope one
of
these fancied deities has a soft corner for us dumbos. Otherwise, we
are
going to get screwed. A billion times over.
Therefore,
I made
doubly sure I did not vote. I sat on my ass on voting day — not
that I
don’t do so everyday. This voting day, I absolutely did. Not
only
figuratively and metaphorically, but literally. I may have many
buts in
life, but at least today I have a little sore, yet not so sorry a
butt.
We are a fool’s paradise.
Long live the banana republic of India!
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/secrecy
The
secrecy of the vote is seen as one of the fundamental principles
required in the conduct of democratic elections. Failure to secure the
secrecy of the vote opens the possibility for voters to prove how they
have voted, facilitating voter coercion and vote buying. Both of these
practices undermine the free expression of the will of the voter and the
possibility for election results to reflect the will of the voters.
If
implemented properly, the paper-based system of voting effectively
protects the secrecy of the vote. In the case of electronic counting,
the same protections that currently exist for the hand counting of paper
ballots should be applied. Electronic voting, however, introduces a
number of additional ways secrecy can be violated. Voting machines
record the choices cast on them by voters, and these votes may be
recorded in the order in which they are cast with a time stamp. This
means if someone knows the order in which voters cast their ballots on a
voting machine or the time at which a voter cast their ballot and has
access to the record of voting on the machine, they could determine the
choices made by each voter.
Appropriate procedures restricting
access to logged transactions on the voting machine would reduce this
threat to the secrecy of the vote. In countries that have experienced
authoritarian trends, these issues are likely to generate suspicions
among citizens concerning breaches of ballot secrecy, and extra steps
may be required to establish public confidence.
Other
developments with electronic voting machines are increasing the threat
to the secrecy of the vote. While the VVPAT is a vital tool in building
confidence in the use of electronic voting machines and in providing an
audit mechanism, it can also be implemented in such a way as to
undermine the secrecy of the vote. Some VVPAT systems have a roll of
paper on which the voter’s choices are printed. As the choices are
printed sequentially, this can be used with the order in which voters
cast their ballots on the voting machine to determine the content of
each person’s vote. Access to the paper audit trail cannot be restricted
in the same way as with electronic records on voting machines, since
the audit trail is meant to be taken out and checked against the
electronic record of the voting machine.
However, not all VVPAT
systems function in this way. Some voting machine paper audit trails
operate a cut-and-drop system where the printed vote is cut from the
roll of paper and drops into an internal ballot box within the voting
machine. This ensures that audit records are randomized in the same way
as placing a paper ballot into a physical ballot box.
A
potential, final challenge to the secrecy of the vote from electronic
voting machines comes from the most recent developments with voting
machines, whereby the machines also conduct voter identification. Most
voting machines still rely on a physical process for voter
identification and authentication, with polling staff checking voter
names against a voter list separate from the voting machine. This means
voter identification data and vote data are held in completely separate
processes (the former through a manual process and the latter through an
electronic process), which are never linked in any way, making it
impossible to link voting data to the voter.
More recent voting
machines are also fulfilling the function of voter identification and
authentication. This identification can be by simply entering an ID
number or passcode for the voter, or it can be through the voting
machine scanning a biometric attribute of the voter and identifying them
from a list of approved voters. Clearly, when the voting machine
identifies the voter, it possesses both pieces of information required
to break the secrecy of the vote and could retain the link between the
two.
Technical solutions are readily available to ensure it is
not possible to link voter data with the value of their vote. However,
EMBs will need to adequately address concerns by stakeholders that this
link is still maintained and that the secrecy of the vote is not
violated.
While challenges related to the secrecy of the vote
with electronic voting machines can be resolved, it is important that
electoral stakeholders are cognizant of them and take all necessary
steps to ensure the secrecy of the vote when considering the use of
voting machines. At the same time, observers should evaluate whether any
aspect of the process might challenge this fundamental principle.
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/legal-and-procedural-framework
Legal and Procedural Framework
The
use of electronic voting and counting technologies should be defined in
the legal framework. This process can take a considerable amount of
time, particularly since key legal provisions are incorporated at the
legislative level (i.e., in constitutions and electoral laws) as well as
the regulatory level. Amendments should, at a minimum, address the
following: physical and procedural aspects of voting or counting
processes; testing and certification; audit mechanisms and conduct;
status of audit records versus electronic records; transparency
mechanisms; data security and retention; voter identification; and
access to source code. The process of developing amendments should
involve input from electoral stakeholders, including political parties
and civil society.
In order to properly implement electronic voting
or counting technologies, the use of these technologies needs to not
only be in compliance with the constitutional and legal provisions
relating to elections and the general conduct of public affairs, but
must also be defined in the legal framework for elections. The legal
framework includes the constitution, if there is one, the laws relating
to elections, and the secondary legislation (such as regulations, rules
and procedures often passed by electoral management bodies).
While
constitutions rarely say anything specific about electronic voting or
counting technologies, they may include general provisions that are
relevant to the use of these technologies. Germany provides a good
example of this (see Figure 11 below for more details), with the German
Constitutional Court deciding in 2009 that the electronic voting
machines used in Germany did not comply with general transparency
requirements for the electoral process established in the constitution.
In
addition to ensuring that suggested technology solutions are in
compliance with the constitutional framework of a country, consideration
should also be given to whether suggested solutions meet international
standards, including emerging standards for the use of electronic voting
and counting technologies. Election officials and lawmakers may wish to
study other countries’ experiences when considering whether to adopt
such technologies.
Primary and secondary legislation will inevitably
need to be amended in order to accommodate the use of electronic voting
and counting technologies. It is important that key legal provisions
relating to the use of electronic voting or counting system are included
at a legislative level so that the use of these technologies is not
entirely legislated at the regulatory level. The necessary amendments to
the electoral legal framework will vary depending on the technology
being implemented but should cover, at a minimum, the issues listed
below:
• Physical Aspects of the Voting or Counting
Process – The use of electronic voting or counting machines will entail
changes to the procedure for the setup and conduct of voting and/or
counting. For example, when direct-recording electronic voting machines
are used, there is no ballot box to prepare and seal. The common
practice of displaying the empty physical ballot box before polling
starts does have a comparable procedure for electronic voting or
counting machines; a display demonstrating that no ballots have been
stored is conducted for observers at the beginning of the process. Some
of the procedures relating to the setup and conduct of voting and/or
counting may be in the election law(s) or may be in secondary
legislation, and both will need to be reviewed and amended to
accommodate the setup and use of electronic voting or counting
technologies.
• Procedural Aspects of the Voting and
Counting Process – The timeline for the preparation of the voting or
counting systems should be clearly outlined, as should details of how
the system is to be operated, who is allowed access to it during
elections, how equipment should be stored between elections and how
access to equipment in storage should be regulated and reported.
• Testing and Certification of Technologies – Electronic voting and
counting technologies clearly need to be tested before they are used.
While any responsible election management body would ensure that
sufficient testing of such technologies takes place before they are used
for elections, it may be useful to guarantee that testing takes place
and specify the kinds of testing to be conducted by including these
requirements in the law or in secondary legislation. Likewise, if there
is a process of formal certification of electronic voting and counting
technologies, this should be included in the law as well. The law should
also clearly identify the institutions with the authority to provide
this certification, the timeframe for certification and the standards
and requirements against which certification will take place.
• Audit Mechanisms – The need for audit mechanisms for electronic
voting and counting technologies is an emerging international standard.
In order to ensure that this standard is met, the requirement for an
audit trail should be included in the law. The nature of the audit
mechanisms may also be specified if relevant — for example, any
requirement for a voter-verifiable audit trail often used with
electronic voting machines.
• Conduct of Audits – Audits
should be conducted in order to generate trust in the use of electronic
voting or counting machines and to ensure that these technologies
function correctly. Many different kinds of audits can be conducted,
including audits of the results, audits of internal logs, audits of
storage and access to devices, and so on. The law should clearly
identify which audits are to be implemented, when such audits are to
take place and the scale of the audits. In addition to requiring audits,
which should be provided irrespective of whether there are any
electoral challenges, the law should also identify conditions under
which recounts are to take place.
• Status of Audit
Records Versus Electronic Records – In the event that the conduct of an
audit determines a different result than is produced electronically by
an electronic voting or counting machine, the law should specify how to
deal with the situation.
• Transparency Mechanisms – The
use of electronic voting and counting machines entails the conduct of
existing electoral procedures in different ways, as well as the conduct
of new stages in the electoral process (for example, the configuration
of electronic voting machines). In the interest of transparency,
appropriate procedures will need to be developed to ensure that
political actors and observers have access to these different and new
processes so that they can provide meaningful oversight of the process.
These transparency measures should be clearly defined in the legal
framework so that observers and party representatives understand and can
utilize their access rights.
• Data Security and
Retention – It is unlikely that existing laws and procedures adequately
cover the issue of electronic data security when using electronic voting
or counting machines. The way in which all electoral data is secured
and stored will need to be provided for in the legal framework, as will
the timeframe and procedures for deletion of the electronic data, and
these provisions must be in accordance with existing data protection
legislation.
• Voter Identification – If
identification/authentication is being incorporated into the electronic
voting process, then this may require legislation, whether using
biometrics or making mandatory a particular form of machine-readable ID.
In such cases it is essential that the secrecy of the vote be protected
through de-linking the vote and the identity of the voter.
• Access to Source Code – It may be prudent to legislate whether
source code is open source or not, in addition to legislating the
mechanisms for any access by stakeholders.
Many of these issues are
covered in greater detail later in this part of the guide, and the
intention here is to identify the issues that are relevant for inclusion
in order to properly legislate for the use of electronic voting or
counting technologies.
It is clear from the preceding discussion
that adapting the legal framework for the use of electronic voting or
counting technologies will entail considerable amendments to laws and
secondary legislation. Electoral stakeholders must be involved in the
development of these legislative and regulatory amendments. Initially,
political parties and observers should be consulted on the ways in which
the legislation needs to be changed, especially from a transparency and
oversight perspective. Once legislation is passed, the election
management body will need to fully brief political parties, the media
and civil society on the changes that have been made.
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/constitutionality-of-electronic-voting-germany
The Constitutionality of Electronic Voting in Germany
After
a largely successful trial period spanning from 1998 to 2005, two
citizens challenged the constitutionality of electronic voting before
the German Constitutional Court. Though the public generally viewed the
voting system in a favorable manner throughout the trial period, the
actual legality of the technology was not fully assessed in advance of
implementation.
Germany piloted its first electronic voting
machines, supplied by the Dutch company NEDAP, in Cologne in 1998. The
trial was seen as successful, and one year later Cologne used electronic
voting machines for its entire European Parliament elections. Soon
other cities followed suit, and by the 2005 general election nearly 2
million German voters were using these NEDAP machines to cast votes.
