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24313 SUNDAY LESSON 869-THE TIPITAKA-Vinaya Pitaka-Sanghadisesa 012 Sanghadisesa 08 Pali English Sinhala from FREE ONLINE eNālāndā Research and Practice UNIVERSITY through http://sarvajan.ambedkar.org Pl Appeal to CEC vs.sampath@eci.gov.in & feedbackceokar@gmail.com to publish d software & source code of EVM & 2 train Rep. of candidates. PROGRAMS 24th March 2013 SUNDAY 9:00 AM Venue: Mahabodhi Dhammaduta Vihara, Narasipura Village, Dasanapura Hobli, Bangalore-North
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24313  SUNDAY LESSON 869-THE TIPITAKA-Vinaya Pitaka-Sanghadisesa

012

Sanghadisesa
08

Pali

English

Sinhala



from FREE ONLINE  eNālāndā Research and Practice UNIVERSITY through http://sarvajan.ambedkar.org

Pl
Appeal to CEC vs.sampath@eci.gov.in & feedbackceokar@gmail.com to
publish d open source code of EVM & 2 train Rep. of
candidates.

http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000272

What is electronic voting machine source code?



Ellen Theisen, MA,
CEO of The Vote-PAD Company, in her 2005 report “Myth Breakers: Facts
About Electronic Elections,” included the following description:

“Source code is
the list of instructions that cause the computer to display screens,
record votes, tally votes, and perform all other functions both visible
and invisible. For example, when the voter presses the VOTE button, that
action triggers a list of instructions for the machine to follow
internally.
‘Open’ source code means the instructions would not be secret. Anyone would be able to look at them.

The National Academy of Science’s 2005 report “Asking the Right Questions About Electronic Voting,” stated:
“The source code
of the [electronic voting] system is the software that defines its
behavior under all possible circumstances… [It is] a computer program
rendered in human-readable form that also clearly lays out the structure
of the program.”


Bev Harris,
proprietor of the website www.blackboxvoting.org, wrote an article
titled “Inside a U.S. Election Vote Counting Program” Scoop Independent
News, July 8, 2003, which included the following description of “source
code”:
“[Source code] is all the computer programs that tell electronic voting machines how to record and tally votes…”


July 8, 2003 - Bev Harris 


2005 - National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 

http://arstechnica.com/features/2012/11/internet-based-and-open-source-how-e-voting-is-working-around-the-globe/

Internet-based and open source: How e-voting works around the globe

E-voting is on the decline in the US, but it’s going strong in other countries.


The Australian Capital Territory uses an open-source e-voting solution.


I live in one of the most wired parts of the United States—the San
Francisco Bay Area—but for the presidential election, I’ve already voted
by mail. On a piece of paper. From the comfort of my living room.
Between folks like me who vote by mail and everyone else who votes by
marking paper in some way, we comprise about two-thirds of all American voters.
Approximately 25 percent of all Americans, however, will use paperless
and electronic voting machines to cast their ballots on November 6.

Around the world though, these percentages don’t hold. An increasing
number of countries are beginning to tackle e-voting with gusto.
Estonia, Switzerland, Spain, Brazil, Australia, India, Canada, and a
handful of other countries have all held elections through the use of
electronic voting machines in recent years.

E-voting was supposed to solve many of the problems inherent in
traditional paper voting: it’s difficult for illiterate people to vote,
it’s difficult to get physical paper out to all corners of a country
(voters abroad can submit their ballot much more easily), tabulating the
results takes too much time, physical ballot stuffing or ballot
swapping can occur with little or no verification. With an electronic
ballot, it’s also, of course, easier to tweak ballots in other languages
or to make them available to blind or deaf voters. As recently as
August 2012, advocates in Pakistan and the Philippines called for the expansion of e-voting in their respective countries.

Currently, there are four major types of e-voting around the world
that are worth keeping an eye on: Brazil’s homegrown direct recording
electronic (DRE) setup, Australia’s open-source software, Estonia’s
Internet voting, and a Spanish startup’s efforts to expand what’s been
called “crypto-voting.” Each of these approaches has its own unique set
of problems, but the primary obstacles they present for many voting
officials and computer scientists is their lack of ability to verify
source code and expense.

From dictatorship to e-voting in just over a decade


Enlarge / This urna, as photographed in 2005, has been a workhorse of Brazilian elections for almost two decades.

Surprisingly, Brazil has one of the world’s oldest electronic voting
systems, dating way back to 1996. While Brazil certainly is a vibrant
(and huge, at 195 million people) democracy, it’s a rapidly developing
country—you do know it’s the B in BRIC,
right? Brazil has gone through significant economic and political
change in recent decades. It wasn’t until 1985 that the country was rid
of its military dictatorship, yet, just over a decade later, the country had implemented a locally designed and produced electronic voting system.

As recently as 1996, the country still had 15 percent of the country
that could not read or write. That meant a significant portion (over 23
million Brazilians at the time) of the country were effectively
disenfranchised from voting.

The DRE machine, known locally as an urna, is about the size
of two or three stacked hardback books, and it has a small screen on
one side with a keypad on the other side. The machine displays a list of
candidates, along with their pictures and the numbers associated with
them. Voters use the keypad to type in their preferred number—the device
only allows one number to be pressed at a time.

Voters then receive a printed stub confirming that he or she voted.
Each DRE device has two flash cards, which store a digital record of the
vote count. The cards are removed at the end of the election and the
vote totals are sent electronically to the Regional Electoral Office,
where national vote counts are tallied within just several hours.

“Nowadays we have 450,000 digital ballot boxes in Brazil,” Antonio
Esio from the Regional Electoral Office in Sao Paulo, told the BBC in 2008. “We are making more each year because the number of voters is increasing around six percent every election.”

Before the electronic system,
voters were required to hand-write the complete names of the candidates
and their parties—something many illiterate people were unable to do.

“By adopting it, you are enfranchising voters who might be
disenfranchised by complicated ballots,” Tiago Peixoto, a Brazilian
researcher with the ICT4Gov program at the World Bank, told Ars.

However, by 2002, some critics in Brazil countered that by relying on
an electronic device, there was little actual voter verification. To
use industry parlance, there was no way to verify that the vote was cast
as intended and counted as it was cast. So printers were added, which showed the vote on a piece of paper protected behind plastic. Two years later, Brazil eliminated the printers, as they were too costly. The printers were slated to be back (Google Translate) for the 2014 election, but they have since been suspended a second time.

By 2008, the entire software running on the DRE machines was
rewritten by developers contracted by the Brazilian Superior Electoral
Court. Six months prior to any election, people who have been accredited
by the Court are allowed to come in-person, “in an environment
controlled by the Superior Electoral Court,” where experts can examine the source code, under a nondisclosure agreement.

Diego Aranha, a
professor of computer science at the University of Brasilia, was one
such expert. But, he said, he and his team were only given five hours in
which to examine millions of lines of code—nowhere near adequate to
perform a proper audit.

One major flaw he found was that the digital votes are randomly
shuffled, as a way to provide extra security while in storage. However,
the algorithm to provide that randomness is given a non-random seed: the
timestamp.

“I made this assumption because I know how many times people have got
this wrong,” he told Ars. “They used a really, really bad pseudo-random
number generator available: the seed was a timestamp in seconds. This
is mission-critical software! This is our software for our democracy.”

Despite these problems, so far, Brazil has used its DRE system in its
various iterations for nearly two decades without any major political
dispute over their use.

In an academic paper published in a forthcoming book, Aranha
concluded: “The necessity of installing a scientifically sound and
continuous evaluation of the system, performed by independent
specialists from industry or academia becomes evident and should
contribute to the improvement of the security measures adopted by the
voting equipment.”

Looking inside the black box Down Under


Enlarge / The ACT remains the only Australian territory or state to use the open-source e-voting model.

“It’s a black box.” So goes the common refrain from computer
scientists and cryptographers who work on electronic voting. In other
words, no one can be completely certain the computer code running on a
given device does exactly what it’s said to. Worse still, no one can
ever know the software running on the voter’s computer is precisely the
same version of the software that was initially certified.

But for over a decade, the Australian Capital Territory
has figured out a way to solve this problem (in use across a handful of
voting locations): just make the software open source. The software
runs on older PCs running Linux and offers ballots in 12 languages.
There are also ballots available for illiterate, blind, or deaf voters.

Each voter receives a barcode that is read by a scanner
attached to the computer. Once the code is scanned, it resets the
software to be ready to receive a vote. Once the ballot is complete, the
card is swiped a second time to cast that ballot. The barcodes are not
connected to an individual voter, but the software is designed to only
allow one vote per voter. The votes are counted electronically,
digitally signed, and sent to a server on a local network.

“We wanted to make it something that people would find trustworthy,”
said Phillip Green, the electoral commissioner for the territory, in a
recent interview with Ars.

“We’ve likened it to a normal election process where if you’re doing
it by hand, everything is available to scrutiny,” Green said. “We
shouldn’t have a black box, where you don’t know what it does. Open
source code was the way to solve the transparency issue. So we get the
code audited by a professional company and they’re looking for areas in
the code that what comes in doesn’t come out and that there’s nothing in
there that would allow someone to maliciously change votes.”

In addition, there’s a software keylogger making sure what’s typed in
actually matches the votes that were recorded, as a way to prevent
fraud. Green added the IT faculty at the Australian National University
in Canberra use the source code frequently as a security auditing
exercise for its students. This system has run more or less without any
problems since 2001.

But if it’s so great, why don’t other states and territories Down
Under use it? There’s no real reason, but like in the United States,
state and territory voting laws and regulations are set at the state
level. The ACT has chosen to go open-source, and there’s nothing
stopping the country’s bigger states, like Victoria or New South Wales,
from doing the same.

The decision largely has to do with size and expense. The ACT,
Australia’s smallest territory by population, is home to about 365,000
people. (My home city of Oakland, California is bigger!) Only about
two-thirds of the population are voters. Nationally, the country has
around 15 million voters—so ACT voters represent less than three percent
of all voters nationally.

“There’s no practical reason why it couldn’t work these, but it’s a hardware [question],” Green added.

“We’re getting out of our system cheaply by borrowing hardware. We’re
part of [the] ACT government computer system and we get monitors that
are coming off refresh cycles. We either get the new ones before they
get them or the old ones coming off; we’re borrowing monitors. We get
out of it pretty cheaply by trying to find cheap and innovative ways,
and because we’ve only got five voting locations, we can get away with
that. [Other states] might want 50 to 60 sites, and would have
difficulty borrowing equipment. It’s several thousand dollars per
machine by the time you get the hardware together.”

Still, despite the success of the open-source e-voting setup, Green
says its days may be numbered. Even though he has his doubts about the
security and openness of Internet-based setups, he believes that it, not
open-source e-voting, will “be the way of the future.” After all,
Internet-based systems can reduce the cost of hardware by allowing
people to just use their own computers.

“We’re looking at it for 2016,” he said in a resigned tone.

Internet voting in Estonia


Enlarge / All Estonians can vote online using their digital ID card.

Perhaps the most famous example of Internet-based voting, though, comes from Estonia.

This tiny, post-Soviet country in the northeastern corner of Europe
reclaimed its independence in 1991. Within less than a decade, the
country was already making progress toward a digital ID card project.
The cards, which look very similar in size to other European Union ID
cards or American drivers licenses, possess a front-facing chip that can
be read by a small handheld device. By 1999, the Estonian parliament
passed an important amendment to the “Identity Documents Act” and
created the “Digital Signatures Act.” This legislature established that
such cards and corresponding signatures would be legal in the country.

The Digital ID card became available in 2002 and led to a number of
“e-services” that all Estonians could take advantage of. Through the use
of open-source public key-private key encryption software (upgraded in 2011 to 2048-bit),
various government agencies have enabled citizens to not only engage in
digital contracts, but also to perform various secure functions
connected with their identity. These include financial transactions,
public transportation tickets, and student university admissions
records.

“What we have in Estonia and have had for eight years is that we have
universal notion of digitally signed files,” Tarvi Martens told Deutsche Welle,
Germany’s international broadcaster, in 2010. (Martens was one of the
leaders of the Estonian digital ID card project at the Estonian
Certification Center.)

“If you sign something digitally with your Estonian ID card, it
universally replaces a paper written signature and this can be applied
anywhere—terminating contracts, creating contracts—everywhere.
Everywhere you’d need a paper signature you can replace it with an
electronic signature,” he added.

With that infrastructure in place, the Estonian government began
testing Internet-based voting in local elections in 2005. Two years
later, it was expanded out to national elections. In the 2009 elections for the European Parliament, 15 percent of all votes cast were submitted online. That number grew to almost 25 percent for the 2011 domestic parliamentary elections.

As a security precaution, voters can submit their ballot as many
times as they like during the e-voting window open during the week
before election day.

“I-voting is possible only during seven days of advance
polls—from the tenth day until the fourth day prior to Election Day,”
the Estonian National Electoral Committee states on its website.
“This is necessary in order to guarantee that in the end only one vote
is counted for each voter. To ensure that the voter is expressing their
true will, they are allowed to change their electronic vote by voting
again electronically during advance polls or by voting at the polling
station during advance polls.”

Domestically, courts have upheld the use of Internet
voting. In 2011, the Estonian Supreme Court’s Constitutional Review
Chamber rejected
the petition of an Estonian student who alleged that the voting
software—which is not open-source—could be maliciously tampered with so
as not to count votes accurately.

Barbara Simons is a
computer scientist and former president of the Association of Computer
Machinery. She’s an outspoken activist against e-voting and told Ars
that because the Estonian government has never conducted post-election
auditing, it can’t be 100 percent sure it works as advertised.

“We don’t know how the Estonian system is working,” she said. “We do
know that the second largest party thinks that the voting was rigged in
2011. The reason they think it was rigged was that the ballot counts
online were different than the paper version. There are possible
explanations, but I couldn’t say that it was rigged—there’s no way that
anyone can prove anything. [The Estonian government] won’t let
independent security experts review it without signing a nondisclosure
agreement.”

Simons points out a common refrain by many people who are used to
Internet banking—that is, if we can bank online, why can’t we vote
online?

In short, it’s mostly because of responsibility and attribution. With
banking, you want to know—and have an extensive record—of what actions
were taken when, and you associate them with a certain person. Voting,
however, requires secrecy, and separation from a person and a specific
identity. Furthermore, with banking, there is insurance and other
precautions put into place to reassure customers against fraud.

“I do online banking because I know the bank will cover it,” she says. “You can’t do voting online—nobody can cover it.”

Or, as two UK-based computer scientists put it in a recent op-ed:
“This is like running your bank account without getting statements or
receipts, and trusting the bank to keep track of your balance
accurately.”

Crypto-voting abounds


Enlarge / Scytl, a Spanish e-voting startup, has made inroads around the world.

Despite these different approaches, there’s one company that has been
getting a lot of attention, a Spanish company with a rather unique
name: Scytl.

The company was founded by a Barcelona-based computer science
professor, and partially funded initially by Spain’s Ministry of Science
and Technology. It’s now making significant inroads with various government agencies
around the world, including Norway, Mexico, India, Spain, and many
others. The company offers not only on-site DRE-style e-voting, but also
(most controversially) Internet-based voting. In fact, during the first
week of September, West Virginia
said it would provide “electronic ballot delivery” to overseas and
military voters in the state for the November 2012 election, joining
other jurisdictions in states of Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, New
York, and Dallas County, Texas.

It’s important to note that for the American market, Scytl does not
offer true, Estonia-style online voting. Rather, it provides a way for
the ballots to be securely sent to the individual.

“The ballot comes back to the local election jurisdiction and is
tabulated in the same way in the local jurisdiction,” explained Michelle
Shafer, a company spokesperson.

The company claims that for the locations where Internet-based voting
is offered, its systems are true end-to-end encrypted solutions. This,
for example, is currently being tested in local elections in Norway and
is scheduled for a nationwide deployment across the country in 2017.

But the company declines to reveal exactly how its setup works on its website.

“Votes are encrypted in the voters’ voting device before they are
cast,” the company’s FAQ states. “Only the Electoral Board can decrypt
the votes by reconstructing the private key. The decryption of the votes
is carried out in an isolated and physically secured computer by
applying a mixing technique that breaks the correlation between the
voters’ identity and the clear-text votes in order to guarantee voters’
privacy.”

In a set of slides dated 2011 that were presented at a cryptography
conference in Spain, the company alludes to the specific techniques that
it is using. The slides refer to various advanced cryptographic
techniques, including homomorphic tallying, which allows for encrypted values to be added, then have the end result decrypted without revealing each individual value.

Scytl’s setup appears to be similar to other cryptographic voting systems pioneered by Ron Rivest, Josh Benaloah, Olivier Pereira, and others with backgrounds in related research and e-voting systems.

“That slide set reads like a bunch of existing crypto voting
techniques thrown together with a Scytl logo on it,” e-mailed Ben Adida,
a cryptographer and co-creator of Helios. That’s another similar crypto-voting system that was tested in a Belgian university election in 2009.