Reaction to the use of these electronic voting machines was generally
very positive among voters, who found the machines to be easy to use,
and among election administrators, who were able to reduce the number of
polling stations and staff in each polling station.
However, after
the 2005 election, two voters brought a case before the German
Constitutional Court after unsuccessfully raising a complaint with the
Committee for the Scrutiny of Elections. The case argued that the use of
electronic voting machines was unconstitutional and that it was
possible to hack the voting machines, thus the results of the 2005
election could not be trusted.
The German Constitutional Court
upheld the first argument, concurring that the use of the NEDAP voting
machines was unconstitutional. The Court noted that, under the
constitution, elections are required to be public in nature and that all
essential steps of an election are subject to the possibility of public
scrutiny unless other constitutional interests justify an exception . .
. The use of voting machines which electronically record the voters’
votes and electronically ascertain the election result only meets the
constitutional requirements if the essential steps of the voting and of
the ascertainment of the result can be examined reliably and without any
specialist knowledge of the subject . . . The very wide-reaching effect
of possible errors of the voting machines or of deliberate electoral
fraud make special precautions necessary in order to safeguard the
principle of the public nature of elections.30
Making it clear that the court’s decision did not rule out the use of voting machines in principle, it stated that:
The
legislature is not prevented from using electronic voting machines in
elections if the possibility of a reliable examination of correctness,
which is constitutionally prescribed, is safeguarded. A complementary
examination by the voter, by the electoral bodies or the general public
is possible for example with electronic voting machines in which the
votes are recorded in another way beside electronic storage.
This
decision by the German Constitutional Court, stressing the need for
transparency in the electoral process without specialist technical
knowledge, effectively ended Germany’s recent use of electronic voting.
Although the Court decision does not rule out electronic voting machines
entirely, no further moves to adopt machines that meet the transparency
requirements have been made.
அசாம், கேரளா, தமிழ்நாடு, மேற்கு வங்காளம்,
The total number of Assembly Constituencies in the States of
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry and seats reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, as determined by the Delimitation Commission
under the Delimitation Act, 2002, are as under: -
State |
Total |
Reserved |
Reserved |
Kerala |
140 |
14 |
02 |
Tamil Nadu |
234 |
44 |
02 |
West Bengal |
294 |
68 |
16 |
Puducherry |
30 |
05 |
– |
Assam* |
126 |
08 |
16 |
(*In Assam, territorial
determination of Assembly Constituencies is as per Delimitation of
Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1976)
(6)
VVPAT (
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail)
VVPAT will be used in all the five poll
going states as per the details in the table below:
States |
No. of ACs with VVPAT deployment |
Assam |
10 |
Kerala |
12 |
Tamil Nadu |
17 |
West Bengal |
22 |
Puducherry |
3 |
(3)
Polling
Stations and Special Facilitation
The
number of Polling Stations in the poll going States as on the date of final
publication of electoral rolls are as follows:
States |
No. of Polling Stations |
No. of Polling Stations |
% Increase |
Assam |
23,813 |
24,888 |
4.5 |
Kerala |
20,758 |
21,498 |
3.5 |
Tamil Nadu |
54,016 |
65,616 |
21.5 |
West Bengal |
51,919 |
77,247 |
48.7 |
Puducherry |
815 |
913 |
12 |
•
•
•
•
•
• வெர்சஸ் மின்னணு பதிவுகள் தணிக்கை ரெக்கார்ட்ஸ் நிலை - ஒரு தணிக்கை
•
•
•
• மூல குறியீடு - அது மூல குறியீடு திறந்த மூல அல்லது இல்லை,
೯. ಓಪಮ್ಮಸಂಯುತ್ತಂ
೧. ಕೂಟಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೩. ಏವಂ ಮೇ ಸುತಂ – ಏಕಂ ಸಮಯಂ ಭಗವಾ ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ ಜೇತವನೇ ಅನಾಥಪಿಣ್ಡಿಕಸ್ಸ ಆರಾಮೇ। ತತ್ರ
ಖೋ ಭಗವಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಆಮನ್ತೇಸಿ – ‘‘ಭಿಕ್ಖವೋ’’ತಿ। ‘‘ಭದನ್ತೇ’’ತಿ ತೇ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಭಗವತೋ
ಪಚ್ಚಸ್ಸೋಸುಂ। ಭಗವಾ ಏತದವೋಚ – ‘‘ಸೇಯ್ಯಥಾಪಿ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಕೂಟಾಗಾರಸ್ಸ ಯಾ ಕಾಚಿ
ಗೋಪಾನಸಿಯೋ ಸಬ್ಬಾ ತಾ ಕೂಟಙ್ಗಮಾ ಕೂಟಸಮೋಸರಣಾ ಕೂಟಸಮುಗ್ಘಾತಾ ಸಬ್ಬಾ ತಾ ಸಮುಗ್ಘಾತಂ
ಗಚ್ಛನ್ತಿ; ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯೇ ಕೇಚಿ ಅಕುಸಲಾ ಧಮ್ಮಾ ಸಬ್ಬೇ ತೇ ಅವಿಜ್ಜಾಮೂಲಕಾ
ಅವಿಜ್ಜಾಸಮೋಸರಣಾ ಅವಿಜ್ಜಾಸಮುಗ್ಘಾತಾ, ಸಬ್ಬೇ ತೇ ಸಮುಗ್ಘಾತಂ ಗಚ್ಛನ್ತಿ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ,
ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ವಿಹರಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ,
ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಪಠಮಂ।
೨. ನಖಸಿಖಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೪.
ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ। ಅಥ ಖೋ ಭಗವಾ ಪರಿತ್ತಂ ನಖಸಿಖಾಯಂ ಪಂಸುಂ ಆರೋಪೇತ್ವಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ
ಆಮನ್ತೇಸಿ – ‘‘ತಂ ಕಿಂ ಮಞ್ಞಥ ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಕತಮಂ ನು ಖೋ ಬಹುತರಂ, ಯೋ ವಾಯಂ [ಯೋ ಚಾಯಂ (ಬಹೂಸು)] ಮಯಾ ಪರಿತ್ತೋ ನಖಸಿಖಾಯಂ ಪಂಸು ಆರೋಪಿತೋ ಅಯಂ ವಾ [ಯಾ ಚಾಯಂ (ಸ್ಯಾ॰ ಕ॰)]
ಮಹಾಪಥವೀ’’ತಿ? ‘‘ಏತದೇವ, ಭನ್ತೇ, ಬಹುತರಂ ಯದಿದಂ ಮಹಾಪಥವೀ। ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಕೋಯಂ ಭಗವತಾ
ಪರಿತ್ತೋ ನಖಸಿಖಾಯಂ ಪಂಸು ಆರೋಪಿತೋ। ಸಙ್ಖಮ್ಪಿ ನ ಉಪೇತಿ ಉಪನಿಧಿಮ್ಪಿ ನ ಉಪೇತಿ
ಕಲಭಾಗಮ್ಪಿ ನ ಉಪೇತಿ ಮಹಾಪಥವಿಂ ಉಪನಿಧಾಯ ಭಗವತಾ ಪರಿತ್ತೋ ನಖಸಿಖಾಯಂ ಪಂಸು
ಆರೋಪಿತೋ’’ತಿ। ‘‘ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಅಪ್ಪಕಾ ತೇ ಸತ್ತಾ ಯೇ ಮನುಸ್ಸೇಸು
ಪಚ್ಚಾಜಾಯನ್ತಿ; ಅಥ ಖೋ ಏತೇಯೇವ ಬಹುತರಾ ಸತ್ತಾ ಯೇ ಅಞ್ಞತ್ರ ಮನುಸ್ಸೇಹಿ
ಪಚ್ಚಾಜಾಯನ್ತಿ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ವಿಹರಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ದುತಿಯಂ।
೩. ಕುಲಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೫. ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಸೇಯ್ಯಥಾಪಿ , ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯಾನಿ ಕಾನಿಚಿ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಬಹುತ್ಥಿಕಾನಿ ಅಪ್ಪಪುರಿಸಾನಿ ತಾನಿ ಸುಪ್ಪಧಂಸಿಯಾನಿ ಹೋನ್ತಿ ಚೋರೇಹಿ ಕುಮ್ಭತ್ಥೇನಕೇಹಿ ;
ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯಸ್ಸ ಕಸ್ಸಚಿ ಭಿಕ್ಖುನೋ ಮೇತ್ತಾಚೇತೋವಿಮುತ್ತಿ ಅಭಾವಿತಾ
ಅಬಹುಲೀಕತಾ ಸೋ ಸುಪ್ಪಧಂಸಿಯೋ ಹೋತಿ ಅಮನುಸ್ಸೇಹಿ। ಸೇಯ್ಯಥಾಪಿ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯಾನಿ
ಕಾನಿಚಿ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಅಪ್ಪಿತ್ಥಿಕಾನಿ ಬಹುಪುರಿಸಾನಿ ತಾನಿ ದುಪ್ಪಧಂಸಿಯಾನಿ ಹೋನ್ತಿ ಚೋರೇಹಿ
ಕುಮ್ಭತ್ಥೇನಕೇಹಿ, ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯಸ್ಸ ಕಸ್ಸಚಿ ಭಿಕ್ಖುನೋ
ಮೇತ್ತಾಚೇತೋವಿಮುತ್ತಿ ಭಾವಿತಾ ಬಹುಲೀಕತಾ ಸೋ ದುಪ್ಪಧಂಸಿಯೋ ಹೋತಿ ಅಮನುಸ್ಸೇಹಿ।
ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಮೇತ್ತಾ ನೋ ಚೇತೋವಿಮುತ್ತಿ ಭಾವಿತಾ
ಭವಿಸ್ಸತಿ ಬಹುಲೀಕತಾ ಯಾನೀಕತಾ ವತ್ಥುಕತಾ ಅನುಟ್ಠಿತಾ ಪರಿಚಿತಾ ಸುಸಮಾರದ್ಧಾ’ತಿ।
ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ತತಿಯಂ।
೪. ಓಕ್ಖಾಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೬.
ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಯೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಪುಬ್ಬಣ್ಹಸಮಯಂ ಓಕ್ಖಾಸತಂ ದಾನಂ ದದೇಯ್ಯ,
ಯೋ ಮಜ್ಝನ್ಹಿಕಸಮಯಂ ಓಕ್ಖಾಸತಂ ದಾನಂ ದದೇಯ್ಯ, ಯೋ ಸಾಯನ್ಹಸಮಯಂ ಓಕ್ಖಾಸತಂ ದಾನಂ
ದದೇಯ್ಯ, ಯೋ ವಾ ಪುಬ್ಬಣ್ಹಸಮಯಂ ಅನ್ತಮಸೋ ಗದ್ದುಹನಮತ್ತಮ್ಪಿ ಮೇತ್ತಚಿತ್ತಂ ಭಾವೇಯ್ಯ,
ಯೋ ವಾ ಮಜ್ಝನ್ಹಿಕಸಮಯಂ ಅನ್ತಮಸೋ ಗದ್ದುಹನಮತ್ತಮ್ಪಿ ಮೇತ್ತಚಿತ್ತಂ ಭಾವೇಯ್ಯ, ಯೋ
ವಾ ಸಾಯನ್ಹಸಮಯಂ ಅನ್ತಮಸೋ ಗದ್ದುಹನಮತ್ತಮ್ಪಿ ಮೇತ್ತಚಿತ್ತಂ ಭಾವೇಯ್ಯ, ಇದಂ ತತೋ
ಮಹಪ್ಫಲತರಂ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಮೇತ್ತಾ ನೋ ಚೇತೋವಿಮುತ್ತಿ
ಭಾವಿತಾ ಭವಿಸ್ಸತಿ ಬಹುಲೀಕತಾ ಯಾನೀಕತಾ ವತ್ಥುಕತಾ ಅನುಟ್ಠಿತಾ ಪರಿಚಿತಾ
ಸುಸಮಾರದ್ಧಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಚತುತ್ಥಂ।
೫. ಸತ್ತಿಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೭. ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ
ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಸೇಯ್ಯಥಾಪಿ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸತ್ತಿ ತಿಣ್ಹಫಲಾ। ಅಥ ಪುರಿಸೋ ಆಗಚ್ಛೇಯ್ಯ –
‘ಅಹಂ ಇಮಂ ಸತ್ತಿಂ ತಿಣ್ಹಫಲಂ ಪಾಣಿನಾ ವಾ ಮುಟ್ಠಿನಾ ವಾ ಪಟಿಲೇಣಿಸ್ಸಾಮಿ
ಪಟಿಕೋಟ್ಟಿಸ್ಸಾಮಿ ಪಟಿವಟ್ಟೇಸ್ಸಾಮೀ’ತಿ। ತಂ ಕಿಂ ಮಞ್ಞಥ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಭಬ್ಬೋ ನು ಖೋ ಸೋ
ಪುರಿಸೋ ಅಮುಂ ಸತ್ತಿಂ ತಿಣ್ಹಫಲಂ ಪಾಣಿನಾ ವಾ ಮುಟ್ಠಿನಾ ವಾ ಪಟಿಲೇಣೇತುಂ
ಪಟಿಕೋಟ್ಟೇತುಂ ಪಟಿವಟ್ಟೇತು’’ನ್ತಿ? ‘‘ನೋ ಹೇತಂ ,
ಭನ್ತೇ’’। ‘‘ತಂ ಕಿಸ್ಸ ಹೇತು’’? ‘‘ಅಸು ಹಿ, ಭನ್ತೇ, ಸತ್ತಿ ತಿಣ್ಹಫಲಾ ನ ಸುಕರಾ
ಪಾಣಿನಾ ವಾ ಮುಟ್ಠಿನಾ ವಾ ಪಟಿಲೇಣೇತುಂ ಪಟಿಕೋಟ್ಟೇತುಂ ಪಟಿವಟ್ಟೇತುಂ। ಯಾವದೇವ ಚ ಪನ
ಸೋ ಪುರಿಸೋ ಕಿಲಮಥಸ್ಸ ವಿಘಾತಸ್ಸ ಭಾಗೀ ಅಸ್ಸಾ’’ತಿ।
‘‘ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯಸ್ಸ
ಕಸ್ಸಚಿ ಭಿಕ್ಖುನೋ ಮೇತ್ತಾಚೇತೋವಿಮುತ್ತಿ ಭಾವಿತಾ ಬಹುಲೀಕತಾ ಯಾನೀಕತಾ ವತ್ಥುಕತಾ
ಅನುಟ್ಠಿತಾ ಪರಿಚಿತಾ ಸುಸಮಾರದ್ಧಾ, ತಸ್ಸ ಚೇ ಅಮನುಸ್ಸೋ ಚಿತ್ತಂ ಖಿಪಿತಬ್ಬಂ
ಮಞ್ಞೇಯ್ಯ; ಅಥ ಖೋ ಸ್ವೇವ ಅಮನುಸ್ಸೋ ಕಿಲಮಥಸ್ಸ ವಿಘಾತಸ್ಸ ಭಾಗೀ ಅಸ್ಸ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ,
ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಮೇತ್ತಾ ನೋ ಚೇತೋವಿಮುತ್ತಿ ಭಾವಿತಾ ಭವಿಸ್ಸತಿ
ಬಹುಲೀಕತಾ ಯಾನೀಕತಾ ವತ್ಥುಕತಾ ಅನುಟ್ಠಿತಾ ಪರಿಚಿತಾ ಸುಸಮಾರದ್ಧಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಪಞ್ಚಮಂ।
೬. ಧನುಗ್ಗಹಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೮. ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಸೇಯ್ಯಥಾಪಿ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಚತ್ತಾರೋ ದಳ್ಹಧಮ್ಮಾ ಧನುಗ್ಗಹಾ
ಸುಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಾ ಕತಹತ್ಥಾ ಕತೂಪಾಸನಾ ಚತುದ್ದಿಸಾ ಠಿತಾ ಅಸ್ಸು। ಅಥ ಪುರಿಸೋ ಆಗಚ್ಛೇಯ್ಯ –
‘ಅಹಂ ಇಮೇಸಂ ಚತುನ್ನಂ ದಳ್ಹಧಮ್ಮಾನಂ ಧನುಗ್ಗಹಾನಂ ಸುಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಾನಂ ಕತಹತ್ಥಾನಂ
ಕತೂಪಾಸನಾನಂ ಚತುದ್ದಿಸಾ ಕಣ್ಡೇ ಖಿತ್ತೇ ಅಪ್ಪತಿಟ್ಠಿತೇ ಪಥವಿಯಂ ಗಹೇತ್ವಾ
ಆಹರಿಸ್ಸಾಮೀ’ತಿ। ತಂ ಕಿಂ ಮಞ್ಞಥ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ‘ಜವನೋ ಪುರಿಸೋ ಪರಮೇನ ಜವೇನ
ಸಮನ್ನಾಗತೋ’ತಿ ಅಲಂ ವಚನಾಯಾ’’ತಿ?
‘‘ಏಕಸ್ಸ ಚೇಪಿ, ಭನ್ತೇ, ದಳ್ಹಧಮ್ಮಸ್ಸ ಧನುಗ್ಗಹಸ್ಸ
ಸುಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಸ್ಸ ಕತಹತ್ಥಸ್ಸ ಕತೂಪಾಸನಸ್ಸ ಕಣ್ಡಂ ಖಿತ್ತಂ ಅಪ್ಪತಿಟ್ಠಿತಂ ಪಥವಿಯಂ
ಗಹೇತ್ವಾ ಆಹರೇಯ್ಯ – ‘ಜವನೋ ಪುರಿಸೋ ಪರಮೇನ ಜವೇನ ಸಮನ್ನಾಗತೋ’ತಿ ಅಲಂ ವಚನಾಯ, ಕೋ ಪನ
ವಾದೋ ಚತುನ್ನಂ ದಳ್ಹಧಮ್ಮಾನಂ ಧನುಗ್ಗಹಾನಂ ಸುಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಾನಂ ಕತಹತ್ಥಾನಂ
ಕತೂಪಾಸನಾನ’’ನ್ತಿ?
‘‘ಯಥಾ ಚ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ತಸ್ಸ ಪುರಿಸಸ್ಸ ಜವೋ, ಯಥಾ ಚ
ಚನ್ದಿಮಸೂರಿಯಾನಂ ಜವೋ, ತತೋ ಸೀಘತರೋ। ಯಥಾ ಚ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ತಸ್ಸ ಪುರಿಸಸ್ಸ ಜವೋ ಯಥಾ ಚ
ಚನ್ದಿಮಸೂರಿಯಾನಂ ಜವೋ ಯಥಾ ಚ ಯಾ ದೇವತಾ ಚನ್ದಿಮಸೂರಿಯಾನಂ ಪುರತೋ ಧಾವನ್ತಿ ತಾಸಂ
ದೇವತಾನಂ ಜವೋ, ( ) [(ತತೋ ಸೀಘತರೋ। ಯಥಾ ಚ ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ ತಸ್ಸ
ಪುರಿಸಸ್ಸ ಜವೋ, ಯಥಾ ಚ ಚನ್ದಿಮಸುರಿಯಾನಂ ಜವೋ, ಯಥಾ ಚ ಯಾ ದೇವತಾ ಚನ್ದಿಮಸುರಿಯಾನಂ
ಪುರತೋ ಧಾವನ್ತಿ, ತಾಸಂ ದೇವತಾನಂ ಜವೋ,) (ಸೀ॰ ಸ್ಯಾ॰ ಕಂ॰)] ತತೋ ಸೀಘತರಂ ಆಯುಸಙ್ಖಾರಾ ಖಿಯನ್ತಿ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ , ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ವಿಹರಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಛಟ್ಠಂ।
೭. ಆಣಿಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೨೯. ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಭೂತಪುಬ್ಬಂ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ದಸಾರಹಾನಂ ಆನಕೋ [ಆಣಕೋ (ಸೀ॰)] ನಾಮ ಮುದಿಙ್ಗೋ ಅಹೋಸಿ। ತಸ್ಸ ದಸಾರಹಾ ಆನಕೇ ಘಟಿತೇ ಅಞ್ಞಂ ಆಣಿಂ ಓದಹಿಂಸು। ಅಹು
ಖೋ ಸೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಮಯೋ ಯಂ ಆನಕಸ್ಸ ಮುದಿಙ್ಗಸ್ಸ ಪೋರಾಣಂ ಪೋಕ್ಖರಫಲಕಂ ಅನ್ತರಧಾಯಿ।
ಆಣಿಸಙ್ಘಾಟೋವ ಅವಸಿಸ್ಸಿ। ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಭವಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಅನಾಗತಮದ್ಧಾನಂ,
ಯೇ ತೇ ಸುತ್ತನ್ತಾ ತಥಾಗತಭಾಸಿತಾ ಗಮ್ಭೀರಾ ಗಮ್ಭೀರತ್ಥಾ ಲೋಕುತ್ತರಾ
ಸುಞ್ಞತಪ್ಪಟಿಸಂಯುತ್ತಾ, ತೇಸು ಭಞ್ಞಮಾನೇಸು ನ ಸುಸ್ಸೂಸಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ ನ ಸೋತಂ
ಓದಹಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ ನ ಅಞ್ಞಾ ಚಿತ್ತಂ ಉಪಟ್ಠಾಪೇಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ ನ ಚ ತೇ ಧಮ್ಮೇ ಉಗ್ಗಹೇತಬ್ಬಂ
ಪರಿಯಾಪುಣಿತಬ್ಬಂ ಮಞ್ಞಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ’’।
‘‘ಯೇ ಪನ ತೇ ಸುತ್ತನ್ತಾ ಕವಿಕತಾ ಕಾವೇಯ್ಯಾ ಚಿತ್ತಕ್ಖರಾ
ಚಿತ್ತಬ್ಯಞ್ಜನಾ ಬಾಹಿರಕಾ ಸಾವಕಭಾಸಿತಾ, ತೇಸು ಭಞ್ಞಮಾನೇಸು ಸುಸ್ಸೂಸಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ಸೋತಂ
ಓದಹಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ಅಞ್ಞಾ ಚಿತ್ತಂ ಉಪಟ್ಠಾಪೇಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ತೇ ಚ ಧಮ್ಮೇ ಉಗ್ಗಹೇತಬ್ಬಂ
ಪರಿಯಾಪುಣಿತಬ್ಬಂ ಮಞ್ಞಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ। ಏವಮೇತೇಸಂ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸುತ್ತನ್ತಾನಂ
ತಥಾಗತಭಾಸಿತಾನಂ ಗಮ್ಭೀರಾನಂ ಗಮ್ಭೀರತ್ಥಾನಂ ಲೋಕುತ್ತರಾನಂ ಸುಞ್ಞತಪ್ಪಟಿಸಂಯುತ್ತಾನಂ
ಅನ್ತರಧಾನಂ ಭವಿಸ್ಸತಿ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಯೇ ತೇ
ಸುತ್ತನ್ತಾ ತಥಾಗತಭಾಸಿತಾ ಗಮ್ಭೀರಾ ಗಮ್ಭೀರತ್ಥಾ ಲೋಕುತ್ತರಾ ಸುಞ್ಞತಪ್ಪಟಿಸಂಯುತ್ತಾ,
ತೇಸು ಭಞ್ಞಮಾನೇಸು ಸುಸ್ಸೂಸಿಸ್ಸಾಮ, ಸೋತಂ ಓದಹಿಸ್ಸಾಮ ,
ಅಞ್ಞಾ ಚಿತ್ತಂ ಉಪಟ್ಠಾಪೇಸ್ಸಾಮ, ತೇ ಚ ಧಮ್ಮೇ ಉಗ್ಗಹೇತಬ್ಬಂ ಪರಿಯಾಪುಣಿತಬ್ಬಂ
ಮಞ್ಞಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಸತ್ತಮಂ।
೮. ಕಲಿಙ್ಗರಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೩೦.