“It’s not clear to me at all that this described technology is
actually used in their system, since from the little I’ve seen of folks
using Scytl, none of this end-to-end verifiability is visible.”

The company does say on its site, however, that “transparency is an integral part of security.”

It explains that election authorities and independent auditors
designated by those authorities are given access to the source code.
Authorities can verify this is digitally signed to make sure that the
same software that was audited is the same one that is actually used
during an election. So why isn’t the source code given to the public to
vet?

“[Voters] don’t have the ability to review the source code of their
[online] banking either,” Shafer, the company spokesperson, added.

The slow march of democracy

Despite much of the hoopla (and hundreds of millions of dollars
spent) surrounding e-voting over the last decade, there seems to be a
considerable amount of evidence against putting too much faith in a
system that can’t be verified. With the exceptions of Estonia (which
seems to have put domestic concerns to rest) and the Australian Capital
Territory (which goes the open-source route), there remain significant
concerns with the expansion of electronic voting systems worldwide.

In Australia, like the US, there’s also the large problem of a
mish-mash of federal and state voting laws. Not to mention, Australia is
a large territory that makes deploying computers expensive and, at
least for now, seemingly unfeasible. Here in the US, we would certainly
do better with a single, unified voting standard that would take power
away from state authorities to have differing voting standards—remember Bush v. Gore?

In short: e-voting is a tall order. It’s difficult to make such
systems verifiable (whether through open-source code, an auditable paper
trail, and/or cryptography), keep them inexpensive, and maintain the
legal backing of the local jurisdiction to support them. This may be why
some voting activists are pushing for “risk-limiting audits.”
These don’t even attempt to get involved with the actual procedures in
voting, but rather just making sure the votes were counted properly
using whatever system is on hand.

It’s a laudable goal to expand democracy as much as possible. Making
voting easier, particularly for those who speak different languages or
who are blind, deaf, or have other handicaps is certainly admirable.
However, without overcoming the multitude of problems that exist in
e-voting systems, it’s hard to see how they can move forward in a
trustworthy way.

http://news.cnet.com/Feds-want-e-voting-source-code-disclosed/2100-1028_3-5229162.html

Feds want e-voting source code disclosed

http://www.bushstole04.com/hackingelections/Summary.htm
The Truth will prevail,
but only if we demand it from Congress!


COMPUTER FRAUD SUMMARY

 

Condensed Version

 

How George Bush used computer fraud

to steal the election

 

1.  No Paper Trail

The
Republicans passed the Voting Act in 2002 authorizing the use of
electronic voting machines with no requirement that they produce a paper
receipt (a “paper trail”), which would allow an ironclad, independent
assessment of whether the DATA IN THE voting machines accurately
reflected the votes cast.

2. Conservative Republican Owned Voting Machine Companies

The
Bush administration then insured that the majority of these electronic
voting machines were made by Diebold and ES&S. The President of one
of these companies and the VP of the other are brothers. Both are
staunch Republicans and Diebold contributed hundreds of thousands of
dollars to Republican campaigns. The CEO of Diebold was Chairman of the
Bush Reelection Campaign in Ohio , and promised to deliver the state of Ohio to George Bush in the 2004 election.

3. No Recounts Possible

Without the capability of generating a “paper trail”, there is no way of having a recount of the votes as required by law.

4. Diebold Voting Machines Can Be Hacked.

Dr. Avi Rubin (Professor of Computer Science, John Hopkins University )
evaluated Diebold’s source code, which runs their e-voting machines.
Diebold voting machines use “Digital Encryption Standard”, whose code
was broken in 1997 and is NO LONGER USED by anyone seriously interested
in insuring that a computer is secure from tampering and hacking.
Moreover, the KEY was IN the source code, such that all Diebold machines
respond to the same key.
  Unlock one, and you have then ALL unlocked.

5. According to an analysis of the 2004 Presidential election by Dr. Steven Freeman of the University of Pennsylvania

“…In
ten of eleven consensus battleground states, the tallied margin
differed from the predicted (exit poll) margin, and in every one, the
shift favored Bush.”
(See: “The Unexplained Exit Poll Discrepancy”
in “Scholarly Analyses” at shadowbox.i8.com/stolen.htm). The discrepancy
favored Bush in Ohio (6.7%), Pennsylvania (6.5%) and Florida (4.9%), and, according to Dr. Freeman, the odds of this being due to random errors are 250 million-to-one.

 6.   No Government Oversight of Voting Machine Industry

Interestingly, no one in the U.S. federal government seems to be
paying attention . . . as usual. There is no federal agency that has
regulatory authority or oversight of the voting machine industry—not the
Federal Election Commission (FEC), not the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and
not the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The FEC doesn’t even
have a complete list of all the companies that count votes in U.S. elections.
         

Once again we are witness to an “eyes closed, hands off” approach
to protecting America . The 2004 election rests in the private hands
of the Urosevich brothers, who are financed by the far-out right wing and
top donors to the Republican Party. The Democrats are either sitting
ducks or co-conspirators. I don’t know which.

7. None or Criminally Negligent Government Oversight of Voting Machines

Your
local elections officials trusted a group called NASED – the National
Association of State Election Directors — to certify that your voting
system is safe.
This trust was breached. NASED certified the
systems based on the recommendation of an”Independent Testing Authority”
(ITA). What no one told local officials was that the ITA did not test
for security (and NASED didn’t seem to mind). The most important test on
the ITA report is called the “penetration analysis.” This test is
supposed to tell us whether anyone can break into the system to tamper
with the votes. “Not applicable,” wrote Shawn Southworth, of Ciber Labs,
the ITA that tested the Diebold GEMS central tabulator software. “Did not test.”


8. Criminal Records of Diebold’s Senior Executives

Check this out - No less than 5 of Diebold’s developers are convicted felons, including
Senior Vice President Jeff Dean, and topping the list are his
twenty-three counts of felony Theft in the
First
Degree. To sum up, he was convicted of 23 felony counts of theft by -
get this - planting back doors in his software and using a “high degree
of sophistication” to evade detection. Do you trust computer systems
designed by this man? Is trust important in electronic voting systems?

9. How Easy It Is to Change the Vote

On the other hand, the Central Vote Tabulation systems are a very inviting target – by simply compromising one
Windows desktop, you could potentially influence tens or hundreds of
thousands of votes, with only one attack to execute and only one attack
to erase your tracks after. This makes for an extremely attractive
target, particularly when one realizes that by compromising these
machines you can affect the votes that people cast not only by the new
touch screen systems, but also voters using traditional methods, such as
optical scanning systems since the tallies from all of these systems
are brought together for Centralized Tabulation.
 

10. Why Votes Do Not Match Exit Poll

There are numerous examples in Florida and Ohio where the votes

do not match the exit polls but only in those precincts where

electronic voting machines with no paper trail were being used. All

of these discrepancies are in favor of George Bush by five to 15%

despite many of the precincts having a strong Democratic majority.

In those precincts where there was a machine with a “paper trail”,

the exit polls matched almost exactly the actual vote.


11. Conclusion
The above are some of the lines that connect the dots of the Bush Conspiracy to steal 
this election. As Fox News’ “fair and balanced” Bill O’Reilly says repeatedly “we report, 
you decide”.
	
 _______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________



Full Length Version

 

How George Bush used computer fraud

to steal the election

 

The following facts point clearly to George Bush, Karl Rove and the

rest of his “dirty political tricksters” stealing this election:

 

1. Bush’s History of Lying

 

George Bush has lied, denied the truth and has been unwilling to

take responsibility for any mistakes on the part of his

administration on numerous occasions, including weapons

of mass destruction, Medicare prescription drugs, military record

and the war on Iraq .

 

2. Voting Act in 2002-No Paper Trail

 

The Republicans passed the Voting Act in 2002 authorizing the

use of electronic voting machines in presidential elections with no

requirement that they produce a paper receipt (Paper Trail”), which

would allow an ironclad, independent assessment of whether the

Data in The Voting Machines accurately reflected the votes cast.

Tom DeLay and other top Republicans fought very hard not to

include in this bill a requirement that the electronic voting machines

be ableto generate “a paper trail”. The Democrats attempted to

require this in that bill but to no avail.

 

3. No Recounts Possible

 

Without the capability of generating a “paper trail”, there is

no way of having a recount of the votes which is required by law.

 

4. Bush Hires Diebold and DS&S to Make Voting Machines

 

The Bush administration then insured that the maturity of these

electronic voting machines were made by Diebold and ES&S.

ES&S and Diebold clearly dominate the field. ES&S claims that

they have tabulated  “56 percent of the U.S. national vote for the

past four presidential elections”, while a Diebold spokesperson

told this writer that the company processed about 35 percent of U.S.

electronic vote count in 2002.

The President of one of these companies and the VP of the other

are brothers. Both of them are staunch Republican supporters.

Diebold has contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the

Republican campaign. The CEO of Diebold has been at George’s

ranch in Texas on numerous occasions. The CEO of Diebold within

the last year has publicly promised to deliver the state of Ohio to

George Bush in this election.

On April 22, 2004, Jim Wasserman of the Associated Press (AP)

reported, “By an 8-0 vote, the state’s (California) Voting Systems

and Procedures Panel recommended that [Secretary of State]

Shelley cease the use of the machines, saying that Texas-based

Diebold has performed poorly in California and its machines

malfunctioned in the state’s March 2 primary election, turning

away many voters in San Diego County . . . In addition to the

ban, panel members recommended that a secretary of state’s

office report released Wednesday, detailing alleged failings of

Diebold in California, be forwarded to the state attorney general’s

office to consider civil and criminal charges against the company.”

 

Interestingly, no one in the U.S. federal government seems to be

paying attention . . . as usual. There is no federal agency that has

regulatory authority or oversight of the voting machine industry—

not the Federal Election Commission (FEC), not the Department

of Justice (DOJ), and not the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). The FEC doesn’t even have a complete list of all the

companies that count votes in U.S. elections.

Once again we are witness to an “eyes closed, hands off” approach to

protecting America. The 2004 election rests in the private hands of the

Urosevich brothers, who are financed by the far-out right wing and top

donors to the Republican Party. The Democrats are either sitting ducks

or co conspirators. I don’t know which.

 

5. Diebold DES Code Broken in 1997

No agency hired by the federal government ever issued a report

indicating that these electronic voting machines manufactured by

Diebold and ES&S were secure from manipulation.

On the other hand, Dr. Avi Rubin, currently a Professor of Computer

Science at John Hopkins University “accidentally” got his hands on a

copy of the Diebold software program–Diebold’s source code–which

runs their e-voting machines.

Dr. Rubin’s students pored over 48,609 lines of code that make up

this software. One line in particular stood out over all the rest:

#defineDESKEY((des_KEY8F2654hd4″).

All commercial programs have provisions to be encrypted so as

to protect them from having their contents read or changed by anyone

not having the key. The line that staggered the Hopkin’s team was

that the method used to encrypt the Diebold machines was a method

called Digital Encryption Standard (DES), a code that was broken in

1997 and is NO LONGER USED by anyone to secure  programs.

F2654hd4 was the key to the encryption. Moreover, because the KEY

was IN the source code, all Diebold machines would respond to the

same key.  Unlock one, you have then ALL unlocked.

Professor Rubin’s Study was published on the Internet in February,

2004. No Bush administration officials or government agencies ever

mentioned this report which clearly states that these electronic

voting machines are not suitable to be used in the upcoming election.

Bev Harris, of Black Box Voting, was videotaped with Democratic

presidential contender Howard Dean in March, 2004. On this

videotape entitled Votergate she and Howard Dean are able to hack

into the Diebold voting software and change the vote in 90 seconds.

Why weren’t eyebrows raised by anyone in the government at this

point?

 

6. None or Criminally Negligent Government Oversight of Voting

Machines

Your local elections officials trusted a group called NASED – the

National Association of State Election Directors — to certify that

your voting system is safe.

 

This trust was breached. NASED certified the systems based on the

recommendation of an “Independent Testing Authority” (ITA). What no

one told local officials was that the ITA did not test for security

(and NASED didn’t seem to mind).

 

The ITA reports are considered so secret that even the California

Secretary of State’s office had trouble getting its hands on one.

The ITA refused to answer any questions about what it does. Imagine

our surprise when, due to Freedom of Information requests, a couple

of them showed up in our mailbox.

 

The most important test on the ITA report is called the “penetration

analysis.” This test is supposed to tell us whether anyone can break

into the system to tamper with the votes. “Not applicable,” wrote

Shawn Southworth, of Ciber Labs, the ITA that tested the Diebold

GEMS central tabulator software. “Did not test.”

 

This is Shawn Southworth, in his office in Huntsville, Alabama.

He is the man who carefully examines our voting software.

Shawn Southworth “tested” whether every candidate on the ballot has a

name. But we were shocked to find out that, when asked the most

important question — about vulnerable entry points — Southworth’s

report says “not reviewed.”

 

Ciber “tested” whether ballots comply with local regulations, but

when Bev Harris asked Shawn Southworth what he thinks about Diebold

tabulators accepting large numbers of “minus” votes, he said he

didn’t mention that in his report because “the vendors don’t like him

to put anything negative” in his report. After all, he said, he is paid by

the vendors.

 

Shawn Southworth didn’t do the penetration analysis, but check out

what he wrote: “Ciber recommends to the NASED committee that

GEMS software version 1.18.15 be certified and assigned NASED

certification number N03060011815.”

 

Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis? Apparently not.

We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories report.

In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems, but

says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could

continue with the same flaws. You’ve gotta ask yourself: Are they

nuts? Some of them are computer experts. Well, it seems that

several of these people suddenly want to retire, and the whole

NASED voting systems board is becoming somewhat defunct,

but these are the people responsible for today’s shoddy voting

systems.

 

If the security of the U.S. electoral system depends on you to

certify a voting system, and you get a report that plainly states

that security was “not tested” and “not applicable” — what would

you do?

 

7. How Diebold and ES&S Began

Once upon a time there were two brothers: Bob and Todd Urosevich.

In the 1980’s, with the financial backing of the right-wing extremist

Christian billionaire Howard Ahmanson, Bob and Todd founded a

company called American Information Systems (AIS) that built voting

machines. They were also certified to count votes.

 

It is interesting to note that back then there was no federal agency

with regulatory authority or oversight of the U.S. voting machine

industry. Even more interesting is the fact that this is still true

today.

Not even the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has a complete list

of all the companies that count votes in U.S. elections.

 

But let us get back to our story….

 

In 1992 a conservative Nebraskan fellow called Chuck Hagel became

chairman of AIS as well as chairman of the McCarthy Group, a private

investment bank. This all happened shortly after he stopped working

for Bush Sr.’s administration as Head of the Private Sector Council.

 

In 1995 Hagel resigned from AIS and a year later ran for Senate,

with the founder of the McCarthy Group as his campaign manager.

 

In 1996 Chuck Hagel became the first Republican to ever win a

Nebraska senatorial campaign in 24 years, carrying virtually every

demographic group, including African American precincts that had

never voted Republican. The only company certified to count votes

in Nebraska at the time was AIS.

 

In 2003 the Senate Ethics Committee forced Chuck Hagel to reveal the

fact that he had $1 million to $5 million in investment in the

McCarthy Group, a fact he’d previously neglected to mention. The

McCarthy Group also happens to be a major owner of ES&S.

 

 

8. Criminal Record of Voting Machine Companies Diebold

During the 2000 presidential elections, Diebold made 16,000

presidential votes “vanish” in several Florida county.

 

Back in 2002 Diebold supplied the state of Georgia with brand new

electronic voting machines. That was when incumbent Democratic

Governor Ray Barnes was defeated and the Republicans won for the

first time in 134 years. The poll results showed an amazing 12-point

shift that took place in the last 48 hours.

 

Diebold was subsequently sued for applying a last-minute code patch

to the machines that was never reviewed. In another strange turn of

events, that code was also deleted right after the election and the

suit fell through.

 

Earlier this year California sued Diebold for fraud and decertified

its voting machines.

 

Check this out - No less than 5 of Diebold’s developers are

convicted felons, including Senior Vice President Jeff Dean, and

topping the list are his twenty-three counts of felony Theft in the

First Degree. According to the findings of fact in case no. 89-1-

04034-1:

 

“Defendant’s thefts occurred over a 2 1/2 year period of time, there

were multiple incidents, more than the standard range can account

for, the actual monetary loss was substantially greater than typical

for the offense, the crimes and their cover-up involved a high

degree of sophistication and planning in the use and alteration of

records in the computerized accounting system that defendant

maintained for the victim, and the defendant used his position of

trust and fiduciary responsibility as a computer systems and

accounting consultant for the victim to facilitate the commission of

the offenses.”

 

To sum up, he was convicted of 23 felony counts of theft from by -

get this - planting back doors in his software and using a “high

degree of sophistication” to evade detection. Do you trust computer

systems designed by this man? Is trust important in electronic

voting systems?

 

Sequoia America’s second largest voting corporation is Sequoia Voting

Systems. This company is owned by the British company De La Rue,

who also owns 20% of the British National Lottery. In 1995 the SEC

 filed suit against Sequoia for inflating revenue and pre-tax profits.

In 1999 charges were filed by the Justice Department against Sequoia

in a massive corruption case that sent top Louisiana state officials to

jail for bribery, most of it funneled through the Mob. Sequoia’s

executives were given immunity in exchange for testimony against

state officials.

 

9. How Easy It Is to Change the Vote

At greater risk than the individual touch screens are the Central

Voting Tabulation computers, which compile the results from many

other systems, such as touch screens and optically scanned cards.

From a hacker’s standpoint, there are a couple of reasons why these

central computers are better targets:

 

a. It is extremely labor intensive to compromise a large number of

systems, and the chance of failure or being detected increases every

time an attack is attempted. Also, the controversy surrounding the

touch screen terminals ensures that their results will be closely

watched, and this theory has been born out in recent days.

 

b. If one were to compromise the individual terminals, they would

only be able to influence a few hundred to maybe a couple of

thousand votes. These factors create a very poor risk/reward ratio,

which is a key factor in determining which systems it makes sense to

attack.

 

c. On the other hand, the Central Vote Tabulation systems are a very

inviting target – by simply compromising one Windows desktop, you

could potentially influence tens or hundreds of thousands of votes,

with only one attack to execute and only one attack to erase your

tracks after. This makes for an extremely attractive target,

particularly when one realizes that by compromising these machines

you can affect the votes that people cast not only by the new touch

screen systems, but also voters using traditional methods, such as

optical scanning systems since the tallies from all of these systems

are brought together for Centralized Tabulation. This further helps

an attacker stay under the radar and avoid detection, since scrutiny

will not be as focused on the older systems, even though the vote

data is still very much at risk since it is all brought together at

a few critical points. This also has been born out by early

investigations, where the touch screen results seem to be fairly in

line with expectations, while some very strange results are being

reported in precincts still using some of the older methods.

 

10. Why Votes Do Not Match Exit Polls

There are numerous examples in Florida and Ohio where the votes

do not match the exit polls but only in those precincts where

electronic voting machines with no paper trail were being used. All

of these discrepancies are in favor of George Bush by five to 15%

despite many of the precincts having a strong Democratic majority.

In those precincts where there was a machine with a “paper trail”,

the exit polls matched almost exactly the actual vote.

 

11. The Unexplained Exit Poll Discrepancy –by Steven F. Freeman,

Ph.D.

“As much as we can say in social science that something is

impossible, it is impossible that the discrepancies between

predicted and actual vote counts in the three critical battleground

states [Ohio, Florida, and Pennsylvania] of the 2004 election could

have been due to chance or random error… The likelihood of any two

of these statistical anomalies occurring together is on the order of

one-in-a-million. The odds against all three occurring together are

250 million to one. As much as we can say in social science that

something is impossible, it is impossible that the discrepancies

between predicted and actual vote counts in the three critical

battleground states of the 2004 election could have been due to

chance or random error.”

 

12. Conservatives see a conspiracy here: They think the exit

polls were rigged.

Dick Morris, the infamous political consultant to the first Clinton

campaign who became a Republican consultant and Fox News regular,

wrote an article for The Hill, the publication read by every

political junkie in Washington, DC, in which he made a couple of

brilliant points.

 

“Exit Polls are almost never wrong,” Morris wrote. “They eliminate

the two major potential fallacies in survey research by correctly

separating actual voters from those who pretend they will cast

ballots but never do and by substituting actual observation for

guesswork in judging the relative turnout of different parts of the

state.”

 

He added: “So, according to ABC-TVs exit polls, for example, Kerry

was slated to carry Florida, Ohio, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and

Iowa, all of which Bush carried. The only swing state the network

had going to Bush was West Virginia, which the president won by 10

points.”

 

Yet a few hours after the exit polls were showing a clear Kerry

sweep, as the computerized vote numbers began to come in from the

various states the election was called for Bush.

 

13. Pre-Election Polls Were “Unexplainably Wrong” in the

2002 Midterm Elections and the Exit Polls Became Not

Operational at the Last Minute

The 2002 mid-term elections were viewed as a grand triumph for

George W. Bush since he ostensibly “defied” the tradition that

incumbent chief executives suffer losses in such contests.

In Minnesota Democrats were united behind Walter Mondale

as a replacement for the recently deceased Senator Paul Wellstone,

who had perished in a plane crash, against Democrat turned Republican

Norm Coleman.

 

After some tough moments Wellstone had weathered well-financed

 Republican onslaughts to secure a lead in the polls before his tragic

demise.

 

Those same polls found Mondale maintaining a lead going into Election

Day, upon which a big surprise was recorded and Coleman emerged

the winner Republican Senator Wayne Allard was running behind in

Colorado with the momentum going in the other direction. When the

results were revealed he, like Coleman, had won in a final surge that

the pollsters failed to detect. The identical phenomenon occurred in

New Hampshire, where popular Governor Jean Shaheen, who had

been on Al Gore’s short list for the vice presidency in 2000, appeared

on her way to the U.S. Senate. The pollsters were once more revealed

to be dramatically wrong as John Sununu Jr. pulled through with another

one of those 2002 Republican final surges to nip his opponent at the wire.

 

The most widely observed case of Republicans seemingly clutching

victory from the jaws of defeat occurred in Georgia. This is the

state where Karl Rove enticed lackluster Congressman Saxby

Chambliss to run against Vietnam War hero and incumbent Senator

Max Cleland. Despite shameful television ads showing Cleland

alongside Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden the incumbent

appeared to have weathered the storm and was ahead in the polls,

as was Democratic Governor Roy Barnes. On Election Day the

Republicans had scored two more of those amazing come from

behind victories in the face of negative poll forecasts as Chambliss

and Republican gubernatorial candidate Sonny Perdue both won.

 

John Zogby had proven himself to be one of the nation’s most

reliable pollsters in 2000, when he correctly analyzed Gore’s final

surge and ultimate victory in the popular vote category, as well as

in the Electoral College but for the fraudulent efforts of Jeb Bush

and Katherine Harris in Florida and the decision of the U.S. Supreme

Court majority in Bush vs. Gore, in which Federalist Society partisans

Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas refused to recuse themselves

despite conflicts of interest.

 

It is interesting to note that the usually reliable Zogby along with

some of his professional colleagues, who had followed the

aforementioned senate races closely, were mysteriously off by

margins as high as 10 to 13 percent. These key races made the

difference as Republicans took control of the United States Senate

and Bush was saluted for his successful barnstorming on behalf of

Republican candidates.

 

Only 50,000 votes nationally kept the Democrats from controlling both

the House and the Senate in the 2002 elections. On election eve there

were (depending on which source you use) either thirteen or sixteen

House and Senate races still too close to call. In all cases, the last

polls before election day showed the Democratic candidates leading.

In all cases the Republican candidates won. This was an election first,

according to some election historians, and polling experts consulted

say they can’t recall a time when the polls called all the close races

in an election wrong.

To compound the problems of the inaccurate polls and lack of paper trails

to refer back to, on the morning of election day the exit polling company

owned by a consortium of media news giants (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox, MSNBC

among others) which has been providing exit polls on national elections for

years, suddenly announced there would be no exit polls done on this election

because “apparent quirks in our new software are providing anomalous results.”

The lack of exit polls eliminates the one source of data which might be used

to validate reported vote totals; i.e., if in exit polls sixty eight percent

say they voted for candidate A and the vote counts only show candidate A getting

forty two percent of the vote, the discrepancy would be cause for investigation.

Finally, a visit to votewatch.us (a web site created to be a repository for reports

of voting problems across the U.S.) reveals an extensive nationwide pattern of

problems with the vote count in 2002, ranging from a Texas race where the Republican

candidate’s win in a Democratic district was overturned after a suspicious election

director demanded new machine chips be installed and recounted the vote coming up

this time with a Democratic landslide, to numerous reports of voters in Florida

trying to vote an all Democratic ticket on the new touch screen machines, and

having their votes register as all Republican instead. One lady reported poll

workers had her try four machines before her all Democratic vote was accepted.

Meanwhile, she said, the other machines continued to be used for voting.

There were no reports of voters trying to vote all Republican and having

their votes recorded as all Democratic.

The combination of these concerns provides compelling circumstantial evidence

for the existence of at least a possibility that the outcomes of the 2002

elections were shaped by partisan electronic manipulation of the vote count.

 

14. Exit Poll Company Replaced in 2004

Until recently, the major American corporate infomedia networks

(ABC,CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox, and AP) relied on a consortium known

as the Voter News Service for vote-counting and exit poll information. But

following the scandals and consequent embarrassments of the 2000

and 2002 elections, this consortium was disbanded. It was replaced

in 2004 by a partnership of Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International

known as the National Election Pool.

 

15. Exit Polls Were Fiddled With on November 2

One of the clear indicators of massive electoral fraud was the wide

divergence, both nationally and in swing states, between exit poll

results and the reported vote tallies. The major villains, it would seem,

were the suppliers of touch-screen voting machines. There appears to

be evidence, however, that the corporations responsible for assembling

vote-counting and exit poll information may also have been complicit in

the fraud.

 

The National Election Pool’s own data—as transmitted by CNN on the

evening of November 2 and the early morning of November 3—suggest

very strongly that the results of the exit polls were themselves fiddled late

on November 2 in order to make their numbers conform with the tabulated

vote tallies.

 

It is important to remember how large the discrepancy was between

the early vote tallies and the early exit poll figures. By the time

polls were closing in the eastern states, the vote-count figures published

by CNN showed Bush leading Kerry by a massive 11 percent margin.

At 8:50 p.m. EST, Bush was credited with 6,590,476 votes, and Kerry

with 5,239,414. This margin gradually shrank. By 9:00 p.m., Bush

purportedly had 8,284,599 votes, and Kerry 6,703,874; by 9:06 p.m.,

Bush had 9,257,135, and Kerry had 7,652,510, giving the incumbent

a 9 percent lead, with 54 percent of the vote to Kerry’s 45 percent.

 

The early exit polls appear to have caused some concern to the good

people at the National Election Pool: a gap of 12 or 14 percent

between tallied results and exit polls can hardly inspire confidence

in the legitimacy of an election.

 

One can surmise that instructions of two sorts were issued. The

election-massagers working for Diebold, ES&S (Election Systems &

Software) and the other suppliers of black-box voting machines may

have been told to go easy on their manipulations of back-door `

Democrat-Delete’ software: mere victory was what the Bush

campaign wanted, not an implausible landslide. And the number

crunchers at the National Election Pool may have been asked to

fix up those awkward exit polls.

 

Fix them they did. When the national exit polls were last updated,

at 1:36 a.m. EST on November 3, men’s votes (still 46 percent of the

total) had gone 54 percent to Bush, 45 percent to Kerry, and 1 percent

to Nader; women’s votes (54 percent of the total) had gone 47 percent

to Bush, 52 percent to Kerry, and 1 percent to Nader.

 

But how do we know the fix was in? Because the exit poll data also

included the total number of respondents. At 9:00 p.m. EST, this

number was well over 13,000; by 1:36 a.m. EST on November 3

it had risen by less than 3 percent, to a final total of 13, 531 respondents—

but with a corresponding swing of 5 percent from Kerry to Bush in

voters’ reports of their choices. Given the increase in respondents,

a swing of this size is a mathematical impossibility.

 

The same pattern is evident in the exit polls of two key swing

states, Ohio and Florida.

 

At 7:32 p.m. EST, CNN was reporting the following exit poll data for

Ohio. Women voters (53 percent of the total) favored Kerry over

Bush by 53 percent to 47 percent; male voters (47 percent of the total)

preferred Kerry over Bush by 51 percent to 49 percent. Kerry was

thus leading Bush by a little more than 4 percent. But by 1:41 a.m. EST

on November 3, when the exit poll was last updated, a dramatic shift

had occurred: women voters had split 50-50 in their preferences for

Kerry and Bush, while men had swung to supporting Bush over Kerry

by 52 percent to 47 percent. The final exit polls showed Bush leading

in Ohio by 2.5 percent.

 

At 7:32 p.m., there were 1,963 respondents; at 1:41 a.m. on November

3, there was a final total of 2,020 respondents. These fifty-seven

additional respondents must all have voted very powerfully for Bush—

for while representing only a 2.8 percent increase in the number of

respondents, they managed to produce a swing from Kerry to Bush

of fully 6.5 percent.

 

In Florida, the exit polls appear to have been tampered with in a

similar manner. At 8:40 p.m. EST, CNN was reporting exit polls that

showed Kerry and Bush in a near dead heat. Women voters (54

percent of the total) preferred Kerry over Bush by 52 percent to 48

percent, while men (46 percent of the total) preferred Bush over

Kerry by 52 percent to 47 percent, with 1 percent of their votes

going to Nader. But the final update of the exit poll, made at 1:01 a.m.

EST on November 3, showed a different pattern: women voters now

narrowly preferred Bush over Kerry, by 50 percent to 49 percent,

while the men preferred Bush by 53 percent to 46 percent, with

1 percent of the vote still going to Nader. These figures gave Bush

a 4 percent lead over Kerry.

 

The number of exit poll respondents in Florida had risen only from

2,846 to 2,862. But once again, a powerful numerical magic was at

work. A mere sixteen respondents—0.55 percent of the total number

—produced a four percent swing to Bush.

 

What we are witnessing, the evidence would suggest, is a late-night

contribution by the National Elections Pool to the rewriting of

history.

 

16. Republicans Attempt to Explain Discrepancies in Exit

Polls and Actual Vote

Despite all kinds of promises to fix things so that the 2004

presidential election could go off without major hitches, what

occurred was a malicious mix combining the worst of the

2000 and 2002 scenarios. When the exit polls proved to be

highly errant in key battleground states such as Ohio and

Florida the mainstream media simplistically explained that

Bush voters had demonstrated a greater reluctance to talk to

pollsters than did Kerry supporters.

 

This argument sounds as convincing as the one Republicans made in

2000 that the reason why so many chads were spat out in Florida did not

relate to the age and unreliability of the machines, but because

large numbers of voters decided at the last second to not vote for

president, resulting in half-hearted stabs at the paper before them.

The same media that recited this nonsense repeatedly, as long as

James Baker could say it with a straight face, is now attacking Internet

critics citing corruption in the 2004 vote as “spreadsheet conspiracy

theorists.”

 

The latest effort in the feeble mainstream media assault occurred

today when the Miami Herald published an article contending that

Bush really did carry Florida by securing Democratic votes in the

traditionally conservative northern tier of the state. CNN Online

 immediately picked up the story and ran it. The information was

meant to refute the contention that Bush’s total was inflated by

the new touch screen voting machines used in the Sunshine

State. The story covered three small counties with four digit

figures as part of a smokescreen dodge to avoid the harsh

reality that something was truly amiss in the 2004 Florida

presidential count.

 

When Robert Parry of the ConsortiumNews.com site recently

noted that Bush had what appeared to be highly inflated vote

totals in the heavily Democratic southern counties of Palm

Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade, the Washington Post

criticized him and fuzzed up the process by using the same

argument posed today in the Miami Herald. Bush had won

because of his strength among conservative Democratic

elements in the state’s northern tier.

 

Parry immediately rebutted the article by pointing out that his

survey had deliberately avoided the state’s notably conservative

north with its smaller population and concentrated on the traditionally

vote rich Democratic counties concentrated near Miami. In this connection it

has been reported that Bush may have received some 130,000 to 260,000

unaccounted for votes in the state’s southern region. Where did these

votes come from?

 

The reason why the media seeks to shift the focus to the state’s

northern section is that it is far easier to bootstrap the Bush

victory alongside Karl Rove’s frequently repeated goal of adding

some four million votes from the 2000 total from conservative

Christian evangelicals.From the clumsy manner in which the

mainstream media seeks to take Robert Parry and others to

task for pointing out voting discrepancies it is obvious that no

solid foundation exists supporting the alleged Bush- voting surge.

 

On Election Night Ken Mehlman significantly crowed not about

Republican gains in the north but in the south, especially along

the Interstate 4 tier known as the I-4 Corridor. His effusiveness

was sought to spin optimism for a Florida victory, but in focusing

on this area the question once more surfaces: Where did this

sudden surge of Bush votes come from? Meanwhile in Democratic

stronghold Broward County the new Bush-appointed Supervisor

of Elections, Brenda Snipes, announced shortly before the

November 2 election that over 90,000 absentee ballots had not

been sent out. This discovery came after her office had been

flooded with calls from concerned voters who had not received

their absentee ballots.

 

Snipes eventually appealed to Secretary of State Glenda Hood in

Tallahassee to resolve the problem. What happened? We do know,

however, that Hood is wearing Katherine Harris’s old mantle well.