ಏವಂ ಮೇ ಸುತಂ – ಏಕಂ ಸಮಯಂ ಭಗವಾ ವೇಸಾಲಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ ಮಹಾವನೇ ಕೂಟಾಗಾರಸಾಲಾಯಂ। ತತ್ರ
ಖೋ ಭಗವಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಆಮನ್ತೇಸಿ ‘‘ಭಿಕ್ಖವೋ’’ತಿ। ‘‘ಭದನ್ತೇ’’ತಿ ತೇ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಭಗವತೋ
ಪಚ್ಚಸ್ಸೋಸುಂ। ಭಗವಾ ಏತದವೋಚ –
‘‘ಕಲಿಙ್ಗರೂಪಧಾನಾ , ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏತರಹಿ ಲಿಚ್ಛವೀ ವಿಹರನ್ತಿ ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ಆತಾಪಿನೋ ಉಪಾಸನಸ್ಮಿಂ। ತೇಸಂ ರಾಜಾ ಮಾಗಧೋ ಅಜಾತಸತ್ತು ವೇದೇಹಿಪುತ್ತೋ ನ ಲಭತಿ ಓತಾರಂ ನ ಲಭತಿ ಆರಮ್ಮಣಂ। ಭವಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ , ಅನಾಗತಮದ್ಧಾನಂ ಲಿಚ್ಛವೀ ಸುಖುಮಾಲಾ [ಸುಕುಮಾಲಾ (ಸೀ॰), ಸುಖುಮಾ (ಕ॰)] ಮುದುತಲುನಹತ್ಥಪಾದಾ [ಮುದುತಲಾಹತ್ಥಪಾದಾ (ಸ್ಯಾ॰ ಕಂ॰)] ತೇ ಮುದುಕಾಸು ಸೇಯ್ಯಾಸು ತೂಲಬಿಮ್ಬೋಹನಾಸು [ತೂಲಬಿಮ್ಬೋಹನಾಸು (ಸ್ಯಾ॰ ಕಂ॰ ಪೀ॰), ತೂಲಬಿಮ್ಬೋಹನಾದೀಸು (ಸೀ॰), ತೂಲಬಿಬ್ಬೋಹನಾದೀಸು (ಕ॰)] ಯಾವಸೂರಿಯುಗ್ಗಮನಾ ಸೇಯ್ಯಂ ಕಪ್ಪಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ರಾಜಾ ಮಾಗಧೋ ಅಜಾತಸತ್ತು ವೇದೇಹಿಪುತ್ತೋ ಲಚ್ಛತಿ ಓತಾರಂ ಲಚ್ಛತಿ ಆರಮ್ಮಣಂ।
‘‘ಕಲಿಙ್ಗರೂಪಧಾನಾ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏತರಹಿ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ವಿಹರನ್ತಿ
ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ಆತಾಪಿನೋ ಪಧಾನಸ್ಮಿಂ। ತೇಸಂ ಮಾರೋ ಪಾಪಿಮಾ ನ ಲಭತಿ ಓತಾರಂ ನ ಲಭತಿ
ಆರಮ್ಮಣಂ। ಭವಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಅನಾಗತಮದ್ಧಾನಂ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಸುಖುಮಾ
ಮುದುತಲುನಹತ್ಥಪಾದಾ। ತೇ ಮುದುಕಾಸು ಸೇಯ್ಯಾಸು ತೂಲಬಿಮ್ಬೋಹನಾಸು ಯಾವಸೂರಿಯುಗ್ಗಮನಾ
ಸೇಯ್ಯಂ ಕಪ್ಪಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ಮಾರೋ ಪಾಪಿಮಾ ಲಚ್ಛತಿ ಓತಾರಂ ಲಚ್ಛತಿ ಆರಮ್ಮಣಂ।
ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಕಲಿಙ್ಗರೂಪಧಾನಾ ವಿಹರಿಸ್ಸಾಮ ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ಆತಾಪಿನೋ ಪಧಾನಸ್ಮಿ’ನ್ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಅಟ್ಠಮಂ।
೯. ನಾಗಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೩೧.
ಏವಂ ಮೇ ಸುತಂ – ಏಕಂ ಸಮಯಂ ಭಗವಾ ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ ಜೇತವನೇ ಅನಾಥಪಿಣ್ಡಿಕಸ್ಸ
ಆರಾಮೇ। ತೇನ ಖೋ ಪನ ಸಮಯೇನ ಅಞ್ಞತರೋ ನವೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಅತಿವೇಲಂ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮತಿ।
ತಮೇನಂ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಏವಮಾಹಂಸು – ‘‘ಮಾಯಸ್ಮಾ ಅತಿವೇಲಂ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮೀ’’ತಿ। ಸೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು
ಭಿಕ್ಖೂಹಿ ವುಚ್ಚಮಾನೋ ಏವಮಾಹ – ‘‘ಇಮೇ ಹಿ ನಾಮ ಥೇರಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಕುಲಾನಿ
ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮಿತಬ್ಬಂ ಮಞ್ಞಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ಕಿಮಙ್ಗಂ [ಕಿಮಙ್ಗ (ಸೀ॰)] ಪನಾಹ’’ನ್ತಿ?