She helped Jeb Bush prepare another “felon list” to disqualify

African American voters, just as her predecessor had infamously

done four years ago. There was another sea of “spoiled votes”

tossed into receptacles. Guess where they predominantly came

from? If you said African American precincts you are one hundred

percent correct.

 

Greg Palast uncovered the Florida fraud involving Jeb Bush and

Katherine Harris four years ago. Significantly, his reporting came

from the BBC and not an American outpost, since the mainstream

media turned deaf when he came calling. After investigating the

2004 election he announced that Kerry had won both Ohio and

New Mexico. Palast noted that the “spoiled vote” discard piles

were awesome in both states, with African American precincts

singled out in Ohio and Hispanics from predominantly Democratic

voting stations debited in New Mexico.

 

17. Some Hard Cold Facts

80% of all votes in America are counted by only

two companies: Diebold and ES&S.  

 

There is no federal agency with regulatory authority or

oversight of the U.S. voting machine industry.  

 

The vice-president of Diebold and the president of ES&S

are brothers.  

 

The chairman and CEO of Diebold is a major Bush campaign

organizer and donor who wrote in 2003 that he was “committed to

helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president

next year.”  

 

35% of ES&S is owned by Republican Senator Chuck Hagel,

who became Senator based on votes counted by ES&S machines.

 

Diebold’s new touch screen voting machines have no paper

trail of any votes. In other words, there is no way to verify that

the data coming out of the machine is the same as what was

legitimately put in by voters.  

 

Diebold also makes ATMs, checkout scanners, and ticket

machines, all of which log each transaction and can generate a paper

trail.  

 

Diebold is based in Ohio and supplies almost all the voting

machines there.

 

None of the international election observers were allowed in

the polls in Ohio.

 

30% of all U.S. votes are carried out on unverifiable touch

screen voting machines.

 

Bush’s Help America Vote Act of 2002 has as its goal to

replace all machines with the new electronic touch screen systems.

 

Republican Senator Chuck Hagel owns 35% of ES&S and was caught

lying about it.

 

ES&S is the largest voting machine manufacturer in the U.S. and

counts almost 60% of all U.S. votes.  

 

Exit polls for the 2004 elections were accurate within 1% or

less in areas where ballot machines were used.  

 

Major exit poll data discrepancies were noted in counties where

touch screen machines were used, especially in Ohio and Florida .

 

18. Conclusion

The above are the lines that connect the dots of the Bush Conspiracy

to steal this election. As Fox News’ “fair and balanced” Bill

O’Reilly says repeatedly “we report, you decide”.

 

Well, go ahead and decide. If you decide that George Bush is

guilty, then we all must act now or else there will be no next time.


 http://www.salon.com/2011/09/27/votinghack/

Tuesday, Sep 27, 2011 05:31 PM IST



Diebold voting machines can be hacked by remote control

Exclusive: A laboratory shows how an e-voting machine
used by a third of all voters can be easily manipulated


Topics:
2012 Elections,
Computers,

Diebold voting machines can be hacked by remote control(Credit: iStockphoto/dcdp)

It could be one of the most disturbing e-voting machine hacks to date.

Voting
machines used by as many as a quarter of American voters heading to the
polls in 2012 can be hacked with just $10.50 in parts and an 8th grade
science education, according to computer science and security experts at
the Vulnerability Assessment Team at Argonne National Laboratory
in Illinois. The experts say the newly developed hack could change
voting results while leaving absolutely no trace of the manipulation
behind.

“We believe these man-in-the-middle attacks are
potentially possible on a wide variety of electronic voting machines,”
said Roger Johnston, leader of the assessment team “We think we can do
similar things on pretty much every electronic voting machine.”

The
Argonne Lab, run by the Department of Energy, has the mission of
conducting scientific research to meet national needs. The Diebold
Accuvote voting system used in the study was loaned to the lab’s
scientists by VelvetRevolution.us, of which the Brad Blog is a co-founder. Velvet Revolution received the machine from a former Diebold contractor

Previous
lab demonstrations of e-voting system hacks, such as Princeton’s
demonstration of a viral cyber attack on a Diebold touch-screen system —
as I wrote for Salon back in 2006
— relied on cyber attacks to change the results of elections. Such
attacks, according to the team at Argonne, require more coding skills
and knowledge of the voting system software than is needed for the
attack on the Diebold system.

Indeed, the Argonne team’s attack
required no modification, reprogramming, or even knowledge, of the
voting machine’s proprietary source code. It was carried out by
inserting a piece of inexpensive “alien electronics” into the machine.

The
Argonne team’s demonstration of the attack on a Diebold Accuvote
machine is seen in a short new video shared exclusively with the Brad
Blog [posted below]. The team successfully demonstrated a similar attack
on a touch-screen system made by Sequoia Voting Systems in 2009.

The new findings of the Vulnerability Assessment Team echo long-ignored concerns about e-voting vulnerabilities issued by other computer scientists and security experts, the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (an arm of the Department of Homeland Security), and even a long-ignored presentation by a CIA official given to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

“This is a national security issue,” says Johnston. “It should really be handled by the Department of Homeland Security.”

The
use of touch-screen Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems of
the type Argonne demonstrated to be vulnerable to manipulation has
declined in recent years due to security concerns, and the high cost of
programming and maintenance. Nonetheless, the same type of DRE systems,
or ones very similar, will once again be used by a significant part of
the electorate on Election Day in 2012. According to Sean Flaherty, a
policy analyst for VerifiedVoting.org,
a nonpartisan e-voting watchdog group, “About one-third of registered
voters live where the only way to vote on Election Day is to use a DRE.”

Almost
all voters in states like Georgia, Maryland, Utah and Nevada, and the
majority of voters in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana and Texas, will
vote on DREs on Election Day in 2012, says Flaherty. Voters in major
municipalities such as Houston, Atlanta, Chicago and Pittsburgh will
also line up in next year’s election to use DREs of the type hacked by
the Argonne National Lab.

Voting machine companies and election
officials have long sought to protect source code and the memory cards
that store ballot programming and election results for each machine as a
way to guard against potential outside manipulation of election
results. But critics like California Secretary of State Debra Bowen have
pointed out that attempts at “security by obscurity” largely ignore the
most immediate threat, which comes from election insiders who have
regular access to the e-voting systems, as well as those who may gain
physical access to machines that were not designed with security
safeguards in mind.

“This is a fundamentally very powerful attack
and we believe that voting officials should become aware of this and
stop focusing strictly on cyber [attacks],” says Vulnerability
Assessment Team member John Warner. “There’s a very large physical
protection component of the voting machine that needs to be addressed.”

The
team’s video demonstrates how inserting the inexpensive electronic
device into the voting machine can offer a “bad guy” virtually complete
control over the machine. A cheap remote control unit can enable access
to the voting machine from up to half a mile away.

“The
cost of the attack that you’re going to see was $10.50 in retail
quantities,” explains Warner in the video. “If you want to use the RF
[radio frequency] remote control to stop and start the attacks, that’s
another $15. So the total cost would be $26.”

The video shows
three different types of attack, each demonstrating how the  intrusion
developed by the team allows them to take complete control of the
Diebold touch-screen voting machine. They were able to demonstrate a
similar attack on a DRE system made by Sequoia Voting Systems as well.

In
what Warner describes as “probably the most relevant attack for vote
tampering,” the intruder would allow the voter to make his or her
selections. But when the voter actually attempts to push the Vote Now
button, which records the voter’s final selections to the system’s
memory card, he says, “we will simply intercept that attempt … change a
few of the votes,” and  the changed votes would then be registered in
the machine.

“In order to do this,” Warner explains, “we blank the
screen temporarily so that the voter doesn’t see that there’s some
revoting going on prior to the final registration of the votes.”

This type of attack is particularly troubling because the manipulation would occur after
the voter has approved as “correct” the on-screen summaries of his or
her intended selections. Team leader Johnson says that while such an
attack could be mounted on Election Day, there would be “a high
probability of being detected.” But he explained that the machines could
also be tampered with during so-called voting machine “sleepovers” when
e-voting systems are kept by poll workers at their houses, often days and weeks prior to the election or at other times when the systems are  unguarded.

“The
more realistic way to insert these alien electronics is to do it while
the voting machines are waiting in the polling place a week or two prior
to the election,” Johnston said. “Often the polling places are in
elementary schools or a church basement or some place that doesn’t
really have a great deal of security. Or the voting machines can be
tampered while they’re in transit to the polling place. Or while they’re
in storage in the warehouse between elections,” says Johnston. He notes
that the Argonne team had no owner’s manual or circuit diagrams for
either the Diebold or Sequoia voting systems they were able to access in
these attacks.

The  team members are critical of election
security procedures, which rarely, if ever, include physical inspection
of the machines, especially their internal electronics. Even if such
inspections were carried out, however, the Argonne scientists say the
type of attack they’ve developed leaves behind no physical or
programming evidence, if properly executed.

“The really nice thing
about this attack, the man-in-the-middle, is that there’s no soldering
or destruction of the circuit board of any kind,” Warner says. “You can
remove this attack and leave no forensic evidence that we’ve been
there.”

Gaining access to the inside of the Diebold touch-screen is as simple as picking the rudimentary lock, or using a standard hotel minibar key, as all of the machines use the same easily copied key, available at most office supply stores.

“I
think our main message is, let’s not get overly transfixed on the
cyber,” team leader Johnston says. Since he believes they “can do
similar things on pretty much every electronic voting machine,” he
recommends a number of improvements for future e-voting systems.

“The
machines themselves need to be designed better, with the idea that
people may be trying to get into them,” he says. ” If you’re just
thinking about the fact that someone can try to get in, you can design
the seals better, for example.”

“Don’t do things like use a
standard blank key for every machine,” he warns. “Spend an extra four
bucks and get a better lock. You don’t have to have state of the art
security, but you can do some things where it takes at least a little
bit of skill to get in.”

————

The video demonstration
and explanation of the Diebold “Man-in-the-Middle” attack, as developed
by Argonne National Lab’s Vulnerability Assessment Team, follows below.
Their related attack on a Sequoia voting system can be viewed here
.

* * *

 

Investigative journalist and broadcaster Brad Friedman is the creator and publisher of The BRAD Blog.
He has contributed to Mother Jones, The Guardian, Truthout, Huffington
Post, The Trial Lawyer magazine and Editor & Publisher.

http://boingboing.net/2009/10/20/voting-machine-sourc.html

Voting machine source-code leak shows election-rigging subroutines?

Sequouia, a company that makes many of the electronic voting machines
used in the US and elsewhere, has inadvertently leaked much of the
secret source-code that powers its systems. The first cut at analysis
shows what looks like illegal election-rigging code (”code that appears
to control or at least influence the logical flow of the election”) in
the source.

Sequoia blew it on a public records response. We (basically EDA) have
election databases from Riverside County that Sequoia insisted on
“redacting” first, for which we paid cold cash. They appear instead to
have just vandalized the data as valid databases by stripping the MS-SQL
header data off, assuming that would stop us cold.

They were wrong.

The Linux “strings” command was able to peel it apart. Nedit was able
to digest 800meg text files. What was revealed was thousands of lines
of MS-SQL source code that appears to control or at least influence the
logical flow of the election, in violation of a bunch of clauses in the
FEC voting system rulebook banning interpreted code, machine modified
code and mandating hash checks of voting system code.

I’ve got it all organized for commentary and download in wiki form.

This is the first time we can legally study a voting system’s innards without NDAs or court-ordered secrecy.

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120702/04164119552/hackable-irish-e-voting-machines-that-cost-54-million-euros-sold-scrap-9-euros-piece.shtml

Hackable Irish E-Voting Machines That Cost 54 Million Euros Sold For Scrap: 9 Euros A Piece

from the buy-high,-sell-low dept

For
years, we’ve been pointing out the massive problems of e-voting, and
governments’ general blindness to the security risks. Of course, beyond
the basic fear of fraud, there should have also been concerns about
wasting taxpayer money. Apparently those concerns didn’t amount to much
in Ireland. As Slashdot
highlights, Ireland spent €54 million on 7,500 e-voting machines.
However, after realizing that there was no way to secure them from being
hacked, the government has sold them off for scrap for a grand total of €70,000, or approximately €9 per machine. On the bright side, at least they weren’t completely worthless…

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/08/ca-releases-sou/


CA Releases Source Code Review of Voting Machines — New Security Flaws Revealed; Old Ones Were Never Fixed

Electronicvoting2_2
A team of computer scientists tasked with examining the source code of
voting machines used in California (and elsewhere across the country)
finally released their much-anticipated report on Thursday and it
contains significant information that could lead the secretary of state
to decertify the machines on Friday (the last day by which Secretary of
State Debra Bowen can make decisions that affect voting machines that
will be used in 2008).

The team, led by UC Berkeley computer scientist David Wagner,
conducted the most thorough security examination of e-voting machines
that has been done to date and examined both touch-screen and
optical-scan systems (a separate Red Team conducted hacking tests on the
machines and released their report last week).

Wagner’s source code team found that the Diebold system still had
many of the most serious security flaws that computer scientists had
uncovered in the system years ago, despite Diebold’s claims that
problems had been fixed. These include vulnerabilities that would allow
an attacker to install malicious software to record votes incorrectly or
miscount them or that would allow an attacker with access to only one
machine and its memory card to launch a vote-stealing virus that could
spread to every machine in a county.

They also found that the Diebold system lacked administrative
safeguards to prevent county election workers from escalating their
privileges on the election management software that counts the votes.
Essentially, the researchers found that the Diebold software was so
“fragile” that it would require an entire re-engineering of the system
to make it secure. From the Diebold report (PDF):

Since many of the vulnerabilities in the Diebold system
result from deep architectural flaws, fixing individual defects
piecemeal without addressing their underlying causes is unlikely to
render the system secure. Systems that are architecturally unsound tend
to exhibit “weakness-
in-depth” — even as known flaws in them are fixed, new ones tend to be
discovered. In this sense, the Diebold software is fragile.

Here’s just a sample of what the researchers found in the Diebold system:

Data on the memory cards for the optical-scan machines is unauthenticated

The connection between the voting machines and the server that contains the vote-counting software is unauthenticated

The memory card checksums do not adequately detect malicious tampering

The audit log does not adequately detect malicious tampering

The memory card “signature” does not adequately detect malicious tampering

Buffer overflows in unchecked string operations allow arbitrary code execution

Integer overflows in the vote counters are unchecked

Votes can be swapped or neutralized by modifying the defined candidate voting coordinates stored on the memory card

Multiple vulnerabilities in the AccuBasic interpreter allow arbitrary code execution

A malicious AccuBasic script can be used to hide attacks against the
optical-scan machine and defeat the integrity of zero and summary tapes
printed on the optical-scan machine

The touch-screen machine automatically installs bootloader and operating
system updates from the memory card without verifying the authenticity
of the updates

The touch-screen machine automatically installs application updates from
the memory card without verifying the authenticity of the updates

Multiple buffer overflows in .ins file handling allow arbitrary code execution on startup

The list goes on. The researchers also describe an interesting
scenario for hacking the voter-verified paper audit trail that gets
printed out from touch-screen machines (see p. 15 of the report).

The researchers found that although some vulnerabilities could be
mitigated by making changes to election procedures, poll workers and
election officials likely wouldn’t be able to implement them adequately
(see this story
on last year’s primary in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, to see why relying on
poll workers and election officials to make voting systems secure can be
problematic.)

Two other systems (Sequoia and Hart InterCivic) were also examined,
with similar results. Regarding the Sequoia system, the researchers
write that “virtually every important software security mechanism is
vulnerable to circumvention.” You can see the Sequoia report here and the Hart InterCivic report here.

http://www.smartmatic.com/solutions/electoral-solutions/view/article/next-generation-voting-technology/#.UU5Cz4XleYU



Next-Generation Voting Technology

Democracy becomes stronger through fair, transparent
elections and legitimate results recognized by all.  The will of the
citizens is the only factor that should determine the outcome of an
election. To make this premise a reality, Smartmatic offers a turnkey
solution with technology of the latest generation.  The company’s
experience is its best letter of presentation.  

Proven by the most rigorous tests and fully
complying with the highest quality standards, Smartmatic’s electoral
technology includes: 

-Multiple audits at every stage, including audits of the source code

-A printed receipt of the vote

-Secure transmission (direct or consolidated)

-Redundant storage

-Advanced data recovery mechanisms

-The latest standards in digital security

-100% accuracy

Proven Benefits

1. Security:Multiple security mechanisms that
come from the novel combination of internationally recognized
algorithms based on accepted standards, which constitute a totally
bulletproof architecture.

2. Agility: With the Smartmatic voting
machines, the voter casts his vote quickly and results are obtained just
minutes after the election day is over, guaranteeing zero numerical
inconsistencies or null votes caused by the technology. It is possible
to produce partial results bulletins and to post them automatically on
the Internet.

3. Auditability:  One of the key advantages of Smartmatic’s technology is allowing for multiple audits before, during and after the event.

4. Veracity: For every vote that is cast a
written receipt is printed that allows the voter to ratify his choice
before casting it into the ballot box, also permitting later audits. 
Smartmatic was the first company in the world to incorporate this
function in a national election.

5. Economy: Every well-designed automated
voting system ought to be capable of reducing election costs. The
printing and transfer of ballots, precinct counts and printed ballots
(involving up to thousands tons of paper) are eliminated.

6. Flexibility: Smartmatic takes into account
that every jurisdiction has its own rules and laws for the tallying of
votes, and the company’s technology can be configured independently for
different elections under different methodologies, such as: D’Hondt,
relative majority, simple majority, etc.

7. Accessibility: Through special devices and
accessories, Smartmatic’s technology makes voting easier for voters
having disabilities and guarantees the equality and independence of all
voters.

8. Versatility:  The solution allows the incorporation of voter and civil registry identification systems, on the same Smartmatic platform.

9. Autonomy: Smartmatic contemplates, should
the electoral authority consider it necessary, the transfer of electoral
technology and the sale of perpetual licenses. This transfer allows the
autonomy of the electoral organism in the mid- and long term.

Technology strengthens the electoral process and automated elections will become the natural way to exercise democracy.

VOICE OF SARVAJAN

Next-Generation Voting Technology solution may also be a mobile system where it could be taken door to door along with representatives of various candidates contesting the election. This will save large number of polling booths required in large democracies which may not require and ID card and as people are happy that electricity, water bills etc are delivered door to door. Same system may be for Electronic Voting Machines as well.

Promoted Comments


  • I think that all-paper vote is still the most reliable and safe
    procedure. Even the paper+scanning machine is dubiously useful. It is
    more costly than simple paper, and if you want to check that the machine
    counted right you still have to review the ballots by hand (with all
    the problems that this might create when the ballot were originally
    designed for being machine-readable, witness Florida 2000).
    That some
    voters are illiterate does not say anything in favour of e-voting, on
    the one hand they still have to be able to read on the screen, on the
    other hand there is no need at all to have a system that requires people
    writing full names of parties and candidates. Pre-printed paper ballots
    where the voter only have to mark an X are the way to go. Much simpler
    and much safer than e-voting, and just as illiterate friendly as it can
    be.

 http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000276

How to Vote on an Electronic Voting Machine

The majority of electronic voting machines in use are manufactured by four companies: Premier Election Solutions (formerly known as Diebold Election Systems), Election Systems and Software (ES&S), Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems. While all electronic voting machines directly record and tabulate votes electronically, the way votes are cast differs between machines and models.

Most DRE (direct recording electronic) voting machines are touch
screen (the machine records the voter’s selections when the voter
presses “buttons” on the machine’s screen) or Selection Wheel (the
machine utilizes a wheel similar to an iPod to allow voters to make
selections). Some machines, including touch screen and Selection Wheel,
require voters to insert an access card to initiate the voting process,
while others require an electronic ballot or access code.

Below is a step-by-step guide to using a popular model of
electronic voting machine from each of the top four manufacturers as
well as links to instruction manuals for each machine. Instructions for
the use of optional features such as a voter verified paper audit trail
have been included when applicable, although particular features may not
be used in every polling location.

I. Premier/Diebold AccuVote TS
II. Election Systems and Software (ES&S) iVotronic
III. Hart InterCivic eSlate
IV. Sequoia AVC Edge


I. Premier/Diebold AccuVote TS
The
Accuvote TS is a touchscreen DRE (direct recording electronic) voting
machine with VVPAT (voter-verified paper audit trail) capability. In the
2012 elections, the Accuvote TS was used statewide in four states (AL,
GA, MD, and UT) and in some jurisdictions in 18 states (AZ, CA, CO, FL,
IL, IN, KS, KY, MS, MO, OH, PA, TN, TX, VA, WA, WI, and WY).

Diebold AccuVote TS Operators Manual (PDF) 1.1 MB

1. Insert Card
Insert the voter access card into the slot to the right of
the screen. The card should be face up with the arrow pointing left and
should be pushed firmly into the slot until it clicks.

2. Read Instructions Screen
Before you begin the voting process, you can magnify or change
the contrast of the ballot to help increase readability. To begin
voting, touch the “Next” button on the screen. You will use the “Next”
button to see each ballot page until you have reached the end of the
ballot.

3a. Select Candidates or Issues OR Select Write-In if Desired
Touch the box on the screen next to your choice. An “X” will
appear, designating your selection. To change or cancel your selection,
touch the box again and make another selection. If there are write-in
candidates for whom you wish to vote, select “Write-In” and a keyboard
will appear on the screen.

3b. Select Write-In Candidate
Separately type the name of each person you want to write-in,
then select “Record Write-In.” The normal voting screen will return and
the name you entered will appear as the choice for that particular race.
touch “Back” to review previous pages.

4. Review Your Ballot
On the Summary Page review your choices. Items in red are
races that were left fully blank or not fully voted. If you want to vote
for a race that was left blank or not fully voted, or change your vote
for any race, just touch that race on the screen and you will be taken
back to the proper page to make or change your selection.

5. Print Ballot for Verification
If the AccuVote is fitted with a voter-verified paper audit
trail, touch “Print Ballot” and you will see an enclosed printed copy of
your choices to the right of the machine. After reviewing the ballot
printout, you can either cast or reject your ballot.

6. Cast the Ballot
Touch “Cast Ballot” when you are ready to record your vote.
Once your ballot has been cast, the printer will scroll to hide your
selections.

7. Finish: Remove Card
You have completed the electronic touch screen voting process.
Remove your voter access card and return it to a poll worker.

Sources: California Secretary of State Office and Diebold Election Systems

II. Election Systems and Software (ES&S) iVotronic
The
ES&S iVotronic is a DRE machine with a touch screen interface and
VVPAT capability. In the 2012 elections, the iVotronic was used
statewide in SC and in some districts in 17 states and DC (AR, CO, FL,
IN, KS, KY, MO, MS, NC, NJ, OH, PA, TN, TX, VA, WV, and WI).

ES&S iVotronic Operators Manual (PDF) 4.5 MB

1. Activate Ballot
You or a pollworker will activate your electronic ballot by
inserting it into the appropriate slot. Next, touch language of choice
with your finger.

2. Select Candidate
To select your candidate, touch the box next to the name. To
de-select, touch the box again. the iVotronic will not allow you to vote
for more people than may be elected to any one office.

3. Review Ballot
After completing last ballot page, touch “review” and
carefully review the selection review screen. To change or make a new
choice, touch the box next to candidate or office name, and then touch
box next to new selection.

4. Vote!
When finished, press the flashing red “vote” button to cast your ballot.

“Thank You For Voting” screen means you have properly cast your ballot.

Source: Election Systems and Software

III. Hart InterCivic eSlate
The
eSlate voting machine is a DRE machine with a select wheel, push button
interface, and VVPAT capability. In the 2012 elections, the Hart eSlate
was used statewide in Hawaii and in some jurisdictions in 11 states
(CA, CO, IL, IN, KY, OH, PA, TN, TX, and WA).

Hart InterCivic eSlate Operators Manual (PDF) 468 KB

1. How the eSlate Works
The eSlate is not a touch screen voting device. Voters
navigate through the ballot with the SELECT wheel and make their choices
by pressing the ENTER button.

2. Getting Started
Using the SELECT wheel, the voter selects a language. Next,
the voter enters the randomly generated four-digit access code they
receive at check-in at the polling place. The code tells the system
which ballot to produce for the voter’s precinct. The access code does
not identify the voter in any way and can not be linked to the voter.

3. Making Ballot Choices
The ballot then appears on the color screen and the voter
uses the SELECT wheel to move a blue highlight bar through the ballot.
Once the voter moves the highlight bar onto their desired choice, they
simply press the large button marked ENTER and the selection is marked.
The box beside that choice is marked in red and the voter’s selection
becomes bold while all of the other choices fade into the background so
the voter has a strong visual signal of their vote.

4. Reviewing the Ballot Choices
After the voter has voted in the last contest on the ballot, a
Ballot Summary screen will appear listing all the choices made and lets
the voter know if they have missed voting in any race. If the voter
makes a mistake or changes their mind they can make corrections from the
Ballot Summary screen.

5. Final Cast Ballot
After reviewing and confirming the Ballot Summary screen, the
voter can press the CAST BALLOT to finish voting. The screen informs
the voter that they cannot go back after CAST BALLOT has been pressed.
Voters will know they have finished voting when they see the waving
American flag or hear “Your vote has been recorded” on the audio
headset.

Sources: San Mateo County Elections Office and Hart InterCivic

IV. Sequoia AVC Edge
The
Sequoia AVC Edge is a DRE touch screen machine with multilingual and
VVPAT capability. In the 2012 election, the AVC Edge was used statewide
in Nevada and in some jurisdictions in 11 states (AZ, CA, CO, FL, IL,
MS, NJ, PA, VA, WA, and WI).

Sequoia AVC Edge Operators Manual (PDF) 171 KB

1. Activate Your Ballot
A poll worker will give you a single-use “Voter Card.” Insert
the card into the yellow slot on the Sequoia voting machine to activate
your ballot. The card will remain in the machine until you have
completed voting.

2. Vote
When the list of choices appears on the screen, simply touch
the box containing your preference. To change your selection, touch the
box again. Touch the “Next” or “Back” arrows at the bottom of the screen
to turn pages in your ballot.

3. Verify and Print
After marking your ballot, a review screen allows you to see
all of your selections. To make a change, touch the box you would like
to revise and you will be returned to the corresponding page of the
ballot. If the machine is fitted with a voter-verified paper audit
trail, you will be asked to print and review a paper record of your
ballot. The paper record will appear in the window on the left of the
screen.

4. Cast Ballot
After verifying the paper record, you may either touch the
“Make Changes” or “Ballot” button on the screen. If you choose to make
changes, a new paper record incorporating your revisions will be
printed. When you select “Cast Ballot,” the printer will indicate the
paper record was accepted by the voter. The paper and electronic record
will remain securely stored inside the machine.

Sources: California Secretary of State Office and Sequoia Voting Systems

PROGRAMS

24th March 2013 SUNDAY 9:00 AM


Venue: Mahabodhi Dhammaduta Vihara, Narasipura Village,
Dasanapura Hobli, Bangalore-North

9:00AM - Inauguration and Consecration of the
Mahabodhi Dhammaduta Vihara
Meditation Hall and monks rooms

Blessings by
Ven.Acharya Buddharakkhita

Consecration and Paritta Recitation by the
Venerable Monks from India and Abroad led by

Venerable Kiribathagoda Gnanananda Thero
Founder, Mahamevnawa Monastery, Sri Lanka


Dhamma D
iscourses by

Venerable Bhaddanta Tejinda
International Meditation Teacher, Mahachulalongkorn University, Thailand

Ven.Phrakhru Ghositbodhisat
Vipassana Meditation Teacher, Mahachulalongkorn University, Thailand

Presided by
Venerable Kassapa Mahathera
Vice-President, Naha Bodhi Society, Bangalore

(Transportation will be arranged from Maha Bodhi Society,
Gandhinagar, Departure exactly at 8 AM. Return reaching Maha
Bodhi Society at 5 pm. Please inform Mr.Athgalo Tel:08892029628
if you need transportation on or before 22-3-2013


3. 8.
Pañhama-duññhadosasikkhàpadaü


1.
Tena samayena buddho bhagavà ràjagahe viharati veëuvane
kalandakanivàpe. Tena kho pana samayena àyasmatà dabbena mallaputtena
jàtiyà sattavassena arahattaü sacchikataü hoti, yaü-1 ki¤ci sàvakena
pattabbaü, sabbaü tena anuppattaü hoti, natthi cassa ki¤ci uttariü
karaõãyaü, katassa và paticayo. Atha kho àyasmato dabbassa mallaputtassa
rahogatassa patisallãnassa evaü cetaso parivitakko udapàdi: “mayà kho
jàtiyà sattavassena arahattaü sacchikataü. Yaü ki¤ci sàvakena pattabbaü
sabbaü mayà anuppattaü, natthi ca me ki¤ci uttariü karaõãyaü, katassa và
paticayo. Kinnu kho ahaü saïghassa veyyàvaccaü kareyya’nti. Atha kho
àyasmato dabbassa mallaputtassa etadahosi: “yannånàhaü saïghassa
senàsana¤ca pa¤¤àpeyyaü, bhattàni ca uddiseyya”nti.

2.
Atha kho àyasmà dabbo mallaputto sàyanhasamayaü patisallànà vuññhito
yena bhagavà tenupasaïkami, upasaïkamitvà bhagavantaü abhivàdetvà
ekamantaü nisãdi. Ekamantaü nisinno kho àyasmà dabbo mallaputto
bhagavantaü etadavoca: “idha mayhaü bhante rahogatassa patisallãnassa
evaü cetaso parivitakko udapàdi: mayà kho jàtiyà sattavassena arahattaü
sacchikataü. Yaü ki¤ci sàvakena pattabbaü sabbaü mayà anuppattaü, natthi
ca me ki¤ci uttariü karaõãyaü. Katassa và paticayo, kinnu kho ahaü
saïghassa veyyàvaccaü kareyya”nti. Tassa mayhaü bhante etadahosi:
“yannånàhaü saïghassa senàsana¤ca pa¤¤àpeyyaü, bhattàni ca
uddiseyya”nti. “Icchàmahaü bhante saïghassa senàsana¤ca pa¤¤àpetuü,
bhattàni ca uddisitu”nti. “Sàdhu sàdhu dabba tena hi tvaü dabba
saïghassa senàsana¤ca pa¤¤àpehi, bhattàni ca uddisà”ti. “Evaü bhante”ti
kho àyasmà dabbo mallaputto bhagavato paccassosi.

3.
Atha kho bhagavà etasmiü nidàne etasmiü pakaraõe dhammiü kathaü katvà
bhikkhå àmantesi: “tena hi bhikkhave saïgho dabbaü mallaputtaü
senàsanapa¤¤àpaka¤ca bhattuddesaka¤ca sammannatu. Eva¤ca pana bhikkhave
sammannitabbo: pañhamaü dabbo mallaputto yàcitabbo. Yàcitvà vyattena
bhikkhunà pañibalena saïgho ¤àpetabbo:

“Suõàtu
me bhante saïgho. Yadi saïghassa pattakallaü, saïgho àyasmantaü dabbaü
mallaputtaü senàsanapa¤¤àpaka¤ca bhattuddesaka¤ca [PTS Page 159] [\q
159/] sammanneyya, esà ¤atti:

1. Ya¤ca ki¤ci, mu.

[BJT Page 418] [\x 418/]

Suõàtu
me bhante saïgho, saïgho àyasmantaü dabbaü mallaputtaü
senàsanapa¤¤àpaka¤ca bhattuddesaka¤ca sammannati, yassàyasmato khamati
àyasmato dabbassa mallaputtassa senàsanapa¤¤àpakassa ca
bhattudadesakassa ca sammuti. So tuõhassa. Yassa nakkhamati, so
bhàseyya:

Sammato
saïghena àyasmà dabbo mallaputto senàsanapa¤¤àpako ca bhattuddesako ca
khamati saïghassa. Tasmà tuõhã, evametaü dhàrayà mã”ti.

5.
Sammato ca panàyasmà dabbo mallaputto sabhàgànaü sabhàgànaü bhikkhånaü
ekajjhaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti. Ye te bhikkhå suttantikà tesaü ekajjhaü
senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti, “te a¤¤ama¤¤aü suttantaü saïgàyissanti” ti. Ye te
bhikkhå vinayadharà tesaü ekajjhaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti, “te a¤¤ama¤¤aü
vinayaü vinicchinissantã”ti. -1 Ye te bhikkhå dhammakathikà tesaü
ekajjhaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti. “Te a¤¤ama¤¤aü dhammaü sàkacchissantã”ti.
Ye te bhikkhå jhàyino tesaü ekajjhaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti, “te a¤¤ama¤¤aü
na vyàbàdhissanti”ti. -2 Ye te bhikkhå tiracchànakathikà
kàyadaóóhibahulà-3 viharanti, tesampi ekajjhaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti,
“imàyapime àyasmanto ratiyà acchissantã”ti. Ye te bhikkhå vikàle
àgacchanti, tesampi tejodhàtuü samàpajjitvà teneva àlokena senàsanaü
pa¤¤àpeti. Apissu bhikkhå sa¤cicca vikàle àgacchanti “mayaü àyasmato
dabbassa mallaputtassa iddhipàñihàriyaü passissàmà”ti. Te àyasmantaü
dabbaü mallaputtaü upasaïkamitvà evaü vadenti: “amhàkaü àvuso dabba,
senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehã”ti. Te àyasmà dabbo mallaputto evaü vadeti:
“katthàyasmantà icchanti, kattha pa¤¤àpemã”ti. Te sa¤cicca dåre
apadisanti, “amhàkaü àvuso dabba, gijjhakåñe pabbate senàsanaü
pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso corapapàte senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso
isigilipasse kàëasilàyaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso vebhàrapasse
sattapaõõiguhàyaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso sãtavane
sappasoõóikapabbhàre senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso gotamakandaràyaü
senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso tindukakandaràyaü senàsanaü
pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso tapodakandaràyaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü
àvuso tapodàràme senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso jãvakambavane [PTS
Page 160] [\q 160/] senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehi, amhàkaü àvuso maddakucchismiü
migadàye senàsanaü pa¤¤àpehã”ti. Tesaü àyasmà dabbo mallaputto
tejodhàtuü samàpajjitvà aïguliyà jalamànàya purato purato gacchati. Tepi
teneva àlokena àyasmato dabbassa mallaputtassa piññhito piññhito
gacchanti. Tesaü àyasmà dabbo mallaputto evaü senàsanaü pa¤¤àpeti: ayaü
ma¤co, idaü pãñhaü, ayaü bhisi, idaü bimbohanaü, idaü vaccaññhànaü, idaü
passàvaññhànaü, idaü pànãyaü, idaü paribhojanãyaü, ayaü kattaradaõóo,
idaü saïghassa katikasaõñhànaü, imaü kàlaü pavisitabbaü, imaü kàlaü
nikkhamitabba”nti. Tesaü àyasmà dabbo mallaputto senàsanaü pa¤¤àpetvà
punadeva vephavanaü paccàgacchati.