ಅಥ ಖೋ ಸಮ್ಬಹುಲಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಯೇನ ಭಗವಾ ತೇನುಪಸಙ್ಕಮಿಂಸು; ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮಿತ್ವಾ ಭಗವನ್ತಂ ಅಭಿವಾದೇತ್ವಾ ಏಕಮನ್ತಂ ನಿಸೀದಿಂಸು। ಏಕಮನ್ತಂ
ನಿಸಿನ್ನಾ ಖೋ ತೇ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಭಗವನ್ತಂ ಏತದವೋಚುಂ – ‘‘ಇಧ, ಭನ್ತೇ, ಅಞ್ಞತರೋ ನವೋ
ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಅತಿವೇಲಂ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮತಿ। ತಮೇನಂ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಏವಮಾಹಂಸು – ‘ಮಾಯಸ್ಮಾ
ಅತಿವೇಲಂ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮೀ’ತಿ। ಸೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಭಿಕ್ಖೂಹಿ ವುಚ್ಚಮಾನೋ ಏವಮಾಹ – ‘ಇಮೇ ಹಿ
ನಾಮ ಥೇರಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಕುಲಾನಿ ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮಿತಬ್ಬಂ ಮಞ್ಞಿಸ್ಸನ್ತಿ, ಕಿಮಙ್ಗಂ ಪನಾಹ’’’ನ್ತಿ।
‘‘ಭೂತಪುಬ್ಬಂ , ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಅರಞ್ಞಾಯತನೇ ಮಹಾಸರಸೀ। ತಂ ನಾಗಾ ಉಪನಿಸ್ಸಾಯ ವಿಹರನ್ತಿ। ತೇ ತಂ ಸರಸಿಂ ಓಗಾಹೇತ್ವಾ ಸೋಣ್ಡಾಯ ಭಿಸಮುಳಾಲಂ ಅಬ್ಬುಹೇತ್ವಾ [ಅಬ್ಭೂಹೇತ್ವಾ (ಕ॰), ಅಬ್ಬಾಹಿತ್ವಾ (ಮಹಾವ॰ ೨೭೮)] ಸುವಿಕ್ಖಾಲಿತಂ ವಿಕ್ಖಾಲೇತ್ವಾ ಅಕದ್ದಮಂ ಸಙ್ಖಾದಿತ್ವಾ [ಸಙ್ಖರಿತ್ವಾ (ಪೀ॰ ಕ॰)] ಅಜ್ಝೋಹರನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ತಂ ವಣ್ಣಾಯ ಚೇವ ಹೋತಿ ಬಲಾಯ ಚ, ನ ಚ ತತೋನಿದಾನಂ ಮರಣಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಚ್ಛನ್ತಿ ಮರಣಮತ್ತಂ ವಾ ದುಕ್ಖಂ। ತೇಸಂಯೇವ
ಖೋ ಪನ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಮಹಾನಾಗಾನಂ ಅನುಸಿಕ್ಖಮಾನಾ ತರುಣಾ ಭಿಙ್ಕಚ್ಛಾಪಾ ತಂ ಸರಸಿಂ
ಓಗಾಹೇತ್ವಾ ಸೋಣ್ಡಾಯ ಭಿಸಮುಳಾಲಂ ಅಬ್ಬುಹೇತ್ವಾ ನ ಸುವಿಕ್ಖಾಲಿತಂ ವಿಕ್ಖಾಲೇತ್ವಾ
ಸಕದ್ದಮಂ ಅಸಙ್ಖಾದಿತ್ವಾ ಅಜ್ಝೋಹರನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ತಂ ನೇವ ವಣ್ಣಾಯ ಹೋತಿ ನ ಬಲಾಯ।
ತತೋನಿದಾನಂ ಮರಣಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಚ್ಛನ್ತಿ ಮರಣಮತ್ತಂ ವಾ ದುಕ್ಖಂ।
‘‘ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಇಧ ಥೇರಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಪುಬ್ಬಣ್ಹಸಮಯಂ
ನಿವಾಸೇತ್ವಾ ಪತ್ತಚೀವರಮಾದಾಯ ಗಾಮಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಮಂ ವಾ ಪಿಣ್ಡಾಯ ಪವಿಸನ್ತಿ। ತೇ ತತ್ಥ
ಧಮ್ಮಂ ಭಾಸನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ಗಿಹೀ ಪಸನ್ನಾಕಾರಂ ಕರೋನ್ತಿ। ತೇ ತಂ ಲಾಭಂ ಅಗಧಿತಾ ಅಮುಚ್ಛಿತಾ
ಅನಜ್ಝೋಪನ್ನಾ [ಅನಜ್ಝಾಪನ್ನಾ (ಸಬ್ಬತ್ಥ) ಮ॰ ನಿ॰ ೧ ಪಾಸರಾಸಿಸುತ್ತವಣ್ಣನಾ ಓಲೋಕೇತಬ್ಬಾ]
ಆದೀನವದಸ್ಸಾವಿನೋ ನಿಸ್ಸರಣಪಞ್ಞಾ ಪರಿಭುಞ್ಜನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ತಂ ವಣ್ಣಾಯ ಚೇವ ಹೋತಿ ಬಲಾಯ
ಚ, ನ ಚ ತತೋನಿದಾನಂ ಮರಣಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಚ್ಛನ್ತಿ ಮರಣಮತ್ತಂ ವಾ ದುಕ್ಖಂ। ತೇಸಂಯೇವ ಖೋ ಪನ,
ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಥೇರಾನಂ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂನಂ ಅನುಸಿಕ್ಖಮಾನಾ ನವಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಪುಬ್ಬಣ್ಹಸಮಯಂ ನಿವಾಸೇತ್ವಾ
ಪತ್ತಚೀವರಮಾದಾಯ ಗಾಮಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಮಂ ವಾ ಪಿಣ್ಡಾಯ ಪವಿಸನ್ತಿ। ತೇ ತತ್ಥ ಧಮ್ಮಂ ಭಾಸನ್ತಿ।
ತೇಸಂ ಗಿಹೀ ಪಸನ್ನಾಕಾರಂ ಕರೋನ್ತಿ। ತೇ ತಂ ಲಾಭಂ ಗಧಿತಾ
ಮುಚ್ಛಿತಾ ಅಜ್ಝೋಪನ್ನಾ ಅನಾದೀನವದಸ್ಸಾವಿನೋ ಅನಿಸ್ಸರಣಪಞ್ಞಾ ಪರಿಭುಞ್ಜನ್ತಿ। ತೇಸಂ ತಂ
ನೇವ ವಣ್ಣಾಯ ಹೋತಿ ನ ಬಲಾಯ, ತೇ ತತೋನಿದಾನಂ ಮರಣಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಚ್ಛನ್ತಿ ಮರಣಮತ್ತಂ ವಾ
ದುಕ್ಖಂ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಅಗಧಿತಾ ಅಮುಚ್ಛಿತಾ
ಅನಜ್ಝೋಪನ್ನಾ ಆದೀನವದಸ್ಸಾವಿನೋ ನಿಸ್ಸರಣಪಞ್ಞಾ ತಂ ಲಾಭಂ ಪರಿಭುಞ್ಜಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ।
ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ । ನವಮಂ।
೧೦. ಬಿಳಾರಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೩೨.
ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ। ತೇನ ಖೋ ಪನ ಸಮಯೇನ ಅಞ್ಞತರೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಅತಿವೇಲಂ ಕುಲೇಸು
ಚಾರಿತ್ತಂ ಆಪಜ್ಜತಿ। ತಮೇನಂ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಏವಮಾಹಂಸು – ‘‘ಮಾಯಸ್ಮಾ ಅತಿವೇಲಂ ಕುಲೇಸು
ಚಾರಿತ್ತಂ ಆಪಜ್ಜೀ’’ತಿ। ಸೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಭಿಕ್ಖೂಹಿ ವುಚ್ಚಮಾನೋ ನ ವಿರಮತಿ। ಅಥ ಖೋ
ಸಮ್ಬಹುಲಾ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಯೇನ ಭಗವಾ ತೇನುಪಸಙ್ಕಮಿಂಸು ;
ಉಪಸಙ್ಕಮಿತ್ವಾ ಭಗವನ್ತಂ ಅಭಿವಾದೇತ್ವಾ ಏಕಮನ್ತಂ ನಿಸೀದಿಂಸು। ಏಕಮನ್ತಂ ನಿಸಿನ್ನಾ ಖೋ
ತೇ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಭಗವನ್ತಂ ಏತದವೋಚುಂ – ‘‘ಇಧ, ಭನ್ತೇ, ಅಞ್ಞತರೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಅತಿವೇಲಂ
ಕುಲೇಸು ಚಾರಿತ್ತಂ ಆಪಜ್ಜತಿ। ತಮೇನಂ ಭಿಕ್ಖೂ ಏವಮಾಹಂಸು – ‘ಮಾಯಸ್ಮಾ ಅತಿವೇಲಂ
ಕುಲೇಸು ಚಾರಿತ್ತಂ ಆಪಜ್ಜೀ’ತಿ। ಸೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಭಿಕ್ಖೂಹಿ ವುಚ್ಚಮಾನೋ ನ ವಿರಮತೀ’’ತಿ।
‘‘ಭೂತಪುಬ್ಬಂ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಬಿಳಾರೋ ಸನ್ಧಿಸಮಲಸಙ್ಕಟೀರೇ ಠಿತೋ
ಅಹೋಸಿ ಮುದುಮೂಸಿಂ ಮಗ್ಗಯಮಾನೋ – ‘ಯದಾಯಂ ಮುದುಮೂಸಿ ಗೋಚರಾಯ ಪಕ್ಕಮಿಸ್ಸತಿ, ತತ್ಥೇವ
ನಂ ಗಹೇತ್ವಾ ಖಾದಿಸ್ಸಾಮೀ’ತಿ। ಅಥ ಖೋ ಸೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಮುದುಮೂಸಿ ಗೋಚರಾಯ ಪಕ್ಕಾಮಿ।
ತಮೇನಂ ಬಿಳಾರೋ ಗಹೇತ್ವಾ ಸಹಸಾ ಸಙ್ಖಾದಿತ್ವಾ [ಸಙ್ಖರಿತ್ವಾ (ಪೀ॰ ಕ॰), ಮಂಸಂ ಖಾದಿತ್ವಾ (ಸ್ಯಾ॰ ಕಂ॰), ಅಸಂಖಾದಿತ್ವಾ (ಕತ್ಥಚಿ)] ಅಜ್ಝೋಹರಿ। ತಸ್ಸ ಸೋ ಮುದುಮೂಸಿ ಅನ್ತಮ್ಪಿ ಖಾದಿ, ಅನ್ತಗುಣಮ್ಪಿ ಖಾದಿ। ಸೋ ತತೋನಿದಾನಂ ಮರಣಮ್ಪಿ ನಿಗಚ್ಛಿ ಮರಣಮತ್ತಮ್ಪಿ ದುಕ್ಖಂ।
‘‘ಏವಮೇವ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಇಧೇಕಚ್ಚೋ ಭಿಕ್ಖು ಪುಬ್ಬಣ್ಹಸಮಯಂ
ನಿವಾಸೇತ್ವಾ ಪತ್ತಚೀವರಮಾದಾಯ ಗಾಮಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಮಂ ವಾ ಪಿಣ್ಡಾಯ ಪವಿಸತಿ ಅರಕ್ಖಿತೇನೇವ
ಕಾಯೇನ ಅರಕ್ಖಿತಾಯ ವಾಚಾಯ ಅರಕ್ಖಿತೇನ ಚಿತ್ತೇನ, ಅನುಪಟ್ಠಿತಾಯ
ಸತಿಯಾ, ಅಸಂವುತೇಹಿ ಇನ್ದ್ರಿಯೇಹಿ। ಸೋ ತತ್ಥ ಪಸ್ಸತಿ ಮಾತುಗಾಮಂ ದುನ್ನಿವತ್ಥಂ ವಾ
ದುಪ್ಪಾರುತಂ ವಾ। ತಸ್ಸ ಮಾತುಗಾಮಂ ದಿಸ್ವಾ ದುನ್ನಿವತ್ಥಂ ವಾ ದುಪ್ಪಾರುತಂ ವಾ ರಾಗೋ
ಚಿತ್ತಂ ಅನುದ್ಧಂಸೇತಿ। ಸೋ ರಾಗಾನುದ್ಧಂಸೇನ ಚಿತ್ತೇನ ಮರಣಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಚ್ಛತಿ ಮರಣಮತ್ತಂ
ವಾ ದುಕ್ಖಂ। ಮರಣಞ್ಹೇತಂ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಅರಿಯಸ್ಸ ವಿನಯೇ ಯೋ ಸಿಕ್ಖಂ ಪಚ್ಚಕ್ಖಾಯ
ಹೀನಾಯಾವತ್ತತಿ। ಮರಣಮತ್ತಞ್ಹೇತಂ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ದುಕ್ಖಂ ಯದಿದಂ ಅಞ್ಞತರಂ ಸಂಕಿಲಿಟ್ಠಂ
ಆಪತ್ತಿಂ ಆಪಜ್ಜತಿ। ಯಥಾರೂಪಾಯ ಆಪತ್ತಿಯಾ ವುಟ್ಠಾನಂ ಪಞ್ಞಾಯತಿ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ,
ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ರಕ್ಖಿತೇನೇವ ಕಾಯೇನ ರಕ್ಖಿತಾಯ ವಾಚಾಯ ರಕ್ಖಿತೇನ ಚಿತ್ತೇನ,
ಉಪಟ್ಠಿತಾಯ ಸತಿಯಾ, ಸಂವುತೇಹಿ ಇನ್ದ್ರಿಯೇಹಿ ಗಾಮಂ ವಾ ನಿಗಮಂ ವಾ ಪಿಣ್ಡಾಯ
ಪವಿಸಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ದಸಮಂ।
೧೧. ಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೩೩.
ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಅಸ್ಸುತ್ಥ ನೋ ತುಮ್ಹೇ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ರತ್ತಿಯಾ ಪಚ್ಚೂಸಸಮಯಂ
ಜರಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲಸ್ಸ ವಸ್ಸಮಾನಸ್ಸಾ’’ತಿ? ‘‘ಏವಂ, ಭನ್ತೇ’’। ‘‘ಏಸೋ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ,
ಜರಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲೋ ಉಕ್ಕಣ್ಡಕೇನ ನಾಮ ರೋಗಜಾತೇನ ಫುಟ್ಠೋ। ಸೋ ಯೇನ ಯೇನ ಇಚ್ಛತಿ ತೇನ ತೇನ ಗಚ್ಛತಿ; ಯತ್ಥ ಯತ್ಥ ಇಚ್ಛತಿ ತತ್ಥ ತತ್ಥ ತಿಟ್ಠತಿ; ಯತ್ಥ ಯತ್ಥ ಇಚ್ಛತಿ ತತ್ಥ ತತ್ಥ ನಿಸೀದತಿ; ಯತ್ಥ ಯತ್ಥ ಇಚ್ಛತಿ
ತತ್ಥ ತತ್ಥ ನಿಪಜ್ಜತಿ; ಸೀತಕೋಪಿ ನಂ ವಾತೋ ಉಪವಾಯತಿ। ಸಾಧು ಖ್ವಸ್ಸ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಯಂ
ಇಧೇಕಚ್ಚೋ ಸಕ್ಯಪುತ್ತಿಯಪಟಿಞ್ಞೋ ಏವರೂಪಮ್ಪಿ ಅತ್ತಭಾವಪಟಿಲಾಭಂ ಪಟಿಸಂವೇದಿಯೇಥ।
ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ , ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಅಪ್ಪಮತ್ತಾ ವಿಹರಿಸ್ಸಾಮಾ’ತಿ। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ಏಕಾದಸಮಂ।
೧೨. ದುತಿಯಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲಸುತ್ತಂ
೨೩೪.
ಸಾವತ್ಥಿಯಂ ವಿಹರತಿ…ಪೇ॰… ‘‘ಅಸ್ಸುತ್ಥ ನೋ ತುಮ್ಹೇ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ರತ್ತಿಯಾ ಪಚ್ಚೂಸಸಮಯಂ
ಜರಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲಸ್ಸ ವಸ್ಸಮಾನಸ್ಸಾ’’ತಿ? ‘‘ಏವಂ, ಭನ್ತೇ’’। ‘‘ಸಿಯಾ ಖೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ,
ತಸ್ಮಿಂ ಜರಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲೇ ಯಾ ಕಾಚಿ ಕತಞ್ಞುತಾ ಕತವೇದಿತಾ, ನ ತ್ವೇವ ಇಧೇಕಚ್ಚೇ
ಸಕ್ಯಪುತ್ತಿಯಪಟಿಞ್ಞೇ ಸಿಯಾ ಯಾ ಕಾಚಿ ಕತಞ್ಞುತಾ ಕತವೇದಿತಾ। ತಸ್ಮಾತಿಹ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ,
ಏವಂ ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬಂ – ‘ಕತಞ್ಞುನೋ ಭವಿಸ್ಸಾಮ ಕತವೇದಿನೋ; ನ ಚ ನೋ [ನ ಚ ನೋತಿ ಇದಂ ಸೀ॰ ಪೀ॰ ಪೋತ್ಥಕೇಸು ನತ್ಥಿ] ಅಮ್ಹೇಸು ಅಪ್ಪಕಮ್ಪಿ ಕತಂ ನಸ್ಸಿಸ್ಸತೀ’ತಿ [ಮಾ ನಸ್ಸಿಸ್ಸತೀತಿ (ಸೀ॰ ಪೀ॰), ವಿನಸ್ಸಿಸ್ಸತೀತಿ (ಸ್ಯಾ॰ ಕಂ॰)]। ಏವಞ್ಹಿ ವೋ, ಭಿಕ್ಖವೇ, ಸಿಕ್ಖಿತಬ್ಬ’’ನ್ತಿ। ದ್ವಾದಸಮಂ।
ಓಪಮ್ಮಸಂಯುತ್ತಂ ಸಮತ್ತಂ।
ತಸ್ಸುದ್ದಾನಂ –
ಕೂಟಂ ನಖಸಿಖಂ ಕುಲಂ, ಓಕ್ಖಾ ಸತ್ತಿ ಧನುಗ್ಗಹೋ।
ಆಣಿ ಕಲಿಙ್ಗರೋ ನಾಗೋ, ಬಿಳಾರೋ ದ್ವೇ ಸಿಙ್ಗಾಲಕಾತಿ॥
Nostradamus! — Rightly Predicted the Outcome of the May 2014 General Elections in Indool’s Paradise. Hacke hay in May!
The trend continued and still continues in all the elections just in favour of Murderer of democratic institutions (Modi)
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/2019-general-elections-to-have-paper-trail-electronic-voting-machines-nasim-zaidi-cec/articleshow/51106327.cms
2019 general elections to have paper-trail electronic voting machines: Nasim Zaidi, CEC
NEW
DELHI: Polling for 2019 general elections will be conducted through
paper trail-based electronic voting machines to “enhance transparency”.
We
have reached a stage where people are demanding hundred per cent
deployment of paper audit trail machines to enhance transparency.
We have preserved secrecy (in this system) too. By 2019, the whole country will be covered by (such) machines,” Mr Zaidi said
Once
the votes are cast, the VVPAT-linked EVM immediately takes a printout,
which is preserved for later use to tally in case of a dispute in the
final result. Mr Zaidi, speaking on the theme of “Leveraging Technology
for Transparent and Credible Elections”, stressed that secrecy of voting
will be zealously preserved even in this system.
Mayawati said parties in Uttar Pradesh conspired to defeat BSP :
Ms
Mayawati’s BSP got 80% seats UP panchayat Elections with Paper Ballots
while she could not get even a single seat in Lok Sabha Elections
because the fraud EVMs were tampered.
As CM of UP her governance was the best and became eligible to become PM.
The
intolerant BJP remotely controlled by 1% chitpawn brahmin RSS conspired
to bury her Techno-Politico-Socio Transformation and Economic
Emancipation Movement without knowing that they are seeds that sprout as
Bodhi Trees.
Ex CJI SADHASIVAM, shirked its duty &
committed a grave error of judgment by allowing in phased manner Fraud
Tamperable EVMs on the request of ex CEC SAMPATH because of the 1600
crore cost to replace them and dealt a fatal blow to the Country’s
democracy.
Ex CJI did not order for ballot paper system would
be brought in. No such precautionary measure was decreed by the apex
court. Ex CJI did not order that till the time this newer set of about
1300000 voting machines is manufactured in full & deployed totally.
All the people in 80 democracies in the world who simply done away with
fradulent EVMs should not recognise Murderers of democratic institutions
(Modi).
This
is the Fundamental Right of a
citizen of
this country, as per the laws laid down by the Constitution.
However, only 20,000 such voting
machines have
been provided for the entire country in 2014
election! This country has
29 states now — with Telagana being the
latest. In
most of them,
depending upon their size etc., either about 400 VVPAT
machines are
being deployed, or some such similar ridiculous
number — more or
less — has been made available in the length and
breadth of the country.
VVPATs will be used in just 14,066
(13.5%) out of 1,90,162 polling stations across the 5 poll-bound states/UT and the List of Assembly
Constituencies in each State. It’s an asinine, bland, cruel, demeaning joke
the 1.25 billion joker s
have been “blessed” with by the powers that
be.
The present CJI must dismiss the Central and State
Governments selected by these fraud EVMs and order for fresh elections.
Till such time he must order for NOTE (NO To Elections)
Otherwise the
1% intolerant, violent, militant, shooting, lunatic, mentally retarded
psychopath haters, angry, jealousy, delusion mad chitpawan brahmin Rowdy
Swayam Sevaks (RSS) and all its avathars Bahuth Jiyadha Paapis
Murderers of democratic institutions (Modi), Venomous Hintutva
Psychopaths (VHP), All Brahmins Venomous Psychopaths (ABVP) Bhajan Dal
etc in the name of stealth hindutva cult will have their hey days full
of happiness like any mad person.
Over millions of cuckoos cackle, cry and crap.
It
is a nation where Crooked cunning 1% chitpawan brahmins
rules in closed quarters, 99% Sarvajan Samaj i.e., All Societies in the
open. Just like the open
toilets under the benign gaze of Mother
Nature — there are more cell
phones than toilets, a survey
reports. Oh! the average voter
retorts — and, then, goes on to do
“business” as usual, sitting on the
haunches.
They are an
indifferent,
intelligently inclined idiocy — oops! democracy, They make
gods out o f
mud, then, prostrating before them, they remain, as before, a
dud. And,
some times, in the name of their fancied little god and his
glory, his
motherland’s favorite sons also kill each other, with the deep
ingrained
vigor of all their bestial ancestry, and like a whiff of wind
are
gone — dead.
After all,
who in
one’s right mind would yet allow the use of absolutely
antiquated,
completely out-dated, easily hack-able and highly
tamper-able “high
school technology” based, obsolete EVMs (electronic
voting machines) in
national elections, even now — in 2016?
More
than 80 democracies
in the world have simply done away with them,
dumping them in the trash,
or simply declared the usage of this
simplistic voting system
susceptible to fraud, and hence declaring the
same as illegal — as the
Supreme Courts of Germany and Holland indeed
have done. Even Japan, from
where EVMs originated, has long abandoned
its rogue babies, and is
using paper ballot system since then. All the
advanced democracies in
the West, except the most dull-headed ones, have
reverted to a voter
verifiable system or the ballot paper. In Canada,
even at the ,most
basic school level, ballot paper voting is in use.
Now is all
that you have. Join hands with Ms Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party
Elephant to move ahead with the Caravan of Techno-Politico-Socio-
Transformation ans Economic Emancipation Movement to save democracy,
liberty, equality and fraternity.
Press Information Bureau
Government of India
Election Commission
04-March-2016 15:55 IST
Schedule for the General Elections to the Legislative Assemblies of Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry.