1. Vinicchissantãti, katthaci.

2. Vyàbàhissantã”ti.

3. Kàyadaëhibahulà machasaü.

[BJT Page 420] [\x 420/]

6.
Tena kho pana samayena mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå navakà ceva honti
appapu¤¤à ca, yàni saïghassa làmakàni senàsanàni, tàni tesaü pàpuõanti
làmakàni ca bhattàni, tena kho pana samayena ràjagahe manussà icchanti
therànaü bhikkhånaü abhisaïkhàrikaü piõóapàtaü dàtuü sappimpi telampi
uttaribhaïgampi. Mettiyabhummajakànaü pana bhikkhånaü pàkatikaü denti
yathàrandhaü kaõàjakaü bilaïgadutiyaü, te pacchàbhattaü
piõóapàtapañikkantà there bhikkhu pucchanti: tumhàkaü àvuso bhattagge
kiü ahosi, tumhàkaü kiü ahosã”ti. Ekacce therà evaü vadenti: “amhàkaü
àvuso sappi ahosi telaü ahosi uttaribhaïgaü ahosã”ti. Mettiyabhummajakà
pana bhikkhå evaü vadenti: “amhàkaü àvuso na ki¤ci ahosi pàkatikaü
yathàrandhaü kaõàjakaü bilaïgadutiya”nti.

7.
Tena kho pana samayena kalyàõabhattiko gahapati saïghassa
vatukkabhattaü deti niccabhattaü. So bhattagge saputtadàro upatiññhitvà
parivisati, a¤¤e odanena pucchanti, a¤¤e såpena pucchanti, a¤¤e telena
pucchanti, a¤¤e uttaribhaïgena pucchanti. Tena kho pana samayena
kalyàõabhattikassa gahapatino bhattaü svàtanàya mettiyabhummajakànaü
bhikkhånaü uddiññhaü hoti. Atha kho kalayàõabhattiko gahapati àràmaü
agamàsi kenacideva karaõãyena. So yenàyasmà dabbo mallaputto
tenupasaïkami, upasaïkamitvà àyasmantaü dabbaü mallaputtaü abhivàdetvà
ekamantaü nisãdi. Ekamantaü nisinnaü kho kalyàõabhattikaü [PTS Page 161]
[\q 161/] gahapatiü àyasmà dabbo mallaputto dhammiyà kathàya sandassesi
samàdapesi samuttejesi sampahaüsesi. Atha kho kalyàõabhattiko gahapati
àyasmatà dabbena mallaputtena dhammiyà kathàya sandassito samàdapito
samuttejito sampahaüsito àyasmantaü dabbaü mallaputtaü etadavoca: “kassa
bhante amhàkaü ghare svàtanàya bhattaü uddiññha”nti?
“Mettiyabhummajakànaü kho gahapati bhikkhånaü tumhàkaü ghare svàtanàya
bhattaü uddiññha”nti.

8.
Atha kho kalyàõabhattiko gahapati anattamano ahosi: “kathaü hi nàma
pàpabhikkhå amhàkaü ghare svàtanàya bhattaü bhu¤jissantã”ti gharaü
gantvà dàsiü àõàpesi: “ye je sve bhattikà àgacchanti, te koññhake àsanaü
pa¤¤àpetvà kaõàjakena bilaïgadutiyena parivisà”ti “evaü ayyà”ti kho sà
dàsã kalyàõabhattikassa gahapatino paccassosi.

9.
Atha kho mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå “hiyyo kho àvuso amhàkaü
kalyàõabhattikassa gahapatino bhattaü uddiññhaü, sve amhe
kalyàõabhattiko gahapati saputtadàro upatiññhitvà parivisissati. A¤¤e
odanena pucchissanti, a¤¤e såpena pucchissanti, a¤¤e telena
pucchissanti, a¤¤e uttaribhaïgena pucchissantã”ti. Te teneva somanassena
na cittaråpaü rattiyà supiüsu.

[BJT Page 422] [\x 422/]

10.
Atha kho mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhu pubbaõhasamayaü nivàsetvà
pattacãvaramàdàya yena kalyàõabhattikassa gahapatino nivesanaü
tenupasaïkamiüsu. Addasà kho sà dàsã mettiyabhummajake bhikkhå dåratova
àgacchante, disvàna koññhake àsanaü pa¤¤àpetvà mettiyabhummajake bhikkhå
etadavoca: “nisãdatha bhante”ti. Atha kho mettiyabhummajakànaü
bhikkhånaü etadahosi: “nissaüsayaü kho na tàva bhattaü siddhaü
bhavissati yàva-1 mayaü koññhake nisãdàpiyeyyàmà”-2 ti. Atha kho sà dàsi
kaõàjakena bilaïgadutiyena upaga¤ji: “bhu¤jatha bhante”ti mayaü kho
bhagini niccabhattikà”ti “jànàmayyà niccabhattikattha, apicàhaü hiyyova
àõattà: ‘ye je sve bhattikà àgacchanti, te koññhake àsanaü pa¤¤àpetvà
kaõàjakena bilaïgadutiyena parivisà’ti. Bhu¤jatha bhante”ti.

11.
Atha kho mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå “hiyyo kho àvuso kalyàõabhattiko
gahapati àràmaü agamàsi, dabbassa mallaputtassa santike nissaüsayaü kho
mayaü dabbena mallaputtena gahapatino santike paribhinnà”ti. Te teneva
domanassena na cittaråpaü bhu¤jiüsu. Atha kho mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå
pacchàbhattaü [PTS Page 162] [\q 162/] piõóapàtapañikkantà àràmaü gantvà
pattacãvaraü pañisàmetvà bahàràmakoññhake saïghàñipallatthikàya
nisãdiüsu tuõhãbhåtà maïkubhåtà pattakkhandhà adhomukhà pajjhàyantà
appañibhànà.

12.
Atha kho mettiyà bhikkhunã yena mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå
tenupasaïkami, upasaïkamitvà mettiyabhummajake bhikkhå etadavoca:
“vandàmi ayyà”ti. -3 Evaü vutte mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå nàlapiüsu.
Dutiyampi kho -pe- tatiyampi kho mettiyà bhikkhånã mettiyabhummajake
bhikkhå etadavoca: “vandàmi ayyà”ti. Tatiyampi kho mettiyabhummajakà
bhikkhå nàlapiüsu. “Kyàhaü ayyànaü aparajjhàmi, kissa maü ayyà
nàlapantã”ti. Tathà hi pana tvaü bhagini, ambhe dabbena mallaputtena
viheñhiyamàne ajjhupekkhasã’ti. ‘Kyàhaü ayyà karomã’ti ’sace kho tvaü
bhagini iccheyyàsi ajjeva bhagavà dabbaü mallaputtaü nàsàpeyyà’ti.
Kyàhaü ayyà karomi. Kiü mayà sakkà kàtunti. Ehi tvaü bhagini, yena
bhagavà tenupasaïkama, upasaïkamitvà bhagavantaü evaü vadehi: ‘idaü
bhante nacchannaü nappatiråpaü, yàyaü bhante disà abhayà anãtikà
anupaddavà, sàyaü disà sabhayà saãtikà saupaddavà, yato nivàtaü tato
pavàtaü, -4 udakaü ma¤¤e àdittaü, ayyenamhi dabbena mallaputtena
dåsità’ti. Evaü ayyàti kho mettiyà bhikkhunã mettiyabhummajakànaü
bhikkhånaü pañissutvà yena bhagavà tenupasaïkami. Upasaïkamitvà
bhagavantaü abhivàdetvà ekamantaü aññhàsi, ekamantaü ñhità kho mettiyà
bhikkhunã bhagavantaü etadavoca: ‘idaü bhante nacchannaü nappatiråpaü,
yàyaü bhante disà abhayà anãtikà anupaddavà, sàyaü disà sabhayà saãtikà
saupaddavà, yato nivàtaü tato pavàtaü, udakaü ma¤¤e àdittaü, ayyenamhi
dabbena mallaputtena dusità’ti.

1. Yathà. Mu. 2. Nisãdeyyàmàti, sãmu. Nisãdàpãyàmàti syà. 3. Ayyeti -sãmu 4. Savàtaü - machasaü,

[BJT Page 424] [\x 424/]

13.
Atha kho bhagavà etasmiü nidàne etasmiü pakaraõe bhikkhusaïghaü
sannipàtàpetvà àyasmantaü dabbaü mallaputtaü pañipucchi: ’sarasi tvaü
dabba evaråpaü kattà yathàyaü bhikkhunã àhà, ti “yathà maü bhante
bhagavà jànàtã”ti. Dutiyampi kho bhagavà -pe- tatiyampi kho bhagavà
àyasmantaü dabbaü mallaputtaü etadavoca: “sarasi tvaü dabba evaråpaü
kattà yathàyaü bhikkhunã àhà”ti “yathà maü bhante bhagavà jànàtã”ti. ‘Na
kho dabba dabbà evaü nibbeñhenti. Sace tayà kataü katanti vadehi, sace
akataü akatanti vadehã’ti. “Yato ahaü bhante jàto nàbhãjànàmi
supinantenàpi methunaü dhammaü patisevità, pageva jàgaro”ti. Atha kho
bhagavà bhikkhu àmantesi: “tenahi bhikkhave mettiyaü bhikkhuniü [PTS
Page 163] [\q 163/] nàsetha, ime ca bhikkhå anuyu¤jathà”ti. Idaü vatvà
bhagavà uññhàyàsanà vihàraü pàvisi.

14.
Atha kho te bhikkhå mettiyaü bhikkhuniü nàsesuü. Atha kho
mettayabhummajakà bhikkhå te bhikkhu etadavocuü: “mà àvuso mettiyaü
bhikkhuniü nàsetha, na sà ki¤ci aparajjhati, amhehi sà ussàhità kupitehi
anattamanehi vàcanàdhippàyehã”ti. Kiü pana tumhe àvuso àyasmantaü
dabbaü mallaputtaü amålakena pàràjikena dhammena anuddhaüsethà’ti.
Evamàvuso’ti. Ye te bhikkhå appicchà te ujjhàyanti khãyanti vipàcenti
“kathaü hi nàma mettiyabhummajakà bhikkhå àyasmantaü dabbaü mallaputtaü
amålakena pàràjikena dhammena anuddhaüsessantã”ti. Atha kho te bhikkhå
bhagavato etamatthaü àrocesuü -pe- “saccaü kira tumhe bhikkhave dabbaü
mallaputtaü amålakena pàràjikena dhammena anuddhaü sethà”ti. “Saccaü
bhagavà”. Vigarahi buddho bhagavà -pe- “kataü hi nàma tumhe moghapurisà
dabbaü mallaputtaü amålakena pàràjikena dhammena anuddhaüsessatha. Netaü
moghapurisà appasannànaü và pasàdàya -pe- eva¤ca pana bhikkhave imaü
sikkhàpadaü uddiseyyàtha:

“Yo
pana bhikkhu bhikkhuü duññho doso appatãto amålakena pàràjikena
dhammena anuddhaüseyya appevanàma naü imamhà brahmacariyà càveyyanti.
Tato aparena samayena samanuggàhiyamàno và asamanuggàhiyamàno và
amålaka¤ceva taü adhikaraõaü hoti bhikkhu ca dosaü patiññhàti,
saïghàdiseso”ti.

15. Yo panàti yo yàdiso -pe- bhikkhåti -pe- ayaü imasmiü atthe adhippeto bhikkhåti.

Bhikkhunti a¤¤aü bhikkhåü

Duññho dosoti kupito anattamano anabhiraddho àhatacitto khilajàto.

[BJT Page 426] [\x 426/]

Appatãtoti tena ca kopena tena ca dosena tàya ca anattamanatàya tàya ca anabhiraddhiyà appatãto hoti.

Amålakaü nàma adiññhaü asutaü aparisaïkitaü.

Pàràjikena dhammenàti catunnaü a¤¤atarena.

Anuddhaüseyyàti codeti và codàpeti và.

Appevanàma
naü imamhà brahmacariyà càveyyanti [PTS Page 164] [\q 164/]
bhikkhubhàvà càveyyaü samaõadhammà càveyyaü sãlakkhandhà càveyyaü
tapoguõà càveyyaü.

Tato aparena samayenàti yasmiü khaõe anuddhaüsito hoti taü khaõaü taü layaü taü muhuttaü vãtivatte.

Samanuggàhiyamànoti yena vatthunà anuddhaüsito hoti tasmiü vatthusmiü samanuggàhiyamàno.

Asamanuggàhiyamànoti na kenaci vuccamàno.

Adhikaraõaü nàma: cattàri adhikaraõàni vivàdàdhikaraõaü anuvàdàdhikaraõaü àpattàdhikaraõaü kiccàdhikaraõaü.

Bhikkhu ca dosaü patiññhàtãti tucchakaü mayà bhaõitaü, musà mayà bhaõitaü, abhåtaü mayà bhaõitaü, ajànantena mayà bhaõitaü.

Saïghàdisesoti -pe- tenapi vuccati saïghàdisesoti.

16.
Adiññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codeti: “diññho
mayà pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi, asakyaputtiyosi, natthi
tayà saddhiü uposatho và pavàraõà và saïghakammaü và”ti, àpatti vàcàya
vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

17.
Asutassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codeti: “suto mayà
pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi, asakyaputtiyosi, natthi tayà
saddhiü uposatho và pavàraõà và saïghakammaü và”ti, àpatti vàcàya
vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

18.
Aparisaïkitassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, taü ce codeti:
“parisaïkito mayà pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi,
asakyaputtiyosi, natthi tayà saddhiü uposatho và pavàraõà và
saïghakammaü và”ti, àpatti vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

[BJT Page 428] [\x 428/]

19.
Adiññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codeti: “diññho
mayà suto ca pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi,
asakyaputtiyosi, natthi tayà saddhiü uposatho và pavàraõà và
saïghakammaü và”ti, àpatti vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

20.
Adiññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codeti: “diññho
mayà parisaïkito ca pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi,
asakyaputtiyosi, -peàpatti vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

21.
Adiññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codeti: “diññho
mayà suto ca parisaïkito ca pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi -pe- ” àpatti
vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

22.
Asutassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codeti: “suto mayà
parisaïkito ca -pe- suto mayà diññho ca -pe- suto mayà parisaïkito ca
diññho ca pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, ” -pe- àpatti vàcàya vàcàya
saïghàdisesassa.

23.
Aparisaïkitassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codeti:
“parisaïkito mayà diññho ca -peparisaïkito mayà suto ca -pe- parisaïkito
mayà diññho ca suto ca pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi -pe- àpatti
vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

24.
Diññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codeti: suto mayà
pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi -peàpatti vàcàyà vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

25.
[PTS Page 165] [\q 165/] diññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü
ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codeti: parisaïkito mayà pàràjikaü dhammaü
ajjhàpannoti -pe- ta¤ce codeti: suto mayà parisaïkito ca pàràjikaü
dhammaü ajjhàpannosi -pe- àpatti vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

26.
Sutassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codeti: parisaïkito
mayà -pe- diññho mayà -peparisaïkito mayà diññho ca pàràjikaü dhammaü
ajjhàpannosi -pe- àpatti vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

27.
Parisaïkitassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, taü ce codeti:
diññho mayà pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi -pe- suto mayà pàràjikaü
dhammaü ajjhàpannosi -pediññho mayà suto ca pàràjikà dhammaü
ajjhàpannosi -peàpatti vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

[BJT Page 430] [\x 430/]

28.
Diññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, diññhe vematiko diññhaü
no kappeti, diññhaü nassarati, diññhaü pammuññho-1 hoti, -pe- sute
vematiko sutaü no kappeti, sutaü nassarati, sutaü pammuññho hoti,
-peparisaïkite vematiko parisaïkitaü no kappeti: parisaïkitaü nassarati,
parisaïkitaü pammuññho hoti, ta¤ce codeti, parisaïkito mayà diññho ca
-pe- parisaïkito mayà suto ca -peparisaïkito mayà diññho ca suto ca
pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi, asakyaputtiyosi, natthi tayà
saddhiü uposatho và pavàraõà và saïghakammaü và”ti, àpatti vàcàya
vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

29.
Adiññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codàpeti:
“diññhosi pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi, asakyaputtiyosi,
natthi tayà saddhiü uposatho và pavàraõà và saïghakammaü và”ti, àpatti
vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

30.
Asutassa hoti paràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, -peaparisaïkitassa hoti
pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codàpeti: “parisaïkitosi,
pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi -pe- àpatti vàcàya vàcàya
saïghàdisesassa.

31.
Adiññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codàpeti:
diññhosi sutosi -pe- diññhosi parisaïkitosi -pe- diññhosi sutosi
parisaïkitosi, pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, -pe- asutassa hoti
pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codàpeti: sutosi parisaïkitosi
-pe- sutosi diññhosi -pe- sutosi parisaïkitosi diññhosi -pe-
aparisaïkitassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codàpeti:
parisaïkitosi diññhosi -pe- parisaïkitosi sutosi -pe- parisaïkitosi
diññhosi sutosi pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi, -pe- àpatti
vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

32.
Diññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, ta¤ce codàpeti: sutosi
-pe- ta¤ce codàpeti: parisaïkitosi -pe- ta¤ce codàpeti: sutosi
parisaïkitosi, pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi -pe- àpatti
vàcàya vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

33.
Sutassa hoti ‘pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpanno’ti -peparisaïkitassa hoti
pàràjikassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannoti, ta¤ce codàpeti:
diññhosi -pe- ta¤ce codàpeti: sutosi -pe- ta¤ce codàpeti: diññhosi
sutosi pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi -peàpatti vàcàya
vàcàya saïghàdisesassa.

1. Pamuñho. Machasaü

[BJT Page 432] [\x 432/]

34.
Diññhassa hoti pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpajjanto, diññhe vematiko diññhaü
no kappeti, diññhaü nassarati, diññhaü pammuññho hoti -pe- sute
vematiko sutaü no kappeti sutaü nassarati sutaü pammuññho hoti -pe-
parisaïkite vematiko parisaïkitaü no kappeti, parisaïkitaü nassarati,
parisaïkitaü pammuññho hoti, ta¤ce codàpeti: parisaïkitosi diññhosi -pe-
parisaïkitosi sutosi -pe- parisaïkitosi diññhosi sutosi pàràjikaü
dhammaü ajjhàpannosi, assamaõosi, asakyaputtiyosi, natthi tayà saddhiü
uposatho và pavàraõà và saïghakammaü càti àpatti vàcàya vàcàya
saïghàdisesassa.

35. [PTS Page 166] [\q 166/] asuddhe suddhadiññhi, suddhe asuddhadiññhi, asuddhe asuddhadiññhi, suddhe suddhadiññhi.

36.
Asuddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
suddhadiññhisamàno anokàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
saïghàdisesena dukkañassa.

37.
Asuddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
suddhadiññhisamàno okàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
saïghàdisesassa.

38.
Asuddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
suddhadiññhisamàno anokàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
omasavàdena dukkañassa.

39.
Asuddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
suddhadiññhisamàno okàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
omasavàdassa.

40.
Suddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü anajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
asuddhadiññhisamàno anokàsaü kàràpetvà vàcanàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
dukkañassa.

41.
Suddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü anajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
asuddhadiññhisamàno okàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti, anàpatti.

42.
Suddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü anajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
asuddhadiññhisamàno anokàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
omasavàdena dukkañassa.

43.
Suddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü anajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
asuddhadiññhisamàno okàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
omasavàdassa.

[BJT Page 434] [\x 434/]

44.
Asuddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü ajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
asuddhadiññhisamàno anokàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
dukkañassa -peokàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti, anàpatti
-peanokàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti omasavàdena
dukkañassa -pe- okàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
omasavàdassa.

45.
Suddho hoti puggalo a¤¤ataraü pàràjikaü dhammaü anajjhàpanno, ta¤ce
suddhadiññhisamàno anokàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti, àpatti
saïghàdisesena dukkañassa -pe- okàsaü kàràpetvà càvanàdhippàyo vadeti,
àpatti saïghàdisesassa -pe- anokàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo vadeti,
àpatti omasavàdena dukkañassa -pe- okàsaü kàràpetvà akkosàdhippàyo
vadeti, àpatti omasavàdassa.

46. Anàpatti: suddhe asuddhadiññhissa, asuddhe asuddhadiññhissa, ummattakassa, àdikammikassàti.

Pañhama duññhadosa sikkhàpadaü niññhitaü.


0  ix>dosfiaih



ta ld,fhys Nd.Hj;a nqÈrcdKka jykafia rc.y kqjr fjZMjk kuz jQ f,akqkag
wNh Èka ia:dkfhys l< jssydrfhys jev jikfial’ tiufhys jkdys u,a,
rdcmq;1 jQ onzn kuz jQQ ia:jsrhka jykafia W;am;a;sfhka i;afjks jhfiys
ry;a njg meussfha fjhs’ Y1djlfhl2 jsiska meusKsh hq;2 huz lsisjla fjzo”
ta ish,a,g Wkajykafia meusKsfha fjhs’ Wkajykafiag u;af;ys l< hq;2
fohla ke;af;a jsh’lrk ,o lD;Hhkays kej; l< hq;2 fohla ke;s jsh’


tl,ays u,a, mq;1 jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafiag ryis.; yqqol,d
jdifhka yqkakdjQ Wkajykafiaf.a isf;ys funÌ js;l!hla we;s jsh’ *4( ‘ ud
jsiska W;am;a;sfhka i;afjks jhfiys ry;a njg meusKsfha fjhs’ Y1djlfhl2
jsiska huz lsisjlg meusKsh hq;2 o” ta ish,a,g uuo meuKssfhus’ u;af;ys
l< hq;2 fohla ug ke;af;ah’ l< foh kej; /ia lsrSul2;a ke;af;ah’
lsfulao uu ix>hdg lskuz j;dj;a lrkafkushso ‘ lshdhs’ *5( tl,ays
u,a,mq;1 jQ onzn ia:jsrhka jykafiag funÌ woyila jsh’ *6( uu ix>hdg
fikiqkao mKjkafka kuz” oka kshu lsrSuo lrkafka kuz fhfylehs lshdhs’


tl,ays u,a, mq;1jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsr f;fuz ijia ld,fhys m, iuj;ska
ke.S isgsfha Nd.Hj;2ka jykafia huz ;eklo t;ekg t

[\q236 /]
j;2ka jykafiag jeË tl;amfil yqkafkah’
tl;amfil yqkakdjQ u,a, mq;1 jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafia
Nd.Hj;2ka jykafiag fufia lSy’ ” iajduSka jykai” fuys ryis.; yqol,d
jdifhka yqkakdjQ ug funÌ ys; mshdg fikiqka mekjSug;a N;a;2oafoaih lsrSug;a leue;af;us hs” lSy’”
idOq” idOq ” onznh” th b;du hym;ah” onzn” tfia jS kuz f;da ix>hdg
fikiqka mekjSuo n;a kshu lsrSuo lrj’” ” iajduSka jykai” tfiahhs”
u,a,mq;1jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsr f;fuz Nd.Hj;2ka jykafiag ms


tl,ays Nd.Hj;2ka jykafia fuz ksodkfhys fuz isoaOsfhys oeyeus l:d fldg
NsCIQkag weu;@fial’” uyfKks” tfia jSkuz ix>hd u,a, mq;1 onzn
ia:jsrhka fiakdik mkjkakyq yd oka kshu lrkakyq yegshg iuzu;
flfr;ajd’iuzu; lsrSuo fufia jsh hq;2h’ ” u,a, mq;1 onzn ia:jsrhka
mhdg oeka jsh hq;hs’” iajduSks” ix> f;fuz udf.a
jpkh wi;ajd’ ix> f;fuz ld,h meusKs l,ays u,a, mq;1 jQ wdhqIau;a onzn
ia:jsrhka fiakdik mkjkakdjQo oka kshu lrkakdjQ NssCIqj yegshg iuzu;
lrkafkah’ fuz oekajSssuhs’ ix>hd udf.a jpkh wi;ajd’ ix>f;fuz u,a,
mq;1 wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafia fiakdik mkjkakdjQ” oka kshu
lrkakdjQ NsCIqj yegshg iuzu; lrhs’ u,a, mq;1 jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka
jykafia fiakdik mkjkakdjQ o N;a;2foaih lrkakdjQ NsCIqj yegshg iuzu;
lsrSu huz wdhqIau;2ka jykafia kulg leue;s jkafka kuz ;2IakSuzN@; jsh
hq;2h’ hfula fkd leue;s jkafka kuz fyf;u m1ldY l< hq;2hs’ u,a,

[\q 237 /]
mq;1jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafia fikiqka mkjkakdjQ oka kshu lrkakdjQ


NssCIqj f,i ix>hd jsiska iuzu; lrk ,oafoa jsh’ ix>hdo Bg leue;af;ah’ ta fyhska


fuh ;2IaKSuz Ndjfhka ms


” u,a, mq;1jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafia iuzu; jQfha .2K iNd.jQ”
us;1iJ:j iNd.jQ NsCIQkag tlg fikiqka mkjhs’ iQ;1dka;sl huz NsCIQyq
fj;ao” Tjqkag tlg fikiqka mkjhs’ ta Tjqfkdjqka iQ;1dka; ix.dhkh
lrkafkahhs” lshdhs’ huznÌ jQ jskhOr NsCIQka fj;ao” Wkajykafiag tlg
fikiqka mkjhs’ta Wkajykafia,d Tjqfkdjqka jskh jsksYaph lrkafkahhs”
lshdhs’ Ou!l:sljQ huz NsCIQyq fj;a o” Wkajykafiag tlg fikiqka mkjhs’ ta
Tjqfkdjqka Ou! idlpzPd lrkafka hhs lshdhs’ huznÌjq OHdk,dNS NsCIQyq
fj;ao” Wkajykafia,dg tlg fikiqka mkjhs’ ta Tjqfkdjqka fkd fmf


tl,ays fuz ldrKh o;a;djQ we;uz NsCIqka jykafia,d u,a, mq;1 wdhqIau;a
onzn ia:jsrhkaf.a iDoaOs m1;sydhH! n,uqhhs lshd fkd l,ayso t;a’
Wkajykafia,d u,a, mq;1 wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka lrd t

[\q 238 /]
lr;a’ ” wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrfhks” wmg
.scACOl@g mrAj;fhys fikiqka mkjkq uekj” lshdhs’ ” wdhqIau;2ks” wmg fpdr
m1md;fhys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’” lshdhs’


” weje;aks” wmg bis.s,s mdrAYajfhys
lZM.,a ;,dfjys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’ ” lshdhs’ ” weje;aks” wmg fjNdr
mdrAYajfhys ima;mKAKS .2ydfjys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’” ” weje;aks” wmg iS;
jkfhys jQ imamfidKavsl mnzNdrfhys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’ “  ” weje;aks” wmg
f.d;u lkaordfhys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’” “weje;aks” wmg ;skaÈl lkaordfhys
fikiqka mkjkq uekj’” “weje;aks” wmg ;fmdo lkaordfhys fikiqka mkjkq
uekj’” ” weje;aks” wmg  ;fmdodrdufhys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’” “weje;aks”
wmg cSjluznjkfhys fikiqka mkjkq uekj’” “weje;aks” wmg uoaol2pzPs
us.odfhys fikiqka mkjkq uekjs” hs lshdhs’


u,a, mq;1 jQ wdhqIu;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafia f;fcdOd;2jg iujeo o,ajkq
,nk weZ.s,af,ka hqla;j ta NsCIqkag fmrgq fmrgqj hhs’ ta NsCIQka jkafia,d
ta wdf,dalfhkau u,a, mq;1jQ wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhkaf.a msgq miska
fh;a’ ta NsCIQka jykafia,dg u,a, mq;1 wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka jykafia
fufia fikiqka mkjhss’ fuz weËh” fuz mqgqh” fuz .2osrsh” fuz fugzgh” fuz
jeislshdf.a l;sld igykhs” ful,ays meusKsh
hq;2hs” fuz ld,fhys kslaush hq;2h lshdhs’ u,a, mq;1 wdhqIau;a onzn
ia:jsrhka jykafia ta NsCIQkag fikiqka mkjd kej; fjzZMjkdrduhg wdmiq hhs’


tiufhys jkdys fu;a;sh N2uzucl hk NsCIQka jykafia,d kjlfhdao mska
wvqjQfjdao fj;a’ huznÌjQ fkd jgskd fikiqka ix>hdg mkj;ao$ m1KS; fkdjQ

[\q 239 /]
 n;a ;n;ao” ta Tjqkag meusfK;a’ tiufhys
jkdys rc.y kqjr ukqIHfhda ia:jsr NsCIQkag kd kd iuzNdrhkaf.ka hqla;
msKavmd; oSug leu;s fj;a’ ta msKavmd;h .sf;,ska hqla;o” f;,ska hqla;o”
jH[ackj,ska hqla;o fj;a’ fu;a;sh N2uzucl NsCIQkag ldvs fydos fofjks fldg
we;s iqKq idf,a n;a m1lD;s jYfhkau fo;a’ Tjqka msKavmd;fhka jehdg ks;s
n;a i;rla fohs’ fyf;u wUqorejka iys;j mQcd i;aldr fldg ix>hd
j<Ëjhs’ iuyre n;ska jspdr;a’ we;uzyq jH[ackfhka jspdr;a’ we;uzyq
f;,ska jspdr;a’ we;uzyq lejs,sj,ska jspdr;a’


tiufhys jkdys l,HdKN;a;sl .Dym;sshdf.a f.g n; msKsi fu;a;sh N2uzucl
NsCIQkag muqKqjd oSug isÈjsh’ tl,ays l,HdKN;a;sl .Dym;s f;fuz lsishuz
lghq;a;la msKsi wdrduhg .sfhah’ fyf;u u,a, mq;1 wdhqIau;a onzn ia:jsrhka
jykafia huz ;eklo t;ekg t

[\ 240 /]
i;2gq lrjQfha  u,a, mq;1 onzn ia:jsrhkag
fufia lSh'’ iajduSka jykai” wmf.a f.or fyg n; msKsi ljfrl2g mejfrAoehs’
lSh’ ‘ .Dym;sh” f;dmf.a f.or fyg n; fu;a;sh N2uzucl ia:jsr fokug mjrk
,oafoahhs’ lSh’ tl,ays l,HdKN;a;sl .Dym;shd fkdi;2gq is;a we;af;a jsh’ ‘
flfia kuz mdm NsCIQka wmf.a f.or fyg n; j<Ëkafkaoehs ‘ lshdhs’ f.g
f.dia odishlg ksshu flf

3= 
tl,ays fu;a;sh N2uzucl NsCIQyq ” weje;aks” wmg Bfha jkdys l,HdKN;a;sl
.Dym;shdf.a n;la mjrk ,oy’ wmg fyg wUqorejka iys; l,HdKN;a;sl .Dym;shd
j<Ëjkafkah’ * tysoS ( iuyre n;ska wm mqokakyqh’ iuyre lejs

33 
tl,ays fu;a;sh N2uzucl NsCIQyq fmrjre ld,fhys weË fmdrjd mdisjqre f.k
l,HdKN;a;sl .Dym;shdf.a ksfji huz ;efklo t;ekg t

[\q 241 /]
N;a;slfhda fjuq'’ ‘ wdhH!hka jykafia,d
kspzpN;a;sl nj oksus’ tf;l2Èjqj;a uu Bfha wdhH! mq;1hd jsiska lshk ,o
mrsos ‘ fyg n;a msKsi tkakdjqkag .nvd f.hs wdik mKjd leË fofjks fldg
l2vq iyf,a n;a j<Ëjj”‘ hs kshuh ,osus’ ‘iajduSks” j<Ëkq uekjhs ‘
lSjdh’

34 
tl,ays fu;a;sh N2uzucl NsCIQkag fuz woyi jSh’ ” weje;aks” Bfha jkdys
l,HdKNla;sl .Dym;shd wdrduhg .sfhah’ u,a, mq;1 onzn ia:jsrhka