The terms of the Legislative Assemblies of Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry are normally due to expire as follows:
Tamil Nadu 22.05.2016
West Bengal 29.05.2016
Kerala 31.05.2016
Puducherry 02.06.2016
Assam 05.06.2016
As per the established practice, the Election Commission holds the General Elections to the Legislative Assemblies of the States whose terms expire around the same time, together.
By virtue of its powers, duties and functions under Article 324 read with Article 172(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 15 of Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Commission is required to hold elections to constitute the new Legislative Assemblies in the States of Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry before expiry of their present terms………..
……
The total number of Assembly Constituencies in the States of
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry and seats reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, as determined by the Delimitation Commission
under the Delimitation Act, 2002, are as under: -
State |
Total |
Reserved |
Reserved |
Kerala |
140 |
14 |
02 |
Tamil Nadu |
234 |
44 |
02 |
West Bengal |
294 |
68 |
16 |
Puducherry |
30 |
05 |
– |
Assam* |
126 |
08 |
16 |
(*In Assam, territorial
determination of Assembly Constituencies is as per Delimitation of
Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1976)
(6)
VVPAT (
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail)
VVPAT will be used in all the five poll
going states as per the details in the table below:
States |
No. of ACs with VVPAT deployment |
Assam |
10 |
Kerala |
12 |
Tamil Nadu |
17 |
West Bengal |
22 |
Puducherry |
3 |
(3)
Polling
Stations and Special Facilitation
The
number of Polling Stations in the poll going States as on the date of final
publication of electoral rolls are as follows:
States |
No. of Polling Stations |
No. of Polling Stations |
% Increase |
Assam |
23,813 |
24,888 |
4.5 |
Kerala |
20,758 |
21,498 |
3.5 |
Tamil Nadu |
54,016 |
65,616 |
21.5 |
West Bengal |
51,919 |
77,247 |
48.7 |
Puducherry |
815 |
913 |
12 |
VVPATs will be used in just 14,066 out of 1,90,162
(13.5%) polling stations across the 5 poll-bound states/UT and the List of Assembly
Constituencies in each State where VVPAT will be used in the forthcoming
elections is placed at “Annexure VI”.
86.5 % voters in all the above states are deprived of paper audit trail machines used to enhance transparency. No preservation of secrecy.
Hence no “Leveraging Technology for Transparent and Credible Elections”, which
stressed that secrecy of voting will be zealously preserved even in this
system.
Over a billion cuckoos cackle, cry and crap in India.
It
is a nation where intelligence rules in closed quarters, idiocy in the
open. Just like the open toilets under the benign gaze of Mother
Nature — there are more cell phones than toilets in India, a survey
reports. Oh! the average Indian retorts — and, then, goes on to do
“business” as usual, sitting on the haunches, as sorry-assed as
before — or sorts.
We are an indifferent,
intelligently inclined idiocy — oops! democracy, We make gods out of
mud, then, prostrating before them, we remain, as before, a dud. And,
some times, in the name of our fancied little god and his glory, my
motherland’s favorite sons also kill each other, with the deep ingrained
vigor of all our bestial ancestry, and like a whiff of wind are
gone — dead.
Lest it becomes confusing, let’s say it as it is — we Indians, like every other human being, are truly one really, really queer kin of apes. In some fields, ahead of others and beyond compare; in other areas, we are as silly and supercilious as a bull-hounded mare. In a nutshell, Indians, at least in the loftier mystical and evolved spiritual circles “get” some things well — like higher metaphysics — while failing miserably, simplistically, in simple, elementary physics.
After all, who in one’s right mind would yet allow the use of absolutely antiquated, completely out-dated, easily hack-able and highly tamper-able “high school technology” based, obsolete EVMs (electronic voting machines) in national elections, even now — in 2014?
More than 80 democracies in the world have simply done away with them, dumping them in the trash, or simply declared the usage of this simplistic voting system susceptible to fraud, and hence declaring the same as illegal — as the Supreme Courts of Germany and Holland indeed have done. Even Japan, from where EVMs originated, has long abandoned its rogue babies, and is using paper ballot system since then. All the advanced democracies in the West, except the most dull-headed ones, have reverted to a voter verifiable system or the ballot paper. In Canada, even at the ,most basic school level, ballot paper voting is in use.
Last year, the Supreme Court of India, having been convinced of an undeniable, edible possibility of EVMs getting tampered with and that easily hacked — even from afar — had ordered the imbecilic Election Commission and the indolent Government of India to provide about 1600 crore (1600, 0000000) rupees — convert this into your respective currency! — for manufacturing these VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail) voting machines; which show a verifiable paper receipt to the voter.
This is the Fundamental Right of a citizen of India, as per the laws laid down by the Constitution. However, recent newspaper reports tell us that only 20, 000 such voting machines have been provided for the entire country in this, 2014 election! India has 29 states now — with Telagana being the latest. In most of them, depending upon their size etc., either about 400 VVPAT machines are being deployed, or some such similar ridiculous number — more or less — has been made available in the length and breadth of the country. It’s an asinine, bland, cruel, demeaning joke we 1.25 billion joker s have been “blessed” with by the powers that be.
All “patriotic” hackers of our motherland are going to make hay in May!
As to how EVMs can be hacked into, tampered with, and results favorably manipulated via software interference and other means — from near and from far, far away — this can easily be found by anybody by just going to Google etc. and filling “EVM HACKING, TAMPERING” or something to this effect in the Search. And lo, behold! a plethora of information will just overwhelm your overly chilled-out, lesser employed, un-billed brains.
However, the only solace for us naive fools is that quite a few unscrupulous politicians and every other most “honorable” political party worthy of its “salt”, would surely be playing this comic-tragic game of hacking into and hijacking the votes of a billion people! Thus, one who outsmarts the other such fine folks, armed with their hacking forks in this merry-go-around, will win.
The rest — this or that “tsunami” or wave in favor of one or the other, poll forecasts and the “newbie”, the over enthused, seeming game changers in the making — well, they may well fall flat on their dumb faces, if not on their smart asses.
That the Supreme Court of India
too, while passing the order of putting new VVAT voting machines in use
in a “phased manner”, has unwittingly shirked its duty. In fact, it
committed a grave error of judgment. Perhaps dealt a fatal blow to
Indian democracy. It should have ordered, as a caution, that till the
time this newer set of about 1300ooo voting machines is manufactured in
full and so deployed throughout India, ballot paper system would be
brought in. No such precautionary measure was decreed by the apex court.
Well,
crib all you want. But don’t cry, my dear countrymen. After all, the
same model of EVMs is yet very much in use in South Africa, Bangla Desh,
Bhutan, Nepal, Nigeria, Venezuela etc. These poor folks of the said
“non-techy” countries — millions of them — too cannot figure out as to
what the hell had, yet is happening, in their dear short-circuited
“developed” democracies. Nor will you.
Don’t worry, be happy! You are not alone “out there”.
Oh, by the way, the somewhat notorious lawyer who had brought in this case — of the present lot of EVMs being tamper-able and hack-able — and, who, had successfully fought it so, forcing the Supreme Court to order the installation of a fail-safe voting mechanism (of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit machines replacing the susceptible earlier Electronic Voting Machines) to ensure a free and fair electoral process in India — well, this oh-so-very honorable fellow too has fallen silent, like a demure maiden. This most vociferous gentleman had openly declared on social websites, especially Twitter, that in case VVPAT machines do not get installed in time for 2014 elections, then, there would be a “constitutional crisis” — putting it out there like an Indian “pehalwan”, a la WWW wrestler, that he would challenge the same in the apex court. He had most emphatically underlined he would ensure that either the new fail-safe voting machines or the old time-tested paper ballot system will be put in use during this general election in India. However, recently, when asked specifically on Twitter about this matter — as to what this lovely man is doing or is going to do about this impending doomsday electoral scenario — there was a deafening silence from his side. May be owing to the fact that since the Supreme Court judgement late last year, this self-righteous rightist has joined the ultra-rightist political bandwagon.
The latter has been projected by pollsters to overwhelmingly sweep these elections — as a direct result of the doings of the monstrous public relations firm hired from the land of the let-it-be, oops! free. This US firm is the same that was used fruitfully by President Bush and Hillary Clinton for their respective political campaigns. It has — let there be no doubt about it — successfully projected its client as the potential winner and the next numero uno in Indian politics.
What the majority of the Indians have missed in fine print is that the outgoing Chief Minister of the state of Rajasthan, in the last year elections, had officially filed a complaint with the election commission that the EVMs used in his state were pre-programmed and tampered with — and that the same had come from the state of which this presently hyped-up future Prime Minister of India, is the current Chief Minister. Now, the lawyer who had gone to the dogs to awaken India and the rest of the world about the mischief and malfeasance possible with the old model of EVMs — and had in fact written a book on this subject — is in a wink-wink deep-throat “smadhi”. A silence that speaks truths we dumb billion idiots on this part of slippery earth cannot fathom. Perhaps it’s a precursor of the things to come.
Let us hope the jolly good hackers of this-that party screw-up each other’s devilish, outright evil plans. In a dog eat dog political crap pit we hapless billion creatures have to walk through every election, maybe this time the ape sitting by the side — the wide-eyed hopeful citizen of India — at least gets a tiny part of the apple pie this messy hacking cat fight will leave behind, on the side lanes. Perhaps these little crumbs will be enough for us to stay afloat. though not gloat.
In a nutshell, simply put, whosoever “out-hacks” the other, will win.
Then again, we are an ancient civilization of more than 33, 0000000 gods and goddesses — some civilized, others not so civil. Let’s hope one of these fancied deities has a soft corner for us dumbos. Otherwise, we are going to get screwed. A billion times over.
Therefore,
I made doubly sure I did not vote. I sat on my ass on voting day — not
that I don’t do so everyday. This voting day, I absolutely did. Not only
figuratively and metaphorically, but literally. I may have many buts in
life, but at least today I have a little sore, yet not so sorry a butt.
We are a fool’s paradise.
Long live the banana republic of India!
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/secrecy
The secrecy of the vote is seen as one of the fundamental principles required in the conduct of democratic elections. Failure to secure the secrecy of the vote opens the possibility for voters to prove how they have voted, facilitating voter coercion and vote buying. Both of these practices undermine the free expression of the will of the voter and the possibility for election results to reflect the will of the voters.
If implemented properly, the paper-based system of voting effectively protects the secrecy of the vote. In the case of electronic counting, the same protections that currently exist for the hand counting of paper ballots should be applied. Electronic voting, however, introduces a number of additional ways secrecy can be violated. Voting machines record the choices cast on them by voters, and these votes may be recorded in the order in which they are cast with a time stamp. This means if someone knows the order in which voters cast their ballots on a voting machine or the time at which a voter cast their ballot and has access to the record of voting on the machine, they could determine the choices made by each voter.