35 
tl,ays fu;a;shd kuz NsCIqKS f;dfuda fu;a;sh N2uzucl NsCIQka huz ;eklo 
t;ekg t                                                    ( a) 16

[\q 242 /]

36 
*3( ” iajduSka jykai” fuh iqÈiq fkdjkafkah’ fkd .e,fmkafkah’ iajduSks”
huz osidjla Nhska f;dro mSvdjkaf.ka f;dro” Wmo1jhkaf.ka f;dro” ta osid
f;dfud Nh iys;h” mSvd iys;h” Wmo1j iys;h’ hulska jeiSu we;sfjzo thskau
werSuo we;sfjz’ oshg .sks jeÈfkahhs is;us’ wdhH!jQ u,a, mq;1 onzn
ia:jsrhka jsiska uu ÉIs; lrk ,oafoafjushs ” lshdhs’* 4 ( wdhH!hka jykai”
tfiahhs” lshd fu;a;shd NsCIqKS f;dfuda fu;a;sh N2uzucl NsCIQkag
ms

37 
tl,ays Nd.Hj;2ka jykafia fuz ldrKfhysoS fuz isoaOsfhysoS NsCIq ix>hd
/ia lrjd wdhqIau;a jQ u,a, mq;1 onzn ia:jsrhka w;ska jspdf

38 
tl,ays Nd.Hj;2ka jykafia NsCIQkag weu;@fial’” uyfKks” tfijS kuz
fu;a;shd NsCIqKsh kijz’ *Ydikfhka my lrjz( fuh fhdojk ,o NsCIQkao
fidhjz’ *oksjz( ” Nd.Hj;2ka jykafia fufia jodrd jsydrhg msjsisfial’
tl,ays ta NsCIqka jykafia,d fu;a;shd NsCIqKsh Ydikfhka myl

[\q 243 /]
NsCIQyq NsCIQkag fufia lSjdyqh’ ”
weje;aks” fu;a;shd NsCIQKsh fkdkijz” Tz f;dfuda lsis jrola fkdl

39 
*3( tl,ays ta NsCIQyq Nd.Hj;2ka jykafiag fuz ldrKh ie< lhd
/ia lrjd NsCIQka w;ska jspddosfiaifha 8 *4(( ysia mqreIfhks” f;dms flfia kuz u,a, mq;1 onzn
ia:jsrhkag wuQ,sl jQ mdrdcsld Ou!fhka fpdokd lrkkakyqo$ ysia mqreIfhks”
fuh fkd meyeoshkaf.a meyeoSu msKsi fyda * fuys 4 mdrdcslfha 33 fPaofha
*4( fuh hk ;ek isg fhdokak’ ( uyfKks” tfiao fuz YsCIdmoh Wfoijz’

30 
“huz NsCIqjla oafjzIfhka ÉIs; jQfha fkd i;2gq jQ is;a we;af;a huz ta
NssCIqjla fjzo Tyq fuz Ydikfhka mylrkafkushs wuQ,sl mdrdcsld Ou!fhka
fpdaokd lrkafkao” Bg miq ta jsksYaph lrkq ,nkafka fyda jsksYaph fkd lrkq
,nkafka fyda ta wOslrKh wuQ,sl nj Tmamq fjz kuz ta fpdaol NsCIQyq fodia
,enssh hq;af;da jkakdy’ Tjqkag ix>dosfiai weje;ao fjz’”

3- 
‘ hfula ‘ jkdys hkq ‘ NsCIqjla ‘ hkq * fuys 3 mdrdcslfha moNdcksfha 3+4
fPo ( fuz wJ:!fhys woyia l< NsCIqjhs’ NsCIq hkq wkH NsCIQka hkqhs’ ‘
ÈIag jQfha’

[\q 244 /]
‘ ÈIs; jQfha’ hkq l2ms; jQo” fkdi;2gq
is;a we;a;djQo” iqj fkdjQo” is; ;o njg meusKshdjQo NsCIqjhs’ ‘ fkdi;2gq
jQfha’ hkq ta fldmfhkq;a” ta fodIfhkq;a” ta fkdi;2gskq;a” ta fkd
iemfhkq;a” m1S;shla fkd ,enQ ;ek;af;a fjhs’ ‘ wuQ,l ‘ hkq fkdokakd
,oaodjQo” fkd wik ,oaodjQo” iel fkdlrk ,oaodjQo hkqhs’ ‘ mdrdcsld
Ou!hlska ‘ hkq i;r mdrdcsldjkaf.ka tla;rd  tllska hkqhs’ ‘ hgm;a
lrkafkah’ hkq fpdokd lrhs fyda fpdokd lrjhs fyda hkqhs’ ‘ Tyq fuz
Ydikfhka neyer lrkafkuz kuz hym;s’ hkq NsCIq Ndjfhka f;dr lrkafkus” Y1uK
Ou!fhka YS,ialFOfhka f;dr lrkafkus” ;fmd .2Kfhka f;dr lrkafkus hkqhs'’
Bg uE; ld,hl’ hkq huz CIKfhlays fpdokd lrk ,oafoa kuz ta CIKh ta wjia:dj
ta fudfyd; blau .sh l,ays hkqhs'’ jspdrkq ,nkafka fyda’ hkq huz
jia;2jlska fpdokd flf


wOslrK ‘*kvq( kuz jsjdodOslrK+jdo kvq” wkqjdodOslrK+fodIdfrdamk kvq ”
wdm;a;HdOslrK+weje;a kvq” lspzpdOslrK+ ix> lu! kvq’ hk i;r
wOslrKfhdah’ ‘NsCIqj fodIh msdosfiai ‘ hkq * fuys 3 ix>dosfiaifha -
*4(( thska ix>dosfiaih lshk ,oS’

4= 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusfha fkd olafka fjzo fyf;u fpdokd lrdo ud jsiska
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKshd oelaflushs lshd fpdokd flfrAo *4( wY1uKfhla
jQfhysh” widlH mq;1fhla jQfhysh” ;d iuZ. fmfydh lu! lsrSu fyda mjdrKh
lsrSu fyda ix> lu! lsrSu fyda ke;hs *5( lshd kuz jpkhla jpkhla mdid 
ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz’

43 
mdrdcssld Ou!hg meusKfhahhs fkd wik ,o mqoa.,hd jsiska mdrdcsld Ou!hg
meusKsfhahhs lshdo * fuys 4= *4(( fpdokd lrkafka kuz jpkhla jpkhla mdid
ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz’

[\q 245 /]

44 
iel fkdlrkakyqgo mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha hhs fpdaokd flfrAo mdrdcsld
Ou!hg meusKsfha hhss ud jsiska iel lrk ,oafoa * fuys 4= *4(( lshdo
jpkhla jpkhla mdid ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz’

45 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusfKkafka kuqÈ Tyq jsiska fkd olakd ,oafoa fjzo” Tyq
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs fpdaokd flfrAo” udjsiska olakd ,oafoahhso”
wik ,oafoahhso” fpdaokd flfrAo * fuys 4= *4(( lshdhs Tyqg jpkhla jpkhla
mdid ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz’

46 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs fpdolhd fkdolakd ,oafoa fjhs’ Tyqo ud
jsiska olakd ,os’ iel lrk ,oS’  mdrdcsld  Ou!hg meusKsfha fjysh’* fuys
4= *4(( jpkhla jpkhla mdid ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz’

47 
*3( huz mqoa.,fhla mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusfKk ,o nj fkd olakd ,oafoao *4 (
Tyq mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhafjysh’ ud jsiska olakd,oS” wik,oShhso” iel
lrk,oShhso” fpdaokd flfrAo” * fuys 4= *4( *5(( jpkhla jpkhla mdid
ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz *6(

48 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs lshd fkd weiQ mqoa.,hdgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo
uu weiqfjus” iel flf

49 
* fuys 47 *3(( ud jsiska mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs uu weiSus ” uu iel
flfdosfiai
weje;a fjz’

40 
* fuys 47 *3(( iel fkd lrk ,oaoyqg mdrdcsld meusKsfhah lshd woyila
fjhss’Tyqo uu iel flf

4-  * fuys 47 *3( uu iel flf

[\q 246 /]

5=  * fuys 47 *3(( uu iel lrus” oelaflus weiqfjus’ mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs fpdaokd lrhs’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

53 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs olakd ,oaoyqgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo mdrdcsld
Ou!hg meusKsfhysh’ uu wiqfjushs fpdaokd lrhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

54 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs olakd ,oaoyqgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo fpdaokd
lrhs’ mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs uu iel lrushs lshdhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy
47 *5((

55  mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs uu weiqfjus’ uu iel lrushs lshd fpdaokd lrhs’ *fuys 4= *4( iy 47*5((

56  *3( mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs wik ,oaoyqgo woyila fjhs’ *4( Tyqo iel lrk ,oafoa fpdaokd lrhs’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

57  * fuys 56 *3(( ud jsiska olakd ,oafoa lshdo * fuys 4= *4( iy 47*5((

58  mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha uu oelaflushs fpdaokd lrhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

59 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs iel lrkakyqgo woyila fjhs’Tyqo mdrdcsld
Ou!hg meusKsfha fjyshhs uu oelaflaushs fpdaokd lrhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy 47
*5((

50 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs iel lrkakyqgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo mdrdcsld
Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs uu oelaflushs fpdaokd lrhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

5-  mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs uu weiqfjushss fpdaokd lrhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

6=  mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKfha uu oelaflushs fpdaokd lrhs’ *fuys 4= *4(iy48 *5((

63 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha olakd ,oaoyqgo woyila fjhs’ oelSfuz jsu;shla
we;sjQfha oelSu fkd woyhs’ oelSu isys fkd lrhs’ oelSfuys uq,d fjhs’ *
fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

[\q 247 /]

64 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs wik ,oaoyqg weiSfuys jsu;shla fjhs’weiSu
fkd woyhs’ weiSu isys fkdlrhs’ weiSfuys uq,dfjhs’* fuys 4= *4( iy 47
*5((

65 
*3( mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs iel lsrSfuys jsu;shla fjhs’iel lsrSu
fkd woyhs’ iel isys fkdlrhs’ ielfhys uq,dfjhs’*4( Tyqo uu iel
flf

66  * fuys 65 *3( ( Tyqo uu iel flf

67  * fuys 65 *3( ( uu mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha hhs iel flf

68 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha fkdolakd ,oaoyqg woyila fjhs’*4( Tyqo mdrdcsld
Ou!hg meusKsfha fjz hhs fpdaokd lrhs’ * 5( * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

69  mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs fkd wik ,oaoyqgo woyila fjhs’ * fuys 68 *4( * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

60 
mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs iel ke;a;yqgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo mdrdcsld
Ou!hg meusKsfha fjz hhs fpdaokd lrhs’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

6- 
*3( mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha fkd oelalyqgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo fpdaokd
lrhs’ *4( oelaflysh weiqfjysh lshd fpdaokd lrhs’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47
*5((

7=  * fuys 6- *3(( oelaflysh iel flf

73  * fuys 6- *3(( oelaflysh weiqfjysh iel flf

74 
*3( mdrdcsl Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs fkd weiQjyqgo woyila fjhs’ Tyqo fpdaokd
lrhs’ *4( weiqfjysh iel flf

75  * fuys 74 *3((weiqfjysh” oelaflysh’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

[\q 248 /]
 

76  * fuys 74 *3(( weiqfjysh” iel flf

77 
*3( mdrdcsl Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs iel fkd l

78  * fuys 74 *3(( iel flf

79  mdrdcsl Ou!hg meusKsfhysh” th iel flf

70  *3( mdrdcsl Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs oelalyqgo woyila fjhs’*4( Tyqo fpdaokd lrhs’weiqfjysh * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

7- 
* fuys 70 *3(( Tyqo fpdaokd lrhs’ iel flfdosfiai weje;a fjz’

8=  *3( mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs weiqjyqgo woyila fjhs Tyqo fpdaokd lrhs’ *fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

83 mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfhahhs iel l

84   * fuys 83 *3(( wik ,oafoysh * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

85   mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha olakd ,oafoahhs fpdaokd lrhs’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

86
*3( mdrdcsld Ou!hg meusKsfha oelalyqgo woyila fjhs’ *4( oelSfuys
jsu;shla fjhs’ oelSu fkd woyhs’ oelSu isys fkdlrhs’ oelSfuys uq,d fjhs’*
fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

87  * fuys 86 *3(( weiSfuys jsu;shla fjhs’ weiSfuys fkd woyhs’ weiSu isys fkdlrhs’weiSfuys uq,d fjhs’ * fuys 4= *4( iy 47 *5((

[\q 249 /]

88 
* fuys 86 *3(( ielfhys jsu;shla fjhs’ ielh fkd woyhs’ ielh isys
fkdlrhs’ ielfhys uq,d fjhs’ Tyqo fpdaokd lrhs’iel flf

89   * fuys 87 fPaoh ‘ ielh ‘ fjkqjg ‘ iel flf

80  * fuys 88 fPaoh ‘ ielh” ‘ fjkqjg ‘ iel flf

8- 
wY2oaOsfhys Y2oaO oelSuo” Y2oaOsfhys wY2oaO oelSuo” wY2oaOsfhys wY2oaO
oelSuo” Y2oaOsfhys Y2oaO oelSuo hkq i;rla fjhs’ tla;rd mdrdcsldjlg
meusKs mqoa.,hd wY2oaO fjhs’ Tyqo Y2oaO oDIags we;af;a wkjldY fldg woyia
mrsos jpk lshhs’ ix>dosfiaifhka Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

9= 
tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg meusKs mqoa., f;fuz wY2oaO fjhs’ Tyqo Y2oaO jQ
oDIags we;af;a wjldY lrjd woyia mrsos jpk lshhs’ ix>dosfiai weje;a
fjz’

93 
tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg meusKs mqoa.,hd wY2oaO fjhs’ Tyqo Y2oaO oDIags
we;af;a wjldY fkd fldg wdfl1dY woyia we;af;a jpk lshhs’ uqid jdofhys
Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

94 
mqoa., f;u tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg meusKsfha wY2oaO fjhs’Tyqo Y2oaO
oDIags we;af;a wjldY lrjd wdfl1dY woyiska jpk lshhs’ ta wdfl1dYfhka
weje;a fjz’

95 
mqoa.,hd tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg fkd meusKsfha Y2oaO fjhs’ Tyqo wY2oaO
oDIags we;af;a wjldY fkdfldg woyia mrsos jpk lshdo’ Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

96
mqoa., f;u tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg fkd meusK Y2oaO fjhs’ Tyqo
woDIagsfhka hqla; jQfha wjldY lrjd woyia mrsos jpk lshhs’ weje;a 
ke;af;ah’

[\q 250 /]

97 
mqoa., f;u tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg fkd meusKsfha Y2oaO fjhs’ Tyqo
wY2oaOjQ oDIags we;af;a wjldY fkd fldg wdfl1daY lsrSfuz woyiska jpk
lshhs’ uqidjdofhka Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

98
mqoa.,hd tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg  fkd meusKsfha Y2oaO fjhs’Tyqo wY2oaOjQ
oDIags we;af;a wjldY lrjd wdfl1dY lsrSfuz woyiska jpk lshhs’
wdfl1dYfhka weje;a fjz’

 99 
*3( mqoa.,hd tla;rd mdrdcsldjlg meusK wY2oaO fjhs’Tyqo oDIags we;af;a
*4( wjldY fkd fldg woyia mrsos jpk lshhs’ Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

90   * fuys 99 *3(( wjldY lrjd woyia mrsos jpk lshd kuz weje;a fkdfjz’

9-  * fuys 99 *3(( wfkdldY fldg wdfl1dYdOsm1dfhka * kmqre jpk lshd nekSfuz woyiska ( jpk lshd kuz wdfl1dYfhka Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

0=  * fuys 99 *3(( wjldY fldg wdfl1dY woyiska jpk lshd kuz Tzuijdo weje;a fjz’

03 
*3( mqoa.,hd tla;rd mdrdcsld Ou!hlg  fkd meusKsfha Y2oaO fjhs’Tyqo
Y2oaOjQ oDIags we;af;a *4( wjldY fkd fldg woyia l< jpk lshdo
ix>dosfiaifhka Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

04  * fuys 03 *3(( wjldY lrjd woyia mrsos jpk lshdo ix>dosfiai weje;a fjz’

05  * fuys 03 *3(( wjldY fkdfldg wdfl1dY woyiska jpk lshdo ta wdfl1dYfhka Èl2,d weje;a fjz’

06  * fuys 03 *3(( wjldY fldg wdfl1dY lsrSfuz woyiska jpk lshdo ta wdfl1dYfhka weje;a fjz’

07  wY2oaOs oDIags we;s Y2oaO mqoa.,hdgo” wY2oaO oDIags we;s wY2oaO mqoa.,hdgo” Wuzu;a;lhdgo” wdoslrAuslhdgo weje;a fkdfjz’ *   0   wuQ,l ix>dosfiaih ksusfhah’ (


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