Appropriate procedures restricting access to logged transactions on the voting machine would reduce this threat to the secrecy of the vote. In countries that have experienced authoritarian trends, these issues are likely to generate suspicions among citizens concerning breaches of ballot secrecy, and extra steps may be required to establish public confidence.
Other developments with electronic voting machines are increasing the threat to the secrecy of the vote. While the VVPAT is a vital tool in building confidence in the use of electronic voting machines and in providing an audit mechanism, it can also be implemented in such a way as to undermine the secrecy of the vote. Some VVPAT systems have a roll of paper on which the voter’s choices are printed. As the choices are printed sequentially, this can be used with the order in which voters cast their ballots on the voting machine to determine the content of each person’s vote. Access to the paper audit trail cannot be restricted in the same way as with electronic records on voting machines, since the audit trail is meant to be taken out and checked against the electronic record of the voting machine.
However, not all VVPAT systems function in this way. Some voting machine paper audit trails operate a cut-and-drop system where the printed vote is cut from the roll of paper and drops into an internal ballot box within the voting machine. This ensures that audit records are randomized in the same way as placing a paper ballot into a physical ballot box.
A potential, final challenge to the secrecy of the vote from electronic voting machines comes from the most recent developments with voting machines, whereby the machines also conduct voter identification. Most voting machines still rely on a physical process for voter identification and authentication, with polling staff checking voter names against a voter list separate from the voting machine. This means voter identification data and vote data are held in completely separate processes (the former through a manual process and the latter through an electronic process), which are never linked in any way, making it impossible to link voting data to the voter.
More recent voting machines are also fulfilling the function of voter identification and authentication. This identification can be by simply entering an ID number or passcode for the voter, or it can be through the voting machine scanning a biometric attribute of the voter and identifying them from a list of approved voters. Clearly, when the voting machine identifies the voter, it possesses both pieces of information required to break the secrecy of the vote and could retain the link between the two.
Technical solutions are readily available to ensure it is not possible to link voter data with the value of their vote. However, EMBs will need to adequately address concerns by stakeholders that this link is still maintained and that the secrecy of the vote is not violated.
While challenges related to the secrecy of the vote with electronic voting machines can be resolved, it is important that electoral stakeholders are cognizant of them and take all necessary steps to ensure the secrecy of the vote when considering the use of voting machines. At the same time, observers should evaluate whether any aspect of the process might challenge this fundamental principle.
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/legal-and-procedural-framework
Legal and Procedural Framework
The use of electronic voting and counting technologies should be defined in the legal framework. This process can take a considerable amount of time, particularly since key legal provisions are incorporated at the legislative level (i.e., in constitutions and electoral laws) as well as the regulatory level. Amendments should, at a minimum, address the following: physical and procedural aspects of voting or counting processes; testing and certification; audit mechanisms and conduct; status of audit records versus electronic records; transparency mechanisms; data security and retention; voter identification; and access to source code. The process of developing amendments should involve input from electoral stakeholders, including political parties and civil society.
In order to properly implement electronic voting or counting technologies, the use of these technologies needs to not only be in compliance with the constitutional and legal provisions relating to elections and the general conduct of public affairs, but must also be defined in the legal framework for elections. The legal framework includes the constitution, if there is one, the laws relating to elections, and the secondary legislation (such as regulations, rules and procedures often passed by electoral management bodies).
While constitutions rarely say anything specific about electronic voting or counting technologies, they may include general provisions that are relevant to the use of these technologies. Germany provides a good example of this (see Figure 11 below for more details), with the German Constitutional Court deciding in 2009 that the electronic voting machines used in Germany did not comply with general transparency requirements for the electoral process established in the constitution.
In addition to ensuring that suggested technology solutions are in compliance with the constitutional framework of a country, consideration should also be given to whether suggested solutions meet international standards, including emerging standards for the use of electronic voting and counting technologies. Election officials and lawmakers may wish to study other countries’ experiences when considering whether to adopt such technologies.
Primary and secondary legislation will inevitably need to be amended in order to accommodate the use of electronic voting and counting technologies. It is important that key legal provisions relating to the use of electronic voting or counting system are included at a legislative level so that the use of these technologies is not entirely legislated at the regulatory level. The necessary amendments to the electoral legal framework will vary depending on the technology being implemented but should cover, at a minimum, the issues listed below:
• Physical Aspects of the Voting or Counting Process – The use of electronic voting or counting machines will entail changes to the procedure for the setup and conduct of voting and/or counting. For example, when direct-recording electronic voting machines are used, there is no ballot box to prepare and seal. The common practice of displaying the empty physical ballot box before polling starts does have a comparable procedure for electronic voting or counting machines; a display demonstrating that no ballots have been stored is conducted for observers at the beginning of the process. Some of the procedures relating to the setup and conduct of voting and/or counting may be in the election law(s) or may be in secondary legislation, and both will need to be reviewed and amended to accommodate the setup and use of electronic voting or counting technologies.
• Procedural Aspects of the Voting and Counting Process – The timeline for the preparation of the voting or counting systems should be clearly outlined, as should details of how the system is to be operated, who is allowed access to it during elections, how equipment should be stored between elections and how access to equipment in storage should be regulated and reported.
• Testing and Certification of Technologies – Electronic voting and counting technologies clearly need to be tested before they are used. While any responsible election management body would ensure that sufficient testing of such technologies takes place before they are used for elections, it may be useful to guarantee that testing takes place and specify the kinds of testing to be conducted by including these requirements in the law or in secondary legislation. Likewise, if there is a process of formal certification of electronic voting and counting technologies, this should be included in the law as well. The law should also clearly identify the institutions with the authority to provide this certification, the timeframe for certification and the standards and requirements against which certification will take place.
• Audit Mechanisms – The need for audit mechanisms for electronic voting and counting technologies is an emerging international standard. In order to ensure that this standard is met, the requirement for an audit trail should be included in the law. The nature of the audit mechanisms may also be specified if relevant — for example, any requirement for a voter-verifiable audit trail often used with electronic voting machines.
• Conduct of Audits – Audits should be conducted in order to generate trust in the use of electronic voting or counting machines and to ensure that these technologies function correctly. Many different kinds of audits can be conducted, including audits of the results, audits of internal logs, audits of storage and access to devices, and so on. The law should clearly identify which audits are to be implemented, when such audits are to take place and the scale of the audits. In addition to requiring audits, which should be provided irrespective of whether there are any electoral challenges, the law should also identify conditions under which recounts are to take place.
• Status of Audit Records Versus Electronic Records – In the event that the conduct of an audit determines a different result than is produced electronically by an electronic voting or counting machine, the law should specify how to deal with the situation.
• Transparency Mechanisms – The use of electronic voting and counting machines entails the conduct of existing electoral procedures in different ways, as well as the conduct of new stages in the electoral process (for example, the configuration of electronic voting machines). In the interest of transparency, appropriate procedures will need to be developed to ensure that political actors and observers have access to these different and new processes so that they can provide meaningful oversight of the process. These transparency measures should be clearly defined in the legal framework so that observers and party representatives understand and can utilize their access rights.
• Data Security and Retention – It is unlikely that existing laws and procedures adequately cover the issue of electronic data security when using electronic voting or counting machines. The way in which all electoral data is secured and stored will need to be provided for in the legal framework, as will the timeframe and procedures for deletion of the electronic data, and these provisions must be in accordance with existing data protection legislation.
• Voter Identification – If identification/authentication is being incorporated into the electronic voting process, then this may require legislation, whether using biometrics or making mandatory a particular form of machine-readable ID. In such cases it is essential that the secrecy of the vote be protected through de-linking the vote and the identity of the voter.
• Access to Source Code – It may be prudent to legislate whether source code is open source or not, in addition to legislating the mechanisms for any access by stakeholders.
Many of these issues are covered in greater detail later in this part of the guide, and the intention here is to identify the issues that are relevant for inclusion in order to properly legislate for the use of electronic voting or counting technologies.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that adapting the legal framework for the use of electronic voting or counting technologies will entail considerable amendments to laws and secondary legislation. Electoral stakeholders must be involved in the development of these legislative and regulatory amendments. Initially, political parties and observers should be consulted on the ways in which the legislation needs to be changed, especially from a transparency and oversight perspective. Once legislation is passed, the election management body will need to fully brief political parties, the media and civil society on the changes that have been made.
https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/constitutionality-of-electronic-voting-germany
The Constitutionality of Electronic Voting in Germany
After a largely successful trial period spanning from 1998 to 2005, two citizens challenged the constitutionality of electronic voting before the German Constitutional Court. Though the public generally viewed the voting system in a favorable manner throughout the trial period, the actual legality of the technology was not fully assessed in advance of implementation.
Germany piloted its first electronic voting machines, supplied by the Dutch company NEDAP, in Cologne in 1998. The trial was seen as successful, and one year later Cologne used electronic voting machines for its entire European Parliament elections. Soon other cities followed suit, and by the 2005 general election nearly 2 million German voters were using these NEDAP machines to cast votes. Reaction to the use of these electronic voting machines was generally very positive among voters, who found the machines to be easy to use, and among election administrators, who were able to reduce the number of polling stations and staff in each polling station.
However, after the 2005 election, two voters brought a case before the German Constitutional Court after unsuccessfully raising a complaint with the Committee for the Scrutiny of Elections. The case argued that the use of electronic voting machines was unconstitutional and that it was possible to hack the voting machines, thus the results of the 2005 election could not be trusted.
The German Constitutional Court upheld the first argument, concurring that the use of the NEDAP voting machines was unconstitutional. The Court noted that, under the constitution, elections are required to be public in nature and that all essential steps of an election are subject to the possibility of public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests justify an exception . . . The use of voting machines which electronically record the voters’ votes and electronically ascertain the election result only meets the constitutional requirements if the essential steps of the voting and of the ascertainment of the result can be examined reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject . . . The very wide-reaching effect of possible errors of the voting machines or of deliberate electoral fraud make special precautions necessary in order to safeguard the principle of the public nature of elections.30
Making it clear that the court’s decision did not rule out the use of voting machines in principle, it stated that:
The legislature is not prevented from using electronic voting machines in elections if the possibility of a reliable examination of correctness, which is constitutionally prescribed, is safeguarded. A complementary examination by the voter, by the electoral bodies or the general public is possible for example with electronic voting machines in which the votes are recorded in another way beside electronic storage.
This decision by the German Constitutional Court, stressing the need for transparency in the electoral process without specialist technical knowledge, effectively ended Germany’s recent use of electronic voting. Although the Court decision does not rule out electronic voting machines entirely, no further moves to adopt machines that meet the transparency requirements have been made